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the future? 
 
The thesis is a profession study, mainly combining perspectives and theories in the 
fields of journalism and crisis psychology. It is a study of a professional group on a pro- 
fessional assignment in an extreme situation as eye witnesses of a disaster. An im- 
portant part of the knowledge base rests on previous research on accidents and 
disasters, in particular, on responders' reactions working in their field of disasters. 
 
The investigation was carried out as a case study of the Gothenburg fire based on 
literature studies, content analysis and interviews. Morning and evening press 
reporters and photographers were interviewed about their experiences of the site as a 
workplace, crisis reactions and coping strategies, as well as the decisions and 
actions on which the reporting rested. In addition, the editors at the newspapers 
concerned were interviewed  about  the  editorial management during and  after 
the disaster. Issues regarding support and recovery were also discussed along 
with individual and organisational learning. 
 
The study has generated a number of models of trauma journalism, one of which 
suggests four different journalist roles at accident sites, based on aspects of    
emotional and problemsolving copying and the conflict between being a journalist and 
a fellow human being. Another model presented is a synthesis of the analytical 
model of the thesis and a competency research model. A new type of competence, 
specific to the professional assignment, is suggested: coping competence. 
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AUTHORS PREFACE  
Ten years after the publication of my doctoral thesis (monograph) in Swedish, 
my present employer, Karlstad University, offered to fund the translation into 
English of the thesis, titled "The Eye of the Disaster: A Study of Journalists’   
Work at Accident Scenes and Disaster Sites", which was publicly de-
fended at the Department of Journalism, Media and Communication at 
Gothenburg University in the autumn of 2008. Shortly after, it was pub-
lished in book form.  
In the past decade, the book has been widely used in undergraduate jour-
nalism programs and professional development initiatives, as well as by all 
actors at a disaster site: the police, responders, paramedics and crisis teams. In 
addition, it has been used for training purposes in public service agencies re-
sponsible for civil contingencies and crisis management at national, regional 
and local levels.   
The international academic community, on the other hand, has not had the 
opportunity to respond to the findings since the thesis was written in Swedish. 
The present version in English is aimed to increase access to the material for 
non-Swedish-speaking researchers and professional journalists.  
The investigation is based on a horrific event – a fire disaster in Gothen-
burg, Sweden, in which 63 children and young adults lost their lives and 200 
were injured while attending a private party.  The casualties were aged 12-25. 
The progress of the fire was explosive and emergency exits were blocked or 
hard to find. Reporters and  photographers were quickly on site, and several 
became professional witnesses to the traumatic event.  The subsequent media 
reporting raised questions about journalists' work conditions and the terms of 
journalism in the context of disastrous events. How is reporting affected when 
the journalists are directly afflicted and struggling to cope with their own acute 
stress reactions? How does the accident site appear as a workplace for the un-
prepared journalist under extreme stress? What coping strategies do the re-
porters use to complete their mission? And what can we learn from this type 
of experience for the future?    
Initially, the study was a research project commissioned by the Swedish 
National Board of Psychological Defence (BPD).  Later, the thesis project 
was further supported by the main funders Ann-Marie and Gustaf Ander's 
Foundation for Media Research, the Wahlgrenska Foundation,  the Med-
ical Research Council, and others.  
A reasonable question to ask is whether the results of the study are 
still reliable ten years later.  The answer is that the issues treated – work 
conditions, stress reactions, coping strategies, learning processes – are 
still relevant. One difference to consider, however, is the present media 
logic with multi-channel publication, increased live broadcasts, contin-
uous web publishing and deadlines, and new technologies affecting 
journalists' procedures and citizens' use of the media, not least the dra-
matic increase of social media. When similar disasters take place today, 
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such factors affect professional procedures and publishing as well as the 
entire communication system. The type of experiences that more recent 
studies have shown to be relevant and sustainable over time are individ-
ual perceptions of the professional mission, encounters with the af-
flicted and responders, their own stress reactions, interaction with col-
leagues and other actors, the need of psychosocial support, as well as 
learning and feedback.  
Since 2008, research on psychosocial interventions after potentially 
traumatic events has been a rapidly growing field. In the study of the 
Gothenburg fire the journalists discuss their expectations of immediate 
debriefing on completion of the assignment.  At present, however, psy-
cho-trauma research suggests that the intervention principles that 
should be used to guide and inform intervention and prevention efforts 
are promoting: a sense of safety, calming, a sense of self- and commu-
nity efficacy, connectedness and hope. 
Hopefully, the book will contribute to enhancing research in the field 
and provide further training for journalists and other crisis actors on 
work conditions in the context of accidents and disasters. A vision of a 
more competent media coverage is also presented for normative pur-
poses, not to mention the need of better psychological preparedness for 
those who volunteer or are sent on similar assignments.  
In the Swedish version, many people are mentioned in the acknowl-
edgement section, but I gratefully and warmly especially mention again 
my supervisors Bengt Johansson and Kent Asp, professors of journalism 
at Gothenburg University. For this English version of the thesis I would in 
particular like to thank Per-Olof Michel, associate professor of disaster 
psychiatry, who helped to ensure that the terminology used in the area of 
psycho trauma is correct, and Elisabeth Wennö, who translated the whole 
thesis into English.  
Last but not least, I am indebted to the journalists, photographers and 
editors who through their personal and moving stories and generous shar-
ing of reflections on covering disasters have contributed to lessons learned 
after the tragic fire in 1998.   
 
 
 
By Kyrkby and Karlstad, Sweden, 
2018  
 
Liselotte Englund 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Suddenly, they are there, in the midst of an unimaginable chaos, barely 
conscious of how they got there, and even less certain of what has hap-
pened. The duty of the journalist in the event of unexpected and serious 
accidents and disasters is to be on site quickly, assess the situation imme-
diately, and start reporting. The time pressure and the assessment and in-
terpretation of the situation constitute three important and aggravating fac-
tors in disaster journalism. What is more, a usually totally unprepared per-
son arrives at an extreme scene: A reporter or a photographer has dashed 
off on an uninformative emergency call, as in the case of the Gothenburg 
fire in Sweden 1998: "There's a fire at Backaplan”, a message which can 
mean anything from a fire in a store-room, not involving human suffering 
or gigantic trauma, to a major catastrophe. What is it like to be the witness 
of an accident with many victims?  
Among others arriving at the accident site, there is a human being, who 
is also a reporter, young or old, experienced or a novice, more or less vul-
nerable, better or worse equipped to encounter the unimaginable event. On 
Friday 30 October 1998, like many other Swedes, I nearly choked on my 
morning coffee. The event reported was as inconceivable as the radio an-
nouncement that the Swedish prime minister Olof Palme had been shot. 
The time was 07:30 and I had just turned on the Swedish Television Chan-
nel 1 (SVT1) news reporting that there was a fire at a private Halloween 
party near the city district Backaplan in Gothenburg, Sweden.  Tens of 
people were dead, and many injured. There was a great deal of uncertainty. 
Perhaps there were many more victims... and how could this have hap-
pened?  
The rest of the day was devoted to TV watching (SVT 1 and 2 and 
Channel 4) and radio listening (Swedish Radio National Channel P1 pri-
marily, since I was in Lund in the south of Sweden, and there was no cov-
erage of other local stations than the regional one at that time). The listen-
ing and watching took place in a mix that turned out to generate interesting 
thoughts, lessons and research issues, which I would like to illustrate with 
the following summary impressions from the morning in question.  
From Teletext I switch over to SVT 2 where a programme about econ-
omy was broadcast as usual and the SVT Morning news (Rapport Morgon) 
discussed the truth commission's report in South Africa with experts. Then 
followed a documentary on Arabic women and guests in the studio as be-
fore. For about 45 minutes of the morning broadcasting only regular pre-
scheduled  segments were on the air. The host was neutral or easy-going 
and I did not sense that anything tragic had befallen Sweden. This is an 
illustration of the time it takes to understand something, or, possibly, of 
media inertia. Then a short sequence of pictures was shown from the acci-
dent site, displaying, in my opinion, too many opportunities for identifying 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Suddenly, they are there, in the midst of an unimaginable chaos, 
barely conscious of how they got there, and even less certain of what 
has happened. The duty of the journalist in the event of unexpected 
and serious accidents and disasters is to be on site quickly, assess 
the situation immediately, and start reporting. The time pressure 
and the assessment and interpretation of the situation constitute 
three important and aggravating factors in disaster journalism. 
What is more, a usually totally unprepared person arrives at an ex-
treme scene: A reporter or a photographer has dashed off on an un-
informative emergency call, as in the case of the Gothenburg fire in 
Sweden 1998: ”There's a fire at Backaplan”, a message which can 
mean anything from a fire in a store-room, not involving human 
suffering or gigantic trauma, to a major catastrophe. What is it like 
to be the witness of an accident with many victims?  
Among others arriving at the accident site, there is a human be-
ing, who is also a reporter, young or old, experienced or a novice, 
more or less vulnerable, better or worse equipped to encounter the 
unimaginable event. On Friday 30 October 1998, like many other 
Swedes, I nearly choked on my morning coffee. The event reported 
was as inconceivable as the radio announcement that the Swedish 
prime minister Olof Palme had been shot. The time was 07:30 and 
I had just turned on the Swedish Television Channel 1 (SVT1) news 
reporting that there was a fire at a private Halloween party near the 
city district Backaplan in Gothenburg, Sweden.  Tens of people were 
dead, and many injured. There was a great deal of uncertainty. Per-
haps there were many more victims... and how could this have hap-
pened?  
The rest of the day was devoted to TV watching (SVT 1 and 2 and 
Channel 4) and radio listening (Swedish Radio National Channel 
P1 primarily, since I was in Lund in the south of Sweden, and there 
was no coverage of other local stations than the regional one at that 
time). The listening and watching took place in a mix that turned 
out to generate interesting thoughts, lessons and research issues, 
which I would like to illustrate with the following summary impres-
sions from the morning in question.  
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From Teletext I switch over to SVT 2 where a programme about 
economy was broadcast as usual and the SVT Morning news (Rap-
port Morgon) discussed the truth commission's report in South Af-
rica with experts. Then followed a documentary on Arabic women 
and guests in the studio as before. For about 45 minutes of the 
morning broadcasting only regular prescheduled  segments were on 
the air. The host was neutral or easy-going and I did not sense that 
anything tragic had befallen Sweden. This is an illustration of the 
time it takes to understand something, or, possibly, of media iner-
tia. Then a short sequence of pictures was shown from the accident 
site, displaying, in my opinion, too many opportunities for identify-
ing the afflicted. The next program was the Sports News with a 
happy-go-lucky host who maintained the customary cheeriness in 
an for me, at that moment unbearable and distantanced way. A re-
flection could be that on a day like this all news should be coloured 
by the tragic event, in tone and content. 
The regular guide for Radio P1 was abandoned. Apparently they 
were lucky, since the studio was doubled staffed because they were 
testing a new morning schedule. One could notice low-keyed, af-
fected reporters, but also interviews with people in distress going 
too far. A young boy in particular was conspicuously off balance. A 
priest in the studio said that he was overwhelmed: ”How should I 
approach those who need me?  
The morning show on Channel 4 had invited guests to comment 
on the tragic event. A dizzy young boy said: ”I don't even know if my 
relative is dead”.  At 08:20, there was a commercial with ”The hits 
songs we like to hear again”, discordantly jarring with the situation, 
begging the question: Is there a backup plan to avoid inappropriate 
commercials in these sitations? In a later news segment, the task 
force commander of the rescue services said that ”you can never 
prepare”, and a reflection could be that if the rescue professionals 
cannot prepare, how can reporters and photographers be expected 
to?  But the degree of preparedness can always be improved. At 
10:20, Channel 4, interrupted the coverage of the fire with a pro-
gramme on hunting. Admittedly, they had devoted the large part of 
the morning to the fire disaster.  
Not until 09:40 did I notice that Channel 1 Morning News (Rap-
port Morgon) had adjusted the tone and content to the situation in 
Gothenburg. Shortly before ten o'clock, the host said ”The incident 
has coloured Rapport Morgon /.../ we'll naturally report more...”.  
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I did not share the opinion that the Swedish National Television - 
SVT morning was coloured by the event. Some would argue that the 
TV coverage in the first hours after the fire had striking similarities 
with the coverage the TV morning after the Estonia ferry disaster in 
1994. In the report Estonia in the News from the Swedish National 
Board of Psychological Defence (SPF), it is described how Channel 
2's morning programme (Go'morron Sverige) showed their regu-
lar segments between the news broadcasts on the morning after the 
ferry tragedy, while the morning programme on Channel 4  (Ny-
hetsmorgon) was completely devoted to the Estonia disaster. Stu-
dio interviews alternated with news broadcasts.   
Radio P1 adjusted the content to the Gothenburg fire until 11 
o'clock when the programme The Job (Jobbet) was broadcasted as 
planned with ”school” as the theme of the day. The programme Res-
pite (Andrum) was somewhat delayed but felt conducive to the sit-
uation with a quiet piano and ”young” meditative electric guitars 
that ”grew”, transitioning into a choir, singing ”let the night be fol-
lowed by day”. This was followed by a crescendo of trumpet, electric 
guitar and organ music ending in the quiet piano of the beginning. 
From earth to earth, ashes to ashes. Birth, life and death. The pre-
recorded Respite programme had in fact been withdrawn and re-
placed by this programme, more adapted to the nightly tragedy.  
Radio P1 replaced the show For pleasure (För nöjes skull) with 
an extraordinary broadcast of the programme Studio 1 where the 
guest was Stig Jonsson, a priest known for his efforts in connection 
with a terrible coach accident in Norway involving young Swedish 
school children in 1988. In response to the question of how to treat 
people who have had a similar, appalling experience, he said that 
”grief needs attention /.../ listen, but don't give complete answers”. 
The host informed us that listeners had called to say, ”there's too 
much talking right now.” And Stig Jonsson added: ”Yes, we need 
silence and music”. Later in the programme there were live report-
ing from the local Hammarkullen's church, where a reporter noted 
that ”this affects us all”. It sounded as if he had a lump in his throat. 
He also said, ”...people want to be alone, and at the same time 
there's a great need of talking”.  
In Radio P1, the Noon News, there was, a later much discussed 
(praised and criticised), segment: a news reporter delivered a per-
sonal and touching report from inside the fire-ravaged premises. A 
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slow walk among burnt shoes, other personal belongings, too nar-
row portholes, soot and ashes and anxiety-evoking sights. At the 
time, it was hard to decide if it was very good or atrocious. Some-
times that line might be thin. Maybe it was the event rather than the 
description of it that was atrocious.  
The same day, at 13.30 hr´s, in another channel, Radio Megapol, 
there was a happy ignorance of a halloween party ending in a trag-
edy as well as the remarkable excited host inviting listeners to call 
in and compete for tickets to ”the great halloween party”, which 
”will be a blast”.  
That day was good starting-point for disaster journalism studies. 
One question that arose was why do things turn out as they do in 
the media on a day like this? How can unbearable events be de-
picted in a bearable way? What is it like to report from an accident 
site?  What stress and crisis reactions affect reporters and photog-
raphers who are sent to an accident site and an inconceivably trau-
matic disaster with short notice and without preparation?  It is the 
two last questions in particular that form the basis of the following 
pages.  
 
Professional eyewitnesses  
Accident and disaster journalism as a field of study poses many 
questions.  What specific demands are placed on the journalist in 
these very vulnerable and stressful situations? What is a profes-
sional approach in such a  context? To what extent do journalists 
under great mental pressure experience that the professional role 
and human empathy are in conflict? If their actions are taken under 
the influence of a trauma, what consequences will this have on the 
decisions and actions that govern journalist and media reporting of 
an accident?   
Journalists, like other actors at the accident site, are in a state of 
emergency – physically, psychologically and in terms of time. The 
assignment to report on such an extreme situation will entail devi-
ations from certain journalistic norms.  The American journalist, 
Jeff Alan, describes in his book on journalism practice, Responsible 
Journalism1, how he, as a young and inexperienced, newly gradu-
ated high school student, was at the Ambassador Hotel in Los An-
geles on the historic evening in June1968. Robert Kennedy had just 
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won a senator election.  Alan was there to report for two radio sta-
tions when Robert Kennedy was shot a few steps away from him. At 
least that is what Alan experienced there and then.  The Senator lay 
bloody on the floor, and people were screaming. ”With the tape re-
corder I started reporting,” Jeff Alan writes.2 
Kennedy has been shot – they think Kennedy has been shot. Robert Kennedy has 
been shot in this room off to the side of the hall. I was near the senator; we heard 
what appeared to be gun shots from inside his room. It ́s mass chaos. You heard it 
as it happened.  
[Ethel Kennedy screams, 'Let a doctor get to him'] We don ́t know what has hap-
pened, it ́s mass chaos. Someone else has been shot in the forehead, and she is 
bleeding badly. Yet another person was shot near Kennedy. It was mass chaos here; 
we did hear gunshots from the hallway and there are people running everywhere. 
Jeff Alan was not sure about what he had seen. He reported what 
he knew, which was not a lot. ”My emotions got in the way; my re-
porting was fragmented and disjointed”, he writes. He further de-
scribes experiencing how people were ”covered in blood” and how 
he first thought that everybody had been shot. Later it turned out 
that many had been cut by shattered champagne glasses. ”I as-
sumed that Kennedy had been shot, but didn't know,” writes Jeff 
Alan. When Alan was running towards the media telephone desk, 
he was unaware that he was the first to report on the incident.  
”With a phone in each hand I went on air live on two stations at once. /.../ Even 
though it turned out that Kennedy had indeed been hit, I had no way of knowing at 
the time. My overzealous reporting could have been inaccurate and irresponsible. 
Jeff Alan's reporting of the night with Kennedy could have been 
the description of nearly any other accident or disaster.  His experi-
ence clearly shows that reporting from an unexpected and shocking 
event is a challenge. When, as in Jeff Alan's case, the reporting is 
live there are special demands on journalism and the journalist. The 
reporter is left to his/her own judgement when no editoral deliber-
ations and clear instructions are available.  
The American airway company PAN AM crash in Lockerbie, 
some days before Christmas Eve in 1988, was a shock to many re-
porters on the site. An American research team lead by Joan Deppa, 
professor of journalism, studied the event, which was marked by 
mass chaos and a high degree of uncertainty3. The newly retired 
Fran Ryan, reporter at the Daily Record in Glasgow, had just re-
turned from a shopping-trip to Lockerbie when he heard about the 
plane crash. Ryan raced his car back to Lockerbie, where he was 
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faced with utter chaos and an enormous crater in flames. Suddenly 
he was on duty again:  
Nothing in his long career could have prepared him for this or any of the many sights 
he would see in the hours ahead. It was as if he had arrived in the middle of a war 
zone. 4 
Now and then people refer to the journalist ”John Wayne com-
plex”.5 Some suggest that the journalist tradition demands that 
”journalists can take it and not show it,” as William Cote, professor 
of journalism, and Roger Simpson put it in the book Covering Vio-
lence.6 
This view of the journalist Superman, is contradicted by the fact 
that many reporters and photographer who are exposed to severe 
trauma actually develop the kind of crisis reactions that should be 
considered to be indirectly affected by an event. Journalists are like 
any other individual: they cannot rid themselves of human reac-
tions and their effects.  
 
Frontline witnesses  
The journalists who are in the eye of the disaster – at the war front, at 
the accident site or in an earthquake area may appear as Wild West 
heroes, unbreakable John Wayne types with bulletproof vests and 
steely eyes.  The Norwegian journalist Åsne Seierstad's reporting from 
Kabul in 2002–2003 is an example of this kind of journalism.7 In an 
interview in the journal The Journalist (Journalisten) she says, ”…the 
most important thing is to be an eyewitness.” 8 Seierstad has made it 
clear to the editors that she wanted to write about her own experiences 
in the place before she went to Bagdad. In another article she says, ”as 
a war correspondent you armour yourself mentally and learn to handle 
things in a strictly professional way.9” She further points out that it can 
be worse for a person to be an unsuspected witness to a car accident 
than reporting from a war for a longer period.  This argument explains 
one of several differences between the conditions of war reporting and 
disaster reporting.  
Swedish Radio's Sofie Ribbing is another example of a frontline wit-
ness, who was sent to a war zone with much less preparation than 
Seierstad had. For many years, Ribbing was an empathising and com-
mitted voice in Radio P1's Studio 1. She was hastily sent on the honor-
able and meritorious mission to cover Bosnien Serbs' progress and the 
 23 
 
horrendeous event at Srebrenica. She was sent there with a plane ticket, 
a telephone number in Sarajevo, a bulletproof vest, a helmet and ruck-
sack; but without the most important things: A clear assignment and 
support back up.  
Back in Sweden, she was showered with praise and distinctions. She 
was said to have introduced an unusual and innovative journalism, But 
there was a downside this time too.  
Sofie's story is a different story. It centres on what she did not say when she returned 
to Sweden in triumph, but suppressed when she was praised and receiving awards. 
It surfaced later when production demands increased in the downsizing radio world 
and she was a mother and wanted to prove that she could cope with that too. After 
two miscarriages the burnout syndrome was a fact. Then the questions came: One 
journalist more or less ¬– does it matter? What is the life and health of a journalist 
worth? Where should the line be drawn between a reasonable effort at work and who 
draws it?  
This, and similar stories are recounted in the book What is a human 
being in the media, by Lisbeth Gustafsson10, and there are more ac-
counts than expected and not only of war but of major accidents, dis-
asters, and political rebellions that have affected and marked the jour-
nalist as a human being. 
An award-winning press photographer describes a photo he took on 
the Tianamnen Square in Bejing in 1998.  Near him is a student sup-
porting an injured and bleeding friend. One arm supports the friend's 
head and the other is in the air while he breaks out in a roar. The pho-
tographer is haunted by his recollections:  
”It's one of my best photos”, he says. ”But it's also a memory that has haunted me 
for a long time. One of all the events I have talked about, again and again. It's vital 
to get it off your chest.”11  
One of the worst international examples of the consequences of vic-
tim journalism to frontline witnesses took place in Africa. The situation 
was described in the Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter – in the 
historical attachment Photos from a decade.12 The headline reads: 
”Two victims and one vulture, or two vultures and one victim?” On a 
field in South Sudan lies an emaciated girl. Behind her there is a hungry 
vulture. The award-winning war photographer   Kevin Carter aims his 
camera and takes a photo. Then he shoos the vulture away.  
His role was clear; firstly a photographer and not a relief worker. Carter's picture 
was spread around the world and turned into an epitome of the affliction in Africa. 
Several humanitarian organisations have used it to raise money to their relief oper-
ations. But the cruel picture also resulted in a press ethical debate. Who was the real 
vulture? This is the eternal dilemma of the war photographer. The question of the 
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girl's destiny preyed on Carter. When a friend put the question that he was con-
stantly asked, about what else he did to help the girl, he answered despairingly: 
”Nothing, there were thousands of them.” If the girl reached a relief station is not 
known. For the photographer who was increasingly marked by the suffering he had 
witnessed on the job as. a war photographer, there was no relief station. The photo 
was awarded the prestigious Pulitzerpris in 1994.  Kevin Carter had his international 
break-through. Two months later he committed suicide.13   
No one can assess the cause and effect in this story, but journalists 
and others were shaken by it. And the press ethical debate continued. 
In Sweden too, there are several examples of award-winning pic-
tures of victims. Sometimes the photo begs the question: What did you 
do as a photographer?  
 
Accident reporting as a journalistic genre 
In all times accidents and disasters have evoked public and media 
interest. Already the newspapers at the beginning of the 16th cen-
tury contained this kind of news. Criminality and wars have always 
had a high degree of news value.14  
In a column in the Norwegian tabloid VG, Verdens Gang, a coun-
terpart of the Swedish Aftonbladet, the media researcher Martin 
Eide writes,”Like other tabloids VG is awaiting the major disas-
ters.”15 A cynical, but possibly a realistic view on how journalism 
and news reporting work. It also reflects the influence of market 
forces inflence, especially on single copy sales. ”Death always has a 
news value,” the ethnologist Nils-Arvid  Bringeus, professor emeri-
tus, states in the final national report on the Estonia  ferry disaster 
and its consequences.16  The church funeral ringing in byegone days 
also raised people's curiosity as to who had passed away. But media 
interest today, according to Bringeus, does not attend to the death 
of the average individual, but to death by accident. 
After a disaster, the media consumer has a need for answers to 
two main issues: ”How could it happen” and ”How big a risk is it 
that it will happen again?” Media scrutiny of power is often delayed 
even if recent major accidents have resulted in investigative jour-
nalism that was initiated ”as soon as the fire was extinguished”.  
Disaster journalism is not essentially different in character from 
other types of journalism. Above all, there are similarities with 
crime journalism and war journalism. The media studies of a Swe-
dish massmurder investigation in 1994 by Börje Ahlström17 and 
Stig-Arne Nohrstedt, Karin Fogelberg and Gert Z Nordström's  
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studies of  war journalism18 testify to this. But journalism in these 
extreme circumstances also deviates from the journalism norm in 
several ways. As the Norwegian media researchers Blix and Bech-
Karlsen put it, we can say that ”problems become pointed and fo-
cused in the case of an accident.”19 
 
Thesis aim and research issues 
Journalistic texts are usually produced under time pressure. In con-
nection with unexpected events such as accidents and disasters, not 
only the time pressure but also the mental pressure becomes tangi-
ble. Work takes place in the present: The focus is on the now.  Then 
and later have less significance. This means that investigation, in-
terpretation, decision and action take place under extreme circum-
stances. In many ways the assignment is ambiguous: it requires be-
ing quick and also correct, being considerate and conducting inves-
tigation at the same time, calming and cautioning the public, in-
specting and criticising without spreading rumours.20 The outcome 
in the media – the journalistic product – is affected by the circum-
stances of its production, that is, the situation, the journalist's men-
tal state and vulnerability, professional skills and the nature of the 
assignment, and finally and not least the impact of the journalist's 
own reactions to the event.  
Originally, I sought an answer to the question: Why do things 
turn out the way they do in the press after a disaster? The question 
led to extensive literature studies before I undertook the interviews, 
forming the empirical basis and centring on the disaster site as a 
media workplace. I wanted to describe the conditions under which 
the media operated at the site of the disastrous Swedish disco fire 
at Backaplan in Gothenburg in 1998, and to create a picture of the 
reactions and patterns of behaviour that emerge in accident report-
ing and how these are managed. The concept of journalist includes 
reporters, photographers and their editors. 
The overriding aim of the thesis is to describe and explain how 
journalists experience working on an accident scene and their own 
crisis and stress reactions. These are related to three factors that 
impact on the special circumstances of the journalistic assignment, 
how it is carried out and with what consequences. The factors are 
the person (the human being as a journalist), the profession (the 
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journalistic assignment and the journalist's role) and the situation 
(the traumatic event of an accident or disaster).  
 
Why journalists at an accident site?  
There are several important reasons for studying journalists (reporters, 
photographers and their editors) reporting on a traumatic event. They 
are, for instance, the only professionals arriving at the scene with an-
other assignment than saving lives, helping the injured, fighting fires 
etc. All other professional categories present are rescue workers. This 
can make the journalists' job distressful and guilt-ridden.21 
Journalists are also the only professionals on the scene who lack 
training in dealing with people at an accident site. Being an eyewitness 
to a disaster in progress entails severe psychological stress, both be-
cause of the sight of the dead people and encountering the injured and 
shocked people, and the experience of their own crisis and stress reac-
tions. The police force, and the rescue and medical emergency services 
are regularly provided professional development in theory and prac-
tice, but despite the regular training each situation entails new chal-
lenges. Journalists do not get any training and are ill prepared for a 
disaster. The journalists' mental crisis and stress reactions in relation 
to the situation, personal qualities and professional assignment consti-
tute an unexplored field, which calls for attention because their reac-
tions may have consequences for other people on the accident site and 
for the performance of the assignment.  
The editors are faced with a different challenge than the eyewitness 
journalist. It can be difficult for the editorial staff to relate to the hap-
penings at the accident site. This distance to the event can hypotheti-
cally mean that the editorial board and editorial colleagues can dis-
tance themselves from events, which can make it easier to separate em-
pathy from the professional task, which may make for a more clear-
sighted journalistic assessment. On the other hand, the hypothetical 
distance can reduce the press ethical sensitivity and increase obtrusion 
if the reporting is to the detriment of the victims.  
It is significant for accident reporting that the reporters and the 
photographers often ”assign themselves”, meaning that no one else is 
on duty. There are no instructions and often no information to speak 
of, which makes disaster journalism different from other genres where 
research is conducted in advance.  
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Studying reporters, photographers and editorial staff as different 
journalist categories is justified, beyond the reasons mentioned above, 
because of the differences in working conditions between reporters and 
photographers. The photographer arrives at the scene with the profes-
sional attribute of the camera, while the reporter can choose to remain 
in the background. The photographing reporter can be perceived as 
provocative by the directly affected when trying to take photos of the 
ongoing trauma. The conversational role of the reporter is less provoc-
ative, but not necessarily simpler. Photos can be taken at a distance but 
conversation requires face-to-face contact.  
Generally speaking, occupational studies of work under stress and 
mental pressure are interesting because the situations involve many is-
sues. Everyday professional problems are accentuated and the ques-
tions sharpened. The professional role and press ethics are tested on 
the basis of very special situations. In connection with a major accident 
or disaster the time pressure is increased, in some cases to the point of 
being radio-like when the reporter calls in their eyewitness accounts. 
With the recent web development (beyond the scope of the present 
study) the printed media's speed has become ether-like. This develop-
ment jeopardises the ethical aspects. The combination of time pressure 
and mental stress is interesting to study regarding reporters on the site 
and editors. An important factor to clarify is how the deliberations and 
decisions made are affected by the strain of the situation.  
The situation on an accident site places great demands on the pro-
fessional groups present, including journalists. The nature of the situ-
ation can vary a great deal between different accidents and disasters. 
Journalist witness the trauma to different degrees. At the Gothenburg 
fire and the 9/11 terror attacks several journalists witnessed the events. 
On other occasions such as the South Asia Tsunami in 2004, the jour-
nalists arrived to the chaos following the acute phase. This involves 
other mental and professional circumstances. Yet another type of acci-
dent takes place in inaccessible places, like the Estonia ferry disaster 
out at sea, where the journalists did not witness the accident either dur-
ing or after the acute phase. Other demands on defining the situation 
and good interpretation ability are required. Also the geographical 
spread of the accident affects the chance to perform journalistic tasks. 
Is the area limited to a block or does it extend to half a nation? Other 
situational factors are how many and what categories of people are af-
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fected. Are the victims children, adults or elderly? One or more nation-
alities? What is actually known about the event and what is left to the 
journalist's interpretation?  
 
Person, profession and situation 
The journalists' experiences and stress reactions are related to the three 
factors that affect job performance, namely the individual person (the 
human being the journalist), the profession (the journalistic assign-
ment and the journalist's role) and the situation (the traumatic event 
of an accident or disaster).  
The situation in the thesis is a constant, as it were, but a situation to 
which different people in different professional capacities have arrived, 
in this case, reporters and photographers. The study aims to describe 
and explain the tension between journalists and fellow human being, 
between the assignment and the wish to help others, between pursuit 
of news and withdrawal. 
We could also say that it concerns three encounters in a very special 
situation: with the situation (”What has happened?”, identifying the 
situation), with themselves (”How should I handle this?”, in terms of 
their own crisis reactions and coping), and with the professional as-
signment (”How should I depict this?”, in terms of press ethics, for in-
stance).  
The journalist's first duty on arriving is to define the situation, 
sometimes with the help of the scarce information to the newspaper or 
via an SOS (mayday/alarm) call, and at other times with a bit more 
knowledge of what has happened. In either case, the reporter and pho-
tographer are left to their own resources to interpret and assess the sit-
uation on site. The editorial staff have to be particularly sensitive and 
responsive in their decision-making, combining empathy and profes-
sionality under pressure, which is a challenge.   
The professional assignment of reporting on a disaster is governed 
by factors on three levels: Firstly, there are the media roles of being 
watchdog and provider of news and information. In the event of a dis-
aster, the information function assumes greater importance as public 
authorities can use the media to inform about channels to public sup-
port and rescue services. In addition, citizens have a right to infor-
mation about the event. Secondly, the journalist has the editorial duty 
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to consider news value, posters and single copy sales (economic fac-
tors), which affect the way in which the event is described. Thirdly, the 
journalist can, at least hypothetically, be his/her own boss, for exam-
ple, at a nightly alert about a major accident or disaster, when the as-
signment is undertaken in interaction or conflict with colleagues and 
management. Here, a balance might have to be struck between the pro-
fessional and private person. How much should I write and how much 
should I help (if at all)?  
It is difficult to predict how individuals will react on arrival to an 
accident site and being a witness, and equally difficult to know how 
they cope with their reactions and on what grounds. The so-called ”in-
dividual vulnerability” (described in Chapter 4) is a critical factor. Vul-
nerability is the sum of inheritance and environment, life style and 
health status, which combine to affect our coping of different kinds of 
crisis. Previous experience and studies indicate differences related to 
the sexes, life experience, previous professional experience and differ-
ent types of media that the journalist represents.22 Translated into 
practical wisdom, It is interesting to know what problems the person 
journalist encounters on the accident sites and how the reactions affect 
the way he/she tackles the problems. In combination with different 
types of situations, parts of our psyche and emotions are triggered dif-
ferently. Are the victims children or adults? Is the disaster a fire, terror 
attack or a natural disaster? Is the event controllable or uncontrollable? 
A natural disaster might not evoke the same kind of wrath as a deliber-
ate fire.   
The person, the journalist, is a person who can react and act very 
differently in various situations. The journalistic assignment involves 
some fundamental principles, which might be modified in extreme sit-
uations. For example, certain press ethical rules might appear impos-
sible to practice, or journalism norms inadequate. Situations are never 
identical. Experiences and lessons learnt can be obtained from each 
event but even the most experienced reporter or photographer can be 
afflicted with both paralysis and hyperactivity, demonstrate profes-
sionality and blunders. The hypothetical question, ”Who is best suited 
to report on a disaster?” is impossible to answer. Besides, the editor has 
seldom the opportunity to select a journalist for an assignment. When 
the alarm is sounded, chance decides who happens to be on duty. How-
ever, knowledge about contributing factors can make the disaster re-
porting easier to organise and carry out.  
 
 30 
 
Analysis model 
What factors trigger journalists' reactions? Studies of journalists' 
reactions are important in order to understand why ”the profes-
sional person” reacts and acts in a certain way, partly in terms of the 
journalist as ”indirectly affected” by the event, partly to understand 
the working conditions behind the subsequent publications. Cogni-
tive, emotional, behavioural, physical reactions and coping strate-
gies are in focus, in other words, what they ”think, feel and do”. In 
this context, the editorial board members are seen as an important 
informant category in their capacity as leaders and journalists 
working in the offices (in relation to the reporters and photogra-
phers on site). A key question is the consequences of the journalists' 
reactions for their decisions and actions on the accident site and for 
the publications of their reports.  
Three factors are assumed to be important for journalists' reac-
tion on site.   
Firstly, there is the extreme situation: a major accident or disas-
ter that reporters and photographers arrive at to depict, which they 
witness and react to. This is an extreme work situation, deviating 
from the normal one in several ways, but also constituting a clear 
example of the mechanisms and problems of news journalism.   
Secondly, there is the profession, that is, the professional person 
in relation to the professional journalism role, the assignment, 
press ethics, etc.  
Thirdly, there is the person: the individual journalist. What kind 
of person is facing the task? Qualities such as personality, vulnera-
bility, stress disposition/tolerance, resilience and coping ability are 
factors that make a difference to a person's way of handling the sit-
uation.  
A further factor studied is reflection after the assignment, such 
as the journalists' need of processing experiences and of receiving 
psychological relief. This is studied in their self-evaluations of their 
own reporting (performance) and of their colleagues at the newspa-
per and in other media. Lessons learnt are an important factor for 
the future. Hypothetically, the personal and collective processing, 
self-evaluation and learning processes can have effects on future 
media traumatic event reporting. The editorial management has a 
great responsibility to support the individual reporter or photogra-
pher during and after the assignment. It is also a leadership issue to 
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communicate experiences of events such as the earlier mentioned 
Gothenburg fire.   
The starting-point of this study is the journalist as a person and 
as a professional. The person is assigned the performance of a task 
in a specific situation, namely on an accident site. The focus is on 
the person's reactions to the potential trauma that witnessing a dis-
aster entails. The individual journalist's reactions to the situation 
are affected by the nature of the event and personal qualities. The 
individual must also handle the professional assignment and its 
regulations. The tension arises between the individual's private 
wishes and needs (e.g. helping or escaping), and professional moti-
vations and demands for reports.   
The analysis focusses on their own reactions, linked to the situ-
ation, the profession and the person during the acute phase of the 
event. The reflections made by the individual journalist some time 
after the event are also discussed in relation to the analysis. These 
reflections and self-evaluations can partly serve as the journalists' 
mirror images of the event, the assignment and their own psycho-
logical reactions.  
The factor ”performance”, that is, the result of the assignment is 
also shown in the model. Although ”performance” can only be dis-
cussed in the form of self-evaluations, it is important to include this 
aspect in the model. 
 
 
  
 32 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Factors affecting journalist performance in severe events (e.g. 
accidents and disaster): An analysis model.   
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the final publications/prints not are included. Actions on the acci-
dent site are important but not a published part of the journalistic 
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Thesis issues 
Studying journalists at work on and in connection with an accident 
site calls for a number of questions, but some must also be excluded. 
The choice here was to study a case where the individual journalist 
(the person), the journalistic assignment (the profession) and the 
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different degrees of vulnerability and/or resilience. At the accident 
site the journalist experiences and witnesses an ongoing trauma. He 
or she may react psychologically and emotionally to the event, and 
copes in different degrees and ways with the potential reactions. 
The journalist handles the situation in individual ways and acts on 
the basis of the above factors. After the reporting assignment, the 
journalist processes the event, evaluates his/her journalistic perfor-
mance, and learns from experience and from feedback to editors 
and colleagues in other media.  
This thesis aims to clarify how individual journalists' reactions 
and performance at the accident site are affected by the following 
issues: 
 
1. The situation 
How does the nature of the event (regarding type of accident, 
spread, time, place, category affected and actors' interaction) affect 
the reporters' and photographers' reactions to the situation?  
How do they experience the degree of controllability, stressors 
on the site, the interaction with other actors and general experi-
ences of the accident site as a workplace?  
 
2. The profession 
How do the reporters and photographers describe that they are af-
fected by their assignments and the demands made at the accident 
site – social role, legal frames and the professional role – in short, 
their way of handling demands, norms and rules in an possibly ex-
treme situation?  
How do the journalists' crisis and stress reactions affect the work 
situation and the social role, and what are the conflicts between the 
private person and the professional person?  
 
3. The person 
How do the reporters and photographers describe the importance 
of personal qualities such as personality, vulnerability, life experi-
ence, stress tolerance, coping ability and life experiences for how 
they function and act as professional private persons in the report-
ing on a disaster?   
How do journalists describe working at the accident site in terms 
of cognitive reactions, emotional reactions, physical reactions, and 
coping strategies?  
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In addition to the analysis of the factors impacting on the jour-
nalistic assignment at the accident site, issues are also analysed re-
lated to the phase that follows on the completed reporting. The 
starting-point is that the reflection is affected by the performance 
and reactions at the accident site. Moreover, it is the reactions and 
performance affect the work and the processes that follow. 
The journalists describe their crisis reactions and their experi-
enced performances in relation to the situation, the profession and 
the person.  The reporters' and photographers' reflections belong to 
their need for crisis support after completing their assignment (and 
how this is conducted if needed); they evaluate their own and their 
colleagues' work and describe how feedback and processing gener-
ate internal and external learning and reflect on the effects on future 
assignments.  
 
Reporters and editors 
Although the reporters and photographers are the centre of atten-
tion in this investigation, the editors and editorial staff also consti-
tute an important category for the study because the editor has the 
final say about the assignment and the report, which ultimately af-
fect the result of the reporting.   
Secondarily, as shown in the analysis model and research issues, 
the interviews also included questions on the time after the report-
ing assignment, illustrating the journalists' need of psychological 
relief, for example, and any therapy and self-evaluation or learning 
processes.  
When a major accident or disaster takes place in the night, the 
newspapers' staffing is reduced. In the case of the Gothenburg fire, 
many reporters and photographers were on duty long before their 
editors. The roles of journalists on the site and editors in the office 
are different at newspapers with main editorial offices in Stockholm 
(some 500 kilometers away from the event), or in  Gothenburg 
(where the disaster happened). Working conditions for the journal-
ists arriving at the site when the fire is out and the area evacuated 
are different compared to the journalist eyewitnesses.  
The shared issues are the views of the assignment, reactions to 
the event, and coping with them, previous experience, ethical deci-
sions and other considerations. The differences are that the journal-
ists witnessed the events at the site and that they have to cope with 
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the conflict of being there both as professionals and as a fellow hu-
man being, which the journalists in the office are spared.   
To draw conclusions of what the reporting entails in the long 
run, questions were also asked about the need of psychological relief 
after the assignment. In their capacity as supervisors, the editors 
can face the fact that they should offer a colleague psychological 
support while being in need of support themselves. Self-evaluations 
of their own reporting, their papers' accumulated reporting, and 
their views on how the media in general reported on the Gothen-
burg fire are also covered. Both journalists in the field and their ed-
itors give an account of their experiences of how they can learn – 
individually and collectively – from the individual case to be better 
equipped for similar assignments in the future.  
In short, the event at Backaplan in Gothenburg turned out to be 
a disaster with unusually many unpleasant ingredients. It encom-
passed children, young adults and was a shocking experience and a 
great tragedy. The first photographers and journalist on the scene 
were the witnesses of an ongoing catastrophe where young people 
were the victims of a conflagration before their eyes. How did jour-
nalists handle that situation and what were circumstances for a cor-
rect and considerate journalism practice?  
 
This study in relation to previous research   
The current situation in the field of disasters and crisis reactions is that 
many areas have been covered and frequently studied. In other areas 
there is a shortage of studies, which motivated this doctoral study. As 
is clear in the following chapters, there is a great deal of knowledge of 
rescue work and public agency work in connection with disasters and 
accidents. Likewise, the crisis reactions among survivors and rescue 
workers have been studied nationally and internationally. Occupa-
tional studies of journalists and news production have also been stud-
ied in many ways. But the areas of journalists' crisis reactions, coping 
strategies and reporting on accidents and disasters are unexplored. 
The table below demonstrates the relation between this research 
fields and related fields. 
To explain the complicated relationships affecting the journalist's 
performance on the accident site, knowledge of disciplines other than 
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journalism is needeed. Media theory must be combined with crisis psy-
chology to clarify understanding and explanations. Theories of such an 
analysis are missing, which is why  an explorative study is necessary.  
The methodological aim of the study is to create concepts for the 
understanding and further studies of disaster journalism and to discuss 
the relation between the concepts.  
 
Table 1. Study areas and objects in distaser research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The content of the book 
This introductory chapter is followed by four chapters which in turn 
address the theoretical basis of the empirical studies of the situa-
tion, the profession, the person, and the reactions. Then follows a 
description of the empirical study in Chapter 6, including accounts 
of methods and the case of the Gothenburg fire. Chapter 7 describes 
the journalists' experience of the situation. Chapter 8 describes 
their experience of the assignment. Chapter 9 centres on assess-
ments and decisions. Chapter 10 deals with the person, that is, the 
journalist´s as a human being´s, and their own reactions to the as-
signment. In Chapter 11 the needs of social and psychological sup-
port among those who have witnessed the disaster are treated, and 
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how newspaper managements when applicable handled and organ-
ised this. Chapter 12 describes how the journalists and their editors 
evaluate their personal and collective efforts professionally, and 
their experience of internal and external learning. The empirical 
Chapters 7-12 focus on the journalists' crisis reactions in relation to 
the conditions for their job performance. These chapters are domi-
nated by quotations from the interviews, which may appear too de-
tailed and too long, but the choice to include them is deliberate. The 
aim is to let the voice of the interviewee be heard and not simply to 
convey the facts. Hopefully, the very personal stories add life and 
colour to the text. General conclusions and a concluding discussion 
are provided in Chapter 13.  
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 THE SITUATION 
 
The professional role always requires the journalists to venture into di-
verse environments, places and times, and to encounter various cate-
gories of people. Prepared or unprepared, they have to take on the task 
of listening, asking, investigating, interpreting summarising and re-
porting. But how do the situations, working conditions, and the specific 
”workplace” affect the task? The situational difference between report-
ing on a disaster from the newspaper office and at the accident site is 
striking. Similarly, the everyday journalistic tasks, which usually do not 
involve stress reactions, differ from the extreme situation of working at 
an accident site.   
The aim of this chapter is primarily to describe the situation of jour-
nalists covering accidents with reference to existing research. A back-
ground is given to accidents and disasters in terms of type of accident 
and disaster, extent and consequences, etc. The type of accident has a 
bearing on how journalists and others react to the event. The stressors 
contributing to making the work hard are described along with the im-
portance of the degree of accident controllability, resolvability and 
transparency. The category of affected persons is of the utmost im-
portance, and therefore also treated. Many researchers agree that 
events affecting children are the worst to deal with.1 
A major issue involves the main actors at the accident site, namely 
the rescue services, health care personnel and the police. The special 
demands imposed on the journalist and the tensions and conflicts (de-
scribed in the introductory chapter) arising in the situation need to be 
examined more closely.  
 
The nature of the event 
Human societies have always been haunted by accidents and disasters, 
and invariably these have been a subject of interest. A disaster is a rad-
ical event,2 not only to the affected eyewitnesses and next-of-kin but 
also to the media organisations, public authorities, the nation and com-
munities. Research on disasters originates in the U.S. 1950s for the 
purpose of meeting military needs to increase preparedness for possi-
ble attack with ABC weapon (weapon of mass destruction).3 As an ex-
tension of this branch, research has then been conducted to improve 
general preparedness for crisis and disasters. Many argue that disaster 
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research stands to gain a great deal from the military experience, for 
example, the American psychology Professor Barton Meyers,4  who 
even argues that war should be included in the disaster concept since 
the social and psychological consequences are very similar. The indi-
vidual can also experience a disaster to be equally traumatic as a war. 
Hypothetically, this may also be reflected in similarities between war 
and disaster journalism.  
The individual-related research on reactions to disaster situations 
can be said to rest on two main issues,5 partly the patterns of behaviour, 
reactions and coping during the acute phase of the disaster, partly the 
more long-term effects on health after the disaster. In the latter case, 
research usually centres on PTSD, the post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Risk research is a related field,6 which has a focus on the period before 
a disaster – among others, the so-called warning period. In the case of 
sudden and unexpected accidents, however, there is no such phase.   
 
Classification of accidents and disasters  
The terminological definitions of accidents and disasters in this thesis 
are derived from the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare's 
handbook on medical disaster preparedness,7 from which the follow-
ing definitions have been borrowed: A disaster is a situation where 
available resources are inadequate in relation to acute needs, and the 
drain is so heavy that normal quality requirements for medical treat-
ment can no longer be maintained despite appropriate measures. A 
major accident is a severe event where available resources are inade-
quate in relation to acute needs, but where it is possible to maintain 
normal quality requirements through a reallocation of resources and a 
different technology. The single term accident is a sudden event that 
has detrimental effects on human beings, the environment and prop-
erty. An accident can be caused by natural phenomena or human acts 
or omission to act.  
A medical disaster is a situation caused by an accident, natural dis-
aster, war etc., where health care and our common resources are not 
enough in spite of reinforcement. There is, in other words, no possibil-
ity to help all the victims. Efforts have to be primarily geared towards 
saving lives and alleviating suffering, while reducing damages and their 
effects are secondary.8 The rescue workers available cannot fulfil their 
task because of the lack of personnel and resources. In their revised 
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version of regulations and general advice on peacetime medical disas-
ter preparedness, the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare 
has introduced the concept of 'severe event' for situations requiring 
special health care management.9 The term covers disasters as well as 
major accidents such as threat, hostage situations and terror attacks.  
The concept of severe event extends the meaning in a psychological and 
psychiatric perspective, since an event can require many and special-
ised health care efforts without causing many deaths or physical inju-
ries. It can also refer to a minor event, which may affect many people 
in an area, especially if the victims are children. The term severe event 
is primarily used in the fields of health care, health protection, disease 
control and the social services. 
International research on disaster and accidents commonly rests on 
three definitions.10 Firstly, there is catastrophe, which is a radical 
event, usually a natural disaster in the form of an earthquake or flood-
ing. Disaster is used to describe major events such as tanker accidents, 
shopping mall bombings, or collapsing stadium stands with many cas-
ualties (the Swedish Estonia event and the Gothenburg fire are disas-
ters rather than catastrophes in British terminology). For minor acci-
dents, in which local, regional and national institutions are not af-
fected, the term accident is used.11 
A more or less interpersonal interpretation of the concept disaster 
means that the event is psychologically disastrous for the affected fam-
ilies.12   Dynes also refers to a common sociological interpretation of 
what a disaster is, namely an event in which a great many human rela-
tionships in a limited geographical area are broken. In terms of the lat-
ter explanatory model, international transportation accidents with vic-
tims of different nationalities are not included in the disaster concept.  
There are many viewpoints. The words accident and disaster can 
have very different meanings depending on the contexts in which they 
are pronounced, who is giving the information, etc. Accidents and dis-
asters can be classified on different grounds. Some definitions are given 
above and beyond this a classification can be made on the basis of 
cause, size, extent and spread. 1 3 A certain understanding of different 
types of accidents and disasters is important for the understanding of 
how and why people react so differently to various situations. Individ-
ual reactions are therefore important to observe and understand in the 
light of the causes and contexts of events. 
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A classification based on the cause of an event leads to two main 
groups, namely natural disasters and technical disasters, the latter are 
called produced ('man made') disasters. The group produced disasters 
can further be categorised in terms of intentional and unintentional 
events. Causes that human beings cannot influence are often easier to 
handle from a psychological perspective than a situation with a clear 
scapegoat. The coping strategies are also dependent on the nature of 
the event.14 
The ferocious tsunami – the tidal wave – leading to the South Asia 
disaster during Christmas in 2004 was a natural disaster of gigantic 
proportions at a great distance from Sweden, but with as nearly as 
many victims as in the Estonia disaster.15 Next to the sinking of Estonia, 
the Gothenburg fire in 1998 is one of the most severe disasters ever to 
afflict Sweden.   
 
The place of the event 
An accident or disaster does not always occur in an accessible place for 
the rescue services and the media. The Estonia ferry disaster is a case 
in point. Plane and tunnel accidents are other examples. At the 
Backaplan fire in Gothenburg in 1998, the surrounding buildings were 
easy to approach, while the premises on fire were inaccessible to the 
fire fighters and smoke divers.   
A further example is the avalanche disaster in Norwegian Vassdalen 
where a military exercise was taking place in 1986, despite bad weather 
conditions. Because of a misunderstanding among the officers in 
charge, tracked vehicles went out despite the avalanche alert. The re-
sult of this fatal mistake was that 31 soldiers ended up in a snowslide 
and 16 lost their lives. The Norwegian journalists were hard pressed to 
create a picture of the event. The area was inaccessible and the sources 
– the military officers – were unwilling to communicate, it was re-
ported. In Arne Blix and Jo Bech-Karlsen's study of the Vassdalen ac-
cident, there is a description of how the first journalist arrived at the 
accident site – on skies.16 
In connection with the Estonia ferry disaster, which was not wit-
nessed by either journalists or photographers, a special dilemma arose. 
The ferry terminal at the Swedish side of the Baltic Sea was the outpost 
to which the media and next-of-kin were referred. Hospitals in all the 
countries concerned became the workplace of the world's journalists 
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and photographers. In exceptional cases, a TV cameraman was allowed 
to accompany a surface rescuer into the air to document the rescue of 
people at close quarters. This was not indisputable. 17 
 
Controllability 
The newly arrived journalist's identification of the situation at an acci-
dent site is affected by an interpretation process. The crisis psycholo-
gists at the Swedish Armed Forces, Ann Enander, Claes Wallenius and 
Gerry Larsson argue that an individual in an accident or disaster situ-
ation does not react directly to the objective reality. Rather, it is the 
interpretation of it that constitutes the subjective reality that the indi-
vidual reacts to.18 An individual under acute stress interprets the situ-
ation and their own situation in it (see further in Chapter 5). This in-
volves asking questions such as: ”Is this a threat?” and ”What can I do?” 
The situation and their own resources to handle it are interpreted. To a 
great extent, this is assumed to be unconscious.  
Enander, Larsson and Wallenius have developed a model, which de-
scribes the degree of controllability, resolvability, and clarity in disaster 
situations.19 The model centres on individual experiences rather than 
objective course of events, and illustrates how, for instance, an event 
such as the Gothenburg fire can be experienced as both unresolvable 
and ungraspable when the journalist arrives at the scene.  An example 
of a situation that is perceived as graspable and resolvable  (A)  is a fire 
in a stadium stand, because normally, there is a possibility to be res-
cued.  In the case of graspable situations impossible to resolve (B), an 
accident may have happened but the people involved understand what 
has happened and are completely dependent on others for their rescue, 
for instance, being shipwrecked on a deserted island or being trapped 
in a mine. The Gothenburg fire is an example of this category since it 
was virtually impossible to get out of the burning building. Situations 
that are perceived as ungraspable but still resolvable (C) are, for exam-
ple, threats of polluted drinking water. By boiling the water we can 
manage the situation.   
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Figure 2. Subjective key dimensions for understanding and explaining 
individual reactions to disaster events.20 
  
Finally, situations that are both ungraspable and unresolvable are en-
vironmental threats such as nuclear plant disasters, which have conse-
quences that are difficult to survey and nearly impossible to resolve. 
The most difficult situations to handle in the moment must be situa-
tions that are easy to grasp but impossible to resolve. The Gothenburg 
fire was such a situation. 
The extent of subjective clarity and controllability respectively is of 
great importance to the interpretation process. Gerry Larsson argues 
that emotional reactions are the result of and governed by the cognitive 
assessment of a situation.2 1  Others, for instance, Öhman, have 
pointed to indications that emotional responses can arise without cog-
nitive features.22 One aspect that needs to be emphasised is how stress-
ful an individual perceives a certain situation. Lack of food and sleep, 
weather conditions, and collegial conflicts are some examples of non-
cognitive emotional responses.  
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Stressors 
The Norwegian clinical, research and war psychologist Atle Dyregrov 
has listed stressors that helpers (rescue workers) experience in disaster 
situations, based on conversation with rescue personnel in Norway and 
abroad and other research studies and reports on disaster relief work 
from the whole world.23 Several of the stressors can be assumed to ap-
ply to media members on the site too, even if they, according to 
Dyregrov's model, also constitute a stressor to the rescue personnel. 
The stressors are a result of the extreme situation on the accident site.  
  
Table 2. Stressors in rescue operations: rescue personnel and journalists 
compared. 24 
 
 
 
 
The work on the accident site may take place under extreme pres-
sure.  Working without knowing the situation fully and in organisa-
tional chaos under time pressure, perhaps combined with mass media 
obtrusion, is a delicate problem. Curious by-standers and agitated rel-
atives are significant stress factors. Dyregrov describes how rescue per-
sonnel can experience the situation:  
They can see that people are dying without being able to do anything for 
them; they can be forced to make decisions affecting other people's lives and 
health; they can inadvertently tread on body parts, and all their senses are 
exposed to strong impressions. The contact with dead children is perceived 
to be the most stress-inducing factor.25 
 
Potential stressors 
for journalists 
 
 
Uncertainty at call-out, time  pressure  x 
Duration/waiting   x 
Public and media turnout   x (public turnout) 
Strong sensory impressions  x 
Contact with deceased and injured  x 
Scope, duration and intensity of disaster  x 
Insufficient resources   ? 
Danger    x 
Problem if cooperation, line of command,  x 
coordination and leadership 
Role conflict    x 
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Accident site work organisation is always marked by uncertainty. 
This fact, in combination with strong sense impressions and contacts 
with victims, and time pressure – sometimes for a long time – makes 
the work very stressful. 
Cooperation, coordination and leadership must be solved while 
people are dying in clear view of rescue workers and eyewitnesses.  
Much of the experience that responders at accident sites have in all, 
probability also apply to reporters and photographers present in their 
capacity as professional eyewitnesses.  
 
Actors and victims 
”Why are they here?”  is a recurring question from people who dispute 
the presence of the media at accident sites, or perhaps rather the way 
in which media professionals go about their business. To some the an-
swer is given while others have strong reservations. The answer is col-
oured by strong feelings, personal and professional experiences, and 
responses are probably also based on too little knowledge about the 
conditions of journalism. There will always be people who think that 
journalists have no place at accident sites, as Blix and Bech-Karlsen 
suggest.26 There are those who obstruct the journalists' work (respond-
ers or eyewitnesses) and those who criticise a publication after the fact. 
The reason may be a self-interested wish to hide something, but more 
often a wish to protect individual integrity. Protecting individuals 
against exposure is usually the clincher in such argumentation. 
In particular, the fast and live local broadcasting media function as 
invaluable information channels in tracing victims, checking rumours, 
giving information and instructions, and leaving official messages to, 
for example, family members.27 In this capacity the media act as a con-
trol centre and independent journalistic work is superseded by the 
need to relay the messages of a credible source. A risk in disaster re-
porting is that speed is given priority over objectivity and source criti-
cism with the result that erroneous information reaches the public. The 
media provide effective information about different kinds of responder 
services to victims and their families. Even negative announcement 
such as ”there is nothing to report at present” can be valuable.  
Throughout history, there are many examples of situations where 
journalists allegedly have prevented the emergency care,28 for instance, 
by physically being in the way of emergency services, or, as in the case 
of the Estonia ferry disaster, when the journalists intensive telephoning 
 47 
 
blocked lines intended for communication with the responders. Such 
experience contributes to tense relations between the media and re-
sponders or relatives and survivors.  
A representative of the Swedish Rescue Services addressing a semi-
nar with Swedish war psychologists and disaster psychiatrists on dis-
aster ethics in 1998, claimed: ”There is a prevalent contempt of jour-
nalism in the Swedish municipal crisis groups”.29 Many other examples 
of similar attitudes are documented in several reports and experience-
based records.30 Not least has the occasional experience of survivors 
and relatives regarding media intrusion and journalist transgression 
contributed to colouring the public groups' perception of journalists 
and photographers as a collective. 
The former priest, Stig Jonsson, who worked in connection with the 
Måbødals bus accident, thinks that accidents and disasters must be 
covered by the media, but the question is how. 
We can't stop the media from covering accidents, but the way they write 
about them it is important /.../ The Haukeland hospital staff in Bergen, Nor-
way think that the press severely violated the integrity of patients and fami-
lies /.../ We understand that they have a job to do, but they must understand 
that we have a job to do too, said the hospital staff.31 
Media presence at accident sites is a question of legitimacy, as the 
answer to the initial question rests on legislation pertaining to public-
ity: freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the public's right to 
access information.   
 
Contact areas and confrontations at the accident site 
The members of the media are the only professional category arriving 
at the scene without the duty to save lives or partake in the rescue op-
erations in any other way. Rather, they perform as professional wit-
nesses with a different, clear duty, which, however, is often questioned 
by rescue service personnel and survivors and other eyewitnesses. 
Another distinguishing feature is the tension that can arise – some-
times a kind of polemics – between the media professionals and the 
other professional rescue groups at the site, while the rescue services 
have a duty to cooperate and do that.   The contacts made at the site 
take place against the background opinion that the media presence is 
provocative, and yet their presence cannot be called in question. But 
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there is reason to review their work performance. Gunnar Ekman de-
scribes, in his doctoral thesis on police work,32 how policemen are po-
sitioned against ”them” ('the Svenssons' and 'the yobs')”, a ”we-against-
them” attitude, which is reminiscent of the interplay between journal-
ists and rescue workers, or journalists and citizens”.  
The journalist profession is similar to the police profession in the 
sense that it also involves a multitude of relationships. In Ekman's 
study of police work, a policeman notes that ”we can meet anyone from 
managing directors to addicts.”33 In their professional practice, jour-
nalists and photographers can meet the same spectrum of situations 
and people from all walks of life. At an accident site, anything from for-
mal interviews with rescue chiefs to emotional, tentative conversations 
with survivors and bereaved people can take place. The same journalist 
is expected to manage the whole spectrum of relationships in inter-
views, observations and photo journalism. This is an example of the 
way the situation per se places demands on a range of the journalist's 
professional skills and acts. 
In a study of the so-called Flink murders in the city of Falun, Swe-
den in 1994, Alström investigates the journalists' contact areas at the 
scene of the crime.34 The scene and the situation cannot completely be 
compared with an accident scene such as the Gothenburg fire, for in-
stance, but can still be of interest in the context. In the Falun case, there 
were striking differences between the choice of sources and contacts in 
the journalists' practice. So, for instance, were the evening tabloids to 
a greater extent present in Falun than the morning dailies. The tabloids 
contacted the police more than the morning papers and the local press. 
The local press interviewed psychology experts to a lesser extent than 
all other papers. No comparative quantitative study of contact areas 
has been made in relation to the Gothenburg fire. However, the gov-
ernment report35 indicates roughly the same tendencies as in the Falun 
case in terms of the papers' difference in staffing at the accident site. 
The morning press normally allots less space to this type of accidents 
and crime. It follows that the number of personal encounters are fewer 
but there are more telephone interviews. Similarly, their presence at 
the scene is less conspicuous than that of the evening tabloids. 
When the media meet people at an accident site, the interaction is 
different if the individual is directly affected or an eyewitness. The cat-
egory  ”citizens” appear in three different shapes: as affected (victims 
and survivors), family and friends arriving at the scene, and other eye-
witnesses at the site. These actors interact with journalist and rescue 
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personnel on the basis of different circumstances. This is a reason for 
approaching the citizen actors from different perspectives.  
The main stakeholders and actors on the scene can therefore be di-
vided into five different categories:  
1. Affected/survivors 
2. Family and close friends (arriving at the scene) 
3. Eyewitnesses /the concerned public 
4. Responders36   (rescue services, the police, paramedics, public offi-
cials) 
5. Journalists (reporters and photographers) 
Two of these groups have a professional mission at the site, namely 
the responders and the journalists. But only the former have the duty 
to help and save lives. This is why both the members of the media and 
the public or relatives are spectators or eyewitnesses. The journalists 
can therefore be defined as professional eyewitnesses.37 
Interaction and cooperation at an accident site or a disaster area 
take place under heavy psychological and physical strain for many. 
Folkesson's study38 of the rescue team during the Gothenburg fire 
shows that more than 40 per cent of the rescue personnel found the 
contact with relatives and friends very stressful and around 15 per cent 
pointed to other situations at the scene as complications. Contact with 
the media are likely to belong to the category ”other situations”, as pre-
vious studies by, for instance, Dyregrov39  have shown that the presence 
of the media and the public are perceived as very stress-inducing fac-
tors.   
 
Directly   affected 
Affected people, here in the sense of injured and unharmed survivors, 
are main actors in the drama on the accident scene. By definition, the 
deceased belong to the category affected too, even if they are not actors 
in the same way as the survivors are.  
Often the category affected falls into subgroups, for instance, ethnic, 
geographical or age groups, or classmates or colleagues, or a random 
number of individuals, who happen to be in the same place – at a venue 
or on a journey.40 The composition of the affected group impacts on the 
scenario and what takes place during the first few hours at the accident 
site. 
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The interaction between the affected and the media can vary. In the 
midst of chaos it is not clear to the injured and other survivors who the 
journalist are. If they are aware of the media presence, they react dif-
ferently. Harrison has, like several other researchers, noted that the af-
fected individuals in a disaster seem to want to be interviewed by the 
media. Talking about the event publicly can offer a moment of relief.41 
Experiences of several disasters show that the affected often welcome 
the opportunity to share the pain, according to the British disaster ex-
pert Michael Granatt, with reference to studies on the Piper Alpha, 
Tjernobyl and natural disaster such as hurricanes.42  He claims that it 
certainly happens that the persons affected by a disaster never want to 
see a journalist or a camera again, but most of them have no objection 
if the situation is within the frame of normal media coverage.  
At the same time, research has shown that journalists can aggravate 
the trauma that the affected can be afflicted with.43 Above all, this ap-
plies to long-term reactions. Consenting to an interview at the accident 
site does not mean that the interviewee will perceive it as positive in the 
long run. Brewin and others think that individual's recovery process 
can be disrupted by detailed questions.44 
 
Family and close friends 
In most accidents and disasters the site is sooner or later filled with 
family and friends of the affected. They can be attractive interview ob-
jects for the reporters but also constitute an obstacle to journalists try-
ing to get close to the affected, which can lead to conflicts between these 
persons and the members of the media.  
In the case of inaccessible accident sites such as accidents at sea, the 
journalists and family members meet in the same place, often in venues 
chosen by authorities. After the Estonia ferry disaster in 1994, the 
Estline terminal became not only a ”disaster place” in Stockholm but 
also an information centre and acute crisis centre.45 Around 450 family 
members came to the terminal and 5 621 incoming calls were regis-
tered. The Estline terminal became the Estonia Swedes' ”accident site”. 
After the Estonia ferry disaster there were great difficulties in accessing 
reliable information on the ferry passengers. The uncertainty of surviv-
ing, missing or dead persons was nearly total. Such uncertainty entails 
an extra traumatic strain on everyone remotely concerned and puts 
great demands on journalists' treatment of vague and preliminary in-
formation.  
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Eyewitnesses 
The eyewitnesses of the accident in this context are all persons present 
on the scene besides journalists, rescue personnel, survivors and fam-
ily/friends. Most accidents also attract a stream of people who happen 
to be in the vicinity: residents, passers-by, and a curious public who 
have just heard the news on the radio. The latter group often consti-
tutes a neglected actor at accident sites.  
Through history, people have intervened in disasters to help those in 
need and lend a hand to rescue services. Fires and explosions are exam-
ples46 of situations where the public has played a part in raising the 
number of people saved. Such public actors are also sources of infor-
mation for the media. The media dramaturgy is often intensified 
through the often self-appointed eyewitness ”heroes”. The accuracy of 
their assessments and statements is difficult to verify but are always 
useful elements in the media dramaturgy. The downside of the self-ap-
pointed heroes is the risk that their actions can be used for self-serving 
interests to highlight their own achievements or, in a worse case sce-
nario, to hide guilt.   
 
Responders – helpers  
The care of the directly affected persons at the accident site is provided 
by the rescue and medical emergency services. A rescue operation in-
volves three actors and three legislative frameworks: The rescue ser-
vices (often municipal) under the Rescue Services Act,47  the police 
force (state) under the Police Act,48 and healthcare (county council) un-
der the Healthcare Act.49 The three actors are usually called responders 
or rescue services in the context of a disaster.   
Leadership is exercised by the Rescue Services at a disaster site.50 
Land-based disasters are managed by a rescue service commanding of-
ficer,51 whose team includes a police force commander and a chief med-
ical doctor. The police have the authority to  ”... close, evacuate or pro-
hibit entrance to a building, room or other place, notify prohibition of 
moving a certain object /.../ or take other such measure.”52 Media often 
depict this function as if they prevent civilians from intervening. The 
police have to perform a balancing act between prohibiting and asking 
civilians for necessary assistance (which seldom happens), while pre-
venting more casualties.  The latter is often a consequence of the phe-
nomenon that people who have just been saved from a fire return to it 
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to save their friends. This conflict between police, survivor and even the 
media, is described in the government report on the Gothenburg fire,53 
and in research studies of the communications situation in connection 
with the fire.54 
The medical staff and their efforts are seldom criticised in the con-
text of accidents and disasters. In actual fact they seldom get either 
praise or complaints and the paramedics' performance on site only fig-
ures in a few studies apart from the National Health and Welfare 
Board's so-called KAMEDO reports.55 They emerge as a grey and hard-
working mass – a kind of invisible heroes. Hospital staff, on the other 
hand, attracts the attention of the media after the acute phase. In the 
Health and Welfare Board's general guidelines the importance of con-
ducting rescue operations in a humane and dignified way is empha-
sised, and this includes providing protection from media exposure:  
All medical treatment on the accident site must, beyond the somatic care 
provision, also be imbued with humanity and the basic needs of warmth, wa-
ter, rest and discretion must be met. Correct and succinct information must 
be given tactfully and continuously. If possible do not separate family mem-
bers. It is also imperative that the affected are protected from further new 
and strong impressions, mass media and the public.56 
In international disaster medicine there are two main approaches 
to the treatment of injured in a disaster. The American model advocates 
minimal treatment on the scene and quick transportation to hospital, 
so-called load and go. The Swedish model prefers more extensive treat-
ment on the site with assessment and registration before transporta-
tion to hospital, so-called stay and play.57     The latter approach entails 
greater risks of exposing the injured and the deceased, which the jour-
nalists must consider. Both the accident site and the hospital are disas-
ter sites in this context.  
Irritation and conflicts between rescue personnel and the media 
have been documented after several major accidents and disasters.58 
”The mass media often have to bear the brunt of this, and justifiably 
so”, Atle Dyregrov comments in defence of the rescuers' anger with the 
journalists.  He offers the following quote from one of his studies as an 
example: ”Obtrusive journalists who tried to get inside the barriers to 
take photos of the dead,” said a member of the rescue team in response 
to the question of what was the hardest in connection with a plane 
crash. Dyregrov also refers to a study of rescuers after the Måbødalen 
bus accident, which shows that 90 per cent of the local rescue team 
thought that the media representatives behaved reprehensibly.  
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Journalists 
The journalist does not arrive at the scene alone. Also his or her col-
leagues or, as it were, competitors, are there.  Speaking about competi-
tion in the case of disasters may seem insensitive, and previous studies 
of rescue workers indicate more collegiality than competition between 
the media.60 But the tendencies are there, and gradually the collegial 
tension tends to grow. The thought of the photos the competitors might 
have taken, and observing how ”close” the other reporters venture, af-
fect the journalists' work in varying degrees. The internal professional 
discussion after major accidents usually involves blaming other papers 
for violating press ethics but seldom criticism of their own papers.61 
The contributions to the debate that describe how a colleague has dis-
graced the profession or caused suffering to others in some way can 
also be regarded as a reflection of the tension between journalists who 
have been working alongside under traumatic and stressful conditions.   
 
Meeting and portraying survivors 
To understand the work situation at an accident site it is imperative to 
know something about the survivor's condition and reactions. Around 
900 persons died in the Estonia ferry disaster. The Finnish psychology 
and psychiatry researchers Taiminen and Touminen62  observed 32 
survivors in immediate hospital care for four days.   
Directly after the rescue most of them were calm and only displayed 
minor emotions. This changed in the course of a few hours. Denial was 
the first reaction. Four survivors who had lost their family members got 
amnesia. They remembered ”everything but the last hours before their 
rescue”. This makes it difficult for journalists who need reliable 
sources. Their memories returned after two days, however. Many were 
thrown between euphoria, denial and anxiety. Some were afraid of the 
dark and developed agoraphobia.  Others mixed aggression with guilt. 
Survivor reactions are marked by the type of disaster that they have 
survived. In transportation accidents (ship, train, plane, and coach), 
the initial reactions are more intense, because the accident is often sud-
den and quick.63 Often such accidents happen in a remote place and 
inaccessible place, unknown to the survivors. This unspecific ”some-
where” increases the feeling of dislocation. Transportation accidents 
often involve people of different nationalities, which compound com-
munication between them and their relatives. Usually the media news 
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is out of sync with the next-of-kin communication. Certain types of 
transportation accidents, especially plane crashes most often have a 
100 per cent fatal outcome.   
Fire disasters produce similar reactions in many ways in the survi-
vors, but also differ in some respects from transportation accidents. For 
instance, there is sometimes a short alert phase even if the spread of 
the fire is very fast. Survivors of the stadium fire in Bradford in the UK 
in 1985 described, in regard to their physical experiences, that they 
barely felt any pain despite their burn injuries. Most of them felt the 
heat from which they tried to escape. Someone actually drove his car 
home without shoes – they had burnt.64 Psychologically, feelings of ter-
ror and panic dominated with a clear flight impulse. Dyregrov suggests 
that survivors' reaction pattern often involves ”rapid, automatic mobi-
lisation of accumulated experience”.65 At the accident site actors who, 
to a lesser and greater extent react automatically on the basis of accu-
mulated experiences, meet survivors, rescue staff and journalists. The 
relevant issue is therefore to define what type of accumulated experi-
ence is the most functional one in regard to individual coping and act-
ing at the accident site.  
 
When the directly affected are children and young adults 
The Gothenburg fire in 1998 claimed the lives of 63 children and young 
adults, even more were injured and many survived the horrible event. 
The journalists reporting on the event were faced with the task of depict-
ing severely traumatised children and young people.  
Directly or indirectly affected children and young people constitute 
an extremely vulnerable group. This thesis deals with such a situation 
as it involves directly affected, that is, killed or injured, children. 
Dyregrov emphasises that children have an (temporarily) increased 
need of closeness and contact in the event of a disaster. Children also 
display a number of normal symptom behaviours such as anxiety and 
anger. There is a tendency, however, he thinks, that adults underrate 
children's disaster reactions and need of help.66 
The grown-ups attitudes to children seem to be imbued with the perception that 
children soon forget what they have experienced, which may the reason for the com-
parative lack of studies of children's disaster.67 
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Coté and Simpson share the same line of thought, suggesting that 
parents, in spite of their love and care, are unreliable observers of chil-
dren's mental status.68 Previous research has primarily studied surviv-
ing children by interviewing their parents, with the result that many 
have been lulled into a sense of false security that children escape many 
normal disaster reactions: ”They’re okay” has been a far too common 
statement, in Coté och Simpson's view: 
Among the most acute reactions that children are afflicted with is a 
sense of unreality and disbelief, fear and bewilderment, coping and 
strength and finally magical thinking. Experiencing the event like a 
dream is more common in children than being overcome by a sense of 
unreality, and, above all, they are less inclined to deny the event com-
pared to adults.69 
The grown-ups' reactions to the event – if present – are very influ-
ential in how children react. Even if most children, particularly the 
older children, behave in a calm and collected manner at an accident 
site, complete paralysis is not uncommon. Children can lose control of 
body movements and feelings. They can also hide to escape danger. It 
is important for rescue staff to know that children tend to wander off 
from the scene on their own, as Dyregrov stresses.  
Unlike young children, teenagers can judge themselves harshly. 
This is especially true if they feel that they could have prevented some-
thing from happening. Guilt and self-recriminations are common and 
may take hold without objectives reasons. Dyregrov notes that there 
are striking similarities between children's and adults' way of reacting 
to disasters. This also explains the similarity in the symptoms afflicting 
affected rescue staff and journalists. When a major accident or disaster 
involves children, there are special demands put on the reporters, both 
in terms of consideration and in terms of knowledge about how chil-
dren react to disasters. This should be heeded when the journalists' 
sources are children and young adults.  
 
Accident site as workplace  
”Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise”, Martin Luther is reported to 
have said standing before the Imperial Diet (assembly) at Worms in 
1521.The philosopher Michael Polanyi interprets this to mean that the 
will of the individual ties her to a voluntary duty: ”The freedom of the 
subjective person to do as he pleases is overruled by the responsible 
person's freedom to act as he must.”70 Polanyi thinks that individual 
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conscience is the product of traditional education and selection. Pro-
fessional traditions strive to cultivate a conscience among its mem-
bers.7 1  Elaborating on Polanyi's science and society theory, the philos-
opher Bertil Rolf 72   interprets his ideas of a professional conscience. A 
functioning profession imparts higher values such as truth and justice 
and the conception that a calling pervades the professional practice. 
At the accident site, the journalists and photographers ”cannot do 
otherwise”. What does their professional conscience look like in this 
extreme working environment? A great deal has to do with the journal-
ists' sense of calling in depicting the unbelievable drama. For a 'real' 
journalist it is worse to be accused of doing too little than too much in 
such a situation, as Kerstin Persdotter, head of Swedish Channel 4 
News at the time, claims in the Publicists Yearbook in 1995 after the 
Estonia ferry disaster. The internal newsroom criticism is more severe 
if it turns out that a member has underrated an event, she suggests and 
adds that it is not wrong to criticise and question journalists' way of 
working, but not enough defence is offered to protect indisputable 
news reporting. In her own defence, Persdotter goes on to say: 
Reporting a disaster with so many victims becomes unbearable to follow, 
simply because what is described is unbearable./.../There were a few of-
fences made and those were the result of a very difficult working situation. 
It's not vulture-like to look for survivors and interview them in the hospital, 
wrapped in blankets, still clearly shocked by their terrifying experiences. I'd 
like to see the TV viewer or radio listener who wouldn't prefer to hear the 
story.  
Journalists in the field as well as the public as media consumers face 
the paradox involved in disaster reporting. We want to know more, but 
not too much. The journalist wants to report what has happened but with 
some reservations. How do journalists perceive this paradoxical and chal-
lenging task?  
 
International studies of disaster journalism  
Research on disaster reporting on site is available in a few studies, pri-
marily in the US, Great Britain and Australia. The previously men-
tioned American professors of journalism, William Coté and Roger 
Simpson, together with other researchers provide a good survey of the 
typical issues associated with journalistic practice in the context of ac-
cidents, disasters and other trauma in Covering Violence.73 Typical is-
sues are, for instance, the journalists' role as the public's eyewitness, 
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their own experiences, humanity versus the scoop, and reporting when 
children are victims. They try to define the distinguishing features of 
reporting on traumatic events and how to handle it since such reporting 
is often criticised by the public. Coté and Simpson also try to relate 
experiences of journalistic practice to current research on psychotrau-
matology with the purpose of supporting responsible journalism and 
increasing the journalists' understanding of their own crisis reactions 
and of those of the affected. As Coté and Simpson put it, the aim is to: 
”get more of the best and less of the worst”. 
The researchers' conclusions include that journalists sometimes 
have to shoulder the role of ”helper” despite their lack of knowledge of 
crisis reactions and trauma. In such cases the journalists must ”seek to 
avoid making damage”. In addition, it is beyond doubt that no one wit-
nessing a disaster can escape mental reactions, which in some cases 
could scar for life. This also applies to journalists.  
 
Scandinavian research on disaster journalism   
Nordic media researchers Blix & Bech-Karlsen74 were quick to study 
journalists' methods and ethics on accident sites. As residents in the 
Norwegian North, they had recourse to a number of accidents and dis-
asters in their vicinity. Because of its topography, northern Norway has 
been unusually hit with mountain and sea accidents. What started out 
as a teaching material for the journalism programme in northern Nor-
way turned eventually into an extensive research survey in the form of 
a manual.  
Blix and Bech-Karlsen describe how disaster and accident journal-
ism is pursued during different phases of the disaster. They have also 
studied journalism in connection with a number of Norwegian acci-
dents in the 1980s. The oil platform Alexander Kielland, which cap-
sized in 1980, is an example of how the information from uncertain 
sources was reproduced in the media, which had to correct themselves 
continually. The tabloid VG – Verdens Gang – launched strong criti-
cism against the security in the North Sea already in its first issue after 
the accident, thus marking the entrance of the critical disaster journal-
ism on the scene.75 
A plane crash in the so called Mehamn accident in1982 led to many 
years of speculations on the cause of the accident, which was never 
completely established. The media were eventually forced to wonder to 
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what extent they should pay attention to rumours and speculations in 
the event of an accident.76 
When an aeroplane with 33 passengers crashed into a mountain at 
Torghatten in 1988, a very risky and hard rescue operation ensued. 
Photos from the operation were attractive to the media.  The national 
media alerted the local press, which immediately dispatched photogra-
phers to the scene. On the day after the accident – a Saturday – both 
the local papers had many photos of the rescue operation. On Monday 
the national media and the TV channels published photos of bodies en-
cased in plastic. This introduced an extensive press ethics debate in 
Norway, which also encompassed self-criticism regarding the intensive 
pursuit of relatives of the victims.77 
The Vassdalen avalanche accident in 1986 exemplifies the infor-
mation crises that sometimes arise in connection with accidents and 
disasters. The press criticised the Norwegian armed forces and author-
ities for withholding essential information.  In return, the media were 
attacked for unacceptable methods, witch-hunting scapegoats and lack 
of consideration for the affected.78 
The coach accident in Måbødalen (with Swedish school children 
from Kista) led to intensive press ethical discussions in Norway and 
Sweden. In this case, the hospitals were the main criticisers of media 
methods. The hospitals reported after the accident that the affected had 
experienced the press as ”beasts” and the hospital felt haunted by the 
media. Some members of the responders also felt disturbed by the jour-
nalists' intrusive questions about the cause of the accidents during the 
rescue operation in progress.79 
 
Swedish studies 
Several major accidents and disasters have been documented and stud-
ied in Sweden:  the hotel fire in Borås in 1978,80 the coach accident in 
Måbødalen in1988,81 the Estonia ferry disaster in 1994,82 and the 
Gothenburg fire in 199883 are some examples. Swedish researchers and 
practitioners have also studied major international events such as the 
9 September terror attack in 2001.84 In addition, there were the fire on 
the ferry the Scandinavian Star in 1990, the tram accident in Gothen-
burg in 199285 and accidents and crimes such as the Flink murders in 
Falun in 1994.86 The two former accidents were never evaluated from a 
media theoretical perspective. In the wake of the Måbødals accident, 
there was a certain internal professional debate but there is very little 
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media research related to the event. The coach accident in Måbødalen 
must, however, be seen as a watershed moment in the Swedish accident 
and disaster journalism even if research in the field only took off after 
the Estonia disaster. ”A more ruthless professional group has seldom 
been seen”, the priest Stig Jonsson and the journalist Annika Hagström 
commented in a documentary debate book.87 
Swedish research on the media coverage of crises, accidents and dis-
asters has been dominated by studies of media coverage (content)88 
and crisis communication.89 Some have adopted the perspective of the 
affected,90 but none provide any detailed analysis of journalism on the 
accident site.91 Studies of the responders' working conditions and men-
tal reactions, however, are richly represented.92 These provide an im-
portant basis for this study of journalist profession's working condi-
tions on the accident site.  
The pursuit of publishable material on accidents, disasters and 
crime poses questions about several professional dilemmas as stressed 
in some previous works.93 
 
Studies of the fire disaster 
Ten days after the Gothenburg fire, the government decided to appoint 
a special analyst to investigate how the communication of news and in-
formation regarding the fire had worked for the affected persons with 
a non-Swedish background. The appointee was Professor Kent Asp at 
the Department of Journalism at Gothenburg University. The govern-
ment referred to the discussions caused by the fire, not least on issues 
related to the rescue operation, the police investigation and public se-
curity in connection with public events. There was also a concern that 
the debate after the event might fuel and deepen the gaps between 
groups of people in the community. The investigator was also in-
structed to investigate the working conditions for the mass media that 
particularly targeted immigrants.  
The government report SOU 1999:6894 states that the Gothenburg 
fire is the worst fire in Sweden in modern times. The conclusions on 
the media performance include that there were relatively few specula-
tions in the media despite the fact that the fire hit the world news and 
despite the rescue leaders early statement that the fire was deliberately 
started. Some criticism was directed at the premature and intrusive in-
terviews with young people with intense stress reactions, who were dis-
satisfied with the achievements of the police and rescue services. The 
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report states that ”it is important and natural to interview eyewitnesses 
but also important that journalists and photographers are aware that a 
state of shock can affect people's personalities and judgement.”95 The 
problems mentioned regarding the rescue staff's treatment of the 
youngsters can be explained by the stressful situation, which did not 
facilitate flexibility in work approaches and attitudes. The report sug-
gests that the people in charge need to know their staff so well that they 
can send the most suitable persons for the task of working flexibly and 
emphatically with agitated people with acute stress reactions,96 which 
is a conclusion that should reasonably be applied also to media organ-
isations.  
Shortly after the government inquiry of the fire, the Swedish Board 
of Psychological Defence (SPF) initiated an investigation performed by 
researchers from Örebro and Gothenburg. Stig-Arne Nohrstedt and 
Larsåke Larsson headed several studies of information and communi-
cation situation in connection with the event. While the government 
inquiry called the event ”the fire disaster”, the SPF study called it the 
”Gothenburg fire”. The latter was based on medical criteria for major 
accident and disaster respectively.   
Larsson and Nohrstedt's research group primarily mapped the au-
thorities' handling of the fire and its consequences. It was noted, for 
instance, that the joint disaster management organisation of the City of 
Gothenburg worked well from a coordinating perspective compared to 
if various authorities had operated with their own crisis team. Regard-
ing the communication achievements there was an obvious and new 
channel in use, namely the mobile phone. Via mobile phones the event 
was communicated rapidly between the young people and their fami-
lies, and also internally between the rescue and medical services and 
other authorities. Computer communication via the internet had a 
great impact too. Even though papers did not exist on the web to the 
same extent as today in 1998, web pages and chat functions were ex-
tensively used. As so often the case in accident and disaster situations, 
media were the dominant channel of information for the general pub-
lic. The authorities focused on providing information to the media and 
one another.  
A number of studies of the Gothenburg fire have been conducted 
with a focus on other aspects that the media perspective, of which some 
have relevance to this thesis, for instance, two studies at Karlstad Uni-
versity in psychology and public health, one by Per Folkesson on the 
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rescue services operations and their stress reactions,97 and one by Bar-
bro Renck with a similar focus on the police.98 
Folkesson's study (primarily involving firemen and medical emer-
gency staff) shows that the rescue operations were characterised by fo-
cus, physical strength and endurance. The mental mobilisation in-
volved keeping staff focused, paying attention, temporarily shutting 
down emotional functions and subordinating all actions beyond the op-
erative target of saving lives. The study does not indicate any major 
psychological consequences for firemen and smoke-helmeted firemen. 
However, there were more signs among medical staff, cirisis support 
staff, and particularly among women. The importance of teamwork and 
the function of organisations for a well-executed operation was part of 
the conclusions. 
Renck's study of the police operation during the nightly fire shows 
that the policemen experienced a number of stressors. The media re-
porting is described as a stress factor. Other stressors were the uncer-
tainty surrounding the call-out, the strong sensory impressions and the 
magnitude of the fire. Surprisingly, the study shows increased immun-
ity to stress reactions in those who had experienced more traumatic 
events after the fire (the study was carried out one and a half year after 
the fire).   Renck suggests that some sort of immunity can arise in com-
bination with coping strategies and that policemen with a ”strong psy-
che” unconsciously or consciously choose difficult challenges. 
Margareta Bäck-Wiklund and colleagues at the CEFOS99 in Gothen-
burg show in their report how existential issues surfaced after the fire: 
”Everything came to a standstill in a black hole and nothing was recog-
nisable. Would existence ever be the same again? Would everyday life, 
joy and faith in the future ever return? Immediately after the fire, it was 
difficult for many people – not just the directly affected – to see how 
normality could be reinstituted.”100 An interesting question is if the 
journalists witnessing the fire were filled with similar emotions and an-
guish.  
The crisis groups and their support of people affected by the fire 
have been the subject of a number of studies by a research group (FoU 
Väst) in the social care area, notably the experience document ”Meet-
ing what you meet” in which support centre staff describe their experi-
ences, for instance,  social worker Britt  Berggren who writes about 
”committed journalists who really respected the afflicted and our work” 
and that ”cooperating with the media can even have a therapeutic ef-
fect.”101 Tuija Nieminen Kristoferson has studied how individual grief 
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can be both private and public, not least through the media.102 The 
Gothenburg sociologist Abby Peterson has both studied integration as 
a process after the fire103, and the fire disaster in a collective memory 
perspective,104 called ”the black hole”, and the memory of life before the 
fire. Peterson refers to the growing research interest in how people cre-
ate meaning in life. On the basis of this sociological perspective she has 
studied how the persons affected by the fire together shape and form 
their memories, sharing their grief. Commemorative days and other 
ceremonies have assumed great importance, not least on the initiative 
of BOA – Fire Victims Families' Association. Abby Peterson notes 
among other things, that several factors affect what we remember, 
namely when we remember, with whom we remember, where we re-
member, and for what purpose we remember. The trauma is the most 
forceful version of remembrance, which in the worst case may mean 
that intrusive recollections can totally occupy an affected or bereaved 
person.105 Peterson emphasises the importance of the cultural context 
in memory processing. This was apparent after the fire since the af-
fected had different backgrounds. There is also a kind of discrepancy 
between the public mass media death and the private and invisible 
grief. The latter may make the bereaved feel insecure and aban-
doned.106 Previous studies, for instance Eva Reimer's study of Estonia 
ferry disaster families, have also shown that collective memory sharing 
is supportive.107 Reasonably, this means that the rescue services, other 
responders, and the journalists' would also be in need of a collective 
memory community after a traumatic assignment where they have wit-
nessed suffering and death.  
However, none of the studies mentioned have specifically paid any 
detailed attention to the journalist profession. This thesis fills this gap, 
as it is not only based on the empirical studies that was carried out to-
gether with media researchers as part of the SPF study above in 1999 
and 2000,108 but is also a substantially more detailed and profound ex-
pansion of the empirical material. 
 
Learn from history 
One way of acquiring knowledge of the practice of journalism and me-
dia organisations is to study its performance in connection with a spe-
cific event. We can, for instance, look back on several interesting news 
coverage in the past, which have shaped the organisation and practice 
of Swedish media.109 An early example is train accident in Ställdalen in 
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1956 when 41 persons, of whom many were children on their way home 
from school, lost their lives. The day after, the daily newspapers pub-
lished reports that were extremely obtrusive, detailed and exposing.110 
The local press was most obtrusive while the national morning and 
evening papers were more moderate. Today, the situation is the reverse 
according to several studies of accidents.111 A couple of hours after the 
accident, which was described in terms of a disaster, the Swedish Radio 
broadcast a live telephone interview, which later was to be regarded as 
a breakthrough for telephone interviews in the radio. Bengt Feldreich 
conducted the interview respectfully. The Swedish radioman Sven 
Jerring broadcast live from the funeral in the Ljusnarsberg's Church. 
Subsequent to this event, freelance journalists were retained by the ra-
dio to allow for a more ”mobile” radio journalism. A few months after 
the Ställdalen accident, the real news breakthrough for the radio news 
Echo of the Day (Dagens Eko) came when the Sweden – America Line 
passenger ship Stockholm collided with the Italian ocean liner Andrea 
Doria in thick fog off the US east coast. Across the Atlantic Ocean, the 
news correspondent Arne Thorén reported on the radio more or less 
live.112  Swedish Television got started with live news broadcasting dur-
ing the underground collapse at Skanstull in Stockholm in 1967, which 
lasted for three days and nights, the longest live broadcast up till then, 
during which the viewers could follow the dramatic event to its success-
ful resolution.113 
Through decades, events such as the coach accident in Måbødalen, 
Scandinavian Star ferry fire, Estonia ferry disaster, the tsunami in 
2004 and others have come to shape media practice. Each event has 
resulted in a new discussion on norms, ideals, professional code, and 
ethical rules, sometimes resulting in new routines and procedures, 
sometimes quickly sinking into oblivion, that is, the same mistakes and 
press ethical errors are still repeated at a new site. Ekström and 
Nohrstedt define the aim of the journalistic outcome as ”sufficiently” 
factual and balanced.114 They emphasise that efficiency and the ability 
to turn the unpredictable and complicated into something predictable 
and simple is everything in a profession with tight time limits.  
 
Concluding remarks  
The situation is a great importance to journalists' reactions and perfor-
mance at the accident site. Is it a natural or a technical ('man made') 
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disaster? A deliberate fire or terror threat can be psychologically more 
difficult to handle than an unintentional plane crash. But a natural dis-
aster, unprovoked by humans can still be traumatic to report for a jour-
nalist. The geographical range of a disaster also affect the journalists' 
task, as does the time it happened. When a disaster happens in the 
night, or weekend when staffing is minimal, there is less chance of col-
legial support, professional backup and leadership decisions. The place 
also affects working conditions and reaction patterns. Is the area acces-
sible or not? Are the journalists eyewitnesses or do they get their infor-
mation second-hand at another venue? The Estonia ferry disaster at 
sea was not possible to witness. At the Gothenburg fire, on the other 
hand, both reporters and photographers witnessed the raging fire.  
The question who the directly affected persons are is also of the 
greatest importance. Are they children, young persons or adults? Are 
they even communicable? The journalists' contacts at the accident site 
play an important role, and often involve tensions and even conflicts 
that the reporters and photographers have to handle. Survivors who 
think the media presence is a provocation, rescue workers who think 
that the photographers are in the way or that the journalists interfere, 
family members who want to protect their loved ones and curious peo-
ple who want to feature in the media in the roles of self-proclaimed he-
roes and saviours. Often tension may arise between journalists and also 
between reporters on the site and editors in the office. 
No accident or disaster is like another.  Every event has its own in-
gredients colouring the situation. The Gothenburg fire at Backaplan in 
October 1998 was essentially an uncontrollable and initially uncertain 
situation.  The affected were all children and young people, represent-
ing 19 nationalities. The fire was raging when the first reporters and 
photographers arrived at the scene. They became witnesses to a disas-
ter. It was night-time and a holiday, which means that the press and 
media were staffed by fewer people. There were many stressors: strong 
sensory impressions, many children, time pressure, uncertainties and 
a palpable role conflict for the reporters between the private person and 
the professional person.   
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 THE PROFESSION 
Journalists, rescue service staff, police officers and health care person-
nel – all these professional categories arrive at an accident site on a 
professional mission. While the rescue services, the police, and emer-
gency care services have the duty to save, help and physically prevent 
the spread and consequences of the accident or disaster, the journalist's 
duty is to observe and report. This situation places the journalist as a 
professional witness in a psychologically very special position, and is a 
situation that is minimally explored in research.  
A person with a specific profession arrives at a place where the sit-
uation is as extreme as described in the previous chapter. This chapter 
deals with the tasks, demands and expectations that accompany report-
ers and photographers to the accident site and the dilemma and con-
flicts that they may encounter as a result of the extreme working con-
ditions at the accident site. What tasks are involved in the assignment 
and the journalistic framework? What challenges, considerations, 
norms and rules govern the professional practice in these extreme cir-
cumstances? And what tensions arise between the private and profes-
sional roles?  
 
 
Journalistic mandate 
The media are indispensable channels in a crisis affecting a commu-
nity, locally, nationally or globally. The journalism practised is ex-
pected to be true, factual and relevant, but is in fact also spiced with a 
dramaturgy beyond the dramatic components of the actual event. Peo-
ple want to know ”everything”, and also be spared the worst. A recur-
ring journalist's dilemma is this: how do we report on what has hap-
pened in a bearable way and with tolerable photos in terms of press 
ethics? How do we achieve providing a complete account of facts while 
avoiding unwanted publicity for the individual? The impetus to write is 
strong. The typical disaster happens unexpectedly, affects many and 
the outcome is uncertain. It is, in other words, per definition a perfect 
news item, which explains why the media are especially triggered by 
such extreme events.  
A driving force of all accident reporting is also the fact that accidents 
(and crime) constitute the Swedish news consumers' primary reading.1 
A day of newspaper reading, radio listening and TV watching reveals 
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that the news flow is filled with accidents, crime, war, disasters and 
tragedies of all kinds, thus indicating that such events are important 
elements of news journalism.  
Already in the mid-1980s, Lennart Weibull demonstrated that news 
of accidents and crime is essential to a newspaper's appeal.2 Hvitfelt 
has confirmed the media audience's attraction to accident and crime in 
more recent studies.3 The journalists share this assessment of news 
value, as shown in Marina Ghersetti's chapter in The Swedish Journal-
ist Corps (Den svenska journalistkåren).4 Sensational, dramatic and 
excited news tops the Swedish journalists' list. To this category belong 
accidents and disasters.5 
Such events are often related through the media camera lens before 
citizens and authorities have had time to react and act. The merciless 
abruptness has often been criticised for good reasons. But again, the 
question is if an unbearable event can ever be recounted in a bearable 
way.   
At the rate of media expansion and growing importance in our lives, 
the amount of news reporting and information in the event of crisis has 
increased. Unexpected events with many deaths attract the greatest in-
terest. Lowe Hedman notes that ca. 50 000 people die in traffic acci-
dents every year. This is tantamount to 200 jumbo jets crashing every 
year. During two days after the Lockerbie plane crash in 1988 more 
people lost their lives on the American highways than in Lockerbie.6 In 
other words, in terms of news value, interest lies in unexpected mass 
death events rather than the gradual accumulation of accidental 
deaths.  
The basic conception of the role of media is actually debated. The 
freedom of speech and the press and access to information set the 
norms for the media. At the same time, there is a basic confusion re-
garding the function of the media in accidents and disasters, as the 
Norwegian media researcher Jan Inge Sørbø has pointed out.7 When 
are deviations from the norm justified?  When should other considera-
tions be made? How should journalists relate to their own profession 
at the accident site?  
At the beginning of the 1990s, Kent Asp put the question of the jour-
nalist's mandate to the test in the journalism anthology The Assign-
ment.8 Firstly: Does something called the journalistic mandate really 
exist? Secondly: Where does the mandate come from? The answers 
only partly supported the fact that the democratic mandate is to inform 
the public. Asp also claims that we need to ask to which media and what 
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content the requirement to inform the public pertains. He further asks 
who decides if the requirement has been met or not. A speculative an-
swer is that such assessment can be left to public debate and research. 
But publicists and journalists must evaluate and control the mandate 
too, in Asp's view. Journalists should be in the service of the public and 
truth.9 In the service of the public, media consumers should be influ-
enced in a certain direction and in the service of truth citizens should 
be given the information and knowledge required to make their own 
decisions. In the latter case, the paradoxical situation of state control 
of the media and their free and independent position is palpable.  Being 
in the service of truth does not necessarily equal being in the service of 
the public.  
Kent Asp's argument and questions are relevant in a study of jour-
nalistic practice at an accident site. The question of who gives the as-
signment and how, is of interest as is the question of self-evaluation 
and control during and after the completion of the mission.   
In several situations the journalist's self-scrutiny has been known, 
as public reactions are fairly immediate. But even if discussions have 
been conducted for decades there are still no clear key words for jour-
nalist practice at accident or disaster sites. However, it is noteworthy 
that the journalistic discussions are seldom about the issue 'why we are 
here', but rather 'how we should proceed when we are here'. Blix and 
Bech-Karlsen think that the first issue is closely linked to the media's 
independent position, which means that media loyalty is with the pub-
lic.10 The journalists are therefore at the site on behalf of the public. As 
a result, anyone who closes the door to the media closes the door to the 
public. Needless to say, there are situations when doors must tempo-
rarily be closed and the presence of the media regulated, but the right 
to observe and recount is still the basic principle.   
 
Media and journalist functions in accident reporting 
The role of the media at the accident or disaster site is complex and the 
expectations of journalistic practice may be perceived as contradictory. 
What are the professional demands? Some earlier studies deal with this 
issue.11 Nohrstedt has described a number of paradoxes emerging in 
media reporting on crises and disasters, which can illustrate the dilem-
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mas that journalists face:  Should I inform or examine? Be quick or cor-
rect? Create understanding or dramaturgy?  Evaluate or think of news 
value? 12 
The first paradox is that the media are assumed to provide a na-
tional stabilising information channel while the journalists are ex-
pected to be unaligned with the state and even critically scrutinise pub-
lic authorities and administration. It is difficult to say what this para-
dox means in a specific situation such as a disaster, other than that it 
requires flexibility and adjusting to situations.  
The second paradox entails a conflict between the demands for 
speed, as the case is for all news journalism, and for correct information 
about the disaster. Both demands cannot be fulfilled simultaneously 
and have different importance to different journalists and situations.  
The third paradox is the one involving understanding and entertain-
ment. The founder of the Swedish newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, Rudolf 
Wall, in his time emphasised the importance of interest.13 In the so-
called media logic, certain presentational forms can be related to a sit-
uation in a way that creates a situational media dramaturgy. Sensation-
alism, stereotyping, and polemics are common in the media's pursuit 
to awaken interest. In a disastrous situation there is a risk that the 
dramaturgy becomes en encumbrance to both the information delivery 
and the investigative and problematizing type of journalism.14 
The fourth paradox, described by Nohrstedt, is the conflict between 
evaluation and news value. This is related to the time perspective in the 
reporting against the background that the short-term journalism is in-
fluenced by the news value while the evaluation and the profound re-
porting take place in a later phase.  
The contradictory aspects in covering an accident or disaster are the 
biggest challenges to the journalists. This and previous studies exem-
plify several conflict situations related to all of these paradoxes such as 
confrontations during media reporting on accident scenes.15 
Nearly all disasters unfold according to a fixed pattern.16 A number 
of development phases can usually be discerned, as in all types of crisis, 
not least the individual different states of stress reactions.   
Needless to say, journalism may take varying forms in different 
phases of an accident or disaster. When an event is preceded by a warn-
ing period, this could be called crisis or risk journalism.17 This form of 
media reporting in Sweden has been studied by Jarlbro, Hedman, 
Nordlund and Nohrstedt and others.18 From a warning period (risk 
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journalism) via an acute phase (disaster journalism) to a so-called am-
bivalence period (investigative news journalism), a new direction 
phase (with more long-term investigative journalism) could eventually 
be reached. These  phases can probably last for days or weeks. The 
drama or the excitement may remain at a high level.19 The disaster jour-
nalism in the acute phase of the event may be characterised by a pre-
sent tense form and the press reporting shares features with the speedy 
uncensored news transmission of the radio and the TV. The later phase 
(ambivalence period) can last for months or years, partly depending on 
the extent to which the cause of the accident has been established. The 
Estonia ferry disaster is such a still unresolved event and the subject of 
authority and press inquiries whenever new information is produced. 
Commemorations and new investigations are usually distressful for 
those who were traumatised. 
Crisis situations are characterised by lability and involve choice-
making. Individual and collective stress marks the situation, which also 
leaves room for subjective interpretations. Handling the conditions, 
tensions and paradoxes in such a situation is not an easy matter for the 
individual journalist. It is a matter of public concern that the media 
members should be able to handle such situations.  
In the study The impact of the Tsunami (Tsunamins genomslag) on 
the media handling of the tidal wave in South Asia in 2004, it is stated 
that the role of the press as information provider and channel for find-
ing missing people was greater than ever before.20 The press assisted in 
calling for missing people on the web as well as in the papers. In this 
way, the news reporting targeted both readers in Sweden and the 
Swedes in Thailand.  The press functioned as information as well as 
news provider.  
The journalist profession may sometimes be routinely difficult and 
stressful. At an accident site or a disaster area the stress and press are 
increased. The issues normally facing journalists are sharpened and 
norms and rules may have to be revised. The battle against the clock is 
there, along with the pursuit of status within and beyond the profes-
sion. The scoop, headlines and newspaper poster photos are incentives 
that may conflict with their own morals and ethics. Personal journalism 
is perhaps set against industrial media production, that is, the paper's 
economic interest against individual wish or reluctance to exaggerate 
and dramatize the event. Tensions and conflicts between journalists 
and rescue staff can aggravate the situation considerably.  Beyond the 
interpersonal tensions there is also a field of tension between theory 
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and practice and between the text and reality.  Professional ethics and 
press ethical rules are such examples.   
The journalist – the reporter and the photographer – has a difficult 
and complex task as an indirectly affected individual and a professional 
eyewitness. The professional conscience may guide more than written 
norms and rules. Arriving at an accident site and quickly forming an 
idea of what has happened is difficult. The Swedish Armed forces' 
training manual states: ”The greatest difficulty in complex operations 
is often to identify and define the situation, the task or the problem.”21 
The heart of news journalism is to assess, interpret and recount an 
event in a short time.  When this has to take place in chaotic circum-
stances, high demands are placed on the individual journalist. The risk 
of erroneous decisions increases as it does in all decision-making situ-
ations under duress.  
The interpretation a professional person makes in a given situation 
contributes to a subjective view of reality there and then. Interpreting 
and coping with a situation is a way of creating order. The historian 
Peter Englund suggests that”order is something we invent to hide a 
confusion we cannot bear to watch.”22 
 
Organising work  
As the American sociologist and media researcher Gaye Tuchman put 
it, news journalism ”is to routinize unpredictability.”23 Disasters and 
accidents belong to the most unpredictable that we can imagine. And 
even when this unexpected event happens, the production process, 
deadlines and distribution have to be maintained within given time 
limits. News production involves organisation to a great extent. It is a 
paradox in news production that routine is set against flexibility.24 The 
latter is a great challenge in the case of an accident, as this may be fol-
lowed by decisions on more publishing, extra editions, more staff, tem-
porary newsroom at the site, and so on.  
The practice of journalism encompasses a multitude of situations of 
choice, deliberations and priorities. These are partly based on the social 
and editorial duty, partly on the circumstances and conditions of the 
assignment. Norwegian media researcher Martin Eide describes jour-
nalism practice as ”creativity in an industry-like environment.”25 Stud-
ies of journalistic practice indicate that it frequently diverges from the 
professional ideal of creative journalism. Reality often turns out to be 
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very structured. But within the structures, there is usually room for var-
iations in performing the assignment.  
The power to publish or not to publish lies with the media, some-
times with the individual journalist, but more often with the editor and 
the publisher, or at times even the owner. The control of the assignment 
to the journalist, as well as the content of the paper, can apply to both 
the acquisition and editing of the text and photo. The journalist's own 
freedom of selection and interpretation can vary.26 
When reporters arrive at the site, they may have given themselves 
the assignment as the only person on duty in the middle of the night, 
or in a place without a local reporter, to which a journalist or photog-
rapher arrives first. In practice, the journalist on the scene can direct 
the needs of the paper, request more colleagues, or decides what has to 
be done. After some hours, when the editors have caught up and col-
lected information from several channels other than the reporter in 
place, the control of the process is handed over to the office.  
 
Management and co-worker role 
News journalism involves handling the unpredictable in a predictable 
way. When the situation is extremely unpredictable, as it is during a 
major accident or disaster, routine procedures may have to be replaced 
with improvisation and intuition. In both cases – the normal day and 
the unusual day – the morning meeting plays a great role in gaining 
control of the product to be (article or newspaper). Monica Löfgren-
Nilsson's studies of three editorial offices show, however, that the 
morning meetings seldom allow room for discussions of journalism.27 
They are rather based on the news editor's list of job priorities. The 
morning meeting seems to be the editors' chance to control work. If an 
accident happens in the night, the function of the morning meeting is 
both to get information on the night's events and manage the work 
ahead. Ekström and Nohrstedt mention the time pressure as a limita-
tion of the journalist's chance to fulfil ideals, but also that time frames 
are a resource.28 The production process is preset and the ”editorial 
machinery” is still at work and everyone knows which slots to fill and 
when.   
Monica Löfgren Nilsson notes that the past fifteen years have in-
volved radical changes in Swedish newsrooms.29 Digitalisation and in-
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creased production, fewer employees and more temporary project em-
ployees, increased stress and demands for multi-task skills are the rea-
sons.  
In the daytime, newsroom staff would normally have time for re-
viewing a colleague's material. At night, such procedures may be ne-
glected. Löfgren-Nilsson's previous newsroom studies show that the 
night editor must often settle for checking headlines and photo cap-
tions. Time pressure in combination with modern production technol-
ogy has had this effect. The technology allows reporter and the photog-
rapher to insert their own material and in principle ”pour the text and 
photos” directly into the paper. The chief editor can therefore not be 
sure that a night chief and an editor have read the texts.30 
In a newspaper office, the news director leads, plans and organises 
the daily work. The chief editor and sometimes the managing editors, 
on the other hand, play a more peripheral role in daily journalistic prac-
tice. Their decisions, on the other hand, can have immediate conse-
quences for the newsroom practice, for instance, regarding publishing 
on a normally publication free holiday, which was the case at the time 
of the Gothenburg fire in 1998.   
It is reasonable to assume that the kind of journalistic product that 
the reporter or photographer on the scene feel that they are expected 
to deliver varies with the type of paper they work for. In Ekström and 
Nohrstedt's studies of newsrooms it was clear that the evening press 
has the aim to attract attention, provoke, and entertain, thus differing 
greatly from the aims of the local press. The evening press articles need 
not always be balanced and may contain certain exaggerations, gener-
alisations, far-reaching approaches and sensational headlines.31 On the 
other hand, Ekströms and Nohrstedt's participatory observations at an 
evening newspaper showed that the colleagues protected the personal 
dignity of interviewees to a greater extent than the debate on evening 
press journalism seems to suggest. The researchers found no evidence 
that evening press journalist were more cynical and careless than other 
reporters. However, evening press journalists took a lighter approach 
to norms such as comprehensiveness and accuracy.32 
To a varied extent the press has its own house rules for reporting. 
When Tomas Andersson-Odén in 1996 investigated the existence of 
policy documents in Swedish newsrooms, it turned out that half of the 
pressrooms had one.33 The question is if such policies serve as control 
instruments for managements or if individual employees apply them. 
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Löfgren-Nilsson notes that the papers' policy documents have no rele-
vance to reporters and news directors in their daily work. 
What is the reporters' relation to their news directors and how con-
trolled do they feel in their work? Löfgren-Nilsson's studies shows that 
it is primarily non-urban paper journalists that enjoy great freedom to 
choose how to cover something. In different degrees, reporters and 
photographers are under the orders of news directors that are either 
democratic or authoritarian in their leadership. Most news directors 
seem to be democratic leaders, seeing themselves as advisers and 
sounding boards. The democratic leadership is not unequivocally pos-
itive. It can also be an effect of lack of initiative.34 
Freelance journalists work under different terms than employed 
journalists. But the freelancers must also adjust to the norms and ideals 
characterising the news organisations where they publish their articles. 
When the alert is given, the freelancers are often at the accident site. 
Some photographers use the SOS Alarm Centre for emergency calls,  as 
a wake up call. Freelance reporters living outside the cities often work 
with great mobility in time and room.  
 
Professional codes and ethics 
The press ethical rules and the professional rules among the press 
corps are important to Swedish journalists. Everyday journalist prac-
tice is filled with difficult and contradictory consideration.  At an acci-
dent site the considerations can be complicated, change character and 
the decisions taken can have considerable consequences. News jour-
nalism and its ethical ideals are so demanding that they are difficult to 
achieve, as Ekström and Nohrstedt point out.35 While being demand-
ing, they might also be unclear and contradictory.  
Rules are very important in the performance of tasks in all opera-
tional areas. But rules cannot be supreme. They also need a practice.  
Today, rule and socially defined patterns are often interchangeable. A 
social community decides what is right or wrong in certain given situ-
ations and what is in accordance with the rule and what is a violation 
of it.36 It can also be seen as a basic principle of many professional 
codes defined by social and professional communities. If individuals 
really follow the rule or simply think they do, is a completely different 
matter.  
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Norms differ from rules by not being bound by law. The third Com-
mandment ”Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy” is an example 
of a norm – a recommendation. Codes or rules, on the other hand, are 
followed by sanctions or sanction possibilities. For what do we need 
norms? When we realise the value of a norm, force is invested in it. It 
involves how we should act or should not act in different situations. 
According to Hans-Gunnar Axberger, a basic press ethical professional 
norm is always to tell the truth.37 Essentially, norms are passed-down 
experiences of what is right or wrong. Swedish journalists have both 
written and unwritten professional norms. To these can be added the 
existing professional and publicity codes and rules, which can be sanc-
tioned if violated.  
The professional ethics expected to guide the journalists in their 
work are specified in the booklet Code of Ethics for Press, Radio and 
Television in Sweden (Spelregler för press, radio och TV)38 which is 
published and updated by the joint board of media associations in Swe-
den, including the journalists’ union, the Swedish publicists’ associa-
tion and the branch organisation of press publishers. The journalists 
are thus committed to follow certain principles in their professional 
practice.  
The publicity rules involve the following recommendations: 
 Provide accurate news by being critical of sources and checking 
factual details. The poster, preamble and headline should be sup-
ported by the text.  
 Respect individual privacy. Consider carefully any publicity 
which could violate the privacy of individuals. Refrain from such 
publicity unless the public interest obviously demands public 
scrutiny. 
 Exercise care in the use of pictures. 
 Be cautious in publishing names. 
The professional codes pertain to the journalistic integrity and cred-
ibility in the way material is obtained. Reasonable requests from inter-
viewed people of knowing in advance how and where their statements 
will be published must be met. Special consideration should be paid to 
inexperienced interviewees, and the interviewee should be notified if 
the interview is intended for publication or only for information. Inter-
views and photos must not be faked: ”Montage, electronic retouch and 
captions should be handled in such a way as not to mislead or deceive 
the reader. Whenever a picture has been altered through montage or 
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retouch this should be stated. This also applies to such material when 
it is filed in picture libraries”. 
Special consideration should be paid to the photograph assignment 
and to the procurement of photos, especially in connection with acci-
dents and crime: ”Always show the greatest possible consideration for 
victims of crime and accidents. Consider carefully the question whether 
to publish names and pictures with regard to the victims and their rel-
atives”. 
The ”rules of the game” regarding photos and names apply to re-
porters, photographers and their supervisors. ”Consider carefully any 
publicity which could violate the privacy of individuals. Refrain from 
such publicity unless the public interest obviously demands public 
scrutiny”, it says. 
It is obvious that the interpretation of the rules is elastic. The cul-
tural climate and general mentality have increasingly come to take a 
less tolerant view of the publication of names.39 Many people think that 
most journalistic blunders are in violation of laws, agreements and eth-
ical rules. In actual fact, the media themselves exercise the most crucial 
censorship in accordance with the current press ethical system, even 
when the law would allow publication.  
Of the different professional codes, advertising ethics is probably 
closest to press ethics. Another example is the ethical codes of the med-
ical profession, the so-called doctors’ rules.40 Although these directives 
are often called rules, they are in fact norms and principles.  However, 
some of these professional ethical codes are linked to sanctions, such 
as exclusion from the professional community, and therefore meet the 
criterion of  ”rule”.  
Let us translate the two dimensions of ethics – praxis and inner 
character – into journalistic terms: the press ethical framework is then 
”ethos” and ”ethikos” is what the individual journalist actually does and 
wants to do in a specific situation, i.e. the theory and practice of press 
ethics.  
Journalism ethics involves two contradictory demands. One is the 
demand for truth and the other is the importance of respecting per-
sonal dignity. The press ethical guidelines can be said to be a necessary 
but not satisfactory part of ethical journalistic practice. Many newspa-
pers have realised this and issued additional house rules and policy 
documents on ethics and morality in reporting. Mostly, however, the 
ethical dimension exists in an unwritten and tacit form, for example, in 
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continuous newsroom discussions.41  This may apply especially to trau-
matic events and disasters as the situation is usually characterised by 
great uncertainty and a great many people that experience stress reac-
tions, including journalists.  
 
Approved and questioned media ethics   
While the mass media devote more and more space to ethical and 
moral issues, press ethics has paradoxically been more questioned in 
recent years. Complaints made to ethical review boards of Radio and 
TV and the press  (The Swedish Braodcasting Authority, Radio Com-
plaints Commission and the Press Complaints Commission) are fre-
quent.  Many express disapproval of faked interviews, photos secretly 
taken and spectacular approaches in requesting interviews (for exam-
ple, when journalists have stated a false identity (as close relative or 
friend) to gain access to hospital wards.42 
Another problem in the journalism ethics is the globalisation of the 
media situation. Traditionally, the proximity of event and newspaper 
office has made newspapers careful about photos, names and other del-
icate matters out of consideration for the family and friends of victims. 
But today, when nearly every Swede can watch CNN, the geographical 
distance loses significance. CNN and Sky Channel could show close-
ups of victims in the Baltic Sea after the Estonia ferry disaster. And in 
a developed industrial country like Sweden, far away is also near.  
What do the ethical principles mean to Swedish journalists? The 
studies made at the Department of Journalism, Media and Communi-
cation, at Gothenburg University, show tremendous support for the 
press codes among journalists. Since the first survey, made in 1989, the 
support has increased. The principles of treating individuals with care 
have the strongest support among women and younger journalists. In 
recent years there have been several debates and discussions on the 
press ethical framework, both internally in the branch journals 
(Pressens Tidning and Journalisten), and externally in newspaper op-
ed pieces (opinion editorials), in TV and radio debates.  More and more 
voices are heard calling for a review of the rules and also of the institu-
tional ethical review made by The Swedish Braodcasting Authority 
(Granskningsnämnden för radio och TV) and the Press Ombudsman 
(PO/PoN).43 In the autumn of 2006 the book Media ethics under de-
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bate (Medieetik under debatt)44 was published, in which representa-
tives of the media and organisations and media researchers and press 
officers discuss Swedish media ethics.  Claims are made that the press 
ethical system has eroded from inside and that the present system lacks 
legal certainty for the individual and that the self-correction system 
does not handle complaints on media  work  methods.  
 
Rules of consideration and conduct  
The principle of ”informed consent” is applied in medical ethics.  A cor-
responding professional ethical principle is observed in journalism re-
garding acquiring material: Agree to reasonable requests from inter-
viewees of being informed in advance how and where their statements 
will be published.45 In connection with disasters, however, this rule ap-
pears to be unreasonable against the backdrop of chaotic circum-
stances that would effectively prevent this type of communication be-
tween reporter and interviewee from taking place.   
Respect for individual integrity is fundamental to many professions. 
In journalism this is reflected in the seventh publicity rule: ”Consider 
carefully any publicity which could violate the privacy of individuals. 
Refrain from such publicity unless the public interest obviously de-
mands public scrutiny”. 
The ninth publicity rule refers to, among others, disaster victims: 
”Always show the greatest possible consideration for victims of crime 
and accidents. Consider carefully the question whether to publish 
names and pictures with regard to the victims and their relatives”.  
Journalism ethics does not only apply to what goes into the paper 
or the broadcasting media, but also how the individual journalist be-
haves on site.  In this respect reporters differ from photographers, as 
continuing to speak with a person experiencing an obvious stress reac-
tion, involves a more active step than pressing the camera button. The 
journalist can withdraw, text remain unwritten, whereas the photogra-
pher cannot undo a photo.46 
Studies of Swedish journalists have shown that very few think that 
it is acceptable to conduct interviews with eyewitnesses who are dealing 
with their stress reactions in connection with accidents.47 Generally 
speaking, Swedish journalists take care to protect the rights of the in-
dividual. Women are more considerate than men.48 Another factor in-
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cluded in the journalist surveys is their views on name publishing, in-
dicating that the number of journalists who think names should be 
published without exceptions in the case of children and adults is in-
creasingly dropping.49 
The degree of consideration given is without comparison the most 
debated and studied press ethical issue. This is partly explained by the 
fact that the public is usually particularly concerned and disturbed 
when victims of accidents and disasters are exposed. Ekström and 
Nohrstedt argue that the justification for lack of consideration is always 
made with reference to the primary task of journalism: to tell the truth 
in the media.50 Consideration involves both opportunity and willing-
ness. But assessments as to the where the line is drawn vary.   
Interviews with survivors who try to handle their stress reactions 
and eyewitnesses of accidents and disasters constitute an area not 
treated in the press ethical rules.51 One of the rules partly covers such 
situations: ”Show special consideration to inexperienced interviewees”. 
And: ”Allow the reader/listener/viewer the possibility of distinguishing 
between statements of fact and a comments”. There is no definition of 
an inexperienced interviewee. The logic here does not work in the re-
porting on an accident. Informing an injured survivor in distress about 
publishing does not justify the interview. Individuals with severe stress 
reactions  can hardly know what is best for them in that situation.  Even 
less can they survey the consequences of consenting to an interview and 
being photographed. Analysis of unpublished raw data from the year 
2000 survey showed that two out of ten journalists had problems in-
terpreting this professional code of conduct. Nine out of ten journalists 
thought that it was more or less unacceptable to interview shocked eye-
witnesses. The latter can be interpreted to mean that interviewing peo-
ple in distress is often but not always acceptable, but often there are no 
other people to interview, which means that the journalist has a diffi-
cult decision to make.  
Finally, a proportion of journalists thought that it was more or less 
or even completely acceptable to interview people suffering from stress 
reactions. This opinion was held by more men than women. As in the 
case of photos of identifiable victims, there was the same tendency in 
the correlation between number of years in the profession and opinion 
as in the case of interviewing people in shock. Journalists with fewer 
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years in the profession thought to a greater extent that is was accepta-
ble to interview people in distress than their colleagues with many 
years of experience.   
 
Rules of integrity 
The individual's integrity is well covered in press ethical rules as well 
as in legislation on freedom of speech and freedom of the press. In 
these law texts as well as in the penal code encroaching on personal 
integrity is defamation, in the form of slander or libel.52   In the Swedish 
Journalist Union's collective agreement for its members there is sec-
tion stating, ”employees shall not be obliged to write against their con-
victions or perform demeaning tasks”53 The opportunity to refrain from 
assignments that are perceived as degrading to the journalist well as 
those violating others people's personal dignity or exposing them to hu-
miliation is there.   
Individuals affected by accidents and disasters risk being exposed 
in the media in a humiliating situation. For example, visiting a relative 
who has just lost a beloved can be felt as a strongly demeaning assign-
ment to some journalists while others have no qualms at all. Anyone 
who refuses to carry out an assignment has the right to do so. Not least 
can this be done with reference to the publicity rule: ”Show the victims 
of crime and accident every possible consideration.” But many times it 
is impossible to predict the situations and meetings that might arise 
during a reporting mission. A journalist can experience strong feelings 
of humiliation during an assignment without seeing ”a way out of it”.   
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Journalists' moral compass  
Morals govern the journalists' actions. If ethics is the principles of mor-
als, then morals are our inner compass of right and wrong; what makes 
us do what we do.54 Our morals are not static phenomena. Journalistic 
morals build on the press ethical rules, and on a general human ethics 
in the sense of being responsible for our actions.55 The latter require 
self-reflection, which in Ulrich Beck's terms is an expression of ”reflex-
ive modernity”.56 Giddens has expressed similar thoughts.57  However, 
their theories concern the media rather than journalism. Concerning 
the moral dilemma of journalism, Ekström and Nohrstedt suggest that 
it is about how a certain action can be justified when the real incentive 
is to deliver a punchy piece of news. The authors formulate two ques-
tions as examples: ”Is it morally right to publish?” And: ”How far may 
a journalist go to sell news?”58 
Rather than addressing these issues, the authors claim that journal-
ists and editors instead ask how their actions can be justified.  Such an 
argument makes the market news value take precedence over moral 
righteousness and to govern editorial decisions. The ultimate conse-
quence of such professional morals of action can be – if they deviate 
greatly from general morals – that the public finally rejects journalism.  
The journalistic morals have, like morals in general, plasticity, that 
is, elasticity and flexibility.59 The question is if morals are adapted to 
each individual situation primarily on the basis of shared professional 
and organisational norms. According to Ekström and Nohrstedt, the 
journalists' own feelings, values and experiences are less involved.60 
As always there are exceptions confirming the rule, as when indi-
vidual journalists reject assignments and publications, which is a kind 
of moral empathy with reference to the idea that they would not have 
liked to be treated in a certain way, the golden rule of journalism. Jour-
nalists, like other professional groups involved in interpersonal rela-
tionships, have a professional conscience. 
The sum of journalistic conditions, norms, ideals, ethics and conse-
quences is described in Ekström and Nohrstedt's contextual model, 
which links these concepts to the journalistic ethics of action,61 which 
means that it is in the specific situation that the journalist's ethical con-
duct is tested in the context of the norms, ideals, conditions and con-
ceivable consequences of the professional assignment. Sometimes eth-
ics of conduct works by instinct without reflection. At other times, the 
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decision is made after much deliberation, and sometimes after consult-
ing colleagues and supervisors. Ethics of action can be seen as an ap-
plication of the journalistic professional ideals balanced against all 
other operating factors.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The journalist profession is both independent and restricted, sur-
rounded by legal frameworks and guidelines. Journalists as a pro-
fessional group at an accident site face many tough challenges. It is 
in the public interest that the media are in place but their presence 
is still regulated by the current circumstances of the situation and 
professional codes and norms. Media reporting in such contexts is 
also characterised by a number of paradoxes. The need to be both 
quick and correct, close and distant, informative and critical, news 
hunting and considerate take a great deal of effort. The most diffi-
cult aspect is probably the situation that the journalist is ”only” an 
eyewitness and not a respondent. When the person the journalist 
wants to save lives, the professional journalist must document and 
report. 
Journalists' reporting on a traumatic event is expected to be truthful 
and factual, and yet having the dramaturgy and rhetoric required for 
appealing to readers. Consideration of victims must be shown, and sin-
gle copies sold. Interest in accidental deaths is big.  While that which 
must not happen, is happening and although we do not want to hear 
about it, there is still a great need of information. It is the journalists' 
duty to supply it. Several dilemmas and paradoxes present themselves 
to the journalist. Should they give priority to social stability infor-
mation or to critical scrutiny? Speed of accuracy? Understanding or 
drama? Information or news reporting? The journalist profession is 
part of an industry-like editorial machinery requiring a great deal of 
creativity. Policy documents and professional codes only partly govern 
work. Media supervisors are often democratic sounding boards rather 
than commanders.  
The journalists' professional codes of practice and press ethics are 
– despite the profession's free and creative nature – important to all 
members, but paradoxes are still at work. The journalists' codes and 
norms are simultaneously demanding and governing principles and un-
clear and contradictory. When the task is to report on a disaster, certain 
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rules have greater value than others. The guidelines on respect for in-
dividual integrity, protecting privacy, showing consideration of victims 
and being careful with photos belong to the prioritised category.  
An important aspect of the professional code of practice is that both 
conduct and publications must take place in an ethical manner. It is not 
enough to refrain from publishing a photo. The very moment of taking 
the photo may be a violation. All colleagues must consider actions as 
well as publishing and in particular the journalist who is the eyewitness 
on-site.   
Who, then, is adequately equipped to encounter chaos and identify 
the situation? Are the professional demands enough? A problem when 
the alert is given is the limited opportunity to select a person for the 
assignment. And even if it had been possible, it is impossible to know 
how a person will react at an accident site. Events are never identical. 
When the experienced war correspondent arrives at an accident scene 
with many children, this may be the last straw. The medical journalist 
on her way home from work might be the best equipped to cover a fire 
disaster. A newly graduate journalist, a former nurse, might make the 
most humane reporting on the survivors of a major accident. We can 
only speculate. Every situation is unique. The event can have compo-
nents that ”trigger” the journalist's reactions, depending on previous 
experiences. The impact of personal factors in the context of accidents 
is described in the next chapter, which also discusses how the profes-
sion can affect individual reactions and performance on the scene. 
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 THE PRIVATE PERSON 
 
 
Personality, that is, the human being behind the professional role, is 
the baggage that the journalist brings to the accident site. The individ-
uals' so-called vulnerability background, which involves resilience, cur-
rent life situation, health, and the nature of the trauma, is also crucial 
to their ability to handle a disaster.1 A person's accumulated life expe-
riences, including previous bereavement, grief and loss, are part of vul-
nerability too. The human being is fragile as well as adaptable, although 
the proportions vary with the situation.  Depending on the vulnerability 
profile, people are susceptible to stress in various degrees in different 
situations. 
   The Norwegian professor of disaster psychiatry, Lars Weisaeth,2 
argues that the intensity of the event and the individual's interpretation 
of it, combined with personal vulnerability (or resilience) decide the 
consequences of overwhelming strain. Individuals also have different 
degrees of emotional intelligence, which Daniel Goleman, psychology 
researcher and science journalist, defines as ”the capacity for recogniz-
ing our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, and 
for managing emotions well in ourselves and in our relationships.”3 
Emotional intelligence is a useful quality for rescue service members 
and for journalists at the accident site.  
Current knowledge of the importance of personality factors among 
rescue personnel can help us understand how journalists are likely to 
react, function, and act in the same situation. People's cognitive, emo-
tional, behavioural and physical reactions, coping strategies, and as a 
result of these, performance and actions, are essential to identify in the 
study of journalists' practice at the accident site. We know that journal-
ists react – but how?  
Behind all journalism there is a subject – a human being. It is im-
possible to separate the person and the journalist. 4 In the reporting on 
an accident or a disaster, the private person or the ”I” will loom large as 
a kind of threat against the professional person. Arriving at the scene 
is a journalist who is also a human being shaped by nature and nurture, 
mental and physical health (or illness), previous and current life situa-
tion, short or long professional experience, more or less life experience. 
The first question is: ”What has happened?”  The next question is: ”Is it 
dangerous?” And then: ”What can I do?” How much does the person 
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behind the professional matter? And how do the person's vulnerability, 
life experience, stress susceptibility and emotional intelligence affect 
the journalist's practice at the accident site? 
 
Stress susceptibility and vulnerability 
There is a limit to human resilience. As the Norwegian researchers in 
disaster psychiatry Lars Mehlum and Lars Weisæth put it, the human 
psyche is ”a delicately balanced and complex unity, which has still 
proved to be very adaptable and flexible both through the evolution 
shaping it and through the individual's life.”5 The psyche develops just 
as the body through challenges and efforts, but not always in a favour-
able direction. Sometimes the strain is so overwhelming that it be-
comes destructive and debilitating.  A disaster or lethal threat triggers 
stress reactions in more or less everyone affected by the event.  To 
some, the overwhelming strain turns into a psychological trauma.   
In order to understand and explain the effects of psychological 
trauma, knowledge of several domains is needed. Biology, psychody-
namics and cognitive theory, learning psychology, social theories and 
existential humanist philosophy are some fields, according to the au-
thors of the book Psychotraumatology (Psykotraumatologi),6 the cri-
sis psychiatrists Tom Lundin, Per-Olof Michel and Ulf Otto. The accu-
mulated knowledge in the area is based on experiences made in con-
nection with wars and major disasters. Military research is, in other 
words, useful to contemporary nature and technology disasters. But 
stress reactions in traumatic events are not a new phenomenon. Hodg-
kinson7 and Shay8 point out that the phenomenon is portrayed in the 
battles of Homer's The Iliad.  
During a lifetime we all experience crises in various ways and of dif-
ferent dignity, directly or indirectly. Life ambitions are defeated and we 
are forced to change perspective on our place in existence. Johan Cull-
berg, professor of psychology, thinks that the Western view of human 
evolution is mechanical with growth, maturity and decline. Its opposite 
is a dialectical view, emphasising how our attitude to life can benefit 
from painful events, which provide knowledge of life at the level of ex-
perience.9 The latter perspective means that the psychological crisis is 
the basis of human maturity. The human being is always evolving, 
learning formally and informally of life experiences. Private and pro-
fessional development is interwoven and competitive at the same time. 
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In the Chinese sign for crisis, which means threat and opportunity, 
both strength and weakness are represented. In a crisis situation all 
senses are activated and paradoxically many people under duress can 
perform beyond their normal capacity.   
Experiencing trauma is a basic component of human life.10 What 
factors influence an individual's way of reacting and the risk of devel-
oping acute or posttraumatic stress reactions? As described above, a 
stable and confident personality is considered to be a possible protec-
tive factor.11 Conversely, a bad self-esteem is a risk factor. The social 
net, often regarded as a ”salvation” in many situations, is not a guaran-
tee for preventing posttraumatic problems, according to Michel and 
others.12 McFarlane mentions our own or family member's mental ill 
health as a vulnerability factor.13 
The so-called strength/vulnerability model attempts to illustrate 
the factors leading to vulnerability and severe stress reactions.14 Indi-
vidual personality, stress tolerance, previous life crises, unprocessed 
trauma or previous psychiatric problems are factors affecting vulnera-
bility. The current trauma affects vulnerability in various degrees de-
pending on if the event involves dramatic loss, exposure to grotesque 
death and strong sensory impressions. Dyregrov uses the expression 
”factors influencing the course of events.”15 He argues that people's re-
actions to a trauma beyond the personal factors, also depend on the 
current situation, training and experience and social environment. In 
other words, personal background, current life situation, health and 
the character of the trauma mean a great deal to how the reactions will 
manifest themselves. This applies to survivors, rescue workers and the 
indirectly affected such as eyewitnesses and next-of-kin. Many factors 
interact and it is the degree of vulnerability that decides if the normal 
emotional crisis develops into a psychiatric condition.    
 
Risk factors 
Witnessing the suffering of others, combined with feelings of helpless-
ness and powerlessness, has proven to be a risk factor for later psychi-
atric problems. Trauma researchers currently talk about ”potentially 
traumatic events,”16 because the individual’s interpretation of the situ-
ation decides if it will be a stress factor or not. The type of event (situa-
tion), the group affected, and the degree of exposure have an impact on 
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whether the affected and the indirectly affected run the risk of develop-
ing long-term psychological problems as the result of posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) .  
A number of risk factors for developing long-term psychological 
problems in relation to a trauma can be listed on the basis of two psy-
chological meta analyses,17 also summarised by Per-Olof Michel and 
others in the document ”Crisis support in severe events” (National 
Board of Health and Welfare).18                              
 Event severity level and perceived threat to life  
 Lack of social support after the event 
 Pronounced mental reactions during and immediately after the 
event, especially dissociation (deficient ability to integrate the 
self and the experience cognitively) 
 Sex (female = increased risk) 
 Age (child = increased risk) 
 Level of Intelligence and education  
 Social class and/or minority status 
 Vulnerability due to previous experience (victimisation or abuse 
in childhood; previous severe trauma; previous own or family 
member’s psychiatric disorder)  
 Concurrent life stress 
Media reporting can in itself increase the exposure to traumatising 
impression through persistent repetition and richness in detail. It is 
possible that thorough research on accident and disaster reporting in-
directly entails increased exposure for the reporters and photographers 
involved. The risk factors should be considered in relation to the indi-
vidual journalist as belonging to a potential risk group and journalists 
should be made aware of the risk factors for the individuals portrayed 
in the media.   
 
Resilience 
Our way of reacting to and recovering from potential traumatic events 
can vary a great deal. Some may be affected by persistent posttraumatic 
reactions (chronic reactions), while most may recover. Yet another 
group may develop delayed reactions, while others may not experience 
any problems (resilience). This is what studies of 9/11 have shown.19 
Several recent studies show that the majority of people who have been 
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afflicted by some form of severe event do not develop serious traumatic 
reactions. On the contrary, some seemed even to have become stronger 
through the event. Masten et al. have described a kind of ”posttrau-
matic growth” and argue that it involves a kind of ”ability to adapt to 
difficult or threatening circumstances.”20 A Dutch research survey 
shows that resilience is constituted by an interaction between social 
support and self-reliance.21 The latest research survey issued by the 
Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare shows, however, that it 
can be extremely difficult to assess, in the acute phase of a disastrous 
event, which individuals run the risk of developing disorders.22 
When an accident or a disaster strikes, some people will eventually 
be psychologically traumatised, and not only the directly affected, but 
also survivors, next-of-kin and close friends, not to mention the rescue 
services, eyewitnesses, church and social services personnel and mem-
bers of the mass media.2 3  
 
Personality traits 
There are many psychological approaches on how to study personality. 
One approach used in defence and disaster research is the so-called 
”trait models”.24 Such models are based on a hierarchical view on per-
sonality based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. At the bottom there are 
thoughts and actions related to the current situation, for example, the 
need to take cover. The second level is constituted by habitual thoughts 
and actions such as putting on a safety belt without thinking. Level 
three involves personality traits such as anxiety and humour, while the 
top fourth level comprises personality dimensions based on closely re-
lated personality traits. If a personality trait is calm and relaxed, the 
personality dimension can be ”emotional stability”.   
The so-called Big Five model, developed by the American personal-
ity psychologists, Paul Costa and Jeff McCrae, is described by Larsson, 
Kallenberg and Carlstedt.25 It is a trait model based on five everyday 
language definitions of personality dimensions. The assumption is that 
all people have several or all personality traits but to varying extent. No 
one has only one.  
An outgoing and sociable dimension is called extraversion. Domi-
nant traits are need for excitement, energy and optimism. The oppo-
site, introversion, means solitude and introspection, which do not 
equal unhappiness or pessimism but rather independence and being 
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reserved. People with emotional stability can handle difficult situations 
without being upset, while emotionally unstable people are easily af-
flicted with fear, guilt and despondency. Conscientiousness marks a 
person who has organisational skills, trustworthiness, strong will and 
is result-oriented, often beyond what is normal. The disadvantage with 
this kind of personality dimension can be obsession with work and a 
disdain for applying moral principles. A dimension that is similar to the 
dimension of extroversion is social smoothness, that is, being helpful, 
friendly and having a positive view of people, which are attractive qual-
ities but which tend to become a disadvantage in competitive situa-
tions. Social inflexibility, on the other hand, although perceived as less 
attractive, can be more competitive and skeptical, which often are use-
ful qualities in difficult analysis situations. A personality dimension 
that involves sensitivity to one’s own feelings is openness to new expe-
riences, which is a dimension of variation, intellectual curiosity and 
creativity, while a reluctance to embrace openness to new experience 
entails conservative values and a preference for the familiar.  It is in-
teresting to ask what might happen to the journalist, the person, in re-
lation to these personality dimensions when trying to identify the basic 
reactions and coping with a traumatically dominated reporting assign-
ments. Even if the personality factors cannot be studied scientifically, 
the perspective can be a useful preunderstanding.   
 
Emotional intelligence and empathetic aptitude 
In connection with studies of the media reporting of traumatic events, 
the concept of emotional intelligence may be relevant to refer to again. 
With this concept, Daniel Goleman means ”the capacity for recognizing 
our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, and for 
managing emotions well in ourselves and in our relationships.”26 In 
conversations on emotional intelligence, a recurring issue is whether 
or not women and men have this quality to the same extent. Are women 
more disposed to emphatic approaches? Goleman thinks that we can-
not claim this with any degree of certainty, but notes that girls already 
at an early age are trained in interpersonal skills more than boys. Ac-
cording to Goleman,  there are no sex differences regarding women and 
men’s attempts to hide their real feelings. The so-called empathetic ap-
titude is the same between the sexes.27 But in regard to the ability to 
detect another person’s feelings, then women are better than men, he 
thinks, and refers to several American studies, for example, Rosenthal 
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and Hall.28 Socio-biologists, according to Goleman, stress the superi-
ority of feelings over reason in terms of decision-making and actions 
but also see emotional intelligence as complementary and separated 
from academic intelligence. Our feelings help us in situations where 
tasks are too important to leave to the intellect, for example, situations 
of threat and painful loss. In difficult decision situations, there is an 
interaction between feelings and reason. Emotional intelligence arises 
when there is a balance between reason and feelings. Translated into 
disaster journalism, this would mean that the journalist is never just 
journalist or fellow human being but always both and, but, in different 
degrees in different individuals in different situations. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The person – human being – behind the professional role is a decisive 
factor for understanding how the professional assignment is carried 
out at the accident site. Personality can be described as an individual’s 
baggage. Some of it is called vulnerability, which is the accumulated life 
experiences, background, health and current shape. Individual risk fac-
tors for developing long-term psychological problems in addition to 
vulnerability are personal qualities such as sex, age, level of education 
and parallel life stress. Previous crises can also increase vulnerability, 
especially if the accident trauma has elements that are reminiscent of, 
or ”trigger,” previous experiences. Vulnerability does not only concern 
how life has been earlier but also how it appears at the moment when 
the journalist is sent on his mission.   
The character of the traumatic event, together with individual vul-
nerability and interpretation of the event, can affect how the journalist, 
the person, will react and handle the situation. There are limits to hu-
man endurance, even for journalists:  Every individual holds both 
strength and weakness. When existence is falling apart – privately or 
professionally – it helps having a stable and confident personality.  
Conversely, weak self-esteem is a risk factor. A person’s degree of vul-
nerability and resilience decides if the trauma becomes a normal emo-
tional crisis, or if it develops into a psychologically harmful condition. 
Previous studies have shown that journalists as eyewitnesses should be 
recognised as indirectly affected when reporting on a disaster. The abil-
ity to handle this can also be affected by different personality traits. A 
socially outgoing energetic person reacts differently from an introvert 
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and passive person. An emotionally stable person is better equipped to 
handle disasters than an unstable person. Social smoothness and flex-
ibility can also be a tool, as well as a personality that allows for open-
ness to changes. Some people react to a trauma with resilience, and 
others may describe  a kind of ”posttraumatic growth,” that is, the dif-
ficult experience can strengthen them. The cornerstones of resilience 
are social support and self-reliance. It is very difficult to predict how 
different individuals will react to the same event, but it is clear that 
people react very differently to similar experiences.    
The person equipped with a certain emotional intelligence and an 
empathetic aptitude, in Goleman’s terminology, is better prepared for 
traumatic events. The interplay of reason and emotion is important in 
certain situations, which supports the notion of the indivisible symbi-
osis between the person and the journalist, the person and the profes-
sion. The personality and vulnerability of the journalist are therefore 
crucial aspects to consider in identifying the cognitive, behavioural, 
emotional and physical reaction patterns of how a journalist can be ex-
pected to react to a traumatic experience. Are there differences and 
similarities in comparison with responders’ reactions and coping strat-
egies? Or is the professional eyewitness’s encounter with a disaster 
completely different?  
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 THE REACTION 
 
 
What journalists experience, do, feel, and physically react to in connec-
tion with a disastrous incident can partly be understood through the 
findings of studies with a focus on the reactions of rescue service mem-
bers. Several studies show that many experience a feeling of unreality.1 
Lindström and Lundin showed in a study of the Borås fire, that this is 
an appropriate response as it enables individuals to focus on their tasks 
with more energy and attention.2 A common emotional reaction is that 
the feeling is overwhelming. The feeling is at its worst when children 
are involved, or if the professional responders know any of the victims. 
A great many dead or injured people are also overwhelming, and feel-
ings may be triggered by details, in particular objects like shoes or be-
longings which remind them of their own children. Material things in 
general have a strong symbolic value because they create a feeling that 
the victim is someone known to them. Sometimes the overwhelming 
feelings are so strong and painful that some individuals  are unable to 
continue working.3 
People affected by an accident or a disaster often say, ”it can't be 
true”, ”it's like a dream” or ”like a film”. They may feel like a bystander 
although they are affected. The most prevalent reaction is this sense of 
unreality, often accompanied by the absence of strong feelings, which 
comes as a surprise to the affected, responders and the media members 
alike. A so-called super memory is not uncommon, which means that 
they observe details and may have extreme perceptive powers. Often 
the reaction evokes self-recriminations and the individuals blame 
themselves for not responding appropriately.4   
 In view of the scarcity of studies of journalists' crisis and stress re-
actions in the case of accidents and disasters, there are reasons to pay 
attention to existing research focusing on the category of rescue ser-
vices. Even if there are big differences between the preparedness and 
function of the professional groups for such assignments, there may 
hypothetically be lessons to learn from the research on the reactions of 
the rescue services.  
Journalists are indirectly affected by the drama on the accident 
scene by virtue of simply being there. By seeing, hearing, interviewing 
and performing their duties, they are exposed and may become affected 
by the event. Journalists can, like rescue staff, be afflicted with what is 
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called compassion fatigue,5 i.e. secondary stress. It can be seen as a 
result of all the information about and experience of the suffering of 
others, in short, a duty beyond the tolerance limit.   
It is not, however, an established truth in the profession that jour-
nalists themselves can be afflicted by traumatic stress or other psycho-
logical reactions. The belief is still held that journalists are immune to 
emotional impact in such situations, according to Coté and Simpson.6 
But no matter how trained and prepared a journalist may be for dis-
astrous situations, emotional reactions still may occur – during work 
and after.  Journalists who, without warning, face a disaster for the first 
time can suffer serious reactions. Some can ”…react with paralysis or 
severe psychological stress,” as Blix and Bech-Karlsen point out.7 They 
also suggest that journalists as a rule should be prepared for a disas-
trous situation, but that minimal efforts are made in reality to provide 
this support. When the alert is given, it is too late to prepare.  
Doing a good job in a crisis situation requires that the person con-
cerned is familiar with his/her own emotional reactions – not the other 
way around. It is possible and crucial that professionals are prepared 
for a disaster assignment to some degree on their way to the accident 
site. The journalist and the photographer have to be given any little 
piece of information available so they can mentally prepare. The same 
applies to the rescue services, according to Dyregrov.8 They cite the 
coach accident in Måbødalen in Norway when many responders 
reached the place totally ignorant of the fact that children were in-
volved. A more exact knowledge of what was in store would have made 
them better prepared.   
 
Stress reactions 
Knowledge of the effects on disaster rescue responders only started to 
take form in the 1950s and 1960s. A corresponding interest in the jour-
nalists' reactions is, however, still fairly new or still slumbering in me-
dia employer offices. Towards the end of the 1970s, there was increased 
interest in rescue team members' reactions concurrent with a generally 
growing interest in psychological reactions to disasters.9 From the sec-
ond half of the 1980s, awareness of the psychological and psychiatric 
aspects of major accidents, mass injury situations and disasters has 
grown in Sweden and internationally.10 The demand for further training 
in crisis psychology and disaster psychiatry has increased in medical 
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undergraduate studies as well as in rescue services’ professional devel-
opment units, the police, health care, the social services and the church.  
In Scandinavia, the Alexander Kielland oilrig accident gave rise to 
a study of professional and voluntary responders' reactions during the 
acute rescue operation, carried out by the Centre for disaster psychiatry 
(Kontoret för Katastrofepsykiatri) in Oslo, headed by Arne Sund and 
Lars Weisaeth. In Sweden, the psychiatrists Britt Lindström and Tom 
Lundin11 have studied the rescue workers’ reactions in connection with 
the hotel fire in Borås. One of the conclusions was that ”professional 
contact with a disaster situation of this type can entail both inner and 
outer experiences of crisis and stress types”. 12 The descriptions include 
experiences of so-called ”Superman reaction”, which is explained as 
”active action without emotional reactions in uniform”. Similar reac-
tions were described by the rescue chief after the Gothenburg fire. He 
said that ”the uniform in us was on duty”.13 
The existing research on rescue team reactions has primarily fo-
cused on post trauma reactions and minor reactions during the opera-
tion. A conclusion common to several studies14 is that well prepared 
personnel who are supported during the work can carry out tasks that 
involve strong sensory impressions without being afflicted with unnec-
essary complaints afterwards.   
Since the function of a rescue team on site is to help, it means that 
physical obstacles, wrongly allocated duties and general unprepared-
ness might  produce strong feelings of helplessness in the rescuers. 
How journalists, arriving at an accident scene as eyewitnesses rather 
than responders, feel has, on the other hand, not been studied. This 
thesis addresses such issues.   
Other physical reactions frequently reported are nausea, vomiting, 
tremor and palpitation. Rescue teams have described in studies how 
they, while carrying dead people, had to go off to vomit before they 
could carry on.    
Wrath is a very common reaction. Wrath, irritation and conflicts 
may arise between colleagues and also wrath against survivors, next-
of-kin or bystanders who make unreasonable demands or hinder work 
in various ways. Management and cooperation problems within and 
between professional groups are common.   
The cognitive, behavioural, emotional and physical reactions afflict-
ing rescuers are summarised in Table 3.  
For a long time, the members of the different task forces and other 
help organisations have been a neglected affected category. Not until 
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the end of the 1980s did researchers and employers start to take an in-
terest in rescuers who had been on site at an accident or disaster.15 To-
day it is apparent that there are psychological reactions among these 
professional categories too. Yet, most studies have focused on the re-
sponders' reactions after the event and less on their reactions during 
the operation.16 Lindström and Lundin have studied the reactions of 
responders during and after operations in two studies, first the Alexan-
der Kielland oilrig accident, 1 7 and second, the Borås fire in 1982.18 
Accidents that especially affect rescuers are those involving chil-
dren,19 as is described in Chapter 2. Robinson20 found in a study of am-
bulance personnel that  the most stress inducing situation involved tak-
ing care of children.  
The degree of identification with an affected child or its family 
might be an aggravating factor in rescue operations.  
When children are involved the natural defence falls apart. While helpers 
usually manage to distance themselves mentally from emotionally charged 
situations, they do become slightly overly engaged and can identify with the 
traumatised or dead child and its parents. /.../ Rescue personnel in disaster 
areas say that they function satisfactorily until they come across a child or a 
toy, when their efficiency is reduced, and sometimes they even stop work-
ing.21              
Children's vulnerability increases the helper's sense of meaningless-
ness. Conversely, saving a child means increased joy. A number of 
saved children can momentarily outweigh the grief over the loss of a 
considerably higher number of deaths. 
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Table 3.  Stress reactions in rescue service personnel during on site operations, 
according to Dyregrov (1992)21 and ICD 10 with diagnosis number 
F43. 22 
 
 
 
 
In one study firemen were asked to list the type of incidents that had 
affected them the most.23 As many as 98 per cent of the firemen stated 
incidents involving children. The list included the following items: 
 Dead or injured children  
 Fires gaining strength and ground with life-threatening situa-
tions 
 Multifactorial events  
 Death 
 Life-threatening injuries to personnel or casualties 
The Gothenburg fire in 1998 involved traumatic stimuli on at least 
the first of the items. The rescue services often regard media members 
as on-site stressors. This is expected in the circumstances, but is also a 
factor impeding the cooperation on site. Apart from taking care of dead 
children, a dead friend or colleague is a strong stressor for the helper. 
Such a meeting can momentarily render them incapable of working. 
Support, rest and sheltering from strong sensory impressions can 
bring them back to work. If this fails, the person must leave the accident 
site.24 
   Cognitive Emotional Behavioural Somatic 
  sense of unreality  overwhelmed hyperactivity nauseous 
bewilderment helplessness underactivity upset stomach 
reduced focus fear withdrawal tremor 
memory problems wrath excessive joking freezing 
attention  
deficiency 
despondency abnormal activity quick pulse 
rigid thinking   aching muscles 
reduced ability  
to think 
  uncoordinated 
movements 
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A big problem is that rescue personnel and other helpers often work 
way beyond their tolerance limits for a long time. This applies not least 
to the chief of operations, who stays on duty day and night with exhaus-
tion and inefficiency as a result.25 
 
Acute stress: a normal reaction to an abnormal situation 
Exposure to death and blood, for example, can cause distress.26  The cap-
sizing of the Alexander Kielland oilrig, however, resulted in very few 
stress reactions that affected rescuers' efficiency.2 7  
Incidents that affect the individual without warning such as fires 
and transportation accidents, are termed potentially traumatic events, 
which refers to a situation in which an individual is exposed to very 
strong emotional influence, totally unprepared and therefore has no 
time to mobilise potential coping strategies.28 
The force of the reaction depends, among other things, on the in-
tensity and duration of the trauma. Other influential factors are per-
sonality traits conducive to coping with sever psychological strain. 
Sometimes a person's normal stress reactions transcend the normal. 
An acute stress reaction can be regarded as a very strong normal reac-
tion to an abnormal traumatic strain.29 If such a reaction is at hand for 
more than three days it may fullfill criterias of an acute stress disorder 
(ASD).30  
When the disaster strikes, most people involved suffer immediate 
consequences in terms of state of awareness. Information and impres-
sions are received, processed and stored in a different way than nor-
mally. Common acute stress reactions could be:31 
 altered state of awareness (e.g. sense of unreality, of ”a 
dream”), disbelief, distress 
 altered perception of time and ”super memory” 
 lack of feelings 
 bodily reactions 
 overreaction – under-reaction 
Stress is – contrary to general belief – not only negative. It is rather 
a resource, enabling mobilisation of mental resources to handle the 
outer threat; a normal reaction to an abnormal situation, in other 
words. 
Stress reaction may in some cases transmit misleading signals:  
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At the same time others may be mislead into thinking that the person is unusually 
collected when he/she in reality has not started reacting yet.  Some people who dur-
ing a disaster have appeared in the media seemingly unruffled have developed prob-
lems later because of the expectations created about their ability to manage difficult 
situations.32 
Such a reaction pattern can possibly convey a reduced perception of 
risk in disaster situations to some people. Such reduced risk perception 
may also make rescuers perform heroic deeds with the risk of their 
lives.3 3 
Why so many people still make good decisions an act approriatly 
might have to do with intuition through the ”quick, automatic use of 
accumulated experience”.34 But a purposeful action in a disaster situa-
tion relies on more than intuition. Previous experience and training 
contribute to ”optimal disaster behaviour.” 35 Basically, it is a matter of 
skills in handling a situation.   
 
Survivor experience of stress and crisis reactions  
Studies of survivors of disasters can be relevant in mapping journalists' 
reactions in connection with disaster reporting. There is a broad spec-
trum of the ”normal reactions to an abnormal situation” that the sur-
vivors represent. When the survivors are children, there are additional 
reaction patterns, also described in Chapter 2 on the accident site ac-
tors.  
Many major accidents and disasters generate survivor biographies. 
Kent Härstedt, survivor of the Estonia ferry disaster, is one example. 
Many of the crisis reactions described by crisis psychologists,3 6  are ex-
emplified in Härstedt's book (1995, Det som inte kunde ske). Below are 
some examples, which could all have been taken from the daily papers 
after the disaster. What seems absurd in the eyes of the journalist and 
the reader should be understood as completely normal behaviour and 
reactions in an abnormal situation.  
 
Sense of coherence, situation-based training:  
Härstedt describes how he, in the first minutes of the Estonia ferry's 
violent lurchings, is struggling upwards along the ship's tilting floor, 
passing panicky, injured people, shouting: ”Calm down! Everything 
will be alright”. 
I think that it can be a matter disposition how we react in crisis situation. But I can 
see that my military training was a help.37 
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Training and experience hence, make individuals mobilise their 
coping strategies in a constructive way.   
 
Over- and under-reactions: 
In retrospect Härstedt recalls how differently his fellow passengers 
reacted to the situation: 
Many had wide eyes, they were hyper stressed, people in total panic, impossible to 
get contact with. Others were injured and could hardly move. And some were apa-
thetic, simply sitting there crying. Some struggled intensively with the whole body 
to get away from the place, while others tried to logically plan to do their best of the 
situation in cooperation with others or on their own.38 
People react very differently to the same event. The majority of the 
reactions can be regarded as normal.  
 
Altered state of awareness: 
The irrational behaviour and the altered state of awareness that 
commonly occur are also exemplified in Härstedt's text:   
On the staircase I happened to run into a girl from behind. There was a tear in her 
skirt and I tread on her shoe. It fell down the stairs. She turned and looked at me in 
despair: My shoe, my shoe! I stopped too and looked at her: What is a shoe? But she 
turned and ran down the boat to get it. 
Sense of unreality: 
In the upside-down life raft, which was finally found after many 
abandoned hopes in the Baltic Sea, Kent Härstedt has time to think a 
lot. Like many people who suffer from traumatic stress, Härstedt is af-
flicted by a feeling that all this is fictive:  
Now and again during the night I had had a strong feeling of unreality – it returned 
several times in the morning. In the night I caught myself thinking that I was in a 
bad film. The fact is that when the raft nearly capsized the first thing I thought was: 
This is not happening. /.../ There is a gap between what we were experiencing and 
our perception of it.39  /.../ When the helicopters were approaching it was like a film, 
a war film. Images from Vietnam, perhaps, helicopters collecting people from a bat-
tlefield.40 
A sense of unreality is one of the most palpable and apparent reac-
tion in both survivors and rescue personnel.   
 
A sense of humour: 
Humour and so-called altruistic acts are common under stress. 
Härstedt also experienced this:   
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And in this unreality there was a strange sense of humour /.../ It can't be as bad in 
reality; it must be.41 
Only some hours later, Kent Härstedt and Sara Hedrenius became 
the Swedish media serial drama of a woman and a man who survived 
an enormous disaster against all odds.  
These reaction patterns are not only what journalists on site can en-
counter but also hypothetical examples of their own possible reactions.  
  
 
Previous studies of journalist' stress reactions  
Journalists' experiences of working in extreme situations raise ques-
tions of their psychological condition at the moment of reporting. To 
date, this has been a largely neglected research field.  
Experienced-based documents such as anthologies of professional 
practices are available in some cases. In this area the U.S. has been a 
pioneer.42 One of the few research articles on the theme was written by 
the professors Coté and Simpson.43 William Coté, who has a back-
ground as a newspaper journalist, has been instrumental in providing 
trauma training for journalist students in Washington. In line with the 
Swedish psychiatrist Tom Lundin's view of the members of the media 
who are indirectly affected by a disaster,44 Coté and Simpson even call 
the journalists victims.  
Journalists can become trauma victims simply by doing their work – by visiting 
scenes of destruction, talking to, and photographing people who have been injured 
or traumatized. Sometimes they feel the effects after seeing dead or injured people 
and the debris of deadly events. In other cases by hearing tragic stories and by 
trying to ease the pain of others, journalists join disaster workers and others.45 
The fact that journalists at an accident site are exposed to stress is 
beyond doubt. Those who arrive at an accident site are confronted psy-
chologically and emotionally with the affected in a way that resembles 
what the responders' experience. However, there is, according to Coté 
and Simpson, skepticism in the journalist corps to the effect that they 
see themselves as protected against this type of psychological effects. A 
common argument is that education and professional experience pro-
vide a suit of armour. Another argument is that journalists are assumed 
to be able to channel their feelings and focus on the job in a way that 
prevents stress reactions.  
Although such attitudes lack scientific support, many share the notion 
that they lack the right to feel emotional pain or be traumatised.46 To 
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others, admitting to being depressed or anxious seems to be a taboo on 
the grounds that it may suggest that they are unfit to do their job.47 
Himmelstein and Faithorn,48 the latter a psychiatrist in New York, 
have studied the context of journalists as eyewitnesses to disasters.  
They interviewed a number of journalists about their professional ex-
perience of stress management, finding that the members of the media 
are an often-neglected group in terms of psychological and emotional 
strain in relation to traumatic events. 
Himmelstein and Faithorn call reporters and photographers pro-
fessional eyewitnesses.49 In a study they especially focused on the per-
sonal qualities required of accomplished war and disaster correspond-
ents to keep delivering ethical and expert reporting. In short, they con-
cluded that journalists have a genuine interest in and a passion for their 
job, and a strong sense of meaningfulness. Journalists' self-esteem – 
their ego in Freudian terms,50 is of great importance in stress manage-
ment. 
The Canadian psychiatrist Anthony Feinstein has, together with a 
research team, studied the psychological effects on war correspondents 
across the world compared to a control group of other journalists. 
Through self-reporting on-line questionnaires and a selection of inter-
views, the team above all tried to identify symptoms of posttraumatic 
stress reactions. The war correspondents displayed a three times 
higher degree of long-term psychological stress compared with the con-
trol group. They also used alcohol to a greater extent; the women war 
correspondents drank five times more alcohol than their women col-
leagues in ”normal jobs.” A little more than 20 per cent of journalists 
reporting on wars suffered depressions and worse quality of life. Three 
fourth of the studied group managed satisfactorily in the long run, some-
times thanks to medication.51 
Roger A. Simpson and James G. Boggs have studied American 
newspaper journalists' psychological reactions to accident reporting.  
They found that the longer a person had worked as a journalist, the 
greater the risk was that the person would display symptoms of mental 
ill health. Especially reporters and photographers who had reported on 
accidents involving car crashes were haunted by obtrusive and disturb-
ing memories. Simpson and Boggs argue that some of the professional 
tacit codes involve never admitting to being emotionally affected in 
connection with reporting on violent events or repeated assignments of 
a traumatic nature.52 
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The American media researcher Gretschen Dworznik has studied 
how accidents and crime entice journalists to make conspicuous and 
attention-creating news drama in local TV evening news.53 She has also 
studied how local TV reporters and photographers are affected by what 
they see as eyewitnesses when they report on a murder, a traffic acci-
dent or a fire. Dvorznik notes that there are several studies of war cor-
respondents and war journalism but very few of local minor everyday 
events, albeit traumatic. The hunt for news and publicity drives jour-
nalists, she thinks. Anke  Weidmann  and other German psychology 
researchers have studied journalists who reported on the South Asian 
Tsunami in 2004. They found that nearly seven per cent of the journal-
ists had developed signs of posttraumatic stress disorder eight months 
after the event. The symptoms could be related to their degree of expo-
sure, and a number of social variables, especially a low degree of sup-
port from the editorial staff and colleagues.54   
There is an international database on trauma journalism at the Dart 
Centre for Journalism and Trauma,55 which promotes well informed, 
efficient and ethical media reporting on disasters, violence, conflicts 
and other trauma. Dart Center is a forum and a resource for journalists 
as it provides analysis material, exchange of ideas and high quality pro-
fessional development in trauma journalism. Journalists' psychologi-
cal reactions at accident sites are a professional problem, indicating the 
importance of studying journalism in different situations. The condi-
tions and consequences of media reporting on a disaster require an under-
standing of the norms and deviations of the journalistic assignment; in 
other words, the ability to see ”the specific case.”  
 
Interacting with stressed leaders 
Functioning as the leader under pressure in an acute traumatic situa-
tion involves a great challenge. Our understanding of the conditions of 
leadership in such a situation derives from knowledge of leadership 
and organisation theory in normal circumstances. Functioning well in a 
crisis depends on good leadership in a non-crisis.  
Swedish psychiatry researchers emphasise the importance of care-
fully considering which colleague to send on the assignment, if pos-
sible in all situations. The criteria are developed for selecting rescue 
staff, but are, in my view, partly applicable to the media sphere. In both 
cases a problem is that the employer seldom has the opportunity to 
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choose when an accident happens, at least not in the acute phase. 
When possible, the following criteria can serve as guidelines: carefully 
chosen selection criteria, a minimum age of 25, thorough training, and 
special care in finding good leaders for the job.56 
There is a lot to suggest that people subordinate to leaders more 
readily in a disaster although a great deal depends on the situation. In 
a simulation training for new recruits to the rescue services, where the 
recruits were suddenly confronted with a brutally realistic accident sce-
nario, it was reported that just over one third of the recruits acted effi-
ciently, one third calmly and one fourth passively or not at all.57  Wei-
saeth58 divided the affected by an explosion/fire in a major paint indus-
try into three groups based on their reaction pattern. The first group, 
comprising a third of the affected, primarily engaged in ”passive fol-
lowing”, which means that they copied others, especially in flight be-
haviour. The second group, about half of the affected, retained their 
ability to interact and cooperate. The third consisted of those who took 
leadership initiatives.59 
In connection with the Gothenburg fire, the editorial leadership in-
volved several challenges. It was a very traumatic event, which is diffi-
cult to understand for those who did not witness the events on site. It 
took place in the middle of the night, with few regular managing editors 
in their offices. Selecting someone for the job was not an option since 
very few were on duty. In addition, the fire happened in the night before 
a non-edition day, an obviously aggravating factor. Many victims were 
also children and young people of non-Swedish origin, which made the 
situation more complex to manage. Supervisors in the media industry 
are seldom in the field, for example, on the scene of a fire. The geo-
graphical distance between leader and assigned reporter can create 
tensions when it comes to understanding the course of events, crisis 
reactions etc.  
According to Larsson et al., a leadership can be regarded as innova-
tive- or relation-oriented.60 The former involves the ability to pause 
and take in the whole situation, to think ahead, and not be over-
whelmed by emotional reactions. Relation-oriented leadership is char-
acterised by a clear leadership role, ability to motivate staff for the task, 
concern for the individual and understanding the need of crisis man-
agement after a stressful experience. In an elaborated analysis of lead-
ership styles in stressful situations, Larsson, Tedfeldt and Wallenius 
describe three ways of leading co-workers.61 First, there is the non-
leadership characterised by laissez-faire attitude. Second, there is the 
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conventional leadership, based on control, demand and reward. Third, 
there is a developed leadership, based on role models, personal con-
cern, inspiration and motivation.   
In a disaster the leadership role is complicated because it encom-
passes both the task of dealing with colleagues' feelings and reactions 
while ensuring the continued work in progress.62 Leaders should coor-
dinate activities, make critical decisions and take care of their person-
nel. Leaders, too, are influenced by their stress coping abilities and their 
personal disposition (physical, psychological and related to life philoso-
phy). 
The leader also needs support in critical situations, and they should 
not be afraid to show grief, Dyregrov asserts. It is possible to grieve and 
work simultaneously. Recommendations for leadership in crisis and 
disasters include that leaders should spend as much time as possible 
with their employees in the time following on the disaster. Leaders 
should also ensure that co-workers are given opportunities for informal 
support through social meetings.  
Reactions to disasters are very individual and situation-dependent, 
in a way unpredictable and yet generated within certain given frames. 
A long line of factors influences the individual's crisis process through 
complex interactions. Nature and nurture, the current life situation 
and previous crisis, training and experiences, the present trauma are 
some examples. Many of the reactions that the affected persons display 
are also typical of the indirectly affected persons' reactions. What 
coping strategies are suitable in protecting themselves and having the 
strength to carry out their duties?  
 
Coping strategies 
Human ability to respond to and manage inner and outer threat and 
stressors is called coping.63 Coping can also be described as a form of 
stress management. What individual coping looks like depends on how 
the threat is perceived and on previous experiences of managing immi-
nent threat. Denial of threat is common but the effects of denial are 
always fateful. Denying means that individuals can put themselves at 
risk.  
There are mainly two ways of managing and coping with stress. One 
way is problem focused coping, which means an ability to seek infor-
mation, analyse problems and finding feasible solutions. The ability to 
 112 
 
communicate and cooperate is also an example of such qualities. An-
other method is emotion focused coping. This method takes the form 
of positive thinking, self-control, wishful thinking, underestimating 
risks and dissociation. Flight behaviour is also an example and this can 
be manifested in an exaggerated focus on details.   
In practice, every individual in a stressful situation uses both prob-
lem and emotion focused coping, even if one is dominant in certain in-
dividuals and in certain situations.64 
In view of the stress reactions described above, it is reasonable to 
ask how the professional categories operating at the disaster site re-
spond to and manage the stress. Assessing the performance of mass 
media personnel in disasters requires taking account of the working 
conditions.65 
There is a lack of relevant studies of journalists' coping strategies in 
connection with disasters. Hopefully, this thesis will generate 
knowledge i n  this area. Other material is primarily the press's own 
articles on reporters' reactions and on-site coping. Such witness re-
ports have been published in Sweden after the Tsunami in 2004, the 
Gothenburg fire in 1998, and, internationally, there are American bi-
ographies and documentaries on media reporting of the 9/11 terror at-
tack in 2001 (see Chapter 1). Coping with the reactions to a trauma and 
at the same time a very unclear event means a great challenge to the 
individual. How do circumstances affect impressions and interpreta-
tions of the event?  
Some answers are provided in the many studies carried out of res-
cuers' coping strategies at accidents and disaster sites. How the rescu-
ers' manage to accomplish their mission under extreme circumstances 
is something of a mystery. What makes them persevere?   
Dyregrov has, together with Mitchell,66 among others, listed a num-
ber of tools in our metaphorical toolbox, which were developed to illus-
trate the coping strategies in the rescue services, but are also interest-
ing in comparison with journalists at an accident site.  
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Table 4. Coping strategies and defence mechanism in rescue service 
personnel on accidents sites, according to Dyregrov and Mitchell. 
 
 
 
 
Many coping strategies correspond with the survivor reactions pre-
viously described. Gerry Larsson et al.67 describe those as defence 
mechanisms working automatically and mainly at a pre-awareness 
level. The individual's perception of reality, which partly does not 
match ”objective” reality, can thus be ”polished” to give the individual 
protection against anxiety. The most important defence mechanisms, 
according to Larsson, are: repression, denial, isolation, ”sensation 
seeking” and rationalisation.68 
Unlike journalists, rescue workers regularly exercise disaster opera-
tions. In combination with mental preparation travelling to the acci-
dent site, these exercises constitute two appropriate coping strategies. 
Poor preparation, on the other hand, increases the vulnerability to 
stress reactions.  
Sense of unreality fills the function of keeping feelings at bay. Some-
times responders define the operation as exercise to keep the distance. 
Another way is to think of something else, gardening for instance as an 
example of emotion regulation by distraction.  
At times, the emotional distance can lead to misinterpretations. For 
instance a responder at the coach accident at Måbødalen perceived the 
dead children as life saving dolls: ”I thought it was strange that they 
had brought life saving dolls on the outing.” 69 
 
mental preparation 
sense of unreality  
suppressing reactions 
distancing and dehumanisation 
humour 
regulating exposure 
activity to prevent reflection 
 meaningfulness 
 self-supporting comment 
 contact with others: social support 
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Alexander and Wells70 found in the study of the oilrig Piper Alpha 
disaster in the North Sea, off the coast of Scotland in 1988,  that 99 per 
cent of the policemen working in the morgue had resorted to humour 
as a defence mechanism. This form of coping is used with great caution 
as next-of-kin or other bystanders may be within earshot. Activity is a 
way of protecting oneself against gushing feelings by focusing com-
pletely on the task and on peptalk, for example, ”I can do this.” Finally, 
contact with colleagues on site is perhaps the most comforting coping 
strategy.  
In relation to the previously described coping strategies, it is clear 
that individuals first interpret the situation, then their own resources 
to manage the situation, and finally employ coping strategies.  
One of many coping strategies is called numbing.71 When individ-
uals react in this way, others are ”fooled” into thinking that they are 
calm and collected when they are really in distress and afflicted with 
a sense of unreality. Numbing is, according to Hodgkinson and Stew-
art, a defensive manoeuvre, protecting the individual from experienc-
ing a trauma in progress, and sometimes also from the threat to life in 
a realistic way.72 This coping strategy was, for instance, employed 
among the seamen who after the Zeebrygge ferry disaster in Belgium 
in 1987, participated in identifying their dead co-workers. Distancing 
from feelings, using alcohol and resorting to humour became the pro-
tective armour against reality.73 It took 6 months before the seamen 
could talk about their experiences. 
It is noteworthy that there is a possible difference between stable 
coping strategies, which are employed in long-term or recurring strain, 
and situation-specific coping strategies, which refer to different strate-
gies being employed in different types of situations or at different 
phases of a certain situation.74 
Some studies point to the importance of feelings of guilt or responsi-
bility in connection with an incident. Such feelings are assumed to af-
fect the coping strategies used.75 
 
Performance – action on site 
Performance is an isolated factor in the media reporting on a disaster. 
Performance includes the journalist’s actions and behaviour on site 
and the result of the media coverage by publication. Empirically, the 
final publications of photos and texts will nor be investigated, but rather 
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the journalists’ experience of their own and others’ efforts on site. Pre-
vious studies include investigation of performance in the form of jour-
nalistic publications, for instance, in the government inquiry into the 
Gothenburg fire.76 
Individual, as well as group psychological reactions to the current 
threat, are triggered in an accident or disaster. Working and function-
ing as a professional in such situations may be demanding. Performing 
under extreme pressure is usually regarded as a reverse phenomenon, 
meaning that the performance can be improved at a certain stress level 
but dropping at higher levels.77 The phenomenon can partly explain the 
variation of experiences of working at an accident site (Figure 3). 
Figure 3 shows that stress has both positive and negative effects and 
that performance ability is at its highest at a ”moderate” stress level. 
This applies to bodily as well as cognitive performance. The individual’s 
way of reacting to stress is, in addition, very individual. Factors such as 
good physical condition (absence of illness, tiredness, injuries etc.) and 
a positive self-esteem (realistic and coherent) are two strong resources, 
while weak physical condition and low self-esteem provide a weaker ba-
sis for interpretation and coping.78 Gerry Larsson, Ann Enander and 
Claes Wallenius, military crisis psychologists, have described the stress 
reaction curve using examples from their field. Attention is reduced so 
that relevant signs from the surroundings are filtered and the perfor-
mance deteriorates.79 In the same way as the performance ability is af-
fected, our way of thinking is also altered under stress. Our ability to 
solve problems may become reduced, rigid and stereotypical. There is 
also the risk of assessing options and decisions unsystematically. A de-
teriorating ability to differentiate between the dangerous and the trivial 
is another effect on a person’s actions. Acting randomly can increase 
and so also the number of erroneous actions. The speed of work in-
creases, while precision decreases.  
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Figure 3.  Correlation between the strength of stress reaction (performance)       
      and stress reaction. 
 
 
Lastly, as mentioned, a sense of coherence has great importance. 
Aaron Antonovsky, sociologist80  has defined ‘sense of coherence’ as fol-
lows: 
The sense of coherence constitutes a global orientation representing the degree to 
which one has a pervasively permanent and yet dynamic sense of confidence regard-
ing (1) how stimuli deriving from inner and outer life surroundings are structured, predict-
able and possible to explain; (2) there are available resources to meet the demands of 
these stimuli; and (3) these demands are challenges, which deserve conscious atten-
tion and engagement.81 
The sense of coherence is in turn built on three cornerstones, 
namely the sense of comprehensibility, the sense of manageability, and 
the sense of meaningfulness.  
If all these variables malfunction, there is a risk of tunnel vision, in-
creased fear and misguided actions. At the same time the stress reac-
tions can be functional for the individual who can focus on ”the 
threat”/problem and can drop irrelevant details for the moment. En-
ergy is then mobilised for physical efforts and an emotional prepared-
ness for fight or flight.  
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People who have been in life-threatening situations describe expe-
riencing adrenaline rushes, which are the result of physiological energy 
addition. Studies of stress reactions in military leaders show that they 
can lose the ability to survey a situation and look ahead, that they mis-
calculate time and do many things at the same time, losing their sense 
of time and priorities, fail to delegate and issue complex and unclear 
orders.82 In an interview study by Wallenius with UN battalion staff in 
Bosnien-Hercegovina, it emerged that many experienced that fear had 
a positive and activating effect. Some felt that their powers of concen-
tration and thinking were heightened in an acute threatening situation, 
but also that the ability to think was reduced – ”like looking through 
a straw” – if the threat was extended in time.83 Hypothetically, there 
might be a difference between military stressed officers and a newspa-
per office. The military leaders probably spend more time in the field 
than the editors do. Considering how being there and witnessing im-
pact on individual reactions,  it is reasonable to assume that the editors 
are spared the most traumatic stress and are therefore better equipped 
for operative leadership. On the downside they lack the insight, over-
view and understanding that only witnessing can provide.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The reactions of journalists witnessing a disaster – a potential trauma 
– are important for the understanding of the outcome of their assign-
ment on site. The journalists' reaction patterns are normal reactions to 
an abnormal situation. 
Studies of rescue service personnel and their reactions show that, 
despite strong sensory reactions, there are still remarkably few who ex-
perience reduced capacity in connection with stress reactions during a 
potentially traumatic assignment, but the less distressing the event, the 
longer the time until a debilitating stress reaction. But in case of a heavy 
trauma, when the individual does not have time to mobilise coping 
strategies, some individuals can find it difficult to complete their as-
signment.   
Previous research of rescue service personnel reactions suggests 
that the most difficult situations to handle are those involving children. 
Dead and injured children increase stress among staff dramatically, 
causing severe crisis reactions. The most common crisis reactions seem 
to be cognitive (experiential), emotional, behavioural and somatic 
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(physical). Studies of how rescue service personnel have reacted in con-
nection with traumatic assignments have shown that there are usually 
a handful of reactions in each of the categories.  
The most common reactions are the sense of unreality, super 
memory, self- recrimination and possibly reduced risk perception. The 
reactions can mainly be handled through two types of coping strategies: 
problem focused coping which seeks information, analyses and solves 
problems, and emotion focused coping, which is characterised by pos-
itive thinking, self-control or negative aspects such as, distancing, flight 
or dissociation.  
Rescue service personnel were for a long time a forgotten category 
after accidents and disasters. Journalists, however, have been an even 
more neglected category of indirectly affected individuals.  
Several researchers think that an ”optimal disaster behaviour” can 
be achieved through an intuitive and quick employment of accumu-
lated knowledge, experience and training in practice. Rescue personnel 
are trained for this, unlike journalists. The editors face a particular 
challenge. Existing knowledge of leadership under stress and crisis 
suggests that there is a conflict between task-oriented and reaction-ori-
ented leadership. The former involves pausing for thought, get an over-
view and think ahead without being overwhelmed by feelings. The lat-
ter is more focused on motivating co-workers and delivering individual 
support and crisis management. The kind of leadership that the jour-
nalist in the field has to relate to probably affects reactions, coping and 
approach. 
The fact that journalists react is described and to a certain extent 
treated in a few international studies.84 But how do they react, and how 
do the reactions in turn affect the professional task as a journalist? How 
does the conflict between the professional role and the person involved 
manifest itself? These are the central questions to be treated on the ba-
sis of the journalists' reporting on the Gothenburg fire. 
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 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
 
 
Doing research is similar to looking through another person's eyes, ac-
cording to Stig Lindholm, professor of pedagogic psychology. He also 
likens the result – the potentially new – as an effect similar to listening 
to music in stereo. It is not merely a matter of simple addition, but the 
discovery of depth.1 In this case, I have looked through the journalists' 
eyes to describe and explain the conditions under which journalists 
work at an accident site.  
The process towards a complete thesis design is a long and winding 
road. Thus, this study started off as a study of disaster victims and their 
portrayal in the media, turned into a study of media content, to finally 
end up in an occupational study of journalists working on a specific 
case. The subject of disaster journalism has, however, been consistently 
central; only the focus has changed.   
 
 
Investigation method 
These thesis began as a case study in 1999, the year after the Gothen-
burg fire, and a few results were published in the research report ” Me-
dia at the accident site”.2 This analysis was to have an extremely im-
portant function in the ensuing thesis investigation, namely as a 
question generator and a source of knowledge. Studying the content 
of the press raised many questions, which formed the basis of the in-
terview design in combination with the theoretical frames. The media 
content also provided the reporters, photographers and editors that were 
judged to be important pieces of the puzzle.  
 
Selecting respondents from the content analysis  
The content analysis is crucial to the thesis without being a part of it. It 
has two main purposes: Firstly, to contribute to the so-called case jour-
nal – increasing knowledge of the event and its circumstances; sec-
ondly, to generate respondents and questions. The news reporting in 
the following Swedish morning papers Göteborgs-Posten (GP) and 
Dagens Nyheter (DN) and the evening papers GöteborgsTidningen 
(GT) and Aftonbladet (AB) were analysed and categorised during the 
 122 
 
first days of the disaster. The emphasis in the content analysis is on the 
first and second days, that is, the 30 and 31 of October in 1998.  Most 
papers printed extra editions at different times in the two days, which 
meant that text and photos were revised. In some cases the difference is 
so great that both the first and last edition were analysed. In itself this 
fact raised many questions regarding press ethics under time pressure, 
and interpretations and decisions made under stress.  
The mentioned newspapers have a different character and are is-
sued in different geographic areas, but share the journalistic task and 
form of news coverage. The four papers can be said to exist in the same 
discursive space, which means that the texts in the four papers can be 
regarded as related in a coherent pattern. We can assume that many 
readers in this period use more channels than they usually do. Messages, 
stories and interpretations are therefore synthesised by the individual 
reader. In this sense, the questions evoked on media content, text and 
pictures, can be seen as common to all the papers.  
There were further reasons for letting the content analysis come be-
fore the interviews besides the selection of respondents: The study of 
newspaper texts provided good insight into the object of study and was 
an empirical complement to the theories of media and disasters. Since 
there is a lack of useful theories of disaster journalism and media prac-
tice at accident sites, the close reading of the media coverage has given 
rise to issues that require multi- and cross-disciplinary studies of crisis 
and disaster psychology, journalistic practice and other disaster re-
search. Lastly, the study of the newspaper articles was a way of gener-
ating questions for the interviews. This approach resulted in a kind of 
”case journal” – a relatively detailed case data bank – described below 
in the section on case studies.  
 
Delimitation 
Working on the thesis has been a funnel-shaped process, which started 
with an ambition to cover disaster journalism in both breadth and 
depth and then went through a number of necessary narrowing down 
steps.  
Regarding the three phases of a disaster –– before, during and after –– 
the study focuses on the acute phase (what takes place at the accident 
site). Professional practice involves conditions, implementation and ef-
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fects, and implementation is the central aspect in the study. The jour-
nalist’s practice during a disaster in progress must nonetheless be 
treated in the light of conditions and effects, but the interpretation and 
analysis of the empirical material rest on cognitive (as experienced), 
emotional, behavioural and somatic reactions, and the journalists’ de-
scriptions of their interpretations and actions on site. 
All types of media were present at the Gothenburg nightly fire in 
1998: Radio, TV, newspapers, photo agencies, news agencies. All had 
a great impact and none was less interesting than another, but a de-
marcation had to be made.  The press was chosen because reporters 
and photographers were the first to arrive at the site and my primary 
object of study was journalistic practice during a disaster where the 
journalist’s status as eyewitness is a vital factor.  
A newspaper is also in many ways a more permanent document than 
broadcast media. It has both a short-term and a long-term importance 
to the reader, not least the persons affected. A printed text remains and 
can impact on the reader for better or for worse for a long time.  
The term ‘journalist” in this thesis includes both reporters and 
photographers.  Otherwise it is refered to the categories ‘reporter’, 
‘photographer’ and ‘editors’. Photography journalism has often 
proved to be of great importance in disasters,3 and including photogra-
phers was a matter of course in this study. The investigation covers 
both the morning and evening press in Stockholm and Gothenburg.  
Table 5 below shows the press staffing at the Gothenburg fire acci-
dent site in the first hours. Table 5 also shows that press members were 
the first to arrive and that the selection of papers and respondents make 
up a high proportion of the journalists and media on site.4 When the fire 
was extinguished at two o’clock in the early hours of the morning, 
around fifteen reporters and photographers were there.5  A substantial 
number of the press journalists who were on site during the night and 
in the morning are part of this study. Interviews were made with fifteen 
reporters, photographers and editors at two morning papers: Göte-
borgs-Posten (GP) and Dagens Nyheter (DN) and two evening pa-
pers:  GöteborgsTidningen (GT) and Aftonbladet (AB). 
 
 
 
 
 124 
 
Table 5. Reporters and photographers present at the fire at Backaplan in the 
night between the 29th and 30th October 1998  (bold type marks 
interview respondents)  
 
 
 
The interviews were made via telephone, as described further be-
low. The questions focused on the professional and psychological as-
pects of the journalistic tasks in relation to the Gothenburg fire. Most 
of the reporters, photographers and editors (selection see above) were 
on duty during the first hours of the disaster. Some arrived later, which 
offers interesting points of comparison. 
The category of editors comprises managing editors, chief editors, 
local project leaders/editors and image editors. The respondents in-
clude personnel stationed in Gothenburg and Stockholm, permanent 
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employees and free-lancers and, by a fortunate coincidence, both men 
and women, as well as large age distribution.   
The same respondents also figure in an earlier report ”The Gothen-
burg fire 1998: A Study of communication, rumours and trust”, which 
deals with other areas.6 Parts of the interview material have also been 
presented in an earlier research report,7 which in addition includes 
some examples of the content analysis preceding the interviews.   
The editors are included in the study because they add a manage-
ment perspective on accident reporting, which is important to the 
whole picture. The newsroom activities take place under completely 
different premises than at the accident site. Ethical considerations and 
discussions are made clear because the interviews include both per-
spectives. The process from sounding the alarm to publishing is also 
clearer in the light of the more complex starting-points. Interaction and 
conflicts, as well as a view of self-evaluation and learning also become 
more transparent.   
 
Interview as a method 
In the introduction to The qualitative research interview (Den kvalita-
tiva forskningsintervjun) Steinar Kvale suggests that the best way to 
find out how individuals experience the world is to ask them.8 This is 
the justification of the choice of method, which is simple enough, but 
the implementation is more difficult. Interviewing is an art and listening 
is hard work.9 
The interview method may have advantages if used in the right way. 
The interviews complement one another in a way that is complex and 
complementary and not simply a number of additional cases.  There is 
also a subtle interplay, generating pictures of realities.  
 Interviewing is an art that rests on the judgement of qualified re-
searchers rather than on rules regardless of content and context. In the 
therapeutic, as well as the research interview, the interviewer is the 
tool. The result of an interview depends on the expertise, sensitivity and 
empathy of the interviewer.10 
Witnessing a tragedy such as the Gothenburg fire was a traumatic 
event for all the interviewed members of the media. Reliving the expe-
rience in the research interviews could, for some probably mean re-
newed pain as well as the relief that comes with ”talking about it”. The 
emotionally sensitive subject held deeply tragic portrayals and per-
sonal naked stories.  
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Talking about chaos, suffering and death in a research interview is 
strenuous for both the interviewer and the interviewee. The present in-
terview study was conducted by phone (more details further on) 
around six months after the fire. This time period might have had both 
good and bad effects on the information that the respondents gave. 
Here are some examples of effects: 
The incident was relatively well processed, often mentioned, and 
therefore easy to discuss on the phone for the affected persons. The risk 
of memory lapses can have increased and decreased: On the one hand, 
the long time might have led to the loss of certain details, and, on the 
other, the risk of memory gaps being filled in various ways would have 
been greater if the interview had taken place closer in time to the event 
as an effect of individual distress.11 
Respondents’ perspectives on the incident and ability to see con-
texts are assumed to improve with time – to a certain point when some 
details start to fall into oblivion. However, in this case the recollections 
were so strong that the respondents were not likely to forget them. In 
some cases, it was difficult to know if the memory loss was truthful or 
an excuse not to answer uncomfortable questions, as in this example 
from an interview with a managing editor: ”Oh, I think I’m afflicted 
with Alzheimer’s now.” (Laughter). 
The risk of modified information, conscious or unconscious, in-
creases with time. Since the Gothenburg fire was discussed thoroughly 
among journalists and editors at the time of the research interviews, 
the respondents may have added corrected descriptions and clarifica-
tions and this is impossible to determine. 
How could these interviews be carried out in an optimal way, when 
there was the added weakness that conducting the interviews in 
Gothenburg was not optional? After considering various video confer-
encing options, it was finally settled that telephone interviews would be 
the most economical and efficient method. The interviews were rec-
orded and the quality was good enough to rule out misconstructions. 
On the plus side, the target group was defined as experienced phone 
users and the distanced interview form was thought to reduce the risk 
of ”emotional excesses.” A personal meeting would have been more like 
a therapy situation as the experiences at the time were relatively un-
treated.  
Even if the target group was assumed to be verbal and articulate, 
many of them pointed out that they were not used to being interviewed. 
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Interviews were interrupted on some occasions for smoking, need of 
fresh air or a glass of water: ”Excuse me, I'll need a glass of water. I got 
something in my throat. Please hold  (pause). I'm more used to listen-
ing than talking”.12 The painfulness of the topic was evident, even on 
the phone. When a photographer described the scenario on the acci-
dent site, and heard ”all the 17-year-old girls' light voices screaming,” 
his own voice broke and he said: ”Now I'm getting hoarse too...”.13 
The disadvantages of telephone interviews are the possible difficulty 
in establishing contact and the lack of possibility to interpret non-ver-
bal signs.  
 
 
A psychological perspective 
An important aspect of psychotherapy education, is developing the lis-
tening skills required to capture the many nuances and layers of mean-
ing in a narration through empathy and active listening. Patients and 
clients should be listened to with ”evenly suspended attention” as 
Freud, who regarded the therapuetic interview as a research method, 
put it.14 
The free and reflecting approach to the research interview is also 
exemplified in Freud’ s clinical case studies, where he attentively pre-
sents his interviews.15 It is very difficult to present the relational and 
covert aspects of the interview situation in the written form, which 
means that the researcher has to have experience-based knowledge and 
skills in formulating experience that go beyond the traditional frames 
of reporting in research.  
The open interview format is a characteristic feature of the psycho-
analytical interview as reflected in Freud’s non-intentional approach of 
letting himself be surprised at every turn of the process.16 The inter-
views in this study, however, were not wholly without intentions, but 
keeping an open mind to unexpected turns was certainly an ambition.  
A similarity between the qualitative research interview and the psy-
choanalytical interview is the emphasis on inter-human interaction. 
Therapy skills in the art of listening are also important for professional 
groups such as journalists and researchers. Moreover, Kvale17 argues 
that the journalistic way of conveying an interview atmosphere could 
be applied by researchers to a greater extent in their reporting of inter-
view studies.  
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Reconstructed experiences? 
After an accident such as the Gothenburg fire, there is a risk that the 
ensuing debate will impact on individuals’ memories. Perby describes 
how she, in connection with case studies of different professions, now 
and then would hear respondents’ saying that they don’t know ”in what 
degree this is my personal opinion”, or that she should ”ask the others 
too.”18 The ongoing conversation between colleagues entails correcting 
memories and opinions. This is the reason why the accumulated im-
presssion of the responses is of greater weight than the recollections of 
the occasional individual.  
One respondent in the study contradicted himself when he de-
scribed his experiences of what was happening around him at the dis-
aster site. In one breath he said that it was not until he left the site that 
he realised that people had died and in the next he described how the 
paramedics performed CPR on fire victims:  
‘...and then there were some they gave up on, and you could tell they were dead. And 
I thought there were sure to be more dead young people. Maybe five. Or some around 
five’.19 
The example shows that it is not that easy to decide which experi-
ences were actually made on site, and which are a reconstruction and the 
result of pooling all the knowledge of the course of events, its causes and con-
sequences. This is an important aspect to keep in mind when analysing 
the stories told.  
 
Meeting on the phone: advantages and disadvantages  
Besides the reasons mentioned above for choosing telephone inter-
views instead of visiting in person, one further factor was decisive: The 
studies of the media content preceding the interviews were so demand-
ing that one-to-one meetings might not be desireable. In his introduc-
tion to the book Interviewing (Att fråga),20  Bo Wärneryd has compiled 
a comparative survey of different data collection methods, such as vis-
iting and telephone interviews. The survey is designed for collecting 
statistical data in connection with survey investigations, but can to 
some extent clarify aspects of the qualitative interview situations in the 
present study. Table 6 presents a shorter version based on Wärneryd’s 
survey, revised to suit the present purpose. It is noteworthy that the 
factors Wärneryd regards as negative in the emotionally charged inter-
view, can in fact be beneficial.  
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In the study of the journalists involved in the Gothenburg fire, the 
interview situation was more anonymous but this was not only a disad-
vantage. However, talking about sensitive subjects over the phone may 
require long experience of open communication by phone and when 
the experience is there telephone interviews work well. Based on expe-
rience of the method after the fire study, the distance that came with 
the telephone medium may have prevented the research interview from 
turning into therapy. The silences or pauses were not felt uncomforta-
ble to the interviewer. They rather generated more information. Silence 
could sometimes be relied on instead of follow-up questions. Interpret-
ing moods, silent pauses, swallowings, throat clearings and sighings 
may probably be easier in the absence of face-to-face visual impres-
sions. The assumption that the pressure of the situation would yield 
quick and superficial answers did not apply to this case. The questions 
were very short and the answers usually very long, which might be due 
to the respondents' verbal abilities. In addition, the respondents knew 
in advance that the interview was expected to take between one and two 
hours (different for the various categories), which was likely to create a 
certain mutual expectation of degree of detailness.  
 
Table 6. Comparative overview of different aspects of the visiting interview and 
the telephone interview. Source: based on Wärneryd (1993). 
 
 
 
 
 One-to-one interview Telephone interview 
Contact situation Face to face Interviewer more anonymous 
More limited, less flexible 
Chance to establish 
a measurable  
situation                  
Big space for non-verbal com-
munication, hard to controll 
Only verbal communication, 
but pauses could be experienced  
as disturbing 
Support information              The interviewer can explain, 
and impact                but major risk for impact 
 
Less risk for interwiever  
influence 
Questions and the kind 
of questions 
All questions possible, even                
delicate ones, if special                        
measures are taken (e.g. anonymity) 
Pressure to answer Can involve a pressure to an-
swer 
Situation pressure vs. quick/ 
superficial answers 
Most topics possible, maybe 
except the most sensitive and 
intimate 
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The case study as method 
There are many definitions of a case study. Some of the definitions that 
Sharan B Merriam,21  professor of pedagogy, refers to are also men-
tioned in Wilson,22 who thinks of the case study as a process of trying 
”to describe and analyse a certain unit in qualitative, complex and in-
tegrated terms, often continuously for a long period of time”. Guba & 
Lincoln23 argue that the case study aims to demonstrate ”the properties 
of the class of phenomena of which the case is an example”. Becker24 
thinks that the case study should lead to an integrated understanding 
of the units studied and to the development of general theoretical state-
ments on regularities in the social structure and the social process. In 
the various definitions, Merriam discerns four basic features that are 
characteristic of all qualitative case studies. Firstly, they are particu-
laristic, meaning that they focus on a specific event, phenomenon or 
person, but still reflect a general problem. The case study displays how 
people handle problems of all kinds in an integrated way.  
 Secondly, they are descriptive, which means a detailed and exten-
sive description of the phenomenon. The case study comprises many 
variables and displays the complexity and interaction between them, 
usually through a qualitative description.  
Thirdly, they are heuristisk, which includes the aim to improve the 
reader’s understanding of the phenomenon studied, for example, by 
providing bakgrounds and explanations to a problem. Previously un-
known variables and conditions may lead to new perspectives and in-
sights. This perspective is also applicable to evaluations and summar-
ies, which makes it useful in practice.  
Fourthly, they are inductive and the data generate concepts, hy-
pothesis and generalisations. A qualitative case study reveals new rela-
tionships, concepts and new understandings.  
A reason for taking case studies seriously is that different situations 
have different setups. Case studies can give rise to interesting compar-
isons between disciplines and professional groups.   
An advantage of case studies as a research method is the natural de-
limitation: in time, geography and in the number of possible respond-
ents. The prospects of creating a case journal to document the event 
are good.25 Interview transcripts, reports, and in this case media pub-
lications, notes, articles and other material related to the case must be 
compiled and organised. Merriam quotes Patton, who clarifies the dif-
ference between the case journal and the case study:  
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The case journal compiles and structures the extensive information collected in a 
more unified, albeit primary, form. The case journal encompasses all the infor-
mation used in the analysis and in the reporting. /.../ The case journal must be com-
plete and esily managed at the same time.26 
Yin27 calls the case journal the case study database. The infor-
mation here is edited, superfluous material deleted and the material 
has a structured chronology.28 The case journal in this study has four 
components: literature about the case; press/media publications dur-
ing the first week; interviews with journalists and my own texts. 
Most case studies in the social sciences centre on practical problems 
in an integrated perspective with the purpose of acquiring deeper in-
sights into a certain situation and how the persons involved construct 
it.29 The context is more important than the variables. 
Anyone who thinks that there is a universal form of knowledge – for example defi-
nitions or mathematical systems possible to formulate – cannot focus on the specific 
in an area; in pursuit of the general, she will constantly distance herself from the 
living knowledge in the area. Instead, we should take case studies seriously, that is, 
take the specific and unique – the physionomy of the domain – seriously. Situations 
have faces. Case studies in general give rise to interesting comparisons between ar-
eas.30 
According to Stake,31 seeing the case study as a method is debatable. 
He claims that it is not a matter of methodological choice but a choice 
of study object., This may be a far too broad definition of a case study. 
Most research is a case study in Stake’s definition. He argues that the 
knowledge yielded through a case study differs from other research 
findings in four ways: It is more concrete and in harmony with our ex-
perience and more contextual. It is more developed through the re-
searcher’s interpretation (something that leads to generalisations when 
new information in the case is added to old information) and contrib-
utes to extended generalisations of different reference populations.32 
The case study is, according to Yin, applicable when a ”how” or 
”why” question is addressed to all concurrent events on which the re-
searcher has no or little influence.33  Yin points out that this kind of 
study requires a great deal of plannning and precision in formulating 
questions. One way of reaching a goal is through careful in a more per-
ceptive or insightful way on the subject.  
Working on a case study is similar to what journalists do. And the 
fact is, literature studies and this study is supported by detailed content 
analysis of a selection of the media production related to the case. 
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The preparatory studies of literature and press texts did not aim to 
seek the answers of others to a number of given questions, but raising 
questions as Yin points out that one of the best case studies written was 
produced by two journalists, namely Bernstein and Woodward. In All 
the President’s Men34 the powers that managed to conceal the Wa-
tergate scandal for a long time are portrayed. The authors keep return-
ing to two questions: How was this cover-up created, and why was it 
necessary? 
The two key questions in this study are: How did the journalists 
experience working at the accident site? Why did they react and act the 
way they did – there and then?  
 
Questions and interview guides  
Formulating the questions for the interview study followed on the lit-
erature study and content analysis of the four papers. The first draft of 
the interview guide was tested on a journalist who had been on duty 
when Estonia ferry went down. The journalist was at the ferry terminal 
where all next-of-kin were gathered. The pilot study was conducted by 
phone, which both parties found to work well. The revised and final 
interview guide (Appendix 135) started with basic personal facts such as 
age, gender, education, number of years in the profession, employ-
ment, previous experience of disaster reporting, time of the alert and 
the arrival at Gothenburg fire site, or time of arrival at the office (edi-
tors).  
The questions were divided into categories: the alert phase; arrival 
(if applicable); any instructions; visual impressions; thoughts, feelings 
and reactions; interaction and conflicts with colleagues and other ac-
tors; other actions on the site; interpretations and decisions; the con-
flict between the person and profession (fellow-human being and/or 
journalist?); editorial discussions and decisions; press publications; 
the need of psychological support/relief after the assignment; how/if 
such therapy was provided and its effect; self-evaluation of their own 
professional efforts and the paper's reporting after the fire; internal 
and external learning – at the newspaper and professionally. The man-
aging editors were asked specific questions on press ethical responsi-
bility and leadership.  
The questions were not always asked chronologically. Instead, a rel-
atively non-verbal but listening approach was adopted, with the result 
 133 
 
that questions in the guide could be ticked without asking them. Most 
interviews also generated a new question to the guide and to the re-
maining interviews, which made the material increasingly richer.  
Many questions were also on themes that later became irrelevant to 
the thesis delimitation. In addition, the material comprises issues re-
lated to human grief, reporting on collective grief demonstrations, 
commemorative celebrations and funerals, as well as interviews with 
survivors in the hospitals, which contain many interesting aspects for 
further studies.  
 
Studying an occupation 
Occupational studies involve detailed study of the multifaceted and 
specific character of an occupation, and often, as in this case, in a given 
situation. Professional expertise and skills are explored through a se-
ries of interviews with respondents over many years and rests on the 
idea the researcher and respondents are part of the study object. The 
researcher lives in and with the study object and the number of re-
spondents are often lower than in more ”distanced” research ap-
proaches where the same person is only interviewed once. Göranzon36 
and Josefsson37 are examples of Swedish researchers in the field of oc-
cupation who apply the practice-related model with close contact with 
the respondents.  
A literary popular science example of how occupational knowledge 
can be studied is Yngve Ryd's book Snow (Snö) about the Swedish-
Sami reindeer owner Johan Rassa and the Sami understanding of 
snow. The book builds on several years of interviews with Rassa and 
provides more than 300 words for snow and how the Sami people re-
late to the snow types.38 
Occupational studies of journalists have been carried out at the De-
partment of Journalism by, among others, Weibull and Asp, who have 
studied the journalist corps as a social group,39 and, unlike the research 
mentioned above, primarily through quantitative questionnaire sur-
veys. Asp, Weibull and Börjesson, Melin-Higgins and Andersson40 
have studied journalists' values and attitudes, for instance, their atti-
tudes to press ethics and codes. Some studies also centre on journalists' 
opinions of the journalistic practice, for example a couple of studies by 
Löfgren-Nilsson.41 In her doctoral thesis on journalistic ideals and or-
ganisation principles, Löfgren-Nilsson observes that journalism re-
search often lacks empirical links between occupational studies and 
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practice.42 This was her reason for studying journalistic practice in the 
newsroom for a longer time.  
Occupational research in the form of indepth qualitative interviews 
is rare in the Swedish journalism research. Orre has studied the phe-
nomenon of reporting as an occupational praxis through interviews, 
but used the model of recurring group conversations.43 A survey of a 
great number of international journalism studies and a compilation of 
central conceptions of journalism are available in Weaver.44 The differ-
ent roles in the journalist profession have been described by, among 
others, Melin-Higgins and Thurén.45 
Studies of an occupation, means studying individuals and their sto-
ries. Sometimes the stories clash, sometimes they complement each 
other. Exploring an occupation includes all the personal and social fac-
tors that are embedded in the occupational role practised.   
 
From interview to text 
From the interview to the finished text a great deal happens. Interpre-
tations are made already in the transcription phase, and then the tran-
scriptions are in turn interpreted and analysed before the text is com-
pleted. Like the enthnologist, Billy Ehn, one may be fascinated by the 
transformation of conversation into a research text.46 
The interviews studied here were interpreted and analysed in two 
ways, partly through repeated and systematic listening, partly through 
repeated readings of the transcriptions. Ehn has described this process 
as an act of creation:  
Your read the interviews over and over until ou know by heart, you compile themes, 
compare what others have said, identify key aspects and delete things that cannot be 
used. The finished academic text looks deceptively simple when you quote from in-
terviews. In realty it is a complicated and arduous work to choose what to include, 
where and with what meaning.47 
Ehn has a point in the apparent simplicity of the interview analysis. 
To a layman's eyes the quotations can appear to be similar to a news-
paper interview. It is difficult to see that several years can lie between 
the start and the finish.   
The thesis is based on 15 interviews, lasting between 1.5 and 2 hours 
each, which correspond to 20-30 pages of printed text per interview, 
categorised with the help of close reading of the material. The catego-
ries were created on the basis of the smallest meaning-carrying ele-
ment, that is, not on already constructed models,48 but they are also 
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firmly related to theoretical frames on competence and stress reac-
tions. The  attempt was to analyse dimensions of experience, reactions 
and patterns of action to see in what ways the respondents describe 
them. The situational context is also analysed and specified to which 
phase of the publication process they are related.  
 
Knowledge generated by the choice of method   
Witnessing the tragedy in Gothenburg was a traumatic experience for 
several of the interviewed media members. On several occasions during 
the interview, the interviewer was faced with methodological choices 
related to reliability and ethics, for instance, the roles of the researcher 
and the interviewee. The emotionally charged topic of deeply tragic de-
pictions and personal, naked stories gave rise to misconstructions as 
well as problems in drawing the line when an interviewee talked in a 
way that was more suitable for a therapy session.  
Some factors of uncertainty are always inherent in retrospective inter-
views, and  when they involve emotional experiences (in this case also 
in combination with professional ideals) there is room for mistaken 
statements and misconstructions. However, the interview study may 
be viewed as highly relevant to the key issues of the thesis in design and 
performance. In addition, the preparation for the interview guides was 
meticulous, as described above. 
The processing of collected material worked well too. The interviews 
were both transcribed verbatim for reading and recorded on CD for lis-
tening and computer processing. In Glaser's terms, the theoretical cod-
ing of the interviews was then made on the basis of the following three 
aspects:49  1) Cause and effect: What were the consequences of certain ac-
tions or decisions? 2) Processes in the journalistic work at the accident 
site: How did the work proceed over time and how did the journalists 
react to the situation? 3) Strategies for problem solution: What did the 
journalists do to manage situational problems such as press ethical is-
sues and journalistic decisions?  
There will never be a fire identical to the Gothenburg fire, but more 
tragic accidents are certainly in store. Even if each situation is unique, 
there are similarities and parallels in aspects of the event and the onsite 
journalistic efforts that may be similar in the future. This thesis pro-
vides a picture of how journalism practice may take shape under ex-
treme circumstances. 
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Research ethical guidelines  
The study has been conducted in compliance with the research ethical 
principles issued by the Swedish Research Council.50 The principles of 
individual protection were considered with regard to the insight that 
the nature of the investigation and the population does not guarantee 
complete anonymity. This was discussed with the interviewees, who 
consented to the proposed manner of quoting from the interviews in 
the thesis. 
The interviewees were informed about the purpose of the study, 
which means that the requirement of information is met. Since the in-
terview material was originally collected within the frame of another 
project funded by the Swedish Board of Psychological Defence, the in-
terviewees were primarily informed about that project and about the 
report to be published.51 Only a few of the question areas were analysed 
for the psychology defence report. All participants were later informed 
that the whole interviews had been analysed for publication in a doc-
toral thesis.   
The requirement of consent has been met because all participants and, 
when applicable, their editors consented to the interviews being recorded 
and transcribed for analysis in the report and the thesis.  
The research ethical principles involving confidentiality and privacy 
were the most difficult to meet. The uninitiated reader cannot identify 
any interviewee. As regards the initiated journalists and all the persons 
present at the accident site in Gothenburg, the confidentiality require-
ment is an unreasonable and superfluous rule. The journalist profes-
sion is in most cases public. Texts and photos are accompanied with 
bylines with complete names. A certain newspaper might only have had 
one photographer on site in the middle of the night, which means that 
the reference ”Photographer AB” is only an apparent anonymity. Some 
information in the interviews are so detailed that the individuals are 
fully identifiable to a certain circle of people. This problem was dis-
cussed with all interviewees, who were aware of the problem but did 
not object to continued participation in the interview study. The  inter-
viewer also guaranteed that no third party would receive any infor-
mation of identities through me. The confidentiality requirement has 
thus been met.  
The collected interview material has been used only for research 
puposes and will not be used in any other way, in compliance with the 
ethical rules.  
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The Research Council’s recommendations that respondents and in-
formants are allowed access to ethically sensitive parts have been ob-
served to a great extent and whenever deemed necessary.  
 
Closeness and distance 
The issue of closeness and distance has been treated by several re-
searchers in connection with descriptions of qualitative methods.5 2  
The role of the researcher is often described as a constant vacillation 
between closeness and distance, where closeness can be an advantage 
as well as a disadvantage. This interplay can be observed in several con-
texts: the interviewees’ closeness to the object of study and the re-
searcher’s closeness to the empirical material, collected and analysed.53 
Conducting emotionally charged interviews means a strain on both 
the interviewee and the researcher. The latter must imperceptibly ac-
commodate his or her own as well as the interwiewee’s reactions to 
what is described, as Sandberg and Thelander point out in connection 
with an interview study of the poisonous tunnel construction through 
the Halland Ridge (Hallandsåsen), in the south-west Sweden.  
Researchers must never proceed further in the interview than they can manage 
themselves. They must be able to carry the interviewee’s emotional response as well 
as their own without breaking down.54 
A risk in establishing a good contact with interviewees is that the 
researcher deceives or manipulates the interviewee because he/she can 
be lulled into a false sense of security about the good relationship and 
disclose more information than intended. The purpose of the interview 
can be forgotten and the interviewee can forget that statements do not 
remain private. If the tone is too friendly, the risk increases. ”Thanks 
for coming and welcome back,” said an older man to the researchers 
upon leaving his home.55 In the case of the Gothenburg fire, several 
interviewees concluded by saying, ”it was nice to get it off my chest” or 
”oh, this brings back a lot – a lot surfaced now”. 
As mentioned, the interviews in this study were preceded by two 
months of content analysis, primarily of the press but also TV broad-
casts. Filling the days with so much tragedy required a balance between 
empathy and distance, and mostly the latter; what Devereux, Hungar-
ian-French ethnologist, has called counter transference could other-
wise take place.56 This concept refers to situations where the research-
ers react to their own observations.  
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The telephone interview as a method turned out to be a useful in-
strument in balancing closeness and distance, probably for both par-
ties; a traumatic event leaving permanent scars was to be described and 
understood.  
 
 
The case of the Gothenburg fire: A background 
During the night of 29-30 October 1998 several alert calls were re-
ceived at the Emergency Control Centre at 23:43 about a fire in the 
premises of the Macedonian Society at Backaplan in Gothenburg. This 
section gives a description of the case to give the reader a chance to 
understand the enormity of the situation and the conditions under 
which the journalists did their job.   
The emergency operations were very complicated and aggravated 
by the great number of people who were present at the site, blocking 
the passage.  A further complication was the great many young people 
in different degrees of distress. According to the emergency service re-
port, many young people also helped in the life-saving efforts. Initially, 
around 60 persons were saved by firemen, 40 via the stairwell and 20 
through the windows. Many saved themselves  by jumping from win-
dows.  
‘I see the utter chaos all around, hundreds of people lying in a jumble, lifeless, you can’t 
tell if they are shocked, injured, severely injured or … in any case lifeless. People are 
dragged around /... / there is shouting and crying, the surge of the crowd moves in 
from everywhere, not just from the premises, but from everywhere, as I recall.’ 
(Operations  squad leader)57 
Still an hour after the start of the fire, the actors on site have not 
grasped the extent of the accident.58 
The Gothenburg fire is one of many accidents that we did not think 
could happen. The progress of the fire was rapid. In total, 213 young 
people were injured and 63 died in the tragic fire, 60 of which on site.59 
More that 100 men participated in the operations: 50 members of the 
rescue services, 40 ambulance paramedics and other medical staff, 
and great number of policemen.60 
The scenario described was witnessed by many reporters and pho-
tographers. The journalism practice on the site can, with few excep-
tions, be defined as reticent. The experience was potentially traumatic 
also for the members of the media, which affected their work dramati-
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cally.61 The event lead to extensive coverage by national and interna-
tional mass media as the majority of the young people belonged to fam-
ilies with non-Swedish background.  
The party organisers were called The Playaz Club. Flyers with the 
message of disco, hip-hop music, R&B soul had been disributed in 
schools and in the city in the days before. The entrance fee was 40 SEK 
and 320 tickets had been sold to a venue holding 150 persons.62 Most 
of the youngsters were 17 or 18 years old and lived in the Gothenburg 
districts of Hammarkullen, Bergsjön and Angered, which have a large 
proportion of immigrant families. The party venue, located on the sec-
ond floor of old converted industrial premises, was rented by the Mac-
edonian Society in Gothenburg. 
The fire, which was later shown to be arson, started in a stairwell 
adjacent to the emergency exits. When the door was opened, the oxygen 
made the fire accelerate dramatically, and a backdraft was a fact in the 
heat of 50 to 60 centigrade.  
A disc jockey tried to warn the crowd using his microphone. Panic 
and confusion developed in the partygoers' struggle to reach the only 
functioning exit. The abhorrent scenes involved young people not get-
ting out, and some who reached the door were stuck there. 
 
Media coverage: course of events 
The broadcst media in Gothenburg became aware of the ongoing fire 
via a personal beeper. The regional Gothenburg daily newspaper GP 
received a signal from the SOS Alarm Centre mini call service. A GP 
photographer off duty but carrying the emergency call centre's alarm 
seeker happened to be in the vicinity and went there immediately. The 
regional Gothenburg daily evening newspaper GT got a tip from a pri-
vate person who apparently was listening to the SOS Alarm. A free-
lance photographer for the regional public service TV based in 
Gothenburg,  SVT Västnytt, was reached by a mini call message at 
home. An editor got a signal message from an alert intelligence ser-
vice in the city of Norrköping, but did not understand the gravity of 
the situation. The alert service company continued signalling to Swe-
dish media and at midnight the authorities televison news channels 
SVT1/Aktuellt and SVT2/ Rapport were notified. Shortly after, the 
news reached the Norwegian newspapers Verdens Gang (VG) and Af-
tenposten.63 
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In Gothenburg,  only the newspapers GP and Arbetet carried the 
news about the fire in the morning edition. The presses were stopped 
and at 02:30 the last information of the number of deaths at that point 
in time came in and Gothenburg edition went to the presses.64 
The news of the fire reached the world around 01:45 via a telegram 
from TT,  a Swedish Newspapers’ Telegram Bureau (Tidningarnas Tel-
egrambyrå), on the Reuters news network. Ten minutes later channel 
TV4 broadcast the news of the fire as the first TV channel in Sweden. 
The Swedish Radio reported on the fire in the national public service 
radio Echo News (Ekonyheterna) at 02:00, and thereafter every 30 
minutes and after four o’clock every 15 minutes. The first local Gothen-
burg radio broadcast was at 02:00 and there were live reports from the 
accident site in between the news.65 
The government official investigation report on the Gothenburg 
fire66 concluded that many members of the mass media arrived at the 
scene only a few minutes after the rescue services and the police.67 The 
television and the radio dominated the news coverage initially and it 
took several hours before the first papers were distributed. A little more 
than two hours after the fire alert, the radio and TV media started 
broadcasting.   
Besides GP’s reporting in the morning after the fire, the evening pa-
pers carried detailed reports and on the following day, several papers 
issues extra editions despite the press free day (All Saints’ Day). 
The government investigation report arrives at two important con-
clusions regarding the media reporting: First, it is noted that it is ”nat-
ural for the media to interview eye witnesses, but that these should take 
place with discretion and awareness that distress can change people’s 
personality and judgement.” Second, it is noted that the media por-
trayal of the fire as an ethnicity related event was ”justified in view of 
the great many people of foreign background among the casualties”.  
Summing up, the report concludes that the information provided by 
the regular media was nuanced and factual, but the lack of TV broad-
casting in non-Swedish languages is criticised. Broadcasts in other lan-
guages would have made a great difference to people in this multiethnic 
event.  
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Table 7. Timeline for media engagement during the first ten hours of the 
Gothenburg fire  29-30 October 1998. 66 
 
 
 
23:42  SOS Emergency Call Centre receives an alert 
23:50 Several media are informed about the fire 
00:00 -00:50 Photographer and reporter from Aftonbladet  and photographer from 
GP arrive, soon followed by photographer and reporter from GT. 
GP’s reporters arrive at around 00:15. A bit later, a freelance pho-
tographer from SVT Väst arrives.   
 
00:35 ca Reporter from SVT Gothenburg arrives  
00:50 GP stops the presses when the two reporters return to office  
01:21 TT’s first telegram about ”some 20 young people victims of an 
uncontrollable fire”  
 
01:43 Reuters issues a telegram via TT and the news is spread interna-
tionally 
01:46 TT reports that there are around 50 victims  
01:50 Östra hospital’s oncall PR officer meets the first reporters and 
photographers who are already at the hospital   
01:55 First national TV news broadcast: a news bulletin in channel TV4 
02:00 First newscast in national radio P3/P4  
02:00 Report that the fire is out  
02:15 BBC’s first broadcast on the fire 
02:30 First press conference at the Östra hospital announced via TT 
02:30 First local radio broadcast: SR Gothenburg/P4. The 
Gothenburg edition of GP in press  
 
03:00 First press release is issued by Gårda fire station  
03:00 TV4 broadcasts live from Backaplan 
03:00-04:00 SVT2 and TV4 post information on their teletext pages   
03:30 SVT’s local studio Västnytt is staffed with 25-30 persons 
03:30 Press conference at på Gårda Fire Station announced via fax 
04:00 News broadcast in SVT/Rapport. The Gothenburg newspaper 
Arbetet  staffs its neswroom.  
 
04:10 CNN presents the news on its website 
04:30 First local TV4 newscast 
05:00 Delayed issue of GT’s Friday edition. Later in the morning GP         
and Arbetet decide on issuing a special edition for the press-free  
All Saints’ Day  
 
06:57 SVT’s local studio Västnytt’s first live newscasts from Backaplan  
10:15 First newscast from SVT’s local studio Västnytt  
. 
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Media coverage in the press, radio and TV 
The Gothenburg fire in 1998 attracted a great deal of attention from the 
media in Sweden and abroad.68 Swedish media, in particular the even-
ing press, appeared to be able to mobilise many people for extensive 
coverage.  Fridays are, for logical reasons, the day of the evening papers 
and the broadcasting media and the morning papers only ran short 
items and the occasional photo in their Friday editions.  However, both 
GP and Arbetet published a 16-page special edition on the normally 
press free All Saints’ Day. Sixty-one staff members worked on the spe-
cial paper at GP and 13 extra persons were brought in at Arbetet. The 
papers were delivered to different meeting-places in Gothenburg where 
people could collect a copy. Radio Gothenburg (Radio Göteborg) an-
nounced where the papers were available. The influx of journalists and 
photographers grew significantly during the Friday. The first foreign 
teams came from Copenhagen and Oslo but soon world media were in 
place. Around 130 journalists and photographers attended the press 
conferences arranged during the day.   
The government official investigation of the news coverage and in-
formation in connection with the fire included an analysis of different 
media and the proportion of their coverage given to the various stages 
such as the progress of the fire, life saving, hospital care, bereavement 
etc. The report shows that the broadcasting media by far paid the most 
attention to the fire, while the major city morning press devoted less 
space to it. The explanation may seem simple. The broadcasting media 
were on site and on the air very quickly, while the press free day for the 
morning press obviously meant a later engagement. However, the fact 
that the broadcasting media, especially TV, lend themselves better for 
dramatic scenes and life saving acts and the here-and-now experiences 
can have motivated the broadcasting media’s focus on the acute stage. 
The rescue operation gets most space in the evening press but the 
morning papers cover this  less. Beyond the time difference of media 
presence on site, this can be explained by the fact that rescue opera-
tions are more suitable to the evening press media logic, as the authors 
of the reports suggest. Regarding the portrayal of human grief, this was 
most attended to in the morning press while the broadcasting media 
paid less attention.69 
To further clarify the nature of the event, a selection of different me-
dia portrayals of the fire during the acute phase are presented below as 
examples of the situation and not as assessments of media content.  
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The fire portrayed in the press 
When the papers GP, DN, GT and AB had been selected from the ex-
tensive content analysis of the whole media production after the fire 
and before the interviews, the fours papers were the object of close 
reading and categorisation. A few parts of the analysis have previously 
been published in the the Swedish Rescue Services Agency’s 
(Räddningsverket) report ”Media at the accident site” (”Medier på 
olycksplatsen”).70 The bulk of the content analysis has not been pub-
lished and has served as a basis for the case study and for identifying 
respondents and designing the research issues and interview ques-
tions. Below, the media reporting is described as a background to the 
case study description and is not meant to provide a complete picture 
of the media reporting.  
GP's special Saturday edition, popularly referred to as the ”memo-
rial attachment”, later proved to be a very important document for 
many, not least for survivors and the bereaved. DN, however, was not 
issued on Saturday. Instead it devoted 12 pages to the tragic event in their 
Sunday issue. Fire reporting dominated the evening papers GT and AB 
for several days. The theme of tragedy and grief recurred in all the pa-
pers. The age of the victims contributes to coverage. Eyewitness ac-
counts are presented to a great extent except for the first day. Personal 
chronicles were more frequent in the studied press than usual. Eyewit-
ness journalists and photographers as reflecting fellow human beings 
were typical features of the coverage during the next days. The personal 
journalism and and personal form of reporting are examples of classic 
journalism, but here is a context in which the method becomes more 
prestigious.  Photography journalism is another form that was given a 
great deal of space at this time. Several papers, for instance, carried a 
single photo on the front page with a short caption, ”Gothenburg 30 
October 1998” or ”The fire site Friday night.” In this situation the image 
seemed to speak louder than words.  
 
Scenes from Hell 
The reporting on the fire in the press after the fire is filled with horror, 
panic and desperation. Grief, despair, questions without answers and 
a resigned sense of unreality fill the papers.  
What was happening? The boy didn't understand. He had been on a visit in hell.  
(DN  981101) 
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Have you seen the boy on fire? (a small boy's question to a Red Cross worker).  
(DN 981101) 
'The dead were lying in heaps'. Shocked firemen had never seen anything like it. 
(Headline in GT 981030) 
PEOPLE WERE LYING IN DROVES on the fire site... (Caption in GT, 981030). 
'Everybody was hitting and pinching one another, my hair was pulled and no one 
could breathe.' 'I knew that if I fell it would be the end. People would trample you to 
death.' (GT 981031) 
Shocked young people talked about how their friends died in their arms, how people 
were squeezed to death or had fallen to the ground in the street outside, coughing.   
(AB 981030) 
A young girl had stopped breathing. Around her wrist was the rescue services' green 
tag with the words: 'Non-urgent'.  (GT 981031) 
He saw young people jumping from windows onto the police cars below. How they 
were killed, injured.  How they were pushed through the windows. A boys' despera-
tion over his burned girl-friend.  (DN 981101) 
 
The eyewitness accounts are many and often bluntly put. GT let a 
young man describe how party-goers tried to escape the raging fire by 
jumbing from the narrow portholes:  
 
A 16-year-old boy who had gone out for a bit of fresh air was the witness of macabre 
scenes. I saw a guy jumping out head-first. He probably cracked his skull. (GT 981030) 
 
The article continues to describe what it could have been like inside 
for those who did not get out: 
 
Many didn't get that far. Inside the burning building many young people fell to the 
floor.  
Some managed to get up again. Others didn't have the strength and were lying on 
the floor while others in panic trampled all over them.  (GT 981030) 
 
In Aftonbladet, a girl – her picture next to the article – recounts 
how she had run on top of people lying on the floor to save her life: 
'Everyone trampled on others to get out. Me too. Some were sure to be dead, others 
unconscious, but I couldn't manage to think about them', said Yocelin. (AB 981031) 
 
The descriptions are reminiscent of a statement made by a Dane 
who survived the Estonia ferry disaster. He said, ”I survived by tram-
pling on others”. The statement, which became a favoured illustration 
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of desperation and survival instinct in the media, was cabled out to the 
news network. These words led to years of guilt feelings for the Dane, 
which is described in his book I wanted to survive (Jag ville 
överleva).71 Strong expressions like this can make the person who said 
them feel guilty, especially if ”the world” knows who said them. Nearly 
every major disaster is accompanied with similar phrases, which reflect 
powerlessness, and primitive survival instincts and probably describe 
the situation accurately. And one may wonder if it would be possible 
for papers to quote similar statements without attaching them to a spe-
cific person in a picture next to the article? An already dramatic situa-
tion is amplified by the dramturgy of news media. 
Another example of the conflict between understanding and enter-
tainment described in media theory72  is detailed descriptions of suffer-
ing and death. The need to know the facts of the naked truth is pitted 
against the violation of privacy.  It is not unproblematic to describe the 
face of sudden death in detail and with literary embellishments:  
An unbearable silence has replaced the chaos. /.../ The ambulances have been driv-
ing dead bodies to the Sahlgrenska hospital all night and all morning. Now there are 
only three left on the morning damp pavement. One is very small, lying on the back. 
I see a pair of black boots and hands that seem to be folded on the tummy under the 
yellow blanket. (AB 991030) 
The medical disaster expert Per Örtenvall, at the Östra hospital, can 
give more accurate information in a GP article where he says that most 
of the young people died from smoke poisioning, not from burn inju-
ries. Many have asked the question and on the basis of previous expe-
riences he elaborates on the answer:   
He has experience of the ferry catastrophe on the Scandinavian Star.  Smoke 
poisioning was the cause of death in 152 out of the 158 casualties.  
A qualified guess is that the conditions here were similar. Very likely most of them 
died from smoke poisioning. (GP 981101) 
 
The concluding impression – without evaluating the journalism – 
is that the newspapers were filled with unpleasant reading about a dia-
bolical event. The question is if the unbearable could have been por-
trayed in a tolerable way.  
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The fire on the radio 
The first national radio broadcast on the subject of the fire took place 
at 02:00. Both national and regional radio channels P3 & P4, followed 
by broadcasts every half hour until 04:00, when they came on air every 
fifteen minutes.73 
The first newscast by the national public service radio news pro-
gramme The Echo (Ekot) was introduced as follows: 
In view of the disastrous fire in Gothenburg, here follows an extra newscast. You are 
listening to the nightradio in P3 and P4 (the standard Ekot signature tune), Ekot is 
on the air because of the severe fire on Hisingen in Gothenburg around midnight, 
where around twenty persons have been carried out dead and there may be as many 
as fifty victims.  
Swedish Radio’s (SR:s)  local newscast via SR Gothenburg, Channel 
P4, started at 02.30. There were newscasts every 15 minutes and in be-
tween live interviews from the fire site. In addition, official information 
was provided according to the ”Urgent Message to the Citizens” (VMA 
– Viktigt meddelande till allmnheten),74  with current telephone num-
bers to hospitals and cisis supporting services. Radio Göteborg's first 
newscast directily after the Echo newscast cited above, included a plea 
to the youth of the city.  
And this is Sveriges Radio Göteborg, P4.  We are on the air now because of the 
disaster on Hisingen in Gothenburg last night, as reported on the Echo news. 
Information has it that around fifty people lost their lives in the fire, a fire that broke 
out at a disco arranged by the Macedonian society in Herkulesgatan in Gothenburg.  
Dead and injured people have been taken to the Mölndal hospital, to Sahlgrenska, 
to the Östra and to Kungälv's hospitals. If you are safe, please call home to say that 
you are OK and alive. In short, tell your family because so many are worried and call 
the police and the rescue services after the disastrous fire on Hisingen last night 
where around fifty people may have died.75 
In this stage, the local radio acted as much as a community informer 
as a newscaster. The public service organisations and Channel 4 (TV4) 
and recently also some commercial broadcasting media have, by agree-
ment, a special role as informers in crises and disasters. In situations like 
the Gothenburg fire the public service Sveriges Radio should – locally 
or nationally – communicate messages from the authorities ”which are 
”of great urgency to citizens”.76 
Eventually, the rescue operation staff decided to allow the media to 
walk through the premises where so many young people had died.  The 
radio listeners were taken along on this painful walk in a charred in-
ferno by Kristina Hedberg, whose breathless and moving report in the 
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national public service radio lunch news The Lunch Echo (Lunchekot) 
attracted a great deal of attention.  
‘Here on the staircase it’s very wet of course because of the firefighting. There are 
hosepipes and barriers. And here in a corner… a pile of scorched down jackets, and 
boots, sneakers…  I’m climbing to the next halflanding. And now we have reached 
the entrance to the discotheque. Here everything is soaking wet and masses of 
clothes, shoes and handbags and it stinks of… it stinks of old smoke! Everything on 
the walls is black and charred … and sticky of ashes and water on the floor.  And it’s 
really (coughs) …it’s really terrible in here…. Oh, my God!’77 
 
The report continued and it was made abundantly clear that the 
place at the time was ghastly.  
 
The fire on TV 
The first Swedish TV report from the fire site was broadcast by SVT’s 
Västnytt at 06:57. The first extra newscast from the same news studio 
was broadcast at 09:00: 
‘Sixty dead and 190 injured in the most severe fire disaster ever in modern time 
Sweden last night. /.../ According to the rescue services, it could be a case of arson.   
The national public service TV news in Swedish Television, Report 
(Rapport) sent their first extra newscast was at 04.00. Notably, SVT2’s 
tape copies of all broadcasts 04.00 till 09:00 are missing. These were 
not available for the government investigation, led by Professor Kent 
Asp, which among other things mapped the news coverage of the fire,78 
and therefore could not be included in the preceding content analysis 
either.  
Documentary After the Fire (Efter branden), SVT 2, 25 January 1999 
Three months after the fire disaster in Gothenburg, the 
filmmaker/photographer Tommy Wiberg and the producer Lasse 
Weldeborn made an hour-long documentary about the Gothenburg 
fire. Fragments from the documentary are presented here because they 
serve as a summary of SVT’s coverage of the first hours of the fire and 
an important part of the case description. Wiberg and Weldeborn both 
reported from the October accident site. 
The documentary includes stories of how young girls prepare for what 
they thought was a private party. Shirin, aged 13 (who lost two sisters in 
the fire), and Marcus, aged 15, alternate in describing how the party 
started and developed. They describe the unreality of it all when the 
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Disc jockey shouted ”Fire!” during the dancing in the Macedonian So-
ciety’s place at Backaplan in Gothenburg.  
‘The Disc jockey said that there was a fire, but no one took him seriously, really, 
some got on the stage and started singing and then /.../ after some time … there was 
smoke … horrible, strong smell of plastic.’ (Marcus, aged 15)  
Then they describe their own and others’ struggle against the 
smoke, the crowd and the stoppage: How they were lying on the floor 
on top of others and under others; how there was still time for showing 
concern and giving comfort before the poisonous gases made the strug-
gling young persons cry, wail, and become silent. They give expression 
to everything from resigned thoughts of ”I will die” to hopes of divine 
intervention:  
‘I struggled and prayed to God at the same time… that I would make it… that I 
wouldn’t die in this way … please help me’. (Marcus) 
 
The fireman Reine Carlsson describes the inhuman priorities he 
had to make in a situation where more people could have been saved if 
more life saving  resources had been available. But now he is alone and 
and there is a girl in the corner of the crowded room:  
‘While I was there working, people clung to me, my mask, my hosepipes and 
clothes…people I couldn’t help because I had decided on that girl. /.../ It felt really, 
really good to know that I had at least saved ONE from this inferno.’ (Reine Carls-
son) 
 
As in many descriptions of the fire and its consequences, heroic 
deeds are implied, for instance, how children lost their lives in the at-
tempt to save others:  
‘A boy came up to my mother and said, ”I carried out your daughter”… and she said, 
”where is she,  which hospital?”… He said, ”I don’t know, I just carried her out and 
then I don’t know any more”. Then another boy had come up and said, ”I carried out 
your daughter too”. Then we understood that she had come out with smoke damaged 
lungs and had run back in again, and probably died in there with Jasmine [the 
youngest sister]’. (Shirin, aged 13) 
Efforts of this kind can be the result of reflex attempts to save a sib-
ling, but there are also medical and psychological explanations to why 
people return into a burning building. Fire gases and oxygen can af-
fect consciousness and judgement abilities. Returning into a fire is ex-
tremely dangerous, not least since bodily exertion in combination with 
smoke poisoning can quickly lead to sleep and unconsciousness. The 
Swedish Accident Investigation Authority writes in their report on the 
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Gothenburg fire that people in general tend to underestimate the dan-
ger if they have no previous experience of similar events. ”Tunnel vi-
sion” caused by the stressful situation can lead to the wrong priorities 
and quick actions rather than appropriate action.79 
The TV cameraman, Tommy Wiberg, participated in the pro-
gramme himself. His story illustrates the journalistic dilemma clearly: 
having to complete an assignment, more or less willingly, in a situation 
difficult to assess and chaotic, where anything besides saving lives ap-
pears as a provocation. In a film sequence a young man reacts with 
words and gestures, which can be understood as an attempt to keep off 
the media. Tommy Wiberg says in the film that ”the only thing to do 
was to put down the camera and embrace them.” 
‘I don’t think I have ever done such a bad job. /.../ I’ve been involved in many dra-
matic events, which I have managed to keep at a distance, and also to keep my pro-
fessional glasses on. But as soon as I arrived at this place and heard their desperate 
cries, and saw all the young persons lying around… it was very hard to work there. 
On my way to the TV building... then I couldn’t hold back… everything snapped... I 
started shaking. Yes... (weeps). (Tommy Wiberg, film photographer, SVT Göteborg) 
 
In interview sequences from the live broadcasts in the night and 
morning, it is clear that the scope of the fire was difficult to assess. The 
operations squad leader, Sten Schääf, first says that there are ”many 
casualties /.../ probably over thirty,” whereupon an apparently dis-
tressed reporter repeats: ”Dead?” and the squad leader confirms: 
”That’s right”. The death number climbs to 50 and later to 60. In an 
interview Schääf describes how the rescue operations has affected him:  
‘I think around the clock more or less... and still the fire pops up... the sights and 
scenes I’ve faced out there. It will all stay with me for a long, long time to come. Or 
forever ... since for me and for everyone else, I think, it was the worst thing I’ve ever ex-
perienced.’  
 
Sten Schääf conveys his appreciation of all civilians who helped in 
the rescue operations, but he also points out that there is a limit to such 
assistance. Schääf implies that many young people can have got the 
wrong idea from films about the feasibility of heroic action in real life.  
‘You can’t run into a raging fire… films such as Backdraft and Rambo and whatnot... 
they can do it, save ten, fifteen persons and running out... in the world of films ... 
reality is different.’ (Sten Schääf, operations squad leader) 
In Kent Asp’s government investigation report on the fire it is clear 
that both the press and the broadcasting media gave a lot of space to 
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the young people’s criticism of the police and the rescue services’ ef-
forts, and of the speculations that the cause of the fire was arson.80 The 
report also notes that several of the broadcasting media journalists 
went too far in their interviews with distressed teenagers. 
Live broadcasting media do not have the opportunity to editorially 
review the kind of critical segments that the complaints against the po-
lice and rescue services exemplify. The press has a better chance to edit 
even if newspapers too work under radio-like conditions with printed 
and electronic newspapers. This is an explanation and not an excuse to 
how the reporting turned out the way it did in SVT’s broadcasts and to 
some extent in local radio. 
 
Confrontations on the site 
The grief process in bereaved people is affected by the degree to which 
the dead person’s body is damaged or maimed. It is also of importance 
that someone can be held responsible for the death.81 In the latter case, 
mass media are always eager to find a scapegoat. The word ‘scapegoat’ 
derives from the Old Testament where it is described how the Jews con-
fessed their sins by placing their hands on the head of a goat and then 
driving it into the desert. Their sins were thus transferred to the goat. 
In terms of social psychology, the individual can relieve their own in-
ner conflicts and anxiety by singling out a scapegoat to project anger 
and guilt on.82 In the case of mass media, it is often more related to 
speculations than factual analyses and facts.   
There were many confrontations at the Backaplan site as a result of 
the traumatic situation and people with stress reactions. Rescue service 
staff and journalists were objects of the young people’s anger, which 
was difficult to take for many.  
They shouted murderers to us, even though we had saved 60 persons /.../ They con-
fused us with the people they had to escape from in their home countries. /... / For the first 
time ever we got beaten – physical violence – by teenagers who didn’t like our pri-
orities.83 
The confrontations between survivors and rescue workers and the 
criticism launched at the rescue operations units were a prominent 
theme in the newspaper texts studied for this thesis. One article in Af-
tonbladet refers to a radio interview in Ekot, Sveriges Radio, with a 
boy, who managed to get out, in the following way:  
I fell down the stairs and wanted to go back in, but the police stopped us. We were 
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not allowed to go back. The boy is noticeably shocked. He does not know yet how 
many of his friends have survived. (AB 981030) 
 
The article highlights two problems, which are related to the effects 
of acute stress reactions. The first is that the reporter notes that the boy 
in the interview is in severe distress. This reflects on the judgement of 
the radio, and in Aftonbladet’s reference there is no name, which pro-
tects the boy’s anonymity appropriately. The second is the criticism of 
the police, which featured in several media and which, in all probabil-
ity, was a result of both psychological and medical effects.84 
The police’s efforts to stop teenagers from returning to a building 
on fire should be regarded as perfectly reasonable, but there may also 
be other causes for the young people’s behaviour towards the police and 
rescue personnel, which is discussed in the next section. 
”The police stopped us”, ”The police were wrong ”. These headlines 
are from GT (981031) but could be from any other paper. There was a 
great debate on the way several papers chose to portray the police and 
the rescue service operations in days after the fire. In a great many ar-
ticles, survivors were invited to react to the rescue operations:  
Mohammed is very critical of the police. 
'Yes, they stopped us. We are certain to have got out more persons otherwise. The 
police were completely wrong. I am very disappointed.' (GT 981031) 
 
In Dagens Nyheter’s editorial on 1 November 1998, it is noted 
that many of the young people in distress were very critical of the police 
and other authorities, arguing that many more could have been saved. 
Such criticism is common after every disaster, the editorial points out, 
since no one can know exactly what really happened.  
But already the fact that the debate has started and the accusations made must be 
taken very seriously. No effort to map and inform can be too big, everything must be 
done to prevent further misunderstandings. The terrible event must not be allowed 
to develop in new directions. (DN 981101) 
 
In GT, a man, who allegedly saved at least 20 persons from the fire, 
is quoted in the headline, saying, ”We could have done more.” Fifteen 
hours after the fire he is photographed at the accident site together with 
his sister:  
Abbas K pushed aside policemen blocking his way and threw himself into the burn-
ing building. /.../ But several of his friends who did the same perished in the flames. 
/.../ Abbas K is furious at what he sees as acts of omission to save lives on the part 
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of the police. 'They only stood there and said that we should take it easy and wrap 
blankets around us.'  (GT 981031) 
Below the headline, ”Tears, wrath and uncertainty at Hammarkul-
len”, it is described how the state of uncertainty and lack of answers 
lead to frustration and aggression; ”I will kick journalists soon,” says the 
Reverend Gunnar Kampe, according to the article. Many young people 
are described as frustrated because no information was provided in the 
afternoon meeting: 
In the absence of information rumours were spread, mixing grief and anger. How 
many police and fire brigades had arrived if the fire had been in upper-class Askim? 
Then they would have done their best, said Ehti Karinian, who was reading aloud 
from Göteborgs-Posten. An older man said that he heard something about a bomb 
over the loudspeakers. One suggested the Nazis. Others talked about guards not do-
ing their duty, police stopping them from saving their friends and how strange it was 
that a disaster should happen to immigrant youths. (Göteborgs-Posten 991031) 
 
Below on the same page GP tries to explain the rumours mentioned 
in the quote above about the police stopping young people from saving 
their friends. Per-Erik Gyllestad, responsible for the crisis and stress 
management at Swedint, explains: 
'My spontaneous thought is that people in such a situation fall into what we call 
stress cone, which  means that the more stress a person is under, the less that person 
can use their intellect.'  'Actions are instead governed by routines, by whatever is 
lodged deep inside /.../' 
'Trying to stop such a person from running into a house without physical interven-
tion is very difficult.'  (Göteborgs-Posten 981031). 
 
”There is no manual on how to act in extreme situations,” says the 
chief of operations, Sten Schääf, in a GT interview. He describes the 
unreal scenes played out in front of him and his colleagues. And he 
confirms that the police had stopped young people from running into 
the flames to save their friends:  
'We had to prevent a lot.  You can't simply watch young people in panic trying to kill 
themselves. Very shortly after the start of the fire, there was not a chance of going 
back in,' he explains. (GT 981031) 
On the next spread in the same paper criticism of the rescuing ser-
vices is launched again through one of the young people who claimed 
to have played an active role during the night:  
'But the fire brigade was not what I saw. People were jumping out of the second floor 
windows straight into the tarmac. /.../ There should have been more firemen help-
ing out,' she continues. (GT 981031) 
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Aftonbladet refers to the event in a slightly more objective way in 
some of their articles. The tumult is recognised without apportioning 
blame.  
Many hysterical teenagers wanted to get back into the building, risking their lives to 
save their friends. There were altercations when the police and firemen stopped 
them. In ten minutes the firemen managed to save around 20 people with the help 
of ladders and around 50 through the main entrance. (AB 981031) 
Further on in the same paper there is a picture of Police Inspector 
Jan Edmundsson, who is quoted in the hedline to say, ”We used vio-
lence to save lives”, and in the article he explains the police's rough be-
haviour:   
'Someone has said that the police were racist. If you call saving lives, comforting and 
suporting crying immigrant children racist, then you have missed out on some-
thing important in school,' says Jan Edmundsson. 
He s convinced that he and other policemen saved many lives thanks to the rough 
methods. (AB 981031) 
In all the papers studied, there is criticism of the police and the res-
cue services in varying degrees, and also, however, a stricking absence 
of the chance to respond for the two professional groups. In view of the 
massive and, according to many, totally unwarranted criticism, it ap-
pears extremely inadequate that the rescue services were not offered 
the opportunity to give explanations and counter views. One of many 
explanations could be that many statements were given in a state of dis-
tress, grief, and anger, which was also in some way commented on in 
the press. Other reasons for the attacs on, above all, the police are as-
sumed to be possible cultural experiences of police behaviour in their 
home countries. Such theories have sometimes been considered at the 
management level of the rescue services, for example, at a seminar on 
the fire disaster at the physicians' annual meeting in 199885, and at a 
research seminar organised by the Swedish Contingency Services and 
Fire Research 2000.86 
Conflicts between professional groups at an accident site always de-
serve attention. ”It is a normal part of cooperation”, says the former 
police press spokesman, Claes Cassel.87 Journalists, readers or anyone 
else do not gain anything from a misquoted fireman, a policeman 
wrongly accused or any other rumours and inaccuracies spread 
through the media. Meetings with professional groups and discussions 
on a joint operation have proved fruitful. Conflicts and inaccuracies in 
the media are often the result of ignorance. An evening discussion in 
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Gothenburg a week after the fire disaster 1998 was, for instance, a re-
warding meeting between reporters, photographers, the police, fire-
men and medical groups. All of them were on duty at Backaplan fire 
site during the tragic night on 29-30 October 1998, and had a multifold 
of different experiences of events in the night and the morning regard-
ing the interaction between the professional groups.88 Comments on 
other professional groups tend to be channeled through the media. In-
ternal criticism of a professional group in the professional branch dis-
cussion fora has, on the other hand, only referred to the respective 
professonal group.89 
In the following chapters, the journalists' experiences and reactions 
in connection with the reporting of the Gothenburg fire in the autumn 
of 1998, approached in terms of the theoretical model of analysis pre-
sented in Chapter 1.   
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 THE SITUATION: WITNESSING HORROR 
 
 
 
 
The journalist's first task on arriving at the accident site is to identify 
the situation. What type of accident is it? How extensive is it? How 
widespread? How many and what categories are affected? Is the situation 
controllable or uncontrollable and is it clear what has happened? Who can 
give an account of the situation, the cause and the consequences?  The 
journalist has to address a stream of questions as well as relating to the 
other actors present: affected people, responders, the public and other 
eyewitnesses and colleagues from their own paper and other media. Es-
tablishing contact at the accident site is tentative. Reporters and pho-
tographers are mostly left to their own judgement, their own command 
of the situation, interpretations and decisions. Gradually, more col-
leagues and perhaps supervisors may arrive, but the lone individual – 
the journalist – is one of the first to encounter the horrific situation, 
and it is an extreme situation.   
 
The event 
”There's a fire at Backaplan” 
In the night of  29-30 October 1998 many journals in west and mid 
Sweden were awakened by a message saying, ”There's a fire at 
Backaplan. Go there.” Some got more information such as ”many cas-
ualties” or ”a great many young people.” The occasional reporters were 
already on duty and had been alerted via their beepers.  
I got the alert via SOS emergency centre, and before I notified the 
reporter, I got up and put on my police radio and listened to the fire 
brigade. And then I happened to hear that there's a major disaster and 
they're calling for ambulances. Many, many young people injured. 
Then I shouted to my wife: ”Ring NN (the reporter) and ask her to 
grab a taxi and go straight to Backaplan.” That's all she knew when 
she went off.'1 
The newspaper Aftonbladet photographer recounted that he got re-
ports in the car on his way to the accident site that there were both dead 
and injured people, which meant that he ”…really stepped on the ac-
celerator, and the adrenalin level rose even more.” 
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One of the newspaper Göteborgs-Posten photographers heard talk 
about a major fire on the rescue services' ”fire radio” and requested re-
inforcement via the SOS radio. 
I heard that they were all shouting /.../ and said that there was a 
big fire at Herkulesgatan or Backateatern.2 
The photographer drove towards the site and the closer he got the 
more distinctly he heard the calls on the emergency centre's communi-
cation radio. 
They mentioned that it was disaster-like, but that's hard to grasp 
what it is. I first assumed that the Backa theatre was on fire. I was 
absolutely certain about that.3 
The SOS emergency centre's dispatch of rescue service forces often 
triggers a mental reaction in the reporter or photographer who gets into 
a car to go to an accident site, which a freelance photographer testified 
to: 
The adrenalin level rises in me. I mean, it rises as much in me as it 
does in them [the responders] when they are on their way.4 
An editor, who was awakened in the middle of the night, first 
thought the call was a wrong number because he couldn't imagine that 
it was a business call:  
Since we were not issuing a paper the next day, I thought it was a 
goddam drunkard who was trying to get a taxi and had dialled the 
wrong number.5 
A photographer made the same reflection when the message 
reached him late at night:  
Well, if someone calls at four o'clock in the morning and says that 
96 have died in a disco fire, then you think that someone drunk and 
crazy is calling. I mean, these things just don't happen ... The number 
[of dead people] mentioned was unbelievable.6 
The meaning of the phone message eventually became clear to the 
photographer. This is when the effort to get as good a grasp of the situ-
ation as possible starts and work is organized.  
A reporter described the sense of the unreal hitting him when he 
was contacted by his editor in chief just as he had gone to bed. He got 
up and put on the Teletext to read the news and relived the evening 
when he had similarly read the news of the assassination of the 
Swedish primeminister  Olof Palme in 1986:  
And it didn't really register, you know, but that's what it said ... it 
took a while to take in, you see.7 
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Another reporter was prepared for a deer hunting assignment when 
the phone rang around four in the morning and the following request 
was delivered:  
Hey, forget about the deer hunt. You're going to Gothenburg where 
60 young people have died in a fire'. I said: ”This is a bad time for a 
joke” /.../ I mean it's so bloody unlikely. Things like that just don't hap-
pen. But, there was nothing to do but grab the toothbrush and be off.'8 
 
 
An uncontrollable situation 
When it was clear that the disaster was still in progress with many peo-
ple fighting for their lives, the journalists were confronted with uncon-
trollable chaos with no chance for them to intervene in any way. 
At the entrance there were about 50 people, trying to pull people, 
and there was fighting because they wanted to get in. Some tried to 
stop them, and some were furious and started hitting one another.9 
And despite the fact that all rescue and emergency services were in 
place, the eyewitnesses could see that the intervention was not enough.  
What hit me was that oh, my God, here are the very foundations of 
the citizens' basic security gathered: the fire brigade, the police and 
the ambulances. All those who are expected to save lives: they are all 
here, but it makes no difference.10 
 
Ambiguous uncertainty 
Arriving at an accident site and witnessing an ongoing tragedy is a 
stressful experience hard to cope with. The journalists' encounter with 
the chaotic disco fire at Backaplan is a clear example of this. One of the 
Göteborgs-Posten photographers described how he arrived at what he 
thought to be a fire in an empty theatre:  
I drove into the backstreet of the Backa theatre... and there's no one 
there. It was completely empty. /.../ I checked the theatre and saw 
nothing in there but I could smell smoke from the corner. I turned the 
corner and another corner. I was hit by such a sound wave...everyone 
screaming, people running towards you ... and people had jumped 
down on police cars. /.../ I think there was a police car and two fire 
engines, and on fireman was on his way up to extinguish the fire with 
a hose but seemed to change his mind and climbed down. He'd rather 
save lives, like. So, they [firemen] started running towards the exit 
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and there were perhaps 50 people blocking the other entrance and 
carrying people out.' 11 
A reporter described a similar sight on arriving at Backplan:  
I felt the smell when we crossed the bridge, and then I thought that 
this must be pretty awful. /.../ The first thing I saw when I turned the 
corner was someone dying. /.../ And everyone sitting there ... they 
were not exactly approachable.12 
The event was very difficult to understand for those who were first 
on the scene. The live interviews during the night of the fire and in the 
morning after clearly indicate the difficulties in grasping the extent of 
the fire. The operations squad leader first said that there are ”many 
casualties /.../ probably over thirty,” whereupon an apparently 
shocked reporter repeated, ”Dead?” and the squad leader confirmed, 
”That’s right”.13 
The death number climbed to 50 and later to 60. 
You don't understand what has happened. You don't even get that 
people were injured. And dead people were unthinkable... I didn't get 
that until I returned to the paper.14 
Causal relations were unclear and the situation was difficult to in-
terpret: 
The first thing that made me realise that this was a matter of life 
and death was the boy, I think it was a boy, lying on the ground. He 
was black. And I thought, ”That's right, the Macedonian society, they 
would be dark-skinned.” I looked around and saw what I took to be 
Africans and Somalis. Then I saw the little boy again and finally I un-
derstood that he was badly burned.15 
Many strange situations and misconstructions arose as a result of 
the chaos and the tragedies at the accident site. An evening paper re-
porter, for example, contacted a colleague who was to replace her at the 
site and said: 
'Bring warm clothes'... for I had the idea that the kids needed extra 
clothes ... for so many were cold. But he seemed to think that I was 
cold so he brought extra clothes for himself.16 
Confusion is a common effect of a stressful and traumatic experi-
ence, and perception of time is also affected in crisis situations. A pho-
tographer who was at the accident site for one and a half hour thought 
he had been there for 20 minutes.17 
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Unpreparedness and other stressors on the job 
When journalists have to go to an accident site at short notice, only 
knowing that an accident has happened, there is little opportunity to 
prepare. This was a contributing factor to the trauma affecting the first 
journalists at Backaplan. As one of them put it:  
If I had known I was sent to a disaster, I would have been mentally 
prepared directly because I have covered disasters before. I didn't 
know... it was a nightmare really.18 
A photographer described that he could not relate his presence 
there to work. The chaos was total. It was his day off. And now he found 
himself there: 
Then I remembered that ... I have to take pictures of this. I felt a 
bit...  It's difficult to take pictures when it's like this...  You know, you 
want to help people but you don't really know what to do.19   
The photographer then described a problem he experienced, 
namely that the young people who were running out of the building had 
a pretty good idea of events: A major fire, many people inside, many 
injured and some dead, and a great many people who could not get out. 
The photographer knew hardly anything of this on arrival, or the degree 
trauma afflicting the involved. He arrived under orders to take pictures, 
which was provocative to many of the young people:  
They must be wondering why you go there to take pictures of them. 
The atmosphere was pretty aggressive.20 
The uncertainty of the extent of the accident was also hard to cope 
with for the reporters and photographers. A photographer said that his 
assessment was that a handful of people may be dead:  
I mean, when you get there among the first, you don't know if there 
are 63 dead or one or 63 injured.21  
The proportions of the disaster were impossible to take in. The idea 
that the little hall would swallow so many young people was unreason-
able and horrible. 
When a photographer returned to the office after an hour, he put his 
film in the developing machine and went to talk to his colleagues, who 
were listening to the police radio and the fire brigade radio providing 
continuous updates on the fire:  
And then someone said: 'There seems to be more than 50 dead.' 
And it hit me like lightning. I couldn't grasp that it had happened; that 
I had just seen this.22 
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Documenting an event of which the circumstances are unknown de-
mands a great deal of reporters and photographers, and no accident 
site is like another.  
A photographer described graphically the feeling of approaching the 
unknown as follows:  
That thing about arriving at an accident... It's like driving a car on 
a country road, and you're driving at a hell of a speed. And then you 
drive over the hilltop. You don't know what's on the other side. And 
just on the other side – bang – there's the accident. So you don't have 
it in sight when approaching but drive straight into it.  And you need 
to tackle the situation at this particular accident. The situation can be 
different in so many ways. There may be many injured people on the 
ground, like it was here, and there are not enough rescue service of-
ficers. Or it could be an accident where people are already on the 
stretchers. Or an accident where they are stuck in their cars and peo-
ple are working hard to get them out.23 
 
The affected 
”They are children. Only children” 
The stressors that disaster responders rate as the most difficult to han-
dle, events involving children are mentioned most often. In view of this, 
the journalists' unprepared encounter with an accident site full of chil-
dren and young people indicates the degree of potential trauma that 
they were subjected to on arrival at Backaplan.    
A photographer described his first sight of the scene, which led to 
the first reflection on the nature of the disaster, i.e. who the victims 
were:  
They are children. Only children. /.../ I didn't see any adults apart 
from the firemen. It seemed like a parent-free party going... com-
pletely wrong.24 
And the children there constituted a visual battlefield:  
Some girls lay there in their underwear. /.../ They had jumped out 
and lost their clothes, and they were shoeless.25 
In the first chaotic hours of the night the situation was very fuzzy to 
all present. Assessing the condition of the injured seemed impossible 
to all the journalists.   
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It was difficult to say if they were only lying there, still but alive, 
or if they were dead. But someone took pictures of a resuscitation at-
tempt. They didn't succeed in their CPR efforts. And I was certain that 
they would manage, so I took photographs of their efforts. And then I 
noticed that they covered him and then I understood that – oh heck he 
died there.26 
A reporter who arrived early said that she never noticed the many 
nationalities among the victims:   
No, it wasn't clear to me until I read about it in the paper. /.../ But 
most of them were Swedes, although they might have had different 
coloured skin and strange names. But I mean, to me they were 
Swedes, and behaved like Swedish kids (laughs)/.../ I talked about this 
with one of my colleagues in Stockholm who asked if they were immi-
grant kids. ”Well, I don't know,” I said ”because most of them speak 
Swedish.” And if you speak Swedish you were probably born in Swe-
den. That's what I thought.27 
The reporter thought that the issue of nationality lacked signifi-
cance at least in the acute phase of the event: 
The fire was a fire. It was a disaster as it was.28 
The fact that it involved children and young people was an emo-
tional obstacle to many of the journalists compared with how they ex-
perienced other accidents.   
Estonia (ferry disaster) was terrible. Absolutely awful. But here 
there were kids. That's the big difference. Just teenagers. And this, I 
think, is the reason why so many journalists experienced this as an 
equally horrible story.29  
Meeting survivors, eyewitnesses and other people affected by a dis-
aster is an enormous strain, causing very strong feelings, and placing 
high demands on the journalists in their interaction with very vulnera-
ble people.  This was also something that the journalists felt was ex-
tremely difficult to handle at the accident site: 
The hardest thing was to photograph the people who were sitting 
around crying ...  without displaying them in the paper  /.../ but one has 
to work discreetly, sneaking around to take pictures when people turn 
around.30 
What I knew was that if people are screaming it's really good be-
cause they are alive, breathing. But those who don't scream31 
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Accident site as a workplace 
The investigation revealed several examples of threats and aggression 
towards journalists and photographers at the accident site. The strong 
reactions were displayed by surviving youngsters and other eyewit-
nesses. Many journalists said that they had a hard time handling these 
reactions at the site but that these, in retrospect, appeared as normal 
effects of traumatic experiences. Some journalists tried to tackle the 
problem by discussing with the teenagers on site. Others said that they 
initially had problems tolerating being attacked and challenged and re-
counted how they tried to refer to the logic that all professional groups 
were there to do a job.   
Many were aggressive and attacked. Some of them I talked to, so I 
didn't completely ignored them. [The photographer says that he lost 
his son some years ago]. Then a guy came up and said, ”Go to Hell, 
you don't understand anything.” ”Yes, I do indeed”, I said, and told 
him the story of my son. And he said nothing, just went off.32 
On the occasion of the interview, the photographer still thought that 
he had handled the situation correctly and according to the code of 
journalism. When the media cover an accident or a disaster, they are 
always open to criticism, but if they refrain from covering an event, this 
is criticised too. It is a professional paradox, he thought, and stressed 
that ”the trouble-makers” were just a few and that most of them were 
calm and took care of each other.  
 
Journalists and responders  
”We showed consideration for each other”  
The interaction with survivors and rescue service members, the sight 
of dead people, the pressure and/or the support of editors, the de-
mands of making ethically and professionally correct decisions, their 
own crisis reactions and the interaction with colleagues – the list of de-
mands on the journalists at work at the extreme and temporary work-
place of an accident site is long.  
The areas of contact between actors described in Chapter 2, also 
emerged at the Backaplan fire. To a great extent, the reporters and pho-
tographers worked without communicating orally with the rescuers, or 
as a reporter put it:  
You can't disturb officials in such a situation. You can't approach 
the fire brigade or the police – they are very busy, after all.33  
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A photographer took advantage of his previous contacts with local 
rescuers: 
Because I'm on these jobs so often here in Gothenburg, I know so 
many firemen and policemen. /.../.  Luckily, my friends happened to 
be on the scene first. Then I can listen to their radio channel. Very few 
people have access. So I can listen to their conversation when they are 
inside a burning building. So I got reports all the time about events 
inside.34 
It is common that photographers assigned to cover accidents on a 
regular basis are acquainted with the local police and the rescue ser-
vices. This was the case with one more photographer. 
I knew the policemen that were there very well because I had been 
riding with the special police van a year before. /.../ Somehow we co-
operated because they knew they could trust me. /.../ and yes, we 
knew how to handle each other.35 
Most interpersonal contacts taking place were with teenagers, 
whether injured or otherwise affected, and other eyewitnesses or af-
fected people gathered. A photographer thought that the interaction 
changed tangibly over time. As one of the first photographers on the 
scene, he was spared many of the later confrontations, because ”then 
so many photographers arrived at the same time that people became 
hostile to them.”36 
The attacks and questioning of the photographers can be under-
stood as expressions of distress rather than as a rational wish to stop 
pictures being taken, a photographer suggested. An accident report 
without pictures would not have been reasonable, he thought:  
In the moment being there, you get shit. And if you hadn't been 
there, you would have got shit too for not documenting it.37  
While several photographers felt attacked by the distressed teenag-
ers, the reporters present did not feel the same: 
No, no one was angry with me, quite the contrary.38 
The presence of the media at the accident site is taken for granted 
in the Swedish disaster organisation. The general instructions of the 
National Board of Health and Welfare39 emphasise the role of the me-
dia at an accident site. But what is the interaction between the active 
rescue forces? The journalists on site at Backaplan were on the whole 
satisfied with the interplay between the media and the rescue forces. 
As one observed; 
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I thought it worked very well. /.../ The problem was that the police 
and the rescue services couldn't really give any information, but one 
has to respect that in this kind of situation.40   
This reporter never witnessed any conflict between rescue service 
members and journalists. On the contrary, she said, there was cooper-
ation: 
The operation leaders could ask us for help – as when I asked 
where to send the kids and they said, 'Oooh, yes, you can do that. Do 
this and that,' they said.41 
A photographer was completely positive to cooperating with the res-
cue services at the accident site and in the phases following and never 
felt hindered from doing his job by the rescue services. There were 
other complications: 
Yes, I think we showed consideration for each other in the first 
days. /.../ But then these live broadcast vans appeared. It was like a 
FUNFAIR in the end... with all these live broadcast vans from all over 
the world... then it got more troublesome and messy....42  
Several of the reporters who were on the scene first, while the dis-
aster was still in an acute phase, felt that it was very difficult and un-
reasonable to intrude on the rescuers to ask for an interview. A chief of 
operations is always under too much of a time pressure to be disturbed:  
Stealing two quotes from him would have been like stealing two 
lives, you know. /.../ We were there during the most intensive phase 
of the rescue operation.  It was very different for those arriving half 
an hour later. 43 
Everyone understood that this was an absolute disaster. Please 
don't talk to me, like. People nodded when they saw each other.  /.../ 
No one felt like talking ... they probably felt awful too.44 
According to the study made on the media- and communication 
situation at the Gothenburg fire by Larsson & Nohrstedt (2000), 
the contacts worked well between the authorities and the media ac-
tors. Both parties testified to good cooperation and good relations 
between the professional groups when contact was made.45 The po-
lice on their part noted that having existing relationships with the 
local media was very valuable in this context. Frequent press con-
ferences were mentioned as particularly valuable. A problem arose 
when the media were given access to the burned premises when a 
body was still there, which the fire investigator and the rescue ser-
vices didn't know at the time. Police inspector Rolf Johansson from 
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the Gothenburg police technical department deplored this in a state-
ment in DN,46  in which also Hans Carlsson, chief inspector, criticised 
the media's access to what was in fact a crime scene. In this context it 
was also discussed whether the media access had compromised the 
technical investigation. According to the Gothenburg police, the jour-
nalists and photographers were only permitted to enter a very limited 
part of the burnt disco hall. The three-minute walk was filled with anx-
iety, carried out shortly after half past eight in the morning after the 
fire, and was described as an agonising eternity by the Aftonbladet re-
porter in an article: 
More than enough. By the door downstairs there were vomit, shattered glass, blood, 
and upstairs heaps of shoes, on the second floor /.../ a mountain of melted and partly 
burned shoes and clothes, jackets, jumpers, trousers... . (AB 981031) 
 
Collegial interaction 
While newspaper journalist colleagues were constantly aware of the 
media competition, the collegial feeling was also strong beyond the em-
ployment loyalties. Seeing and talking to journalist colleagues at the 
site was very important to the reporters and photographers. The colle-
gial interaction primarily took place in a kind of tacit agreement. There 
were few conversations but instead quick glances and other non-verbal 
hints of collegial community: ”Some quick words. A nod, you know.”47 
But contact was not only made professionally but for more personal 
reasons:  
It was really important, because (laughs) it was kind of comforting 
to get confirmation that everyone feels awful. /.../ My understanding 
is that most of the journalists were like me. They were walking around 
there, patting kids on the head.48 
In some cases, informal cooperation was set up. The Aftonbladet 
reporter described seeing a freelance photographer and shouted to 
him:  
'Can you work for us if there's something?' Whereupon the answer 
was: 'Absolutely!49 
The Swedish-Norwegian cooperation, usually arising when some-
thing happens in Western Sweden, was also in place. Expressen and 
GT, cooperated with the Norwegian counterpart Dagbladet. An inter-
view with a disc jockey by a GT reporter was the result of a tip from a 
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colleague at Dagbladet, who in turn had heard the disc jockey being 
interviewed on Norwegian TV. 
Sometimes we share our texts /.../ although not in the sense that 
my texts are published in their papers. There is union conflict about 
reimbursement for this now. But we simply help each other in the 
field.50 
Similarly, the international media group Shibsted newspapers Af-
tonbladet  and VG (Verdens Gang) collaborated. 
 
Journalists on site when the fire was out  
The first arrivals on the scene encountered chaos, panic and anxiety to 
the greatest extent and also experienced helplessness. Just a few hours 
later the situation had changed for the arriving journalists. What was 
cognitively known was, however, still difficult to imagine.  
The difference between first and later arrivals' experience of the 
event is striking. Journalists arriving in the night and the early hours 
of the morning had more information about the scope and nature of the 
disaster, but at the same time it was hard for them to picture the reality 
of events.  
At five in the morning you know that 63 people have died. And then 
you arrive at the accident site and you see a barricade tape. There are 
heaps of clothes, ambulance blankets. No ambulances are there, only 
some fire brigade vehicles. And then you ask yourself, how the hell 
could 63 people die here?51 
When the dead and injured people had been transported from the 
site a new journalistic phase started, which, like the acute phase, in-
volved many ethical deliberations and difficult decisions. One of the 
evening paper reporters arrived by chartered plane around seven in the 
morning: 
To be honest... there wasn't very much one could do there. Most of 
us were simply standing there feeling that everything seemed very 
unreal. They had just removed all the dead, and what remained was 
a big building with big, black gaping holes in the wall.52 
In some cases, the inconceivable and chaotic situation meant that 
calling in more staff did not work smoothly. DN's Gothenburg photog-
rapher was awakened at three o'clock at night by DN's web editor in 
Stockholm, checking that the photographer was in place:  
My reporter colleague in Gothenburg had forgotten all about me – 
he thought DN in Stockholm would called me but they didn't.53   
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The photographer then had a drive of 35 km to the accident site. He 
contacted a reporter colleague but not the office at this point:  
I just took off.  
I arrived when the drama was over. /.../ roughly at the same time 
as city residents who had heard about it came.../.../ So I was not pre-
sent during the actual turmoil. /.../ I felt rather irresolute: ”what 
should I take photos of here?”/.../ The bodies were at the back of the 
building.  And we can't have dead people in the paper. Not even 
stretchers with blankets. So there was nothing much to shoot. There 
was a bit of smoke, like. /.../ The ambulances drove slowly and quietly 
off with the bodies, you know.  So it was very undramatic.54 
Eventually, family members and other mourners came, and marked 
the beginning of a new phase because, ”then we have to show them a 
bit of consideration too”.55 
 
The situation: conclusions 
An unreal and incredible event, which ”didn't really register” were the 
impression voiced by reporters and photographers who came to the ac-
cident site at Backaplan in the night of the fire in 1998. 
Identifying and defining the situation and the task turned out to be 
a great challenge. On their way to the site most of them felt uncertaint 
about what to expect and ”rising adrenalin levels”. On arrival, many 
experienced a nightmare-like situation difficult to assess and uncer-
tainty as to what had happened. Many asked themselves what they 
should do there and felt that what they saw could not be the truth. The 
encounter with death and suffering, the deceased as well as the physi-
cally unharmed survivors, was strainful. The young age of the affected 
made the situation even worse.  
The interaction between the members of the media and the re-
sponders on the accident scene was characterised by a wordless com-
munication and reciprocal consideration. Several members of different 
professional categories were already acquainted, which many of the in-
terviewees felt was an advantage in terms of interaction. Some de-
scribed the whole thing as ”tacit cooperation” and an unwillingness to 
intrude on the rescue operation. 
The journalists had difficulties in assessing the condition of the sur-
vivors. Many wanted to help the responders saving and caring for the 
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victims. Several journalists also said that they had tried to provide so-
cial and psychological support to the young people gathered outside the 
burning building.  
Some confrontations with distressed teenagers were described and 
experienced by several of them as a hard-to-handle aggressiveness. 
Likewise, there were several confrontations with other eyewitnesses 
who questioned the media presence.   
The interaction between journalist colleagues from the same paper 
or other press and media was relatively brief, if happening at all. How-
ever, the contact seeking and collegial support among the colleagues 
was greatly appreciated.  
The journalists who arrived first, mostly worked alone and with a 
high degree of independence in decisions and actions. Teamwork did 
take place, both in pairs of reporters and in the constellation reporter–
photographer. In practice, however, the inter-collegial contacts were 
scarce.  
The mobile phone was mentioned by most interviewees as an indis-
pensable tool in the contact with colleagues on the scene and between 
the reporter and the news office.  
For the media members who arrived later in the night or in the early 
hours of the morning the situation had changed radically. The drama 
was over, but the event still seemed unreal. It was difficult for the late 
arrivals to understand that chaos had raged before on the scene. One 
wondered, ”What can I do with this?” Others pointed out that the late 
arrivals had more time to give more thought to the report. The morning 
papers had gone to print and they could work with existing facts and 
later deadline.  
The situation was extreme and demanding for the journalists. De-
fining the situation and reporting on it was a challenge. Many still 
thought that they could handle the situation despite the chaotic circum-
stances, the high degree of unpreparedness and their psychological re-
actions: they completed their tasks as the articles were written, the 
phone reports called in and the photos were taken.  
  
 171 
 
Footnotes 
 
1 Photographer AB 
2 Photographer 1 GP 
3 Photographer 1 GP 
4 Freelance photographer/AB 
5 Photo editor in chief GP 
6 Photographer DN 
7 Reporter GT/Ex 
8 Reporter DN 
9 Photographer 1 GP 
10 Reporter GP 
11 Photographer 1 GP 
12 Reporter AB 
13 From SVT: s live broadcast from Backaplan , the night before 31 october 1998. 
14 Photographer 1 GP 
15 Reporter GP 
16 Reporter AB 
17 Photographer 1 GP 
18 Reporter AB 
19 Photographer 1 GP 
20 Photographer 1 GP 
21 Freelance photographer/AB 
22 Fotograf 1 GP 
23 Freelance photographer/AB 
24 Photographer 1 GP 
25 Photographer 1 GP 
26 Photographer 1 GP 
27 Reporter AB 
28 Reporter AB 
29 Reporter AB 
30 Photographer DN 
31 Photographer 1 GP 
32 Freelance photographer/AB 
33 Reporter AB 
34 Freelance photographer/AB 
35 Photographer 1 GP 
36 Photographer 1 GP 
37 Freelance photographer/AB 
38 Reporter AB 
39 (1991:2, rev.1996) 
40 Reporter AB 
41 Reporter AB 
42 Photographer DN 
43 Reporter GP 
44 Freelance photographer/AB 
45 Larsson& Nohrstedt et al (2000). p 50 
46 DN (981105) 
47 Photographer 1 GP 
48 Reporter AB 
49 Reporter AB 
50 Reporter GT/Ex 
51 Freelance photographer/AB 
52 Reporter GT/Ex 
53 Photographer DN 
54 Photographer DN 
55 Photographer DN 
  
 172 
 
 
  
 173 
 
 THE PROFESSION: REPORT! 
 
 
 
 
Even if a reporter or a photographer is not ordered to go to an accident 
site, it is an impulse or an unwritten job description to set off when the 
alert is given. The journalist is supported by the public mandate to re-
port on events of public interest. An accident or a disaster has a given 
news value, and the media have a duty to inform as much as to investigate, 
and in some situations to alert and caution. The editorial job is to report 
on the situation in the best way possible, as closely, interestingly and 
truthfully as possible within the frame of press ethical regulations and 
the professional codes of journalism. There is also a great deal of dram-
aturgy in the reporting, and the ambition to sell as many single copies 
as possible, at least for the evening papers. In the case of the Gothen-
burg fire alert and similar cases, it can be difficult to assess the nature 
of the incident and therefore also the news value. If there is little infor-
mation, the journalist goes to the accident site to form an opinion, pos-
sibly anxious but also ”news triggered,” with an open mind to what is 
in store. Most journalists on their way to an accident site are driven by 
an ambition to get correct information quickly, to be able to describe and 
explain events and to publish something of high news value. Ideally, the eth-
ics of confidentiality, reticence with taking photos of the affected and the 
need to respect personal dignity are second nature. However, in a severe 
situation with time pressure and perhaps under the influence of stress,, 
the imbued ethics may be compromised. Boundaries can, as most 
know, be transgressed although few journalists are ignorant of where 
the lines should be drawn.  
 
Uncertain assignment  
In the case of sudden and unexpected events, a common occurrence in 
media organisations is that reporters and photographers become aware 
of the event before the editors do.  This is what happened in the case of 
the nightly Gothenburg fire.  A photographer notified the newsroom:  
I rang and said, ‘send all the reporters you have’. And then I hung 
up.1 
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According to two Göteborgs-Posten reporters, they received news 
about the fire a few minutes before midnight via their SOS Alarm Cen-
tre beepers. The pillar of smoke could be seen from the newsroom win-
dow. At the same time they received a call from the photographer men-
tioned above.    He was off duty but heard the alert on the police radio in 
his car and drove immediately to Backaplan. On arriving, he phoned 
the newsroom with the information ”many injured”. 
After a while, two GP reporters came. The photographer had promised 
to meet them there. He tried to describe the situation without having a full 
understanding of it:  
They started crying or they stood there holding each other.2  
The photographer’s recollection of the reporters crying has not been 
confirmed by them, but it is apparent that they were very affected by 
the situation. The photographer met the reporters once more during 
the night to coordinate the reporting.  
They had talked with someone… and, well, they had had what they 
could take, if you see what I mean.3 
It came as a surprise to many that the professional role could be 
affected. A reporter looked around where she was standing and tried to 
understand where the burning hall was in the building, but all she could 
see was a cloud of smoke. A ladder was raised against the wall and peo-
ple climbed in and out. In such a situation it was a difficult experience 
for her not ”having access” to her professional role as was normally the 
case:  
I was a bad journalist on this occasion [laughs] but I don’t care, 
sort of. /.../ The professional second nature is pretty absent [in such 
situations].4 
Information and directives and instructions were initially delivered 
in an inverted direction: bottom-up instead of top-down. 
Well, I phoned them at an early stage and told them that ”this was 
an absolute disaster, send all the people you’ve got to the scene,” I said. 
/.../ Both me and the reporter said that to them. And then they sent 
photographers from Jönköping, Östergötland,  Malmö,  and even 
from Stockholm.5 
During the night of the fire, the newspapers allegedly reinforced 
their staff to cover the event immediately. Aftonbladet's editor in chief 
confirmed that the mobilisation was considerable and the decisions 
made quickly: ”It was a matter of getting people down there at all”.  
Once in Gothenburg, the reporters and photographers formed 
teams. The first team – reporter and photograph – worked through the 
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night as a team until a colleague replaced the reporter. Around five in 
the morning, the first photographer started to edit his photos, concur-
rent with more Aftonbladet photographers arriving in Gothenburg. 
”But then the shitty work was done, what we did, me and NN [the re-
porter],” said the paper's first photographer on the scene.  He thought 
that there was nothing to take pictures of when his collegues came to 
the accident site, other than shots of the hall when the journalists were 
invited to a form of 'tour' in a group.   
During the first hours after the alert, the chances to choose staff for 
the assignment were limited. The short time left before the printing 
deadline did not allow for any delay. Several of the interviewees thought 
that some of the media members arriving early at the accident site were 
too inexperienced for this type of job. 
 
”You picked those you could get hold of”  
When GT's reporter received the call from his news editor at home 
in the middle of the night, requesting him to go, he answered, ”Yes, of 
course.” The reporter's wife, as well a colleague, was also asked but de-
clined because of her pregnancy.6 The GT reporter agreed to flying with 
a chartered plane from Stockholm to Gothenburg and was given a few 
hours sleep before he went.   
The  GP reporter who was on the verge of finishing his shift and 
hand over to a colleague, made the decision himself to join the newly 
arrived colleague, who had just arrived at the office.  
I froze to ice and I felt that we should both go. I honestly think that 
I felt like a moral support from the beginning. Something told me that 
we should both go.7 
Also the GP editor, who, like one of the reporters, was about to sign 
out, remained.   
When those who ”happened to be on duty ’had gone to the site – 
You picked those you could get hold of’”8  – the reinforcement efforts 
started. 
It was such a quick decision so that there was no point in sitting 
down to wonder: ”Is this or that one suitable? It was rather a matter 
of getting started and phoning a great many chains. And we got hold 
of many reporters who were off duty and somewhere in the west or 
south of Sweden, and we got them on the move to Gothenburg di-
rectly.9 
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For the chief photo editor at GP it was not indisputable to send as 
many as possible, and not everyone who wanted to. He was contacted 
by staff offering to go in the night but he declined.  
I knew that it didn't end with this particular day but that we 
needed to manage the next day too. So I said, ”No, thank you, but turn 
up for work fit for fight in the morning, early tomorrow morning.10 
DN's local editor also described how members of staff got in touch 
to offer assistance, among others, two journalism students who had 
done practical placement at the paper. They had local knowledge and 
in some cases also personal contacts that could be useful to the paper.   
It soon turned out that they managed beautifully on their own.11 
 
 
Distribution of work 
”A clear-cut news reporter and an observer” 
At Backaplan, ca. 10-15 minutes after the alert, the two GP reporters' 
reached the decision to split up: ”I said to my colleague: 'Walk around 
and see if you can find someone to interview while I stand here and 
watch'”.12 
GP's reporters stayed at the scene for around 40 minutes.  Later, in 
connection with the interviews, the paper's editor in chief   said that the 
approach of   ”a clear-cut news reporter and an observer was and ideal 
constellation.”  
The degree of teamwork varied between the media. One photographer 
thought that the cooperation between photographer–reporter was partic-
ularly important in delicate jobs such as this, because then ”the photogra-
pher can do more...do more research...and that is a condition for a 
good job”.13 Another photograph described it as a giving and taking:  
It was both and. /.../ Some inexperienced photographers, they sort 
of tag along after the journalist and just shoot whatever he points at... 
well, perhaps not what he points at, but everyone he talks to and so 
on... But I'm pretty experienced so often the journalist has a hard time 
keeping up with me. But often we work individually. And if one of us 
finds something, we tell each other.14 
Also work models that are normally only applied in events of the 
same nature as the fire disaster were used. Aftonbladet used a kind of 
flying report writing and a joint byline in the first edition, which means 
that most articles were co-authored. Reporters called in information to 
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one or more writers in the office, who wrote the articles adding their own 
information and telegram news:   
I phoned and got phone calls all the time and sent interview quotes 
and eyewitness accounts to the Stockholm colleagues. The writing 
was done in Stockholm. It was writing from a distance.15 
When the GT's Stockholm reporter landed in Gothenburg, he had to 
write two articles first thing in the morning, of which one was to be an 
interview with someone in a leading operational function. In the taxi to 
the accident site he started working. He half completed one of the texts 
by listening to an interview with the chief of operations on the local 
radio. When he arrived he found the same person and added some 
questions for him to answer.   The finished text was sent via his mobile 
phone to the news office for inclusion in the extra edition. This work 
model, according to the reporter, is different from evening paper jour-
nalism:  
This kind of journalism is similar to radio reporting. It's so quick 
and succinct. /.../ Extra editions don't work in the same way.16 
Later in the morning, the reporters and photographers were invited 
to ”walk” through the burned building, as previously described. The 
GT/Expressen reporter took part and then returned to the GT building 
to write the article: ”Then we had 15 minutes, or something, to do it in 
so there was plenty of time [laughs].”17 
From DN's Stockholm office a number of reporters and photogra-
phers got into a car and arrived in Gothenberg shortly after lunch. 
There was no time to plan anything, ”just to take off in a panic”. 18 
Later, the local reporter, who travelled from Stockholm and was on 
duty in Gothenburg, was appointed teamleader from the afternoon af-
ter the fire.  
 
Reporting on the next days  
An evening paper reporter said that colleagues who were assigned to cover 
the events after the fire – days two and three – went to Backaplan on their 
own initiative to see the place and ”try to understand it”.19 This can be 
compared to the difficulties of the journalists to imagine the scenario 
at sea after the Estonia ferry disaster. An empty burned building at 
Backaplan and a deserted yard are also very far from the scenes played 
out to the eyewitnesses during the fire.  
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Job instructions 
”There was a tacit approach”  
The extent of instructions given varied between the media involved in 
the study of the Gothenburg fire. A comparison between the instruction 
tradition in the police force and the rescue services in relation to major 
and minor incidents shows that the media have something to learn in 
this respect. Even if the latter did not go to the scene to help and save 
lives, the situation there is still extreme and stressful. Several of the 
journalists in the interview study called for better routines and ”manu-
als” for the procedures that should apply in a crisis situation. Job in-
structions can in some cases be implicit, as an evening paper reporter 
said.  
It may sound a little cold and mechanical, but, especially at the 
evening papers, there are those who write a lot of this, an ”editorial 
machinery” sets in at major events. You know automatically how to 
proceed... since it's a well-oiled machinery. I can't say that this is 
something that we sat down to decide that now we'll work in a differ-
ent way than we normally do.20 
In the case of GT/Expressen,21 the work organising for the Stock-
holm reporters started in a taxi to Stockholm Bromma Airport. Plan-
ning continued at the gate, in the plane and in the pre-hired cars at 
Gothenburg Landvetter Airport. On their way to Backaplan, the hospi-
tals and other places of relevance to the fire, the reporters received”ex-
plicit assignments based on the needs for the extra edition to be 
printed roughly in two hours”.22 
Around 15 persons were flown down from Stockholm at this point. 
In addition, GT had a great number of Gothenburg reporters and pho-
tographers on the move into the morning. Two hours later, there was a 
50-page paper edition in print...  
...with a massive amount of information. That' s how the tabloids 
work, and it wouldn't work if each individual was sitting there won-
dering what they would like to write that morning. It simply needs to 
be lead. You get your assignment and you complete it as best you can 
in the morning, as quickly as you can, that's it.23   
Obviously, journalists or photographers sometimes ignore both di-
rectives and instructions.  The reporter on the scene can get an idea of 
the incident that makes management directives or intentions debatea-
ble. At other times, there may be consensus between the reporter or 
photographer and the newsroom.  
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The press ethical directives given by a chief photo editor mostly had 
the character of little reminders in passing.  
One thing one didn't need to say all the time –  it was in the wind – 
was never to  barge in with  ”here is the press” and to be considerate . 
/.../ There might be one or two persons that you stressed that a little 
more to.24 
The chief photo editor hinted that he modified his instructions 
based on how he perceived the respective photographers personality, 
work approach, and need for instructions.  
Most questions were raised after the reporters and photographers 
had arrived at the accident site. ”The questions were acute and were 
asked again and again”.25 People´s skills were highlighted as an im-
portant quality in an editor in major events such as the Gothenburg fire 
and one of the chiefs himself made the following observation:  
If I hadn't known the photographers so well, I would have had to 
be much, much clearer...with some photographers. With others there 
was no need at all. There was an implicit attitude and approach to the 
work.26 
In some cases, the instructions for reticence were explicitly given.  
One photographer said: 
My boss said to me when I talked to him':  ”For Heaven's sake, be 
considerate! Now we must show consideration.” ”Yes”, I said, ”that's 
exactly what I'm doing.” ”I couldn't care less about good pictures – 
consideration is the key word here. For this is so bloody awful, and we 
have to think carefully.27 
... and a reporter said: 
They were especially clear at home even before we went actually 
/.../ that what counts was ‘to be extremely careful, don't intrude on 
people, we will not force you to make interviews if you don't want to, 
respect people's integrity’ /.../ Lie low, basically. Which was a comfort 
to know, that there was no demand on pressuring a poor kid who had 
been there on the first day to give an interview. /.../ I wouldn't have 
done it differently any way. But it felt good to know and sharing the 
same attitude.28 
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Disaster and leadership 
”A very competent leader in place” 
Quickly appointing a local leader in Gothenburg was a successful move 
according to the Stockholm based press members. Good management 
is very important in the acute phase, a reporter thought, in the news-
room as well as in the field.  
My experience was that the paper had good people from the top all 
the way down.29 
Dagens Nyheter did not issue a paper on All Saints Day (Friday) but 
worked instead on the next edition. DN quickly appointed a local pro-
ject leader (local editor) in Gothenburg, who was sent from Stockholm 
and was in place in Gothenburg on Friday, the day after the fire. The 
editorial management, who happened to be at a conference, made the 
decision at breakfast on Friday. One of the paper's reporters com-
mended this solution of a project leader at the local scene, as did his 
colleague at Aftonbladet above:  
It worked well... organised and with good coherence in the job we 
did... Having him here was very valuable.30 
DN's local editor was stationed at the local office in Gothenburg, but 
he decided to visit the fire site:  
I felt I needed an understanding of the feelings and moods 
around.31 
In the first days DN had twelve persons working on follow-ups of 
the fire. The newsroom in Stockholm kept perhaps four or five persons 
busy with the story.  They mainly wrote background material to the ac-
cident such as the fire progress and its consequences. 
The model with a local editor for the Stockholm-based DN was a good 
way of organising teamwork, the leader thought.   
With the teams I had, I could have several teams working in 
Gothenburg at the same time, which means that I had great opportu-
nities to cover everything I wanted to cover.32 
Since  DN did not come out on All Saints Day, the editors had more 
time but the pressure for a good result increased. Leading DN's coverage 
in Gothenburg was a job the local leader described as ”nervous” but not 
unmanageble.  
I was nervous about the assignment, more because it was so big 
and I had to think about so many things, then because of its nature. I 
had no problems leading it.33 
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”Management conveying calmness and confidence”  
It was clear from several interviews that the size and uniqueness of 
this disaster made many press members commit to the job totally. Sev-
eral said that this explained why there were so many special editions, 
supplements and quick reports despite everything.  
It was clear that the management's approach was important to the jour-
nalists on duty during the acute phase. An editor in chief, who was not on 
duty during the early hours of the night, recounted what the journalists 
said about the support they enjoyed from the editorial management dur-
ing the night:  
The journalists said in retrospect that the reason that they could 
act so calmly and confidently was partly because the management 
conveyed calmness. And, I suppose, if you have experienced the acci-
dent site, then you are upset and in need of a management conveying 
calmness and confidence.34 
 
Professional acumen 
”The first thing I saw … was the poster picture”  
When the reporters and photographers came to Backaplan on their 
journalist mission the professional role was shattered for some, while 
others experienced that their professionalism and acumen increased in 
the acute phase.  
Already when I was on my way, I started to plan how to organise 
the photographing. Where should I park the car, what equipment 
should I bring, and stuff like that.35 
Depicting a traumatic event and meeting people in distress means 
meeting oneself and the professional role, confronting one's own ideals 
and values, and testing ethics, morality and emotions, and daring to be 
a journalist. Many journalists expressed amazement at their presence 
of mind in the chaos. There was room for professional thinking in the 
strong personal experiences:   
The whole courtyard was full of injured and dead young peo-
ple/.../ And the first thing I see is a fireman, squatting with the helmet 
on the ground next to him, and he is squatting because he is giving 
CPR to a boy. My first thought when I saw him was ... this was the 
poster picture. And so it was.36 
The photographer said that he, the whole time in the courtyard, tried to 
think professionally and act by reflex:”Most of my assignments involve 
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injured and dead people”. In this case many, many more people were 
affected, but ”I never had time to slow down and reflect on what it was 
all about”. It was not until the first dead were being carried out of the 
building and the first report of around thirty dead came that the pho-
tographer began to take in the enormity of the event.  
 
”I saw in my inner eye the newspaper in print” 
What the editors wish and the reporters or photographers want to 
deliver often constitute a field of tension in journalism. Reporting from 
a disaster entails an extra challenge to the field of interplay as the dif-
ference between being there, observing the event and forming an opin-
ion from an office is immense. It is only logical that views will be dif-
ferent.  
A recurring theme in the issues of the difficulties to tackle an acute 
and unexpected event such as the Gothenburg fire, is the impossibility 
to prepare for it because the assignment is completely unspecified. 
Some thought that ”you can never be prepared”, while others thought 
that routine and experience actually made a difference. There was a 
paradoxical discrepancy between the news editor's interpretation that 
the journalists were calm and confident thanks to the editorial mange-
ment's calmness, while many colleagues testified to the opposite, 
namely that the assignment was very unclear. One explanation may be 
the time difference. No editors visited the fire site at the acute phase in 
the night when the assignment was most uncertain and clear instruc-
tions were missing.   
A chief photo editor, who had grasped the situation in the night and 
made decisions directly without second thoughts, thought that his ex-
periences of previous disasters were very valuable. He knew what ma-
terial he wanted to receive.  
So, I saw in my inner eye the newspaper in print. Before it was 
produced, that is.... I could see spreads and how they would work.37 
Around 11 o'clock in the morning after the fire, the chief photo editor 
'knew' how the next edition would look like, and the most important thing 
is the tone set by the frontpage photo.  
The content and layout of GP's extra edition to a great extent framed the 
works of the reporters and photographers because a team member had a 
”brainwave” and suggested that the newspaper should be edited in 
spreads. 
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It was template streamlined from the start. All writers were told 
how much they should write about this and that, and where it would 
go in the paper. And where various photos would be inserted.38 
 
 
The assignment: conclusions 
It was to a great extent the reporters and photographers who informed 
their editors of the fire at Backaplan in Gothenburg. During the first 
hours they advised the news office with requests such as ”send all the 
people you have”, or ”prepare for this or that.” Several journalists felt 
that too many young and inexperienced colleagues were sent to 
Backaplan to cover and report on the fire.   
The reporters and photographers who happened to be on duty carried 
on alone or spontaneously teamed up with others. Two reporters from 
the same paper, working as a team, appreciated the reciprocal support 
and developed a clear distrubution of tasks in which one had the role 
of ”clear-cut reporter” and the other the role of ”observer”, that is, a 
professional eyewitness.  
Someone remarked that paper's disaster journalism in many ways 
rembles radio journalism. When articles are co-authored with joint by-
lines, and reported via iPhone and written by someone else, then the 
press is similar to the radio.   
When job instructions for the journalists and photographers even-
tually were issued from the newsroom, they often came in the form of 
vague messages such as ”Go there” and ”Don't go too close”, sometimes 
with clearer appeals such as ”For heaven's sake, show consideration”; 
”Be extremely careful”; ”Lie low” or ”Don't intrude on people”. 
Whether or not these are retrospective reconstructions in the inter-
views, is impossible to know.  In any case, two issues appear to be cen-
tral: ”How should this be done?” and ”Where is the line drawn (for how 
close we can go)?” Most questions did not arise until the first journal-
ists arrived at the site.   
More explicit instructions were allegedly given only to the journal-
ists arriving later. At this point the assignments as well as the paper 
layout were more streamlined in form and content.  
Many also referred to a kind of ”editorial machinery”, which in a 
more implicit way affected and controlled the work approach, or as 
someone said: ”You know more or less automatically what to do and 
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how to do it.” An important aspect mentioned was good personal con-
tact between the editor and reporter/photographer, which made inter-
action in tacit concert possible. 
Colleagues who had a local editor in Gothenburg thought him to be 
an important link between the journalists in the field and the Stock-
holm newsroom. The degree of closeness to the accident site was also 
an important factor for how editors understood the journalists' reac-
tions and feelings about the event.  
Generally, the importance of a calm and confident editorial man-
agement during the disaster reporting was emphasised, especially in 
terms of what they wanted: ”So, I saw in my inner eye the newspaper 
in print,” said one of the editors.   
Regarding rules and instruction times, these were stated explicitly 
in the form of instructions.   A factor specific to disaster journalism was 
the inverted direction of job instructions – from the reporter and pho-
tographer at the site to the editorial management.    This was especially 
the case   here since the event took place in the night and newsrooms 
were sparsely staffed.  
It was difficult to assess the importance of preparation for the as-
signment because most of the interviewees said that it was impossible 
to prepare, while others thought that having as correct information as 
possible of the event would be a useful preparation before arriving at 
the scene.  
In a long-term perspective, preparation was understood as routine 
and experience of similar events, which they thought facilitated mental 
preparedness. 
The descriptions of the professional acumen that many testified to 
were very palpable. This phenomenon is one of many coping strategies 
under severe stress as shown by studies of disaster responders.39 This 
study shows that individuals in the professional journalist corps react 
in the same way. A photographer immediately saw the poster photo in 
his mind, for instance. He retained a clear focus on the professional task 
despite ongoing and unimagineable trauma.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 Photographer 1 GP 
2 Photographer 1 GP 
3 Photographer 1 GP 
4 Reporter AB 
5 Freelance photographer/AB 
6 The wife did come to Gothenburg after a couple of days, to report for GT/Expressen together with 
 her husband . 
7 Reporter GP 
8 Local editor DN 
9 Local editor DN 
10      Photo editor in chief GP 
11 Local editor DN 
12 Reporter GP 
13 Photographer  2 GP 
14 Photographer DN 
15 Reporter AB 
16 Reporter GT/Ex 
17 Reporter GT/Ex 
17 Reporter DN 
19 Reporter AB 
20 Reporter GT 
21  GT (Göteborgs-Tidningen) was co-produced with Expressen. 
22 Reporter GT 
23 Reporter GT/Ex 
24 Photo editor in chief GP 
25 Local editor DN 
26 Photo editor in chief GP 
27 Photographer DN 
28 Reporter DN 
29 Reporter AB 
30 Reporter DN 
31 Local editor DN 
32 Local editor DN 
33 Local editor DN 
34 News editor in chief GP 
35 Freelance photographer/AB 
36 Freelance photographer/AB 
37 Photo editor in chief GP 
38 Photo editor in chief GP 
39 Dyregov (1992); Michel et al (2001) 
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 THE PROFESSION: ASSESSMENTS AND DECISIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite a relatively clear professional assignment, reporters and pho-
tographers at an accident site have to face an extreme situation requir-
ing assessment and decision-making. The same goes for the editors, 
but in their case without the crucial factor of being an eyewitness sub-
jected to mentally stressful scenes. Being on site, the journalists have 
to interpret and assess the situation and make press ethical decisions 
on their own. The decisions lead to actions, which result in the publi-
cations based on the reporting. The actions and their effects do not only 
comprise the publications but also the journalists' actions. In terms of 
both professional conduct and the final editorial product, the journal-
ists walk a thin line between rules and their consciences. Reporting an 
unbearable event is in many ways an unreasonable assignment. Should 
the professional role be revealed or concealed? Should the journalist 
help the affected people or simply describe them? How close is it ac-
ceptable to be? Which sequences of events cannot be depicted in words 
or images and must be omitted? All this requires professional maturity 
and experience. This chapter reports on the journalists' own descrip-
tions of the assessments, agonies, compromises and decisions they had 
to deal with in the night and the morning of the Gothenburg fire, and 
comments on the actions and consequences that their decisions can 
have had.  
 
 
Words of the editor in chief 
”It was an historic decision ” 
During the night of the Gothenburg fire in 1998, the editor in chief at 
Göteborgs-Posten was not informed until reporters and photographers 
had returned to the office with texts and photos. Then a reporter noti-
fied him in the night.  The editor of the online GP Direct immediately 
became the key person at the office, according to an interviewed re-
porter. GP made the decision early to issue an edition on the following 
day, although it was the press-free All Saints Day, because of this ”his-
toric disaster.”  
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We might not have realised immediately that it was an historic de-
cision to issue a paper on a non-edition day. /.../ And this in combina-
tion with thinking about the numerous things that had to be done.... 
finding all the key people.... get the technical stuff to work. /.../ It 
worked brilliantly. Much, much better than I could have imagined.1     
Regarding photo policy, the GP chief photo editor decided from the 
start that the situation called for a moderate practice because the pho-
tos ”should reflect events, but still respect people, and the fact that they 
were young and in shock”.2 Another editor gave examples of decisions 
on refraining from using pictures and instead trying to describe grief in 
words. 
I don't think anyone can find the photo of the mother crying for her 
child who had burnt to death in our material. Perhaps a reporter has 
written about her without identifying her in person.3 
An editorial decision to publish turned out to be a press ethical vio-
lation. This concerned an article on a missing girl in GT some days after 
the fire.4 The paper published the article on the request of the family. A 
few days later, the girl was found in the burnt out building and was until 
then an undetected victim. In retrospect, the newspaper should have 
been more careful in the reporting, an editor in chief said.  
It was our way being committed. /.../ but in this case we should 
have refrained from publishing... it was very uncomfortable... I have 
felt bad about it.5 
The newspapers adopted different approaches to multi-ethnic na-
ture of the fire. Some thought that the term ”immigrant” was just as 
natural to highlight as the fact that many victims had various national 
backgrounds. Other papers considered the ethnical aspect to be of sec-
ondary interest and said that they had chosen the approach that Swe-
dish children and young people had been affected. Most newspapers 
were clear about the immigrant aspect from the start.   
I remember that people interviewed had opinions to the effect that 
'this will hit the immigrant communities in Gothenburg hard', which 
was a kind of statement that we – if relevant in the context – pub-
lished. We didn't suppress anything like that.6 
Ethical considerations did not influence the choice of words either.  
It was rather seen as a matter of whether an opinion ”was relevant in 
the context” or not.  
”That's the issue we deliberated on”.7 
While some thought the ethnical aspect important, others tried to 
tone it down or adopt a neutral approach.  
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We never discussed highlighting or toning down the issue. /.../ I 
managed the work for three-four days. In that period of time the focus 
was on the human tragedy so of course we noted that it involved im-
migrants and told our readers this and interviewed immigrant or-
ganisations and imams etc. But to actually address this side of the 
horrible reality was not on our agenda, I think, at least not at the be-
ginning.8 
 
Input from the field  
”My words had weight in the news desk discussions”  
The interaction between the editorial management and the photogra-
phers and reporters, respectively was in many ways pressed and tested, 
as shown earlier. Despite that, very few examples of hot discussions or 
differences in opinions in the course of work were mentioned in the 
interviews. This might deviate from more normal situations at work for 
various reasons such as time, emotions or practicalities. Minor discus-
sions or differences of opinions occurred in some cases the closer the 
deadline came, but reporters and photographers had the power to 
make decisions on site, at least judging by how the situation was de-
scribed after the fact in the interviews. 
A DN photographer was in contact with his chief photo editor dur-
ing work, but since the chief was in Stockholm and the photographer 
on site, it was only logical, the photographer said, who should make the 
decisions on which photos to publish: ”I can decide better what to do 
on the spot. Besides, I'm pretty experienced.”9  But later in the process, 
when they were approaching publishing time, the word of the editors 
carried increasing weight: ”And then... you're not always part of that 
discussion, which pictures to publish.”10 
At the same time, the photographer thought that sometimes in these 
kinds of situations there may a discussion between the photographer 
and the desk on the photo material. If there is time, the photographer 
is invited to make a proposal. A colleague thought that being shown 
trust is important to a photographer.  
Editors being sensitive to me and my expertise and my judge-
ment... That was a strong feeling. And that was positive; that 
my words had weight in the news desk discussions.11 
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However, it might not be ideal if everyone agrees all the time. Some 
arguing and discussion on photo selections is only creative, the pho-
tographer said, since it is ”always fun to argue a point not shared by 
the editors [laughter].12   
Ultimately, the editor decided, even if they disagreed:  
In this case I think the photographer wasn't there at all but out on 
a new assignment at same place, I think... But there was nothing 
wrong with the photographer, but a judgement call that had to be 
made here.13 
A photographer confirmed the importance of editorial support for 
his courage to make the right decision – taking ”the right” photos and 
daring to refrain from taking others, if needed: ”Sometimes I felt, sort 
of, hell, am I too scared? Should I be tougher?”14 In this case the editor 
guided an ethical decision in the right direction, the photographer said, 
and ”as soon as I had talked to him I felt that I needn't be [scared]”.15 
A photo that was rejected by GP was taken by a photo agency and 
published in another Swedish daily paper and internationally. The 
photo showed a long row of covered bodies behind burnt building at 
Backaplan. ”Imagine the thoughts of the families: 'Is that my daughter 
or son lying there'.”16  To the GP chief photo editor there was only one 
possible decision: Do not publish!  
 
Professional conscience 
”I nearly thought  … sorry” 
Performing good journalism, while being a decent empathetic human 
being17 can be a difficult art to master in many contexts. The tasks are 
not incompatible but difficult to reconcile. The experience of many 
journalists in Gothenburg was a both/and. A kind of professional con-
science emerged.   
A photographer said that he got the following question from some-
one: ”Were you a journalist or a human being when you arrived at 
the site?” And his reflection was that ”you don't walk around being 
inhuman when you're a photographer.”18 
There were several descriptions of guilt feelings and comparisons 
made between their self-experienced suffering and the suffering of the 
afflicted, for instance, ”I can hardly allow myself to think that it's aw-
ful if I think of what it was like for people.”19 
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Concern was a given emotion for both reporters and photographers. 
”For every photo taken ... I nearly thought... sorry... in my head for 
shooting it. It was as if I swallowed with every picture”.20 
 
The will to help 
”I would like to save some lives… and write” 
Several reporters and photographers described how the line between 
the professional role and humane helper was shaky.  All the time the 
impulse was to contribute to the rescue efforts and that it was ”okay 
and right” to permit themselves to be a fellow human being.  
I had a hard time doing nothing. /.../ I thought about sending my 
colleague home to write and stay myself. I had worked as an auxiliary 
nurse, but it was 16-17 years ago. Could I do something? But no, I re-
alised that I can't do anything without instructions, and it was clear 
that the rescue teams didn't have time for that.21 
Many journalists tried to help out with basic and practical tasks. A 
reporter partook in guiding injured persons to the right bus for trans-
portation to a hospital, and lent his mobile phone to people who wanted 
to call their parents.  
One of the girls tried to take off... So I talked to her friends and they 
fetched her. The sort of things I did. No journalistic work at all.22 
Priority was given to helping and supporting, which took prece-
dence over the professional duty.  
What I tried to do mostly was checking on people, trying to help, 
sorting a bit, who were injured and in what way and trying to find 
blankets. /.../ I contemplated driving people in my car and giving 
CPR. But then I thought that if I put them in the car that might kill as 
much as save them. There was fresh air outside and better if a nurse 
had a look. /.../ We like to help people even when we don't really 
know how.23 
Despite the understanding that they could not and were not ex-
pected to take part in the rescue operation, the sense of guilt remained 
for a long time with some of the journalists.   
I went through some very, very tough weeks before it abated. And 
then the guilty conscience has ceased. But I really wanted to save 
some lives... and write.24 
A photographer said that if he had had CPR training, he would have 
been able do more.  Many of the interviewees shared this wish, and 
some time after the fire the photographer had the opportunity to un-
dertake such a course.  
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It can be a severe strain on professional identity to dare to practise 
their profession in an extreme situation since there is an author/pho-
tographer byline. Another photographer wondered about the readers' s 
thoughts when they saw his photos in the newspaper.  
I imagined that they were thinking along the lines of was he here 
taking pictures and didn't help at all? I mean it might look as if you 
are taking a picture of someone being beheaded. Then most people 
would think why are you taking a picture of this? Why don't you help 
instead? But you don't know if you would have helped or not. You can't 
draw any conclusions.25 
It is interesting to note how the photographer saw lifesaving as part 
of his duties – at least a kind of general human duty at an accident site.  
What he meant, however, was that journalists seldom have to make the 
choice between helping and reporting. It is only if they happen to arrive 
on the scene before any other responders that helping may be what is 
required, he thought. But then it is the action of a private person and 
fellow human being, not as a professional.   
Then you don't take any pictures. Then you help until the ambu-
lance arrives. Then you might start shooting, but from a distance so 
you don't interfere or annoy people too much.26 
A telling example of the journalists' wish to help instead of reporting 
was their misconstruction of the following interview question: ”How 
would you assess your own efforts at the accident site?” Many under-
stood the question as referring to their own rescue efforts. The ques-
tion, of course, referred to their journalistic achievement, as journalists 
do not have the mission to help and save on the site. ”Well, what I did 
to help was neither here nor there,” a photographer answered.27 When 
the question was clarified – that it referred to his profession – the an-
swer was different: ”I could not have done it better.” The misinterpre-
tations could be an expression of the journalists' spontaneous wish to 
help and of what from others at the site.  
 
Identifying as a journalist or not  
The press ethical rules involve dilemmas for journalists on an accident 
scene. On the one hand, they are expected to ”meet reasonable requests 
from interviewed persons to be informed in advance of how and where 
their statements will be used.” This means identifying as a journalist. 
On the other hand, journalists should ”show the victims of crime and 
accidents the greatest possible concern”, which can be understood to 
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mean that victims should be left alone. The approach taken by journal-
ists in the Gothenburg study was not consistent. Some thought it was 
important to be open about their professional role on the scene, while 
others lay low so as to avoid provoking anyone and also because they 
were afraid of hostility and threats. Journalists' presence in the acute 
phase of major accidents and disasters, as mentioned, often evokes 
strong emotional reactions from those affected and the responders, 
which can be seen as natural and understandable in retrospect, but can 
be hard handle for the individual journalist at the time.  
 
Not identifying as a journalist  
”I hid the camera behind my back”    
The first journalists to arrive at Backaplan were most anonymous, as it 
was not clear to the injured and the survivors that several of the adults 
on the scene were reporters or photographers.  
I was lucky to start with, being there on my own. No one knew that 
media were there. I didn't exactly wear a cap saying 'Press'... so I 
think that people took me for a partygoer, as I'm pretty young. I did-
n't stand out there.28 
The photographers could not hide their profession and their inten-
tions in any way. The camera was a visible instrument. The result was 
some confrontation when distressed young people wondered how they 
could take pictures when their friends were dying.  
I didn't get involved in any lengthy discussions with them but ex-
plained a little why I was there, but no one understood, so I went 
away, tested a bit, shot some pictures and quickly left to avoid con-
frontation.29 
A reporter described similar experiences.  
I admit that I felt a bit threatened. /.../ People were running about 
crying 'help us, help us, they're dying'.   Standing there with paper and 
pen ... it was absurd.30 
Another reporter hid his notepad and pen and made notes furtively.  
When I felt that – ’this I will not remember’ – I went away or round 
the corner or something.  I felt great resistance to openly showing that 
I was a member of the media.31 
The latter reporter thought at the time of the research interview that 
this behaviour was a form of being considerate. But at the same time 
he also mentioned that the threats made to the photographers on the 
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scene might have influenced his decision to conceal his professional 
role.   
The interviews indicated various ways of hiding the professional 
role, sometimes in self-defence, sometimes because of a sense of shame 
and embarrassment: ”I hid the camera behind my back, so no one saw 
it”.32 
A photographer described that he had been unobtrusive because he 
felt that the young people were provoked by his presence. He tried to 
interfere as little as possible, that is, taking few pictures and keeping 
the camera out of sight as much as possible to avoid having to explain 
his duties on the site.  
You can't explain on site why you're taking pictures. They are not 
interested when they have just lost a friend.33 
The unobtrusive approach was shared by several others: ”I usually 
work very discretely”.34 A photographer, who arrived around four or 
five in the morning, thought the photo assignment was a strain, albeit 
in a different way than for those covering the fire in progress:  
The toughest job was to photograph the persons who were crying 
. . . without pointing them out in the paper.35 
Identifying himself to the young people was never on the table, ac-
cording to the photographer. That would have been a violation of ethics 
– interfering with their grief. Asking permission was also out of the 
question.  
No, no. It's not done. You don't approach a person crying over a 
lost friend if you take a picture.36 
 
Identifying as a journalist  
”Notepad visible the whole time”   
There were also reporters who wanted their professional role to be ap-
parent for the same reason that others wanted to be unobtrusive, 
namely as a kind of protection.  
I had my notepad visible the whole time to show who I was, and I 
had the cell phone in the other hand. /.../ I mean, I'm not a nurse, I'm 
not a curious bystander walking around gawping in the courtyard 
either.37 
This reporter thought that he had been better treated because he 
had chosen to be open about his profession. For several of the press 
members who arrived early to Backaplan the aim seemed to have been 
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”simply being”, observing, helping and taking notes, but not really en-
gaging in regular journalism. The role seemed ambiguous and the jour-
nalistic task elusive.  
       Then one of the girls said that she thought a friend who was co-
organising the event was still inside, and then my head rattled. I 
could get the first names of these girls...but it was not an interview. 
You don't do that with people who are in a bad state.38 
 
 ”You don't select on site – or?” 
Traditionally, journalism – particularly among photographers – has 
proceeded in two ways at an accident site. One approach has been  ”vac-
uuming the area” for pictures and information while on site. This re-
quires great efforts regarding selection and censorship at the office 
later. The other approach involves a great amount of restraint on site. 
The latter comes with two advantages: consideration of the afflicted 
and quicker selection process before publishing. Sometimes the two 
approaches are applied after strategic decision. But after the Gothen-
burg fire, many testified that the approach simply ”presented itself”. In 
most cases the reporters and photographers acted with consideration 
and minimised the number of interviews and photos: ”All in all, I shot 
16 photos, and I was there for about half an hour.” 39 In comparison 
with a more normal news event, this photographer would have taken 
between 70 to 140 photos, as he said: ”I just took some pictures for the 
paper. Then I put down the camera and fetched blankets instead.”40 
One of the photographers working at Backaplan during the night 
deviated from the normal approach of taking fewer pictures by taking 
more pictures than usual.  
It was perhaps good to take many pictures so I didn't have to get 
involved emotionally on site. I might have landed in an impossible sit-
uation rendering me incapable of taking photos if I had been less 
busy.41 
One of the editors declared that ethical decisions normally rest with 
the editors and the journalists should only collect material and not se-
lect anything on site.42 This approach, he claimed, also applied at the 
Gothenburg fire. But most of the interviewees of all categories thought 
that ethical considerations should be made on site, while also saying 
that this required an interaction between the journalist on site and the 
office management.  
Not so long ago, the idea was that the photographer should 'vacu-
um' the area, and leave the rest to the newsroom. That time is gone. If 
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we worked according to this motto today, we would not have been 
able to produce the paper we did now.43 
Several had doubts about the vacuuming principle. One photogra-
pher said: ”I don't share the opinion that we should shoot everything 
and let others select. It's a strange view on the part of the editorial 
office”.44 But it was also difficult to select on site, a photographer 
thought.  
I know that the Göteborgs-Posten said in the paper that 'our pho-
tographers are unique – they censor on the accident site when they 
take the photo.' And when we go out we know what the paper wants 
and what they don't want'’. /.../ Of course we may take the occasional 
offensive picture.  But then we rely on the night editor and photo edi-
tor; it's a decision for them to make on which pictures to publish.   
INT: Do you think they do that? 
(Sighing) Yes and no.45 
Although there is a responsible publisher, the photographer has a 
great responsibility for giving the right information when submitting a 
photo, he thought.  
When they came out with NN (the last survivor), it was pitch black. 
All I saw was someone coming and took a picture. I didn't see what 
was happening at all. I didn't see what they were carrying, and I did-
n't see if her face could be seen. I didn't see anything.  It was when I 
was developing the photo and saw this picture when – wow!  – what 
the hell, is this NN? So this is what I did /.../ when I sent the pictures, 
I wrote in the caption, 'These pictures are not suitable for publication 
in a Swedish paper'.46 
The pictures, however, were sold and shown all over the world, he 
said. And because he judged that the ethical censorship varies with the 
geographical distance, he wanted to share the photos. This was a free-
lance photographer with economic interests in the sales, which may 
have influenced his decision. The attitude to the relation between ethics 
and distance may have changed since the Gothenburg fire in 1998. At 
that time there were already different views on whether or not the dis-
tance had any relevance to the ethics of photo publication. In a global-
ised media world, it is reasonable to ask if non-domestic publication 
can in fact cause publicity damage to the exposed individual. 
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Press ethics –  acting and publishing  
Good press ethics – is that to refrain from certain publishing, or to 
refrain from certain actions? Is it an ethical violation to take a photo or 
only to publish it?  
The ethical rules primarily clarify and assess what can be published. 
Perhaps unpublished photos should be assessed too, that is, also be-
haviour on the accident site should be assessed to a greater extent than 
now.  Several photographers volunteered this suggestion.   
But, of course. So much has been said about the fire and that the 
'press kept a serious approach.' I don't think so. Therefore:  what ap-
plies to the place... applies to publication. But, if people crawl into the 
faces of grieving people to get a good shot, and it's not published, then 
I don't think the press is serious.47 
Often the editorial management is too ”lenient” in censoring pho-
tos, an evening paper photographer thought. He said that he often has 
conflicts with editors when they don't want to publish a photo of an 
identifiable person that he wants to publish. But in connection with the 
Gothenburg fire, there was no occasion on which the editors wanted to 
prevent the publication of a photo the photographer suggested.  
Most of the interviewees agreed that journalistic ethics was more 
than publications but also behaviour on site, although some empha-
sised behaviour and others the final publication. An interviewed editor 
thought that it was a more active step when a journalist continues an 
interview with a person in distress than when a photographer takes a 
photo of an afflicted person. The journalist can withdraw an unwritten 
text, while the photographer cannot regret a photo taken.   
 
Professional ethical choices 
”No way – we're not printing that” 
Most interviewees – all categories – claimed that the assignments related 
to the Gothenburg fire included a great many ethical discussions: ”It's 
clear as mud that there were many discussions on what to do and not 
to do”. The ethical discussions were seldom explicit but a kind of unde-
fined approach, an unspoken everyday ethics.  
This is a morning paper, and we basically have our own special 
ethics. We don't throw ourselves at people; we don't accuse a reporter 
who's been on a job of missing news because he didn't walk over bod-
ies. We have an every day ethical approach.48 
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It is noteworthy that the chief news editor of the morning paper 
compared his own paper's everyday ethics with an unnamed rival, 
clearly the evening press.   
A reporter thought that consideration was highly prioritised on the 
scene, although the job had to be done: ”I think I made the decision to 
do it [the job] trying to disturb the people as little as possible.”49 The 
reporter thought that this choice had consequences for the paper.  
It took a longer time for DN to interview the survivors compared 
to the evening papers and the broadcasting media. Because we de-
cided not to approach people directly.50 
Some managers said that they made important ethical decisions at 
an early stage. The GT's editor in chief said that he decided on two 
things two hours after the fire:  (1) to be very careful with suggesting 
that the fire was deliberate, and (2) not publishing photos of people 
that might be dead.  
When a journalistic job is reviewed before publication, ethical issues 
often surface such as ”Should we run photo X or Y?” But often the pho-
tographer has already sifted the wheat from the chaff so the possibly 
unethical photos are never presented to the editor. That is what it was 
like after the fire, according to a photo editor. ”There was only one 
photo, and I said 'No way, we are not publishing that.'”51 
In the interviews, the photo material seemed to give rise to more ethi-
cal discussions than the texts. At Aftonbladet, the choice of photos and 
photo ethics were at the top of the agenda at the beginning of the re-
porting:   
Yes /.../ because pictures are so revealing in such contexts. Photo-
journalism is mostly more important than how to depict an event in a 
text.52 
In this paper there was, relatively speaking, a great deal of  ”mask-
ing” of faces to conceal identities. The time factor also affected the out-
come:  
To be honest, we didn't mask in the first edition /.../ no face was 
masked which we discussed a lot and decided that we'd made a mis-
take./.../ We should have masked then, which we did, in the second 
edition immediately. /.../ But before the first edition we didn't discuss 
at all... until we saw the paper.53 
At Göteborgs-Posten the ethical considerations of the photo mate-
rial for the Friday edition were made very quickly. The photographer 
scanned three of his 16 photos digitally. The task was to scan the front 
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page photo first. As often happens, coincidences influenced the choice 
of photos. The photographer described how the first three got in the 
paper because they were on top of the heap and the paper was going to 
print. The photographer had to make a quick decision, and it was as 
difficult then as on site to decide who was dead and who was alive.  He 
elaborated on his criteria for assessing the condition of the photo ob-
jects. The starting-point was that some people, after all, had to be pho-
tographed. 
Those I knew were alive, those who were screaming and walking 
around – clear signs of life. But you try to hide the injured and the 
deceased. Only for their sake, and because no one should have to see 
their children in the paper.54 
The categorisation may seem rough, and is it really possible to dis-
tinguish between crying survivors, the injured, unharmed and dying 
people? If nothing else, it indicates the difficulty of making proper as-
sessments and choosing (or not) photo objects.  
One of GP's photographers exemplified how he had made an ”ethi-
cal check” of a photo of two grieving girls, leaning against each other.  
This photo circulated in the office to three-four editors and none of 
them thought that it was offensive or inappropriate in any way. Then 
I showed it to the editor in chief and he agreed with the others.55 
Some days later, he visited a school and saw the photo on a notice-
board with recollections of the fire, which he took as confirmation that 
the photo did not violate any ethical principles.  
Regarding ethical considerations, there is reason to note the degree 
to which the affected and shocked young people were interviewed di-
rectly. DN partly chose one specific strategy:  
In several cases we let reporters be in place and instead of inter-
viewing people they were asked to write their personal accounts of 
how they experienced the atmosphere /.../We used it consciously in-
stead of letting shocked people cry out their pain or anger.56 
In practice, also DN's staff interviewed survivors and eyewitnesses. 
But they were very careful to get interviewees' consent. One example 
was the surviving disc jockey. 
We wanted to interview him, but couldn't just barge in/.../ at an 
early stage, he had been very cocky and ’outspoken’, so we considered 
not interviewing him at all at that point, but he had interesting infor-
mation and vivid descriptions of what had happened. We chose to ask 
his mother to be present at the interview.57 
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Did he think that this was a correct journalistic decision? Yes, even 
if the boy was more subdued with the mother present, as ”he didn't say 
as much as he would have if we had talked to him alone,”58 the DN local 
editor was still satisfied with his decision.  
One of many considerations the journalists faced in their reporting 
was their freedom to interview and their responsibility for young peo-
ples' naivety regarding the consequences of their statements.  The jour-
nalists and the media shouldered responsibility in varying degrees.  
It was not self-evident to the reporters to think that it was ethically 
and morally acceptable to interview young people who had just sur-
vived a fire. Some even asked if it was at all conceivable to interview a 
family who had just lost a child. ”We arrived at the opinion that you 
should and you must, even if it is hard”.59 The question how they 
reached this agreement was not answered. A likely explanation is the 
nearly inconceivability of the idea that a reporter should return to the 
office without interviews and then have to face the consequence of the 
decision. The question is also to whom the reporters thought it would 
be hard. Perhaps for both parties: the interviewer and the interviewee.  
DN had a so-called immigrant intern, who helped interviewing in 
the Serbian language in some cases, which facilitated contacts with the af-
flicted.  
...because she was a fellow-countrymen and spoke the same lan-
guage. But we discussed a lot whether it was at all ethically acceptable 
to interview them.60 
In the days that followed, there were continuous discussions, an ed-
itor said, on what should and should not be done. ’Should we ask for 
permission to take a photo?’ and so on. And the discussions were seldom 
initiated by the editors. As one editor said: ”It was rather me that had 
to deal with my staff's questions.”61 
 
Publicity rule no. 9: Always show consideration for the victims of crime and 
accidents  
A core issue in press ethics is individual integrity, because individual 
integrity must be protected while the journalists' understanding of 
their duties is that events and people should be depicted. This dilemma 
also applied to the Gothenburg fire situation.  
Yes, my spontaneous reaction was that the people deserved to be 
left alone.  They have experienced something truly horrific. And they 
 201 
 
shouldn't have to deal with journalists too.  I thought that was very 
tricky. At the same time I was there to do a job, and I knew I had to do 
the job.62 
This professional self-image warrants reflection. The statement ”I 
had to do the job” indicates the professional driving force. The idea to 
refrain from the assignment is not entertained by hardly anybody. As 
important as showing consideration is not overdoing it to the point 
where information is affected, as an editor pointed out: ”We should al-
ways ask the question: 'Do we show too much consideration?' In other 
words: 'Are we taking it too far?'” 
In the debate after the Gothenburg fire, there was criticism of the 
media's unethical and insensitive behaviour in dealing with shocked 
and bereaved people. But if the ethical boundary for violation of integ-
rity is the same as talking to victims at all, journalism will be impossible 
to engage in. An editor in chief put it in this way: 
Then the history of Sweden will never be written. We would only 
report on the number of police cars and firemen. A clinical reporting.  
The editor thus included the writing of history in the media duties. 
A human dimension of major incidents is important but can clash with 
ethics, he observed. ”A no is always a no,” in good old journalist praxis. 
But is a yes always a yes? Informed consent can be deceptive in a dis-
aster situation because of the mental and physical condition of the af-
flicted.  
 
Publicity rule 11: Be careful with pictures  
A photographer related how he wanted to refrain from taking too many 
unnecessary pictures. No photo should be wasted, or taken without 
purpose.  
I thought like this/.../: I can't go around taking a chance. So I prac-
tised at a little distance from the worst drama, and checked if I knew 
exactly how close I would have to stand to people to cover as much as 
possible. And adjusted the camera... manually.63 
Moderate concern involves catching the right moment. Protecting 
the individual does not always equal anonymity. There are generally 
differences in degrees depending on who and what are portrayed. Pro-
tecting the individual can mean taking a picture when a head is turned, 
or a face is covered in hands. This difference means that the ”same” 
picture can be taken in a protective or revealing way ”depending on if 
the photographer has chosen the right moment or not.”64 
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A photographer illustrated in words how the pursuit of publishable 
photos was affected by the nature of the incident and how the way he 
worked differed from his usual ways in other situations.  
Often when you do a job, you look for the strongest photos /.../ But 
in this case you looked for the opposite and tried to find something you 
could photograph and something that could be published.65 
Also in the offices a stronger ethical assessment was made of photos 
compared to procedures in other major events, according to several ed-
itors.  When there is a major disaster in progress, it could be easier in 
theory to take liberties and advantage of the journalistic space. But as 
in the case of the Gothenburg fire there was professional responsibili-
ties to safeguard.   
It's the easiest thing in the world to get dramatic photos of people 
who are in a panic because of grief. To expose them like this, ’bang 
swoosh'. You can be standing 50 meters away and take close-ups of 
people who are crying. Piece of cake. But in some way it's a question 
of portraying it without exposing people.  /.../ It's different if you visit 
people in their homes to interview them, and they're sitting on the sofa 
aware of the situation. This is different from being at a fire site and 
sneaking a photo of people when they are grieving.66 
The line between freedom and responsibility in journalism involves 
who to photograph and in what context. One photographer said that he 
was always clear about 'differentiating between people'. And in some 
cases he would show no mercy.  
A municipal commissioner in a porn club. I wouldn't think twice 
about going there and flashing a bulb in his face ... I wouldn't regret 
that at all. But ordinary people who happen to fall into situations /.../ 
the people who came there to find out that their children had died.  
That's a helluva difference.67 
 
 
Rejected 
”The many pictures I didn't take”  
It was clear from the interviews with the reporters and photographers 
that ethics has its applications at several levels in the chain of produc-
tion. Assessing what not to document on site in the midst of chaos re-
quires instinctive ethical decision making and a mental condition al-
lowing for sound judgments: ”I refrained from many /.../ 'better' pho-
tos. Yes, or juicy ... stronger.”68 
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One of the first photographers to arrive at Backaplan thought that 
he had made several press ethical decisions on site:  
If you think that the photos from the fire were awful, this is com-
pared to what I rejected because I couldn't cope with taking them. 
There's a limit to how vulture-like you can be.69 
Another photographer made similar decisions on photos to take on 
the scene:  
Yes, there were many photos I didn't take, which would have been 
very dramatic. Their grief was beyond anything, with children 
screaming and hugging one another, which I didn't photograph but 
would have been 'good' pictures. But I held back.70 
In connection with the fire, a commonly discussed issue was the fail-
ure of the media to anonymize people, whose medical condition was 
difficult to assess whether survivors or the dead, in the photos, as men-
tioned in the section on professional ethics. The TV media were criti-
cised for showing too much of identifiable young people during the res-
cue operation.71 The Aftonbladets first edition on Friday 30 October 
1998 carried unmasked pictures in spite of the fact that several faces 
were clearly identifiable. ”It was a mistake”, said the editor in chief.  In 
a later edition several faces were pixeled in the photos. The most note-
worthy example was a picture of a girl being carried out in a blanket by 
a rescue worker. In the unpixeled edition, the readers could look 
straight into her eyes. The caption read 'SAVED'...”. But could we know 
for sure? The pictures gave rise to further questions that did not only 
apply to Aftonbladet:  Is it enough to mask a face when the person is 
easily identifiable through clothes? Should pictures needing to be pix-
eled be shown or should the anonymization be done in the act of taking 
a photo? Some papers had a policy to avoid publishing pictures that 
had to be pixeled. It was primarily the two evening papers Aftonbladet 
and GT that published pictures with pixeled faces. The morning papers 
seemed to have adopted the principle that the photo angle should hide 
the faces of the people in the picture.  
A morning photographer said that he tried ”not to look people 
straight into their eyes.” 
You have to work discreetly and sneak around taking pictures 
when people turn, and so on /.../ it is easy to stand with a telephoto 
lens and take photos of faces without anyone noticing. But I didn't do 
that.72 
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Several photographers reacted with restraint in their photography: 
”You simply get shy in your professional role”. In some situations, there 
was no option:  
If a half-naked fourteen year-old girl is lying dead on the ground, 
you don't stroll over to take a photo.73 
There was a variety of attitudes, opinions, and prejudices at work 
among the actors on the scene at Backaplan; between young people and 
rescue workers and between young people and the media and between 
the media and the rescue workers. The journalists assumed that some 
attitudes were rooted in the young people's previous experiences of 
warfare or flight, for instance, which surfaced in the chaotic night. For 
many, this was hard to cope with when many youngsters expressed 
harsh criticism of the police, and there were journalists who ”bought” 
the arguments and reported the criticism in the paper. 
I think that even if we cannot talk to the police and the rescue ser-
vices, we cannot let the young people throw dirt on them either.  To 
me it was all about protecting the young people.74 
An editor in chief said that he had stopped the publication of mate-
rial on several occasions; he had, for instance, toned down criticism of 
the rescue services' lack of efforts, and also recounted conflicts between 
the young and the police.  
Explicit arguments on journalistic ethical considerations were 
sparse in the newspapers in the days studied. There were, however, ex-
amples where the journalist states in the article that he has refrained 
from detailed descriptions of certain scenes of panic, etc. A case in point 
is a description of a couple of smoke divers' tentative entrance into the smoke-
filled hall in Göteborgs-Tidningen:  
What they saw and felt with their hands in there, in the smoke, is not fit for print. 
(GT 981031) 
Also the local DN editor gave examples of how colleagues had re-
frained from a certain kind of journalistic material as a result of being 
considerate, especially in the later stages of the reporting, beyond the 
chaos of the accident site, when the focus was on grief and sadness. 
We abstained – especially in the first few days– from publishing a 
great many photos. Even if people are willing to be photographed, a 
feeling spread among our photographers that this was wrong. For in-
stance, once we had a very good text covering the outside of the Ham-
markullen Church, but the photographer there, he... after discussions 
with me... refused to photograph the people, and just took pictures of 
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the church, the cross, the church entrance etc./.../ They sighed a bit at 
the home office [in Stockholm]...75 
A clear change in the ethical approach was noticeable regarding the 
reporting of mourning rallies and commemoration. This may have 
been because of less time pressure, less stress on the reporter compared 
to the situation at the accident site.  
 
 
Press ethical mistakes 
”I thought … that they looked very much alive ” 
The time factor affects ethical considerations and decisions to a great 
extent.  A photographer described what could happen in the office un-
der time pressure in the night when photos from the photographer are 
received.   
Everyone is working full steam ahead, and I'm just one of the pho-
tographers sending photos to the paper. Then they have put a paper 
together. And they read the picture captions76 arriving with photos 
/.../ And then it's pretty easy for the night editors to publish the 
wrong photo because the information attached is wrong.77 
His pictures were only some among many delivered to the office, 
and the management had to make correct ethical decisions quickly. The 
photographer thought that the text attached to the picture (the photog-
rapher's information to the editor) is always crucial to making the cor-
rect decision. 
If I send a picture: 'Here is Daddy on his knees next to his injured 
daughter'. And they publish the picture. Then it turns out that the girl 
was dead. /.../ Such a picture can easily be published if the caption is 
wrong.  
INT: But the question is still: How could it happen? 
It's like this:  It's three o'clock in the morning. The paper is in print. 
There is no chance to check the information. They trust the photogra-
pher who wrote the text. /.../ That's why it's so important that the cap-
tion is correct.78 
In this case the time pressure and lack of routines had dire conse-
quences since it turned out that the girl was dead. Everyone involved 
should learn from this never to take a chance on an assessment or spec-
ulate about the condition of an afflicted person, but choose another 
caption or refrain from publishing the photo. But never take a chance. 
The consequence hit Gothenburg especially since the evening papers' 
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first editions were also the least ethically acceptable. The editions geo-
graphically most distant from Stockholm (e.g. Gothenburg) were 
printed – as always – first. The ethically ”better” editions were printed 
later and stayed in Stockholm. The editions with the potentially great-
est offensive content were spread among the people who were most vul-
nerable: in Gothenburg.  
 
The grey zone of press ethics  
”You should be on the line”  
There is a kind of theoretical line drawn for what is sound and accepta-
ble journalism. But where it is and how elastic it is depends on the in-
dividual, the news editors, and the situation. Perhaps it also depends 
on a national arena.  In Sweden journalists talk about ”keeping within 
the line” or ”crossing the line”. But where is it and how close to line is 
it reasonable to stay? The question was put to the journalists covering 
the Gothenburg fire.  
I think you should be right there [on the line].  This is when it's best. 
But there has to be expertise in the office to make the assessment. At 
the same time you can't shake off the personal responsibility, but you 
have to stand up for what you submit.79 
Dwelling in the press ethical borderland entails great risks such as 
violation of personal integrity and anonymity rights. The problem with 
photographing an accident victim whose condition was not easily as-
sessed was a case in point for the photographers at Backaplan.  
You didn't know then either. Those who were alive were carried 
out to the ambulances. And the dead were not brought out the same 
way as the living.  They were carried out through the backdoor.80 
The photographer made the assessment that the girl was alive ”be-
cause they hadn't transported any dead persons to the hospital”. But he 
couldn't be absolutely certain, he said. So this is only an example of the 
balancing act between the media's factuality and fictionality, between good 
and bad ethics. A caption only functions as reinforcement of the picture.  
This requires great care and attention to the facts.  
If they had written 'Here one of the injured is carried out', it can be 
turned around two days later: 'The injured person carried out two 
days ago has now died in hospital.' But it's more difficult to write 
'saved'.81 
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In the borderland of press ethics, ”injured” can mean deceased and 
the person ”saved” can die. A misjudgement or a premature conclusion 
can have painful consequences for the family. The photographers' 
chance to assess the conditions of the people they took pictures of was 
limited in the situation for reasons of lack of knowledge and time.  
The picture on the front page – on that I was pretty certain that 
they were alive. But I still don't know if they lived or not, those who 
were there. But I thought when I took the picture that they looked very 
much alive.82 
 
The cynicism of distance 
”Consideration diminishes … with the distance to the 
event”  
Major accidents and disasters of international interest often constitute 
examples of how different media reporting can appear, depending on 
the distance between the media distribution area and location of the 
event. This fact is illustrated in connection with the Gothenburg fire, 
summed up in ”As I say, consideration diminishes proportionally to 
the square of the distance to the event”.83 
Previous studies have shown that the local editors at an accident 
place are more careful than incoming journalists from the national 
press.84 Others think that the differences between Swedish media are 
marginal and irrespective of their locations.  The differences are clearer 
in an international context. But the global media situation has also re-
duced the differences between the national and international levels, as 
a photo editor observed:”Going back 30-40 years, we could show any 
picture of a German – and nobody would react. That wouldn't work 
today”.85 
The present globalised world partly bridges the geographical distance. 
Showing pictures of accident victims requires a rigorous ethical assess-
ment even if the incident takes place abroad. 
Today it's not certain that we would show photos [on the ethical 
line] of people on the Balkan, for instance, as it's very likely that there 
are relatives and family members here [in Sweden].86 
 However, nothing is clear-cut, rather contradictory.  
Last week we had a pretty awful photo from Kosovo. And some 
thought that it was too much, sort of. But we can't censure war. And 
 208 
 
the reason for publishing it was to shake people up a bit... saying, 'This 
is the grim truth.'  
INT: Would it have been possible to publish the picture if it had 
been taken in Gothenburg? 
No ... it's hard to say. But if it had been an accident instead of war, 
then I don't think it would have been publishable here. But in war 
something is different.87 
This statement poses questions suitable for a different thesis: What 
is the difference between war journalism and accident/disaster jour-
nalism? Would journalists and the general public make the same as-
sessment depending on the causes of trauma?  
There are also economic interests in the selling of photo material, 
which can contribute to increased generosity in the delivery of photos 
not publishable in the home country. This was the case after the fire.  
My photos were sold all over the world. They brought in extra staff 
to distribute them [the photographer describes a photo of a badly 
burned girl that was not published in Sweden]... but was on the front 
page of nearly every paper in Germany. It made the front page in 
Spain, in France, in Belgium and everywhere in the world it was pub-
lished.88  
My pictures were sold for SEK 70-80 000. 89 
The photographer had no qualms about this: ”Ethically speaking I 
think it's okay.” His reason was that the exchange was reciprocal as 
photos of disasters in other countries are sent to Sweden. ”We can see 
photos of maimed people every day in our papers.” 
Several photographers testified that colleagues showed a lack of 
consideration and ethics. The reasons that members of the same pro-
fessional category can display different approaches are several: cultural 
differences and the pressure of the home editors were mentioned. 
Some said that covering an event far away from home is more likely to 
lead to transgression. Other causes could simply be ”stupidity, 
thoughtlessness and ignorance.”90 
The DN photographer doubted that the event would have been cov-
ered differently if it had taken place in Stockholm instead of Gothen-
burg.  
It would have made no difference. I don't think so. It's possible that 
more dramatic photos had been taken, and more close-ups of people 
crying, and possible that some had been in the paper. But I'm the pho-
tographer down here and I decide what photos to take.91  
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This may indicate that the person factor and previous experience 
are more decisive than job location and editorial belonging.92 
 
 
Press photo 
”A hundred times  better than words” 
Several previous studies have noted that the news photo has a promi-
nent role in accident and disaster coverage, for example, Gert Z 
Nordström and  Stig Hadenius  et al., who studied the Estonia ferry 
disaster in the media.93 When words fail us, the picture may convey a 
feeling and describe a moment better. Who does not remember the TV 
footage of the plane crashing into the World Trade Center in 2001? It 
is so unbelievable that it has to be seen again and again. After the 
Gothenburg fire, Göteborgs-Posten had a photo covering the entire 
front page and the caption: ”The Disaster Site Friday Night ”.  As a GP 
photographer put it: ”Yes, a picture is a hundred times better than 
words. Together they are very descriptive. But a picture speaks more 
about what is happening than a text does.”94 
At the same time as the press photo is mentioned as a key factor in 
accident and disaster coverage, the time pressure in news production 
also affects the photographical work. 
More and more a single photo is taken. This increases the risk of 
arranged photos.  And then you are really on thin ice, the whole paper, 
if this happens. If you plan to tell a story with more than one picture 
– then you have to be good at arguing a case (laughs).95 
The photographer suggested here that the really good photo cover-
age of a major event is often done by freelancers, as the employed pho-
tographers work under a greater time pressure and the demand for the 
'single photo' is his lot. He hoped, however, to see more visual narra-
tives in the future press.   
That the pictures we look at in the present press are manipulated in 
various ways is not something the general reader reflects on. Also the 
news photos from the fire were in several cases computer processed to 
satisfy both the photographer and the editors. Often this involved 
small, apparently harmless corrections, but they might be significant to 
know about.  
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You could describe it like this: If there is a group, hugging one an-
other, as in one of the photos [I took]. And there is a fire in back-
ground. Three meters away from the group in the photo there is a sin-
gle person. Then I might remove that person from the photo to get a 
more unified picture of the group.96 
In several cases the photographer cropped the pictures from the 
scene to, as he said, ”reduce the distance between the camera and the 
injured and between the camera and the fire.”97 
Most things are technically possible today regarding computer-
aided image manipulation. The example above is a distortion of reality 
worth discussing. But there are limits to what a press photographer can 
consider doing.  Removing an object is one thing, adding is another: 
”My limit is /.../you can add people to a photo. I would never do that, 
the photo is the original”.98 
But removing a person from a photo to protect their identity? 
 It happens.  For instance, I was on a police story /.../ and there 
were plain-clothes detectives in the picture [the photographer de-
scribes how he removed them from the photo] /.../ And I did that be-
cause they'll have a difficult job if they are identified in the paper.99 
The reason he complied with the police request in this case (the fire) 
was, he said, that as a photographer he is reciprocally dependent on a 
good cooperation with the police for future assignments.  
 
 
Assessments and decisions: conclusions 
The journalistic job can be described as full of professional challenges 
and paradoxes. The press ethical considerations are many: Should 
journalists show their professional identity or not? And are their deci-
sions based on consideration or fear? The journalist covering the 
Gothenburg fire did both, or either or. Some of them hid their notepads 
and pens; others displayed their attributes clearly. Some photogra-
phers kept their cameras behind their backs; others went close to take 
many photos. Some reporters interviewed, others observed. Some pho-
tographers were alert enough to see immediately what pictures needed 
taking. Others simply shot a great number ”to make sure”.  
The editors also adopted different approaches to the job in hand re-
garding if they should vacuum the area and let the editorial staff make 
the selection, or let the photographers select on site.  
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Can a photographed image be an ethical transgression if it is not 
published? This is a delicate question to which there is no given answer, 
just as there is no answer to the question whether or not it is a trans-
gression to interview people in shock even if the interview is not pub-
lished or anonymity is protected. All interviewees stressed in unison 
that there was a policy – or decree from the management – not to go 
too near the afflicted at an accident site.  But did the journalists have 
the knowledge to assess who was comfortable and invulnerable enough 
for an interview?  And did the photographer know if the girl in the 
photo was unharmed, injured or dead?  
Many expressed a lack of knowledge regarding the medical and psy-
chological effects of the traumatic Gothenburg fire. A very clear and 
collective tendency was that all expressed a wish to help in some way. 
The professional conscience made a photographer ”nearly say, I'm 
sorry” when he took a photo. But the photo was taken. Was he a good 
journalist and a rotten fellow human being? No one would be likely to 
blame him for this, but many of the journalists judged themselves alt-
hough their mission was to report and not to save lives. And what is 
sufficiently ethical to take photos of in a situation characterised by 
chaos and traumatised young people? 
Examples of editorial decisions made were issuing a paper on a nor-
mally non-edition day, to what extent consideration should be given to 
all the affected people in the choice of photo material, and what ap-
proach to adopt on the multi-ethnic character of the event. The editors 
also gave examples of decisions that they thought erroneous in hind-
sight, for example, the article on a missing girl, who was later found 
dead in the burned premises.  
The category that had the greater say varied. At the accident site, the 
reporters and the photographers had a great influence, while the opin-
ion of the editorial management grew in importance the closer it got to 
the time of going to press. The staff expected the management to be 
responsive to the staff members' expertise and also said that they were 
treated with respect in this sense.   
Someone stressed the importance of knowing that the management 
was really prepared to stand by its decisions. A critical issue turned out 
to be the newspapers lack of routines in crises and disasters. The re-
porters and photographers as well as their editors appealed for better 
guidelines for media crisis management and organisation in connec-
tion with major accidents and disasters.  
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Reporters and photographers described their professional perfor-
mances on site in varying terms. There were, however, similarities. 
Both categories had in the main acted on the basis of two alternative 
strategies: either by revealing their professional role and presence ex-
plicitly by showing notepad, pen and camera or identifying themselves, 
or by concealing their professional identity and trying ”to hide” by 
keeping attributes out of sight, and trying to ”fit in”. Someone went 
round the corner to make notes because it felt so provoking being there 
as a journalist, and some photographers took a minimum of photos. 
The reason for these behaviours, according to journalists themselves, 
may have been a combination of being considerate and the experience 
of feeling threatened by distressed and upset young people.  
Photo editors as well as photographers thought that there were, by 
tradition, two approaches to an accident site. One is to ”vacuum” the 
area for photos, the other is to be restrained and select objects on site.  
Both approaches were practised at the Gothenburg fire, even if the lat-
ter later appeared to have been most common.  
When the photos were taken, the censuring or ”gate-keeping” took 
place on several levels. It was, for instance, decided which pictures 
should be published in Swedish and international press, respectively. 
Freelance photographers and all newspapers (and of course photo 
agencies, although excluded from this study) also had economic inter-
ests in the photo material. This aspect was not ”in the picture” when 
the work was in progress, but it was a result of the assignment. 
The professional performance on site included both acting and re-
fraining from taking the strong photo or interviewing vulnerable peo-
ple, but also daring to do all this within reason. Many journalists shared 
the experience of having a greater responsibility to protect individual 
integrity than a duty to report.  
The skills normally expected of a journalist either came to a head or 
out of play. Some ethical rules, for instance, were especially high-
lighted, while other norms of standard journalism did not apply. Sev-
eral situations accentuated that disaster journalism constitutes a kind 
of press ethical state of emergency. The photo material was discussed 
much more than the texts, which is typical of accident and disaster 
journalism, as some pointed out, because the pictures were so exposing 
and it was so hard to assess the condition of the photographed young 
people. The use of pixeled faces varied considerably between the news-
papers. 
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Several press ethical dilemmas involved the responsibility for both 
acting on the site and publishing. Often press ethics and publishing are 
equated, but in this study many issues of how reporters and photogra-
phers could and should act in different situations on site were high-
lighted, indicating that professional conduct is not only guided by pro-
fessional codes, but also by personal qualities such as vulnerability, 
stress susceptibility and crisis reactions. This dimension is the subject 
of the next chapter. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 News editor in chief GP 
2 Photo editor in chief GP 
3 Local editor DN 
4 Also in Larsson& Nohrsedt et al (2000) 
5 Editor in chief GT 
6 Local editor DN 
7 Local editor DN 
8 Local editor DN 
9 Photographer DN 
10 Freelance photographer/GT 
11 Photographer 2 GP 
12 Photographer 2 GP 
13 Photo editor in chief GP 
14 Photographer DN 
15 Photographer DN 
16 Photo editor in chief GP 
17 Also see Lamark & Morlandstø (2002) 
18 Reporter 1 GP 
19 Photographer 1 GP 
20 Photographer 1 GP 
21 Reporter GP 
22 Reporter AB 
23 Photographer 1 GP 
24 Reporter GP 
25 Photographer 1 GP 
26 Photographer 1 GP 
27 Photographer 1 GP 
28 Photographer 1 GP 
29 Photographer 1 GP 
30 Reporter GP 
31 Reporter DN 
32 Photographer 1 GP 
33 Photographer 1 GP 
34 Photographer DN 
35 Photographer DN 
36 Photographer DN 
37 Reporter AB 
38 Reporter AB 
39 Photographer 1 GP 
40 Photographer 1 GP 
41        Freelance photographer /AB 
42 Editor in chief GT 
43 Photo editor in chief GP 
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44 Photographer 2 GP 
45 Freelance photographer /AB 
46 Freelance photographer /AB 
47 Photographer DN 
48 News editor in chief GP 
49 Reporter DN 
50 Reporter DN 
51 Photo editor in chief GP 
52 Editor in chief AB 
53 Editor in chief AB 
54 Photographer 1 GP 
55 Photographer 2 GP 
56 Local editor DN 
57 Local editor DN 
58 Local editor DN 
59 Reporter DN 
60 Reporter DN 
61 Local editor DN 
62 Reporter DN 
63 Photographer 1 GP 
64 Photo editor in chief GP 
65 Photographer 1 GP 
66 Photographer DN 
67 Photographer DN 
68 Photographer 1 GP 
69 Photographer 1 GP 
70 Photographer DN 
71 See f. eks. Larsson & Nohrstedt (2000) and SOU 1999:68 
72 Photographer DN 
73 Photographer 1 GP 
74 Reporter GP 
75 Local editor DN 
76 Written information from the photographer to the desk, about delivered images. Sort of suggested 
captions. 
77 Freelance photographer/AB 
78 Freelance photographer/AB 
79 Photographer 2 GP 
80 Freelance photographer/AB 
81 Freelance photographer/AB 
82             Photographer 1 GP 
83             Photo editor in chief GP 
84 Alström (1997)  
85 Photo editor in chief GP 
86 Photo editor in chief GP 
87 Photo editor in chief GP 
88 Photographer 1 GP 
89 Freelance photographer/AB 
90 Photo editor in chief GP 
91 Photographer DN 
92 Also see earlier sections about media ethics. 
93 Hadenius et al (1996); Nordström (2002) 
94 Photographer 1 GP 
95 Photographer 2 GP 
96 Freelance photographer/AB 
97 Freelance photographer/AB 
98 Freelance photographer/AB 
99 Freelancephotographer/AB 
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 THE PRIVATE PERSON: ONLY HUMAN 
 
 
 
 
The interview study with the journalists did not include personality as-
sessment. However, the journalists themselves reflected on their per-
sonal strengths and weaknesses regarding their ways of reacting to the 
fire disaster. Many also related their observations of colleagues' reac-
tions. Statements like ”he is a man of steel and yet he fell apart” testify 
to the shattering of the myth of the journalist as the Superman or John 
Wayne during the hours at Backaplan in Gothenburg. Who endured 
and coped with the situation psychologically and who ”broke down”? 
Who was overwhelmed by feelings and who could embrace them with 
presence of mind? When the journalist, with private and professional 
person, arrives at an accident site, the professional person is also over-
whelmed by the impressions, feelings and reactions that the private 
person is affected by. Finding one's role immediately is not automatic. 
Should I help or report? An elaborate discussion of the conflicts be-
tween the private and professional person is presented in the last chap-
ter. The next section gives an account of how the journalists at 
Backaplan experienced their vulnerability and stress susceptibility, as 
well as their reactions and coping strategies.  
 
Vulnerability 
”I have to cope with this”  
The professional journalist is to a great extent shaped by the individual 
assuming a professional role. A tension – or rather process – described 
by the Norwegian media researchers Lamark and Morlandstø, illus-
trates how the individual and the journalist encounter the ideals, 
norms and regulations of the profession.1 
Journalists given the task to cover a traumatic event can never re-
nounce normal human reactions. But the professional mission is a very 
strong incentive that can help postponing the strongest reactions into 
the future. This is what many of the journalists in Gothenburg experi-
enced. 
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You can't just sit down cry, which would be the natural reaction. 
You... I at least ... dissociate from it in some way.  You can't allow 
yourself to feel too much, but simply get the job done.2 
 The journalists' experiences were marked by a sense of unreality 
and powerlessness:   
I walked around with a feeling of 'this is not true, this is not real, 
this can't happen in Sweden.3 
One year after the fire in Gothenburg, the Swedish Television 
showed a documentary of the incident. One of the strongest parts of the 
programme was made by the TV photographer Tommy Wiberg. His 
story illustrates the journalistic dilemma clearly: having to complete an 
assignment, more or less willingly, in a chaotic situation difficult to as-
sess, where anything besides saving lives appears as a provocation. In 
a film sequence a young man reacts with words and gestures, which can 
be understood as an attempt to keep off the media. Tommy Wiberg says 
in the film that ”the only thing to do was to put down the camera.” 
 
I don’t think I have ever done such a bad job. /.../ I’ve been involved in many 
dramatic events, which I have managed to keep at a distance, and also to 
keep my professional glasses on. But as soon as I arrived at this place and 
heard their desperate cries, and saw all the young persons lying around… it 
was very hard to work there. On my way to the TV premises ... then I couldn’t 
hold back… everything snapped... I started shaking. Yes... (weeps).4 
 
A newspaper photographer interviewed for the study described the 
reaction of this colleague on the site, which was a joint workplace at 
that moment:   
I've known him for 25 years.  He is a MAN OF STEEL, you know. 
So what happened to him is very interesting. But he was there when 
it happened. So I can understand him. I think it's very strong of him 
to make this public.5 
Many feelings raged among the journalists who encountered the 
disaster and the aftermath. One way of reacting to such situations can 
also be through a perceived absence of feelings, but guilt and shame 
were central to most of the interviewees.   
 Yes, except for that feeling of shame haunting me all the time. But 
I think it's a result of the winding up in the stress situation and the 
endorphin rush I get, knowing that I have to deliver now and later, 
several different articles to different editions. I can't have a break-
down. I have to cope with this.... I cut off all feelings and just worked.6 
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Acute stress reactions 
”Then I was in real distress” 
The first reactions for some journalists came already on their way from 
the office to the assignment:  
I had a real adrenaline rush when we ran to the garage. I felt all 
of me had kick-started. And we were very tired that evening. I missed 
the staff dining room when they closed and was very hungry and ex-
hausted. But it vanished all of a sudden. I was all go. From toes to top.7 
Arriving at the site, there were other reactions, physical as well as 
emotional reactions such as the feeling of inadequacy: 
When a boy approached me, I felt a bit dizzy.  I felt: God! He is one 
of many! ... I started ...pumping blood ... with my knees, because my 
head was empty and I felt nauseous.8 
Another reporter lost all energy for a while: 
I felt completely useless. Perhaps for the first ten minutes. Then I 
was in real shock, you know, ... totally useless and not like a vulture, 
but I realised that as a journalist there was no task for me there, then. 
Other than to observe.9 
The same reporter remarked that she was totally unprepared for 
this encounter with death. 
I have never seen a human being die in that way.... Twice earlier 
but that was from heart attacks... and standing there watching people 
die near your feet... it was impossible to spare myself from that. Once 
I had seen it.10 
There were very few examples in the study of journalists who had 
not completed their assignment. One reporter, however, said that the 
job had been left incomplete.  
My journalistic performance was pretty bad, I thought, but all con-
sidering I don't think that anything could have been expected. /.../ It 
annoys me, I must say, that I felt so bad...it's terribly annoying... I 
have thought so much about it afterwards; I can't recall so many clear 
images either. /.../ I would have liked to be a bit more of a journalist... 
let's say I'd arrived five minutes later, then everything would have 
been completely different. If I had known that it was a disaster, I could 
have worked more like a journalist. /.../But I did my best in the cir-
cumstances, and I gave a lot to colleagues and so on, but not stuff with 
very much substance.11 
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There were many, both journalists and photographers who were 
standing in the corners, feeling bad and crying. /.../ Some sort of dis-
appeared, but that could have been me not seeing them. I was proba-
bly one of those who should have gone home directly. If I'd had some 
sense left.12 
The later arrivals had a better chance of ”postponing” their reac-
tions to mobilise some kind of energy reserve instead and keep a total 
focus on the job.  
I was pretty high, actually. And we worked round the clock for 
about a week. And it worked. I didn't feel tired or anything.13 
When faced with horror, individuals may become one with their 
emotions. An evening reporter walked around in as if in a glass bubble 
at the office in the hours after his experiences at Backaplan: ”I was 
walking around there like a zombie, green in the face so probably no-
body wanted to talk to me, I think”.14 
For the incoming journalists staying in hotels, the work was in some 
cases less lonely than for the free-lancing Gothenburg press members. 
Someone thought that the socialising with colleagues in the hotel was 
very important support, while other thought that there was little time 
for talking with colleagues or catching your breath in the hotel room.  
We worked 20 hours a day, or 23 hours on the first day. We didn't 
exactly wonder about the carpets in the room (laughs). No, you just 
hit the sack, dead tired.15 
 
Personally affected  
”She could definitely not go”  
Inevitably, journalists find themselves covering a story that involves a 
personal connection, for instance, reminds them of what once hap-
pened to a close friend. One of the photographer recounted (as men-
tioned) how his work was affected by the accidental death of his son 
three years earlier. Some of his son’s friends died in the fire.  His daugh-
ter also had friends among the victims and survivors of the fire, ”but I 
didn’t know that when I went there,” he said. The photographer soon 
realised that this was the very same party that his daughter wanted to 
go to and suddenly remembered how he had ”blankly said no” to her, 
which he did after having checked with the police who the organisers 
were.  
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They were boys selling tickets in the school-yard and they had no 
control over how many they sold. They always sold more than what 
the place could hold. /... / So I checked, and she could definitely not go. 
INT:  ’It’s probably a totally needless question – how does that de-
cision make you feel today?’  
You can ask her. I feel bloody good.16 
Another aspect of the accident that the photographer said he recog-
nised from his daughter’s life was the way young girls borrow clothes 
from each other when going to a party.  
Now I have spoken to her about how difficult it is for the police to 
identify children when they are not wearing the clothes they left home 
in. /.../ I told her that… see how important it is to wear your own 
clothes.....17 
A reporter recounted that she had been involved in two fire inci-
dents in residential buildings, which had to be evacuated. Perhaps 
these incidents accentuated  her fear of  fires when she witnessed the 
Backaplan fire, she pondered.18 
 
Coping  
”I have never been so perceptive” 
A number of factors help professionals to cope with the situation at an 
accident site. Several of the reactions may belong to this category. In 
the effort to manage the situation, these reactions may become a re-
course. A sense of unreality is common, suppression of reactions as well 
as dissociation and keeping active to prevent reflection.19 
Among reporters and photographers on the accident site in Gothen-
burg there were many examples of coping strategies. Having a ‘suffi-
cient ability’ to cope with the situation and perform their duty was the 
goal of many. In several cases, their mental acumen and focus were in-
creased as an effect of their coping strategies: ”I was so observant that 
I don’t think that I have ever perceived something so intensely. Apart 
from delivering a baby.”20 
I have never been so perceptive in my whole life, I think. I went all 
in to be a professional photographer. I’ve never had such well exposed 
photos in my whole life, I think. It’s weird, but... I was so aware of not 
failing with these pictures.21 
The professional duty was predominant for most of them despite 
their distress. 
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All the time I tried to think professionally /.../ I never had time to 
slow down and consider the situation. Not until we were just about 
leave, when they started to carry out the bodies… then I started to 
think.22 
Distraction is an indispensable coping strategy to do this kind of job. 
Many of the journalists applied it.  
You can’t sit down and cry, which would have been the normal re-
action, but you... at least I distracted in some way… You can’t allow 
yourself to feel too much.23 
One way of reacting to crisis situations is with humour. There were 
only a few examples of this strategy among the journalists in this study. 
A reporter described such an attempt: ”I know that I tried to perk up 
and be chipper, type… joking…and I failed miserably.”24 
One of the photographers had also noticed such reaction among the 
survivors.  
In the midst of all the misery... there’s one thing I’ll never forget... 
there’s this guy I give a blanket to and two buddies.  One was injured, 
his face was burnt, so we laid him down on the street.  Then they 
talked to each other and I heard it all. They started to make fun of each 
other and one asked; ‘How do I look?’ And the other said: ‘Bloody aw-
ful, but you will get girls anyway.’… It was pretty absurd in the cha-
otic situation.25 
 
Delayed reactions 
”I only saw people running” 
Different types of stress reactions – early and delayed – were described 
by the journalists and photographers reporting on the acute phase of 
the fire and they mentioned many of physical and psychological reac-
tions that responders may experience. Some examples were: insistent 
memories and thoughts, anxiety, despondency and grief, sleeping 
problems, concentration loss, fatigue, soul-searching and guilt, chang-
ing values. This supports the view that media members may also be af-
fected by a disaster26, and raises the question of how this state affects 
the way an incident is reported.  
Several interviewees described how the reactions to the fire did not 
appear until they were on their way to the office.  
Then we get into the car and drive off and I say to NN [the re-
porter] ...Blimey, there seems to be 50 dead.... ’Yeah, so what?’, she 
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says. /.../ Then I realised that she was totally out of it. Gone, if you 
can say that. I looked at my watch and thought, ‘Hell, now they want 
pictures’.27 
A photographer described that he was haunted by horrible images 
and couldn’t sleep in the first days: ”I only saw people running… and 
I thought that people were falling from the window. And I …wasn’t 
the least bit tired.”28 A colleague reacted in the opposite way – slept 
without any problem: ”I have never slept so well in all my life [laughs], 
because then I was terribly tired, you know.”29  
But not only journalists on site were affected by the disaster.  Col-
leagues in the office and editors were also affected by the fire disaster. 
An editor thought that in this case he could not, as usually, repress his 
feelings during work: ”In this sense, the fire differed from other similar 
incidents.” He continued: 
I worked more than 24 hours and then flew to my summer house, 
and when you just sit down, all the feelings surface and you realise 
what has happened, which you don’t do when you’re in the middle of 
it. And you get very affected and tears start streaming.30 
Many of the reactions that the journalists and photographers de-
scribed can in retrospect seem slightly absurd. But at that point, in the 
morning of the fire, they could be viewed as a reflection of coping strat-
egies.  
Back at the office, a photographer went through his photos to send 
them to Stockholm and started to recapitulate: ”That’s when you’re 
prepared to take it in. You’ve known it all the time but kept it at a dis-
tance.” He continued working anyway, sending his photos until half 
past ten in the morning. Then he went home, and fell asleep against his 
expectations: ”… I simply  fell onto the bed immediately.” Waking up 
in the afternoon his reporter colleague rang, ”because she needed help 
and then I felt a bit bad too.”31 At that point they both decided that they 
needed professional help.  
A photographer who arrived at the scene when the fire was out, also 
experienced reacting with delay.  
Yes, well, the reaction came a few days later I think.  You get fuck-
ing depressed with it all. It was slightly unreal, actually.32 
For others, the reactions surfaced when they got home. 
I really tried to go through this pretty unaffected. But when I got 
home the reactions set in.33 
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Memory loss is described by several journalists, reporters as well as 
photographers.  
And I’ve thought about it so much afterwards. I can’t even conjure 
up clear visual memories.  Unfortunately, I wish I could.34 
Still after sex months, many journalists experienced the situation at 
Backaplan only vaguely. And some reactions would still appear: 
Yes, I’m so totally exhausted that I don’t even really know who 
were there.35  
Actually, I’m still dizzy. It’s true.36 
Memory loss was also something that affected the survivors even 
worse, as a photographer thought: 
I remember people that were there, but none of the fire survivors 
remember me being there. /.../ So they must have been more trauma-
tised than me. Many suffer memory loss from that place.37 
 
In the even longer term 
”In the end you feel bloody worn out” 
Time does not heal all wounds. Sometimes, salt is rubbed into them, as 
the memory gradually returns  
It’s not like I’ve become a superman as a result of this.  I mean, it 
drains you a bit every time. In the end you feel bloody worn out, you 
know. And you sort of want a year’s holiday.... But of course... you get 
used to it, too.38  
The atmosphere in the city was noticeably affected for a long time, 
as a  photographer put it: ”There was a weird atmosphere in Gothen-
burg for months afterwards.”39  But to live and work in the afflicted 
city in mourning can have advantages in the form of processing it, he 
thought: ”Now I’m part of the de-escalation. It’s a form debriefing too. 
/.../ All my colleagues were there.40 
A long time after the Gothenburg fire reporters and photographers 
found it difficult to think and talk about the fire. An evening paper re-
porter tried to find out the time she arrived at Backaplan through her 
saved taxi receipts, but when she couldn’t get hold of the financial of-
ficer directly, she dropped it altogether: ”I didn’t want to  think about 
it unnecessarily.”41 A photographer thought that the memories of the 
fire were worse than the experience of the actual fire.  
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To me, the fire wasn’t as awful when I was there. It was more hor-
rible afterwards, when you understood that people had died and so 
on.42 
How much can a human being endure – how much can a human 
being stand to see? Is there a saturation limit? 
Yes , perhaps. But you get over it with time.  And then maybe there 
is something else happening. And then that is hard. It’s not like I’m 
adding on thing on another.  I’m not the cause of these things. They 
happen whether I’m there or not.43 
A reporter’s comment on the experience of observing and reporting 
on the fire disaster was: ”you could do without it”.  
 
Reactions   and coping: conclusions 
Some factors clearly distinguished the reactions of the journalists at the 
accident scene in Gothenburg from the reactions of responders de-
scribed in previous studies.44 Against the backdrop of the professional 
assignment to observe and report rather than save lives, the journal-
ists suffered shame and guilt feelings because of their presence on 
the scene. Other emotional reactions were powerlessness, being over-
whelmed, dissociation from feelings, distress and a sense of uselessness.  
Among the somatic reactions were increased heart rate, nausea, dizzi-
ness, weeping, tremor and adrenaline kick. Examples of cognitive re-
actions were sense of unreality, confusion, memory loss and dissocia-
tion. Behavioural reactions were reported by the journalists as hyper 
activity (being ”triggered” and ”speeded”), under activity (”was use-
less”, ”should have gone home”), and withdrawing.  
The reporters’ and photographers’ combined descriptions of their 
own reactions stretched across the whole spectrum of crisis reactions 
in responders (Chapter 5). The only type of reaction often appearing in 
responders that was not recognised among the journalists was the be-
havioural reaction of exaggerated joking. Humour is a frequent coping 
strategy among responders,45 but only a few examples of humour used 
for coping purposes was mentioned in the journalist interviews. 
If the reactions are categorised according to Wallenius’  principle of 
functional and dysfunctional reactions,46 the journalists displayed 
some distinct categories. A functional reaction, or coping strategy, dis-
played was distraction from the event to increase powers of perception 
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and professional focus. A dysfunctional reaction was paralysis which 
led to inadequate professional performance or none at all. There were 
also examples of problem-solving and emotional coping. Some acted 
as  ”problem solvers” reacting – according to their own statements – 
with resourcefulness and creativity. They developed a ”super memory” 
and complete purposefulness in the situation.  Others mastered the sit-
uation more emotionally and let helping take precedence over the pro-
fessional duty. Perhaps they let compassion and professional con-
science govern their actions on the accident site and their accounts in 
the interviews.  
There were no clear differences in reactions among women and 
men, or reporters and photographers. Possibly, women more than men 
applied ”emotion-focused coping” and the men more ”problem- fo-
cused coping”, which is in line with previous studies.47 The correspond-
ing weak tendency was also present in the comparison between report-
ers and photographers with the reporters tending to apply a more emo-
tion-based coping, while the photographers seemed more problem-ori-
ented. There were exceptions, however, in all groups, also among the 
journalists. The latter tendency can, however, also be explained by the 
fact that all photographers in the study were men and the majority of 
the reporters were women. 
The spectrum of reactions also included delayed reactions. Many 
reporters and photographers testified that their feelings appeared af-
ter the first 24 hours and for some after some days. Several reported 
sleeping problems and persistent and long-term memories. A few re-
ported having a personal link to the event and the affected young peo-
ple. A reporter described how the memories from a previous building 
fire resurfaced at Backaplan and wondered how the experience had af-
fected the later reactions. A photographer described how the memories 
of his child’s death some years earlier were triggered and relived while 
on duty at Backaplan.   
Generally, most of the interviewees emphasised that they were more 
ready to help victims and survivors than to take photos and write. Many 
would have preferred to exercise humanity while others found it eas-
ier to focus on their professional role.  
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1 Lamark & Morlandstø (2002) 
2 Reporter DN 
3 Reporter DN 
4    Tommy Wiberg, film photographer, Swedish Television,  SVT Göteborg, in a SVT documentary      
    ”After the fire” (”Efter branden”), SVT2 (991025) 
5 Photographer DN 
6 Reporter DN 
7 Reporter GP 
8 Reporter GP 
9 Reporter AB 
10        Reporter AB 
11        Reporter AB 
12        Reporter AB 
13       Reporter DN 
14        Reporter AB 
15        Reporter GT/Ex 
16         Freelance photographer/AB 
17       Freelance photographer/AB 
18        Reporter AB 
19 Dyregrov (1992) p. 179 
20        Reporter GP 
21       Photographer 1 GP 
22       Freelance photographer/AB 
23       Reporter DN 
24        Reporter AB 
25       Photographer 1 GP 
26        Also see Lundin (1992) 
27       Freelance photographer/AB 
28       Photographer 1 GP 
29        Photographer DN 
30       Editor in chief AB 
31       Freelance photographer/AB 
32       Photographer DN 
33       Freelance photographer/AB 
34        Reporter AB 
35        Reporter AB 
36        Reporter AB 
37       Photographer 1 GP 
38        Photographer DN 
39        Photographer DN 
40        Photographer DN 
41        Reporter AB 
42       Photographer 1 GP 
43       Photographer 1 GP 
44        ICD-10 (WHO: http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/) ; Dyregrov (1992);   
      Wallenius (2001); Enander et al (1995); Lindström & Lundin (1982);  
        Folkesson (2003). 
45        Dyregrov (1992); Folkesson (2003); Granér (2000) 
46        Wallenius (2001) 
47   See f. eks. Michel et al (2001) p. 70 
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 REFLECTION: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 
 
 
 
 
Coping with the time after a traumatic experience is as important as 
coping with the job in an extreme situation. The processing and recov-
ery phase is worth studying to better understand how journalists feel, 
think and function in a real-life situation, both in terms of the com-
pleted mission and future unexpected call-outs. The time of reflection 
is somewhat curtailed in the media world, as is the the time of recovery. 
Nevertheless, the care of this indirectly affected professional group is a 
factor to consider at the collective as well as the individual level.  
 
 
Psychological relief 
While accident responders, still in their uniforms, directly move on to 
manage their stress within the organisation, primarily through good 
leadership, and peer support, the journalists might be sent to another 
job. The police, rescue services and emergency care units have stand-
ard routines for providing support and checking mental states subse-
quent to the assignment. In the media world, such initiatives were in 
principle non-existent until the Gothenburg fire in 1998. 
Previous studies, among others Simpson and Bogg’s, show that 
many journalists comply with an unwritten professional code, meaning 
that regardless of the brutality or trauma of an assignment, journalists 
should continue taking photos, collecting facts and telling their stories. 
This unwritten code also includes disregarding individual needs of sup-
port measures.1 
 
Social support and trauma relief  
In 1998, the year of the fire disaster in Gothenburg, the international 
psychological expertise on war more or less agreed that regular defus-
ing, or psychological debriefing, was necessary for human recovery af-
ter potentially traumatic experiences. Nowadays, this wind has turned 
somewhat, to which we will return. But it is to be noted that the ques-
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tions in the interviews for this study were asked on the basis of the pre-
vailing knowledge at the time. The purpose of defusing and debriefing 
was – and still is for many – to speed up the recovery process of staff 
who had experienced and worked with a traumatic event. Abnormal 
situations lead to normal and painful reactions. A second purpose was 
to reduce physical, cognitive, emotional and behavioural stress reac-
tions. The sessions have also been used to identify the persons who are 
in further need of help.2 Advocates of this model also think that such 
sessions are perfect opportunities to share facts and information 
equally and give all the affected parties information about normal 
stress reactions and how these can be prevented.  
The difference between defusing and debriefing is that the former is 
applied immediately, is shorter and somewhat superficial. If a need of 
debriefing is revealed, it is provided.  Big debriefing groups sometimes 
have two leaders. Defusing normally involves one session, while de-
briefing can have three sessions. A further difference is that in relief 
practice priority is given to speedy intervention after the incident ra-
ther than to a quiet and secluded place, while the undisturbed place is 
a debriefing requirement.3 The person who conducts the talks varies 
between organisations, but generally the first session is lead by the 
head of operations if he/she has the confidence of the co-workers.   
The leading literature in the field is produced by the American re-
searcher Mitchell and Everly, but good descriptions are available in 
Swedish, provided by Dyregrov and Andersson et al.4 Recent research 
has, however, as implied above, questioned the benefits of the individ-
ual sessions in particular. Many even suggest that the method can do 
more harm than good regarding the potential of debriefing to prevent 
posttraumatic stress syndrome.5 In the preceding year, 2005, the Brit-
ish National  Institute  for  Clinical  Excellence  NICE – published an 
evidence-based research survey of the field, which summarised the 
forms of intervention that they thought could help victims and indi-
rectly affected persons such as responders directly after an incident – 
for instance, a disaster. 
 Those directly (and indirectly) involved should be provided em-
pathetic support  
 Support can be practical, emotional and social 
 Those directly (and indirectly) involved should be informed 
about common reactions and advised on how to cope with them, 
preferably in writing  
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 For individuals with mild reactions lasting less than four weeks, 
watchful waiting is sufficient 
 Psychological debriefing provided on one occasion for individu-
als is not recommendable 
 Screening of high risk individuals should be performed with a 
simple instrument (e.g. check list), one month after the trauma 
 Individuals with pronounced PTSD symptoms should be offered 
cognitive behavioural therapy within a month.  
Broadly speaking, this involves calming those who have pronounced 
reactions, sustain fellowship, and if possible involve those affected 
partly in rescue operations (as part of the processing). Too emotional 
issues are avoided, but committed and empathetic listening is crucial. 
Individuals who show resistance (see Chapter 4) may not need profes-
sional evaluation or treatment. In worst cases, a normal recovery can 
be disrupted by intrusive interventions (e.g. one-time debriefing) 
prematurely, which may disturb normal recuperation.6 
In the following, however, interviews and conclusions are presented 
in relation to the knowledge prevalent at the time of the fire, which 
meant psychological debriefing or relief as the norm or expected norm.  
 
Employee stress:  a management issue   
Attending to employees suffering acute stress reactions is a manage-
ment duty. The primary care giving should involve emotional help, for 
instance, according to the list above. Routines for this are most often 
established in the rescue services and the police force but considerably 
less employed in the media world.   
In June 2000, the Swedish Work Environment Agency issued rules 
for workplace crisis management, which make concrete demands on 
managers:  
 
Every workplace should have the preparedness and routines required to pro-
vide first help and crisis support in relation to the nature, scope and risks of 
the workplace.7 
 
Good leadership and established peer support are needed to prevent 
stress in co-workers, as Michel and others suggest.8 
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Swedish media companies have not so far paid much attention to 
giving psychological and social support to journalists covering trau-
matic events. Lack of knowledge and routines in such issues has pre-
vented good care provision in the workplace. The interviews in this 
study clearly displayed a need of support.  
 
Defusing after the fire 
”Like inspecting the car”   
The Gothenburg fire was a turning-point regarding media companies’ 
insights into the importance of psychological and social support to 
journalists covering a trauma. And yet it is the employer’s responsi-
bility by law. The reporters and photographers were offered support in 
varying degrees. On the other hand, the informal collegial support may 
have been significant and underrated. The need was probably greatest 
among those who witnessed the fire and saw how young people strug-
gled to survive and in some cases lost. At Göteborgs-Posten the man-
agement is reported to have offered relief quickly, even if there was lit-
tle understanding of the degree of trauma afflicting their employees, as 
a reporter told.   
When I arrived at the office on Friday, I was first told that we were 
to talk to someone after the weekend. As the conversation continued, 
and we talked about what we had seen, one of the bosses reacted. Not 
until then did they seem to realise what we had experienced. Shortly 
after, we were told that a therapist would see us in the afternoon for 
a short session. Yes, there was a need of inspection. Am I in shock? 
Can I trust that my thoughts are on the right track? Will there be ter-
rible reactions?9 
In the GP case, the two reporter colleagues at the site found comfort 
in each other. They spoke continuously about their experiences. At this 
newspaper, collegial support was of great importance because the relief 
sessions were initially effective. The newspaper’s occupational health 
care services did step in, but the sessions did not satisfy the reporters: 
There were only two [sessions]. The therapist didn’t click with us.  
We were not seen by her /.../When I started talking to the others I 
realised how unprofessional it was.10 
On the Monday three days after the disaster a group briefing was 
arranged which also was heavily criticised by the GP staff. In a conver-
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sation with an administrative head some days later, the reporter real-
ised that she in practice had not had a debriefing at all since her expe-
rience of the outcome of the session was negative.  
And then I was really scared. Help! Because I wanted someone to 
look at me and listen to me and say: ’You need help’ or ’You are stand-
ing, this will be tough, but you know what has happened and you are 
not in shock’. Like inspecting the car.11 
The editorial management made sure that the ”final inspection” of 
the two reporters was carried out by two therapists that were  not con-
nected to the occupational health care services.  This time the sessions 
were rewarding and then the reporter did not feel a need of further re-
lief.   
At GP the chief editor could resort to a folder with instructions on 
measures to take for psychological support of staff after a disaster. In 
this sense there was preparedness. Then, however, ”the debriefing 
went well in some cases and not so well in others,” as an editor put it. 
Debriefing often involves personal chemistry, and ”the right sort of 
meeting between the right sort of people”. One interview question con-
cerned whether the journalists thought that debriefing should be vol-
untary or mandatory. The degree of voluntariness appeared to be han-
dled differently. ”It’s important that it is voluntary,” said an editor in 
chief. This view diverged from the position taken by many psycholo-
gists in the 1990s, when relief and debriefing should be mandatory 
to attend but without an obligation to speak.12 GP’s photo editor 
thought that the need to follow up was pretty obvious, sometimes only 
to him as the boss but often by others too: ”In some cases I saw it, and 
in some cases everybody saw it. Also the people concerned”.13 
As a complement to the relief initiated by the employers, both re-
porters and photographers arranged for their own therapy and ”psy-
chological follow-up chats”. Colleagues from other media who had also 
witnessed the disaster met and shared experiences: ”Immediately after 
the fire I went to a photo agency to talk to people who had been there”.14 
The day after the fire, the GP photo editor visited the photographer 
who were the first to arrive at Backaplan and offered to have lunch with 
him so he could talk about it. But the information from the employer 
about the opportunity to get relief and debriefing did not function so 
well, the photographer thought. 
Some day afterwards I heard the chief editor say on the radio that 
’our staff are talking to psychologists now.’ /…/ I thought that was 
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fun. But it was only a mistake. He thought we were talking to psy-
chologists. It wasn’t a PR-thing.15 
After a further few days the photographer was offered group de-
briefing. He agreed and also agreed to revisit the psychologist: ”But it 
was only ’Hello,  I don’t want to talk about this any more’”.16 
GT’s employees were offered psychologist-conducted sessions in 
groups and in some cases individual therapy starting on the Monday 
three days after the fire. According to the chief editor, everyone who 
wanted to attend were welcome even if the offer was primarily intended 
for the persons working on the site. Some ten persons at the newspaper 
attended two psychologist conducted sessions:  ”Everybody thought it 
was very valuable,” according to the chief editor. Also staff in Stock-
holm (primarily stationed at the affiliated paper Expressen) were of-
fered debriefing. 
A DN reporter said that the management offered and provided de-
briefing sessions two weeks after their return from Gothenburg.  
But then I didn’t feel a great need for it. But I think that had some-
thing to do with us being so many there. We had crisis conversations 
every evening when we went out for dinner.  So I think I talked 
through most of it with my friends and it was more meaningful to talk 
with someone who had been there.17 
A photographer at Aftonbladet went to see his family priest for 
counselling after having slept some hours. 
I hadn’t thought so much about it, I had just woken up, but it was 
NN [the reporter] who contacted me and she had talked to the office, 
I think. And got the go-ahead. So we contacted this priest. 
The two went there together. ”For a quick visit,” as the reporter put 
it, and also gave the opinion that the newspaper’s crisis management 
was inadequate. She got a telephone number to call, but  ”couldn’t get 
passed the first short talk”, so it took some days before a professional 
session took place. More sessions followed. The reporter thought that 
too great a responsibility was placed on the employees to acknowledge 
their own needs and seek counselling: ”… but you don’t have the 
strength to do that when you feel rotten.”  
The reporter suggested that there was something to be learnt from 
other professional categories: ”Firemen have a system where they are 
debriefed immediately without changing clothes, which is better I 
think.” A complicating circumstance in the case of journalists is that 
their work is not done when they leave the accident site; it has just be-
gun. Writing, editing, etc. start.  
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The photographer also thought that the employees living in Gothen-
burg might have been supported in their recovery process through the 
opportunity to follow the de-escalation of coverage at close hand. This 
can have been an advantage compared to leaving after a day, he 
thought. The reporters and photographers who did not witness the fire 
but started covering it at a later stage did not seem to need debriefing 
to the same extent. 
Aftonbladet made the decision on the day after the fire that all em-
ployees who in any way were involved in the fire – especially during the 
acute phase – would be offered defusing and debriefing.18 But the free-
lance photographer working for Aftonbladet never attended any pro-
fessional session but settled for the conversation with the family priest 
the day after the fire. He did, however, appreciate the support offered 
– if not taken – by the Aftonbladet. 
In this case Aftonbladet was pretty damned fair. They gave me the 
same perks as their employees  /.../ and I could have got help at their 
expense.19 
In these later phases of the newspaper coverage, the experience of 
the incident assumed new forms. The GP photographer who attended 
the first funeral, declined a collective debriefing afterwards:  
Then I felt that there was no reason and no need either. I was de-
briefed much later but that was for being in Macedonia… and above 
all Albania. There was a real need then. At that point the fire disaster 
seemed petty in comparison with what I seen down there.20 
Another newspaper photographer’s response to the question if he 
had been offered debriefing was that this ”was still a bone of conten-
tion” between him, his editor and the management. He described how 
an unknown person out of the blue rang a colleague at GP the day after 
the fire, and he continued: ”And she said: ’Good morning, we hear that 
you are feeling bad and need psychological support.’ Really…it was 
handled very badly by our bosses.”21  He further described how his col-
league was in the middle of an article and somewhat distractedly an-
swered: ”’Not really, it’s not too bad.’ ’OK. Thanks and good-bye.’”22 
Later the photographer learned that it was the occupational health 
care services that had called, on behalf of the Stockholm management, 
who, however, failed to inform their employees in Gothenburg. Two 
days later after the phone call the employees got e-mails from the 
Stockholm management informing them that they would be offered de-
briefing. This never happened, since the employees – via the reporter 
who had answered the call – were considered to have declined the offer. 
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I think that the proper procedure should be via my boss in Stock-
holm who should have called me to say ’I understand that it was a 
tough job down there. But now we have arranged for you to see some-
one’.23 
The occupational health care services did not contact the photogra-
pher and his colleague again. The description again poses the question 
of who should take the initiative regarding debriefing. How often can 
an afflicted person decide the need for psychological support when 
asked?  
The local editor in Gothenburg, who was in charge of the coverage 
for three-four days, did not participate in the debriefing as he ”had not 
been on the accident site.” He was offered debriefing within an hour 
after returning to the Stockholm office, but declined. 
At this distance it’s not so disturbing. I had more trouble some 
years earlier when I was an investigative reporter at ”DN Special” for 
one year. I covered the Estonia ferry disaster from its sinking and a 
year on. I met survivors and one witness account after the other about 
how the corridors turned around and how they fell down. And it was 
absolutely horrible. Eventually I had problems doing this job because 
I dreamt at night. I was really affected by it. At the time, four years 
ago, there was no crisis therapy. Otherwise I would have liked that 
then.  
This supports the claim that the impact of witnessing is strong and 
that it matters if the journalist has seen the event or met the survivors. 
A disaster like the Gothenburg fire, however, left an imprint on more 
members of the media than on the witnesses or those who met other 
people affected by the disaster afterwards. One of the interviewed chief 
editors said that there ”were even those who felt bad just sitting in the 
office working on it.” In several cases, this category also sought psy-
chological help.    
The interviewed GT/ Expressen reporter from Stockholm did not 
participate in the group relief session at the Stockholm office. He was 
then in Gothenburg working on the paper’s special issue together with 
his wife, also a colleague. He did not feel that either of them were in 
need of organised psychological help:  ”We were sharing a room at the 
hotel, and we were working on the same story. We did nothing but 
talk, technically speaking.”24  He did think, however, that it would have 
been different if he had been working alone in Gothenburg at the time.  
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Even the reporters and photographers who were covering survivors 
and the bereaved in hospital, churches and at funerals were offered re-
lief by several of the papers. These journalists were not at the accident 
site but came into close contact with the disaster and persons con-
cerned. In many cases they too said that they were strongly affected, 
and a photographer said that the group session provided good relief:  
”One one hand I didn’t feel affected, really, but on the other hand: I 
was”.25 Talking with family and friends served a function but in the 
group session ”the real feelings emerged in a good way,” the photog-
rapher said.  
After the fire, several newspapers had established routines for de-
fusing, not only regarding disasters but also war coverage and other 
troubled spots in the world. Photographers working in the Balkan area 
in the turbulent years were offered relief immediately on their return.  
 
The importance of social support  
”I think around 80 people rang on the the first day”  
Social support has shown to be important for recuperation in  individ-
uals who have experienced potentially traumatic events. Formal ther-
apy means a great deal, but fellowship with and the empathy of people 
in the surrounding are as important.26 A photographer described the 
involvement of others as positive, but also as a bit overwhelming:  
I think about 80 people rang on the first day and asked how I was 
doing. So I got tired of it…telling the same story. Relatives and friends 
and acquaintances and colleagues and everyone you know /…/col-
leagues at the paper gave support and came to visit.27 
The scope of the event was difficult to explain and hard to under-
stand for others.    
You nearly had to exaggerate to make people understand the enor-
mity of it.28 
Because only a few witnesses could be interviewed after the fire due 
to distress, injury or other ethical considerations, several journalists at 
the site were interviewed by their colleagues. This meant that reporters 
and photographers were contacted by many and what might have been 
social support and empathy was an encumbrance.  
People heard that we had been there and then it was easier to ask 
us. No one wanted to ask the next of kin then because they had other 
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things to think about. But we [journalists] were some sort of messen-
gers that it was OK to ask. I also think that there is an obligation to 
talk about it. But it’s hard anyway.29 
A photographer thought that the processing of the event was facili-
tated by being at home, sleeping in his own bed, talking to the loved 
ones compared to going through it all in a different location. 
There is a difference being at home covering a terrible event than 
going off to live an awful hotel somewhere and sit in the room at night 
gulping down three large glasses of whiskey perhaps.30 
The photographer was alone in his home during the first 24 hours 
when his wife was away:”But I have two big dogs here and three cats 
and hens and everything.”31 
Those who had a family said that it had been an important support 
factor. 
I have fairly good support from my family. Mostly because we both 
have experience of what we have been through [death of family mem-
ber]. And nothing gets better from being dwelled on. You can’t get 
stuck, but have to move on.32 
 
”Police patrol … my support group” 
When the inter-collegial debriefing was unsatisfactory several me-
dia members (mostly photographers) turned to the responders in the 
police and rescue services who worked that night.   
The people I talked to, who helped me, were the police. I met them 
three or four times afterwards. Then they phoned and asked how I 
was because they had a hard time too. /.../ So they were my crisis 
group. We were there and knew what we were talking about. /.../ It 
was pure healing, as it were.33 
 
Journalist after the fire: 
”Everything I did afterwards felt utterly meaningless” 
Some photographers and journalists who had been heavily involved in 
the fire were offered adjustment of duties. The photo editor at GP de-
cided to give his young photographer a ten-day leave and sent him on 
a mission to a remote snowy place: ”I was sent to Rovaniemi in Finland 
to take a picture of Santa Claus, so it was the other extreme… it was 
good to get away actually”.34 
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On the other hand, it was not easy to completely stop reporting on 
the fire either, the photographer thought: ”It was weird not continuing 
on what I had started on. But… it was really for the best”.35 A reporter 
thought that not even so called easy jobs were that easy either:  
You can’t sort of go off to a happy press conference at Liseberg 
[amusement park]. That’s not easy either./.../ But I didn’t put the po-
lice radio on for one or perhaps two months, before I felt I could stand 
the sirens.36 
This reporter went to Copenhagen for some days to change environ-
ments. Back in Gothenburg there were constant reminders of the fire, 
on the radio, TV, in newspapers and in conversations. A photographer 
felt that ”there was no news to beat this, and no one was interested in 
anything else except the fire because it was so big”. Interviewing soc-
cer players, for instance, did not feel right, he thought: ”Everything I 
did afterwards felt utterly meaningless. Nothing was worse, or bigger 
news. I turned off the police and alert radio for several weeks”.37 
The professional roles of reporters and photographers involve ex-
treme variation in jobs. Both emotional and professional adjustments 
can be difficult. A photographer described how he, one week before the 
fire, had been in the US for ten days and then at the Alpine skiing prem-
iere with the downhill World Champion Pernilla Wiberg and the rest of 
the national team in South Europe. The fire was a heavy assignment on 
top of that, and he requested a few days leave afterwards: ”I suppose I 
couldn’t stand more. I took some days off”.38 
There were also reporters who thought that the character of the as-
signment did not affect the time after the fire. Primarily, this seemed 
to apply to journalists and photographers who arrived in Gothenburg 
when the acute phase was over.   
INT: How do you feel about this today? 
(coughing, thinking…) I don’t honestly know. It’s like a job for me, 
so things go on. I never really ponder on past jobs.39 
All the newspapers made similar follow-ups after the fire. There 
were documentary articles or special issues or supplements weeks or 
months after the fire. The photographer thought that this work was 
hard to do: ”Everyone was tired after the fire disaster. It took a great 
deal of energy.” At the same time he thought that there was a desire to 
take advantage of what he wanted to describe as the power of the news-
paper photo, that is, ”to give a deeper picture, to get close to people.”40 
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Processing and recovery: conclusions 
Journalists’ need of psychological relief after a job varies. In this study 
the whole spectrum from actively seeking contact and help to a 
straightforward ”No, thank you” was represented. The need was most 
pronounced among reporters and photographers who had witnessed 
the fire. Colleagues in the office were also offered relief and many were 
grateful for the support.   
The newspaper managements’ ways of handling the journalists’ 
need of support varied considerably. One editor appreciated the guid-
ance available in an office crisis folder.  
Several employees, however, thought that the crisis management 
left a great deal to be desired. Quite a few – primarily freelancers and 
local editors – were not offered either debriefing or relief sessions. But 
in some cases it worked well for these groups too.  
An important conclusion was that the management should pre-
empt the person offering support, that is, the chief editor should con-
tact the employee first to say that the health care services ”would call 
on our request and I think that you should accept their offer.” 
Instead, a situation arose in which a reporter was given a number to 
call, but ”did not have the strength to get past the first short call”. 
In other cases, journalists took the initiative themselves to get help, 
among others, a photographer who went to see his family priest for 
counselling.   
The varied pattern also applied to organised relief sessions ranging 
from taking place the day after the fire to not taking place at all. In some 
cases, the sessions started after two weeks.  
The degree of voluntariness was discussed. One editor thought that 
relief and debriefing sessions should be voluntary while another 
thought they should be mandatory.  According to the norms for psy-
chological relief sessions in the 1990s, these should have been manda-
tory to attend in this case but without an obligation to speak during the 
sessions. Listening also serves a function. This approach was based on 
the theory that persons who objectively speaking could benefit from 
psychological relief may not recognise their need or have the energy to 
take the initiative under the circumstances.  
The formats of the relief and debriefing sessions taking place after 
the fire varied. There were group as well as one-on-one sessions. The 
primary target group was the journalists on site, but also other mem-
bers of the editorial staff were included.  
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A comment many made related to the importance of professionally 
conducted sessions and that the personal chemistry was right: ”the 
right sort of meeting with the right sort of people”.   
The journalists’ perceived value of the sessions differed. In some 
cases, they seemed to have been successful, and less so in other cases. 
One newspaper’s occupational therapist was not doing a good job, 
which increased employee anxiety. Shortly after, a new attempt was 
made with external therapists, which was successful. An editor had in-
itiated the group debriefing and said that ”everyone thought that it was 
valuable” and had worked well.  
Informal chats between journalist colleagues and between journal-
ists and responders also seemed to have made a difference. The Stock-
holm journalists staying at hotels in Gothenburg for several days found 
support in one another. They had dinner together in the evenings and 
talked a great deal.   
A photographer took comfort in colleagues and the police that were 
on duty in the night of the fire. The policemen also phoned several 
times to ask how he was doing: ”They were my crisis group”, he said.  
Relatives and friends were unanimously regarded as the most im-
portant conversation partners after the disaster.  If the comfort of fam-
ily was appreciated by some, the lack of such comfort was hard for the 
single journalists. But many received a stream of phone calls from 
friends who wanted to hear about the fire (for reasons of curiosity per-
haps rather than providing support). A photographer said that it was 
very difficult to talk about it with others. The whole thing was so unim-
aginable that ”you nearly had to exaggerate a bit to make them under-
stand.”  
Many journalists were interviewed by colleagues at their own news-
paper and in other media in their capacity as eye witnesses. The inter-
views were seen as an obligation and also as stressful.  
In the time after the Gothenburg fire, there were few jobs that 
seemed worthwhile and bearable to the journalists. A photographer 
took ”snap shots of Santa” in Finland, after some days of leave. A re-
porter thought that not even the most trivial ”easy jobs” were easy to 
do.  For someone it was business as usual, taking on new assignments 
without discernment. A few, but not all, editors paid attention to ”the 
indirectly affected” journalists and their needs after the traumatic cov-
erage of the Gothenburg fire.  
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 REFLECTION: SELF-EVALUATION AND  
LEARNING 
 
 
 
Publications 
”I wouldn’t have done it any better”  
A problem shared by many interviewed journalists and photographers 
at the accident scene during the acute phase was the conflict between 
the professional and personal roles: being on the site with the journal-
istic assignment to write, report or taking photos, and having a moral 
obligation, on the personal level, to help and save lives.   
The journalists and photographers on duty in the night of the blaz-
ing fire perceived the situation and their own efforts very differently: 
from ”I’ve never been so focussed in all my life” and  ”I was buzzing 
from top to toe” to ”I felt completely useless” and ”I was one of those 
who should have gone home really.”1 
A striking number of reporters and photographers in Gothenburg 
were very pleased with the result of their reports from the accident site, 
considering the circumstances.   
It was pretty hard to be personal but  /.../  I ’ve had reactions af-
terwards such as ’your article made me cry’ and then I’m pleased be-
cause I feel that I’ve filled a function /.../ but I’m not completely satis-
fied stylistically, as it were.2  
I wouldn’t have done it any better.  It is of good technical quality 
and not too intrusive.3 
What I’m good at is what we call  ’the magical moment’.4 
I’m extremely pleased that I refrained from taking a lot of pic-
tures.5 
Well, it’s hard to review one’s own work. I can say that I take a 
certain professional pride in the supplement that my wife and I pro-
duced. I do.  
The latter – a reporter – especially mentioned a job that felt partic-
ularly good:   
I’m proud that we requested the truth about what really happened 
with Mona (the girl missing) – Mona’s  body.6 
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A reporter felt dissatisfied but couldn’t remember why and the same 
applied to a photographer: ”Difficult to say… in terms of results I did 
my job… I did”. 7 
For many, it was easier to criticise colleagues: ”I think there were 
some blunders made... but I must say that I did pretty well”.8 
One reporter thought that witnessing the event increased journal-
ists’ sensitivity.  
I think that everything is better the closer one has been to a serious 
accident. I think so. It becomes more processed, more respected, more 
filled with knowledge. /.../ you really have to take the bull by the horns 
to be able to write about it. And be as close as you can. Precisely to try 
to understand.9 
 
Us and them 
”I think my newspaper did the best job” 
The loyalty to their own paper’s way of reporting the fire was striking 
among all participants in the study. This was true of both the morning 
and evening papers. 
Organisationally I thought it worked tremendously well. I thought 
Aftonbladet did the best job. And not only because I work there but 
because I really thought so.10 
Another evening paper reporter resolutely stated without any 
doubts that there is a difference in ”the editorial machinery” between 
the morning and evening papers:  
We [the evening press] are more professional. There’s no morning 
paper in Sweden that could have delivered the paper we produce on 
the second day.11 
Pure pride in their own paper emerged in many interviews.  
When I opened the extra edition, I felt so proud of my colleagues. I 
was deeply touched. /.../ I thought everything was done respectfully 
and still we did what we had to do in our role as reporters.12 
GP’s photographer said that he had read everthing in his own paper 
during the first days ”because he couldn’t sleep”. He said, laughing, that 
he was ”surprised to see that GP managed to deliver so well, actu-
ally”.13 The photographer also thought that his colleagues behaved well 
on the scene. 
It sounds as if I’m bragging about GP, but it’s all about making as 
little noise as possible – then it turns out fine in print.14 
 245 
 
The journalists found it very difficult to specify critical views of their 
own paper. Aftonbladet’s reporter mentioned that too much space was 
perhaps given to the ethnic aspect that the victims were ”immigrant 
children” despite the fact that most of them were born in Sweden and 
”felt” Swedish. The GT reporter thought that their paper was good but 
there were still in-house complaints after the coverage. Primarily, the 
critique was voiced informally in ”corridors.” Some described how the 
paper’s regular evaluation meetings were also occasions for evaluating 
the fire coverage. As the local DN head editor commented: 
DN commissioned a ’professional evaluation’, which showed that 
the paper had been ’very successful.’ And we were happy with our cov-
erage.15 
He also happened to be one of the few to express a self-critical opin-
ion:  
We were slightly dissatisfied with our national edition on the first 
day. Although we’d had one and a half day to work on it, it was pretty 
unfinished and badly structured. And we felt that in relation to our 
readers in the afflicted West Sweden we were professionaly a bit dis-
satisfied.16 
However, the editor was more satisfied with the later editions, for 
which they had the time to make certain improvements. A situation like 
this, when an accident happens beyond Stockholm but is covered by 
the Stockholm press, constitutes an editorial problem. Since the edi-
tions to the most distant regions go to print first, there is a greater risk 
of errors and shortcomings in these early editions. The result is that the 
afflicted parties may get a flawed product and may, due to lack of time, 
also have to encounter unethical pictures. There were, for instance, 
non-blurred pictures of identifiable victims in some of the evening pa-
pers’ early editions, while the same pictures were blurred in the later 
editions. In Gothenburg, this slip had consequences because family 
members and survivors read the first Gothenburg edition. 
GP’s photo editor was very pleased when the evaluation question 
was reached in the interview and he referred it primarily to the extra 
edition issued on Saturday, day 2 [the fire took place on Friday night]: 
The most fantastic thing about this edition was that everything 
worked so smoothly. /.../ I think the whole edition is imbued with hu-
manity and consideration but also with clear information.17 
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A photographer at the same paper thought that GP was  ”unexpect-
edly restrained,” in a positive sense, and also wished to give highest 
marks to the overall coverage during a long period.   
A DN photographer was proud that the paper in his opinion dis-
played fewer pictures of crying persons than the competitors. Generally 
speaking, he was also satisfied with the coverage.  
It was very good. Very good. /.../ they had the right mix of jour-
nalist who came down from Stockholm… and Malmö. /.../ If DN excels 
at something, it’s when major things happen.18 
The freelance photographer at GT remarked that, considering the 
gravity of the tragic disaster, public reactions to the reports were very 
positive. He regarded this as a good evaluation of the newspaper’s cov-
erage of the fire.  
A more general issue was raised by a photographer and addressed 
to the newspaper’s management. It concerned the handling of the mul-
tiethnic aspect and the issue of the colleagues’ qualifications in this re-
gard.  
I think it’s embarrassing that the editors lack immigrant back-
grounds. It’s quite a problem for the paper really.19 
This lack of immigrant backgrounds or other multicultural expertise 
among staff applied to all the papers included in the study.  
 
Criticism of rival papers 
”We would never do that”  
It is easy to attack the rivals and difficult to praise them. A reporter did 
both. He thought that both his own evening paper and the rival covered 
the disaster well, and observed that the evening press is often criticised 
after accident and disaster reports.  In his view, it is often the TV chan-
nels that revel in unethical pictures: ”Yes, it would be a riot if we pub-
lished the pictures they roll on TV”.20 
DN’s local editor referred to how the talk could sound at the office:  
The next day we could watch and say: ’Goodness and boo for the 
pictures that the evening papers are running. We would never do 
that’.21 
He gave an example: 
We were pretty shocked by one of the evening papers /.../ which 
one day visited a whole family at their home. There were five to six 
people seated on a sofa in the picture, as they were told that a family 
 247 
 
member, a daughter and sister, had died in the fire. It’s a tremen-
dously moving picture but we felt strangely uncomfortable about it 
and agreed that if we’d had the chance we would not have done in that 
way.22 
A GP photographer said that he was surprised to see that ”TV re-
ported so intrusively”.  He further said that ”TV committed the gravest 
violations and I know that the cameramen regretted this too.”23 
 
Paying for others’ mistakes 
”We are judged collectively”  
In the case of the Gothenburg fire, there were neither frequent internal 
professional criticism, nor external criticism of photographers at work. 
Generally, the photographers were judged to have ”acquitted them-
selves well” on the site and in what ensued.24 There were, however, 
some exceptions. The youth aggression at Backaplan has already been 
mentioned and can also be explained as natural reactions. Some inter-
nal professional criticism was launched, for instance, from a photogra-
pher who observed the site and the bereaved: 
I saw many people who stepped straight into flowers and photos 
and other stuff. It seemed…  
INT: People, were they photographers?  
Yes, colleagues who just stepped over… I felt uncomfortable... alt-
hough I can say on the other hand that I think there was extra caution. 
At least among Gothenburg colleagues because I think the proximity 
was an added strain. /.../ At the funeral I said to a colleague… eh, I 
told him off rather… and asked him why he was so intrusive. He shot 
photos with flashlight straight into faces and moved flowers on the 
graveyard /.../ And he said that he knew most of them /.../. Well, it 
was despicable, I think. In the situation. He arranged the pictures and 
that is not news coverage. It goes without saying. But that I bawled 
him out in this situation… I suppose it was because I was sensitive and 
it would reflect badly on us. We [photographers] are judged collec-
tively, of course, in the aftermath of a disaster. People phone three 
months later and ask what really happened.25 
There was no extensive debate on the fire coverage in the national 
photographers’ membership magazine, The Viewfinder (Sökaren). 
However, an op-ed piece, written by a DN photographer was published, 
which displayed anger with the profession in regard to photographers’ 
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behaviour as well as with journalists’ attitude to their photographer 
colleagues, arguing that the profession contributed to increasing the 
public’s contempt for journalists and photographers. The piece is 
quoted here in its entirety: 
Concerning the disaster fire in Gothenburg 
 
The general opinion on the newspaper photos has been that they were balanced.  
Certainly, and possibly because the most indiscreet pictures were not published. At 
the risk of alienating many of my old friends, I must say: WHAT PAINED ME THE 
MOST WAS SEEING HOW SOME COLLEAGUES BEHAVED. 
Is it necessary to elbow your way to the edge of the grave to take close-up photos of 
people who are about to lower their son into the grave, to force your way before the 
bereaved, and when asked to leave, return after two minutes? This kind of behaviour 
gives press photographers such a frigging bad reputation that we are reluctant to say 
that we are press photographers.  
Commenting on the King’s arrival at the accident site in GP, Frida Boisen writes, 
‘There is a rustle in the riot fencing when a group of photographers fight for the best 
angle. One of them treads on a drawing, kicks an outdoor torch.’ Yes, this is how 
people see us, as an uncontrollable mob. DAMMIT. 
I call for a debate on this issue since progress has been made and we are no longer 
required to deliver ”shots of the corpse” to earn the epithet of good photographer. 
We owe this to many young, and not least female, photographers.26 
The op-ed in The Viewfinder (Sökaren) remained unanswered ex-
cept for one post. Under the vignette ”Message from the Chair” in the 
same magazine, the opinion is presented that the professional photo-
graphing at the Gothenburg fire site was, on the whole, performed well, 
although some reported violations are noted in connection with the fu-
nerals:  
At the fire site the press photographers showed the appropriate concern. People can, 
of course, rightly demand that we should ”save lives first and then shoot”, but this is 
easier said then done. Few press photographers have such skills.  At one of the fu-
nerals there were clear violations by some photographers. It is not necessary to use 
extreme wide angles and practically follow the coffin into the grave! It is a very deli-
cate situation, and it is instead immensely discrediting for those photographers in 
particular and the profession in general. 
Mistakes were made. BL has recounted how he sent out pictures he regretted, TW 
also described humbly and graphically in Studio 1 (national radio news magazine) 
that he failed to block a ‘clip’ so it was unfortunately broadcast once.  Once is too 
many! /.../ Remember to check properly with victims and family members before 
you submit to Picture of the Year!  
 
(Chair of the Press Photographers’ Club,  in  The Viewfinder/Sökaren 4/98) 
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The last line about the Picture of the Year is highly relevant. A re-
view of the winning photos in the competition (arranged by Press Pho-
tographers’ Club), shows that a striking number of winning photos over 
the years are of disasters and wars. The dramatic autumn of 1994, when 
the passenger ferry Estonia went down, generated extensive photo ar-
chives at the Swedish newspapers. The 1994 News Picture of the Year, 
features a woman salvaged from one of the life floats. She was dead. 
This was known at the time of the award. But when the photo was pub-
lished in Expressen on the day after the disaster, the headline read, 
”The Sea of Death and the Lifeline”, which suggested survival. The cap-
tion read, ”A woman is winched to the rescue helicopter after several 
hours in a water-filled raft, while the helicopter’s rescue swimmers try 
to save more survivors.”27 The photo covers the centrefold. Considering 
that it contained erroneous and offending information for next-of-kin 
and survivors, it should have been judged as a severe violation of pub-
licity rule no 7 in the press ethical code.28 This was also emphasised in 
the official government inquiry, which formed the final report of the 
analysis group for investigating the Estonia ferry disaster and its con-
sequences.29 The survivors in the same raft as the woman ”recognise 
her, know that she is dead, remember when she died.”30 The report also 
notes that photographers were allowed on board the helicopters to 
form an opinion of what had happened and what the rescue services 
did.  
Another occasion on which the news picture of the year involved a 
disaster was in 1998, that is, the Gothenburg fire. The winning picture 
was taken during the fire and rescue efforts. The caption reads: ”Tares 
Alyasiri fell on the stairs and injured his elbow. Yet, he assisted in pull-
ing 17 injured and dead young people out of the raging fire at Backaplan 
on 29 October.” The jury’s citation ran as follows: ”The picture captures 
the fire disaster at Hisingen in an attentive combination of tragedy, 
drama and heroism. The young man at the centre of the picture, Tares 
Alyasiri, has just saved 17 friends.”31 The text begs the question how the 
hero’s own statement can be verified. 
   Returning to the journalists’ views on their colleagues’ perfor-
mance, there are examples of how violations affected colleagues. Such 
an incident took place at Hammarkullen’s church, according to an edi-
tor, who claimed that photographers and reporters present all thought 
that it turned into an unpleasant situation:  
Apparently there were some evening paper members who gate-
crashed the worship intended for the bereaved /.../ and after that the 
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attitude to all journalists turned aggressive, regardless of their being 
present on this occasion or not.32 
Media coverage of minor accidents and crimes often results in sim-
ilar reactions to professional photographers, who are seen to have vio-
lated the principles of good press ethics and morality and may lead to 
a general reluctance to allow journalists access to an accident area. In 
connection with the fatal shooting of a school boy at Bromma high 
school in Stockholm in January 2001, journalists claimed that they 
were hindered in their professional performance. This led to a debate 
in the magazine The Journalist: 
 
I get furious reading that school management and the police threw out 
members of the media from the school. /.../ It cannot be tolerated that 
members of the public, public officials in municipalities and the police force, 
etc. can attack and turn away press photographers and reporters who are on 
duty in the service of the public.33 
 
The situation is paradoxical. While the journalists testify that col-
leagues from time to time commit different forms of violations in their 
professional practice, they are also appalled by not having access to ac-
cident sites. One regards himself as being ”in the service of the public” 
but hindered in his duties because others (colleagues) have sometimes 
misbehaved and given the profession an undeservedly bad reputation. 
Or can school managements have other good reasons sometimes to re-
ject the media turnout? This is not discussed in the text above.  Media’s 
lack of consideration must also be taken into account.  
 
Being rewarded for tragedy  
Several examples of how journalists’ efforts have been rewarded in con-
nection with war, disasters and accidents are available in media ”expe-
rience banks” as well as in research literature. Both the awards Picture 
of the Year and the Swedish Grand Prize for Journalism are often jour-
nalistic products related to calamities. On receiving the grand journal-
ism award in 1995, Staffan Heimersson said in a radio interview, ”The 
worst disasters and accidents often lead to the greatest journalistic 
triumphs.”34  
After the Gothenburg fire the GP photographer said that it was dif-
ficult to be congratulated on being the recipient of the Picture of the 
Year award:  
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It was really weird… I would gladly have taken someone else’s pic-
ture… about something else… which I wouldn’t have got a prize for.35 
The fact that a photo is a document with long survival in archives is 
often forgotten.  
Also after previous disasters and accidents, it turned out that the 
documentation of an event can have unexpected consequences. Un-
published pictures become important documents for other purposes, 
and the unethical aspect of photographing an identifiable dead person 
can impact considerably on next-of-kin and their grief process, as well 
as on police investigations. That certain pictures are not published in 
the media is one thing but they can assume other roles.36 
This photographer would consider taking pictures intended for 
long-term documentation even if they should be unsuitable for publi-
cation in direct connection to the event, for example, showing them in 
20-30 years.  
Yes, I’m a type of history portrayer. Such a picture can be evidence 
in a situation… Even if it is uncomfortable to take, it’s got be taken.37 
Who then is responsible for taking possible consequences of archiv-
ing into account – particularly the consequences of publishing old ”dis-
aster pictures” in the future, at least in a legal sense? At the same time 
the photographer felt responsible on another level: 
So it’s the moral sense then. Obviously you’ll have to shoulder that 
too. You carry that with you for the rest of your life! /.../ You can’t 
become a cynical photographer who doesn’t see… no, then you have 
to stop.38 
 
 
Preparedness and learning  
”You can’t prepare”  
After major media events a certain collegial learning takes place, as 
shown by previous disaster experiences. A tentative review of articles 
and public debates in the Swedish journalist union magazine The Jour-
nalist (Journalisten) shows that interest in professional collective 
learning seemed to be greater after the Gothenburg fire that after the 
Estonia ferry tragedy. The same tendency is reflected in the increased 
number of public debates and discussions on disaster journalism after 
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the Gothenburg fire. There may be several explanations. One sugges-
tion is that the media were present on the scene in Gothenburg but not 
on the Estonia ferry.  
The emotional affects on the journalists appear to have been greater 
after the Gothenburg coverage. This can have affected the aftermath of 
attention and self-evaluation that occurred in several issues of  The 
Journalist and at the Swedish Publicist Club and journalist union’s 
seminars. The idea of introducing crisis psychology in journalism stud-
ies was proposed on several occasions but was always rejected. An op-
ed piece in The Journalist sarcastically suggested that the next time the 
alert was sounded the way to go was to ”Lock up the reporter and send 
in a psychologist.”39 
What knowledge of previous events did the journalists sent to the 
Gothenburg fire have? And if they had learnt something from history, 
did this make them better equipped to deal with what happened in 
Gothenburg? And if it is at all possible to prepare for the reporting on 
disasters, to what extent was this done in this case? And will this expe-
rience predict how the reporter will react to a similar situation next 
time?  
How you’ll act when you get to the next disaster is impossible to 
say.  I have no idea about how I will act the next time. /.../ I’ve heard 
several examples of how experienced journalists have been assigned 
to a job but never returned, but were found at home. They couldn’t 
stand it and simply went home.40 
The difficulty of preparing for a disaster is linked to the unpredict-
ability of major accidents. Every situation is unique and the job mostly 
must relies on improvisation. As a photographer put it: 
You can’t prepare /.../ because, I mean, who knows what’s gonna 
happen next time jag...  a plane crashes… perhaps in a residential 
area.  There’s no way to prepare for that.41 
The same photographer also observed that there is a basic prepara-
tion that can be made regarding knowledge of information channels 
and organisational issues:  
What you can prepare is contact with the authorities, of course. 
And both parties learn from mistakes here. It is also important to 
quickly proceed to be the watchdog, and not be paralysed.42 
The issue of investigation and verification versus information in 
covering accidents and disasters is especially significant in studies of 
disaster journalism. A common conclusion is that the media primarily 
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have an obligation to inform in the early phase. This issue was accen-
tuated during the Gothenburg fire in connection with the rescue 
leader’s statement on the cause of the fire. The news was cabled out in 
several media, in some cases with a hint of racist hate crime. Later me-
dia representatives wondered if the statement should have been ques-
tioned and verified by the media. But the opportunity to verify are dif-
ficult – sometimes non-existent – considering that the ”machinery” 
starts and cannot be stopped. 
The fire event and its consequences led to several important conclu-
sions. Göteborgs-Posten, for instance, decided that the next time a ma-
jor disaster happened a reporter should be immediately assigned to en-
gage in investigative journalism on the fire and its causes parallel to the 
news coverage.  
An area in which the journalist profession and the media experi-
enced a lack of knowledge and expressed a will after the disaster to 
learn for the future concerned other cultures and religions. According 
to many, this was where the greatest mistakes were made along with 
ignorance about behavioural patterns and stress reactions. More 
knowledge of religious differences would have made the funeral report-
ing different, for instance. One photo editor claimed that this was defi-
nitely a lesson for the future:  
Yes, we have learnt that there are cultural clashes, that we see 
through the lens of our values and then there are other values based 
on other cultures.43 
He also thought that more things remain to be learnt, such as pho-
tographers needing to show more consideration in vulnerable situa-
tions: ”Some really intruded brutishly at a funeral”.44 
A further area of desired future learning, and in which professional 
development was provided in the workplace, was psychological 
knowledge and crisis management. In this area there were mixed expe-
riences, involving criticism of the managements in several cases. At Af-
tonbladet the mistake of not offering defusing at an early stage was 
taken seriously, according to a reporter, and a meeting was called a 
month after the fire to discuss how to rectify the mistake and how a 
structure for defusing could be designed. The reporter – local Gothen-
burg editor – thought the meeting was particularly important to the 
reporters stationed outside of Stockholm. The meeting served the func-
tion of support even though the aim was to learn and to evaluate:   
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Everyone who was at the scene was present. So it was very re-
warding. For the Stockholm people had already talked with one an-
other. But the Gothenburg staff had not been able to speak to so many, 
like. That’s why it was good.45 
Aftonbladet’s chief editor added that this was an area in which all 
media had learnt something and needed to learn more:   
I think so, yes... that when it comes to our own staff welfare efforts, 
we could improve crisis management more than we have done this 
time… follow-up after … and during.46 
In an acute situation there is seldom the opportunity to choose re-
porters and photographers to send on a job, even if this is possible later 
and above all for the coming days of reporting. 
At a morning meeting I wondered why so many young reporters 
were working. I think that in this situation experienced staff members 
should take their responsibility and at least notify the office that they 
are prepared to report on the event. /.../ I really wish that the man-
agement would learn to pick their senior reporters – it’s a manage-
ment issue.47 
When a disaster happens in the night, as in the case of the Gothen-
burg fire, there are few or no opportunities to choose who to send on 
the job, unlike daytime. A news editor elaborated on how his awareness 
after the fire would affect his choice of journalists the next time.  
I think that I would first of all engage all reporters available. Then 
possibly making an assessment… not of reporters’ skills… but of their 
psychological resilience in a stressful situation.48 
Another editor shared the thoughts that experience of such an event 
must be valuable but that the individual must be considered: ”The 
question is how much a person can endure… there are persons I would 
not send next time”.49 Aftonbladet’s chief editor said that ”obviously I 
choose people with experience of similar situations.” He also re-
counted that, before the reporting on the second day, consideration was 
given to determining which staff members had developed a good rela-
tionship with people in connection with the Estonia ferry disaster, and 
they were also chosen to cover the fire and its consequences.   
But to what extent can learning take place in this area?  Each situa-
tion is unique and circumstances are difficult.  Individuals and organi-
sations can learn but mistakes will always be made in extraordinary sit-
uations:  
It’s an extreme situation, reporters affected by events, a manage-
ment working under extreme time pressure /.../ Decisions having to 
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be made very quickly. You, know, we redid a whole paper in two 
hours. And a great number of people were involved. Of course some 
decisions will be wrong.  That’s a given. The thing is to minimise the 
erroneous decisions and trying to maintain a professional and hu-
mane principle in the work.50 
Some of the internal professional learning – or feedback – is in the 
form of internal and external debate. This was the case after the 
Gothenburg fire. Three days after the fire a traffic researcher from the 
city of Umeå in northern Sweden wrote an op-ed in DN headed, ”A low-
water mark for the press. The media coverage of the Gothenburg disas-
ter is unethical and intrusive”.51 ”Swedish media have learnt nothing 
from the Estonia ferry disaster. The reporting on the Gothenburg fire 
disaster shows that crisis journalism is still in a crisis,” he wrote.52 
But no other Swedish research or media and communication stud-
ies have validated the Umeå researcher’s claim that the coverage was 
inferior.53 There was a hint of criticism from the government investiga-
tor in the national inquiry,54 but this primarily pertained to the early 
TV media broadcasts. Several subsequent studies have later shown that 
media coverage of the Gothenburg fire was better in terms of press eth-
ics compared to previous disasters.   
The debate, as it were, was rather skewed because of the Umeå re-
searcher’s op-ed in DN... and it didn’t provoke a discussion… or there 
was no discussion… and he was the only one in all the media… and 
then there was no proper debate... And we didn’t think at all that his 
criticism of the media was true of the situation.55 
Aftonbladet’s chief editor, in other words, did not share the re-
searcher’s claim and nor did the GP’s photo editor.  
Discussions on journalistic ethics are ongoing internally, according 
to a photographer.  Such discussions do not arise in disasters only: ”We 
discuss – sometimes loudly – about our views of colleagues’ pic-
tures”.56 Continuous discussions are an important part of long-term 
learning.  
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Learning from history 
”A more low-profiled way than… before the Estonia ferry 
disaster” 
Swedish journalists think that they have learnt a lot about accident and 
disaster journalism in the ten-year period from the Måbödal coach ac-
cident, 1988, via the Estonia ferry disaster, 1994, to the Gothenburg 
fire, 1998. This is clear from professional debates and publications in 
The Journalist as well as the interviews in this study.  
I think that both newspaper editors and reporters have acquired 
more routines, in our case also more caution in handling these mat-
ters, probably because of Estonia. /.../ I think that most of them be-
haved in a more low-profiled way than what they would have done 
before Estonia (ferry disaster).57 
There were pictures in the first reports on Estonia that should not 
have been published, I think. /.../ I don’t think they would have done 
it now.58 
10-15 years ago, the Gothenburg fire would have been mass media 
disaster. But we learnt from the coach accident in Norway.59 
A photographer remembered that ”names were published quite 
quickly after the Estonia”60, which was not repeated in the case of the 
Gothenburg fire.  
Internationally, the situation is different. For example, the skii tun-
nel disaster in Kaprun, 2000, started a lasting press debate in Austria.61 
Swedish Radio Vienna correspondent, Kjell Albin Abrahamsson, wrote 
about the debate in the media paper Pressens Tidning. 
 
‘Sensation-driven journalists wanted to film charred bodies,’ was the head-
line of an article in the Austrian Der Standard.62 It is interesting that the 
press ethical debate started early, actually parallel to the news reporting. 
/.../ The coverage of the Kaprun disaster has triggered a press ethical debate 
carried out in all the papers and does not seem to abate. The tone is thought-
ful and balanced, there are no attacks or executions; rather pensive ponder-
ings on how death is handled and coped with. /.../ Perhaps there will never 
be a really good disaster journalism. But when there are thousands of victim 
relatives it is imperative to critically discuss the journalistic tools and ana-
lyse what is a violation of the private sphere.63 
 
There is a great deal more to learn, Abrahamsson thought, even if 
the wind has turned slightly regarding press ethics in recent years. Or 
is it our collective oblivion that presently earns disaster journalism 
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higher marks? Or an increased immunisation of media coverages of 
disasters?  
In many cases, the journalists in this study indicated that many pos-
itive changes have been made in the disaster genre. A negative change 
that a photographer mentioned was TV’s practice of broadcasting from 
accident sites. Broadcasts include, he thought, more and worse acci-
dent pictures today than some years ago.    
The annoying thing is that we still image photographers are such 
hooligans at times, or perceived as such.  That we take pictures we 
shouldn’t.  That people have opinions on it when they see a picture. 
And at the same time they watch TV. Not just one picture but a roll-
ing.64 
The photographer exemplified this with references to how TV in a 
flow of images portrayed the circumstances of Princess Diana’s death 
in UK: ”Then it’s suddenly acceptable to look at all these pictures. But 
if a still image photographer takes such a picture, then it’s unaccepta-
ble.” Does he think that still image photographers have portrayed re-
cent accidents and disasters in a better way?  
Yes, even photographers are more serious… there are always a 
number of misguided fools who are prepared to do anything for a 
good picture... but as a rule, it’s very serious now.  It really is. /.../ But 
I also think that TV is really chomping on the bones... /.../ People 
breaking down, parents of children burning to death. That’s not en-
joyable to be confronted with in a news programme when you’ve just 
learnt that your child has died in a fire.65 
What is learnt after a completed mission is seldom simply construc-
tive or destructive, but rather both and. One and the same reporter 
could say that ”I’m probably roughly the same journalist as I was be-
fore”, only to quickly add that she has probably learnt some lessons 
from the event. And in the next breath she said that ”you recognise 
your limitations now.” The latter may be for better and worse. The risk, 
according to theory, is the so called ”destructive learning” that the next 
time duty calls the reporter will start off with the feeling that ”I won’t 
manage this.”  
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Life experience 
”Even the news reporters are only human”  
The cornerstones of each journalist’s individual competencies are 
based on education and life and professional experiences. Most of the 
interviewed journalists stated that ”life experience” topped their lists 
on factors influencing their capacity to cope with the disaster, both in 
terms of the ability to do the job and the way in which it was performed, 
ethically and journalistically.  
I think life experience has enormous importance… for the ability to 
take in difficult things, and see the consequences of the ongoing course 
of events you’re in the middle of /.../ If I have met people in difficult 
situations before, and have been in them myself, combined with the 
journalistic craft.66 
The reporter further said that what a journalist writes and does in-
volves that person’s life experience. The angle of the report is imbued 
with the journalist’s own experience.  
I work in a unit where I’m the only woman for the most part. There 
are seven men between 45 and 50 /.../ It goes without saying that we 
angle our jobs very differently. I’ve worked as an after-school teacher, 
worked in health care, I raise children and have been through a di-
vorce. /.../ I’m not saying that anybody with some life experience 
could have done it. But we mustn’t forget how much it affects our 
work. Who we are.67 
Personal experiences of grief and loss of family members in various 
ways affect the photographer or reporter covering a disaster.   
Sure, I’ve been bereaved too. Even news reporters are human. 
When we work, we are rooted in ourselves in some way. We are the 
person we are all the time based on our experiences.68 
As earlier described, these views were shared by a photographer 
who had lost his son in an accident some years before the Gothenburg 
fire and was overwhelmed by emotions standing at Backaplan:  
One thing that was useful to me at the accident site and afterwards 
was that when this catches up with me – that something awful has 
happened – I can postpone this [in comparison with an episode hap-
pening some weeks after the son’s death]. When I lost my son and was 
hit by a ”downer” in a shop or something, I couldn’t sort of break down 
in the shop. I had to get a grip until I left it and was sitting in the car. 
That experience was really useful to have at the accident site. I could 
do the same:  Postpone it somehow.69 
 259 
 
The photographer speculated whether this reaction was the expla-
nation to why he took so many pictures of the accident, not least in 
comparison with his colleagues, although thinking that ”if you are a 
bloody good photographer, there should be no need to take 70 pic-
tures… I don’t know.” Above all, he thought that life experience and 
professional ethics were closely related.   
A reporter70 acknowledged the need of experience also on the part 
of the afflicted, thinking that it was better for afflicted young people to 
meet older – adults – journalist and photographers, as this was seen to 
facilitate contact.  
Several of the interviewees stated that life experience in different 
forms was an important basis for ethical conduct.  The angles of the 
reports were marked by the reporters’ own experience. There is a sig-
nificant difference between being ”new as a journalist but having a 
background of nursing and blood, misery and death [compared to 
thirty years of] talking to CEOs and never having seen a dead person,” 
as a news editor said. A colleague suggested that it is about having ”a 
deep resonating experience”, or as a colleague put it: ”If you can tell the 
dead from the living on the job, it helps”. 
 
Professional experience 
”A professional maturity”  
Several of the photographers covering the Gothenburg fire disaster 
were experienced accident and crime photographers. One photogra-
pher felt confident despite working alone because he personally knew 
policemen working on the scene: ”I’ve been in some gruesome situa-
tions with them earlier, which they have handled well /.../. So I didn’t 
feel all alone, as it were”.71 
Also many journalists covering the fire had experience of accident 
reporting. This was partly due to coincidence but when possible, expe-
rienced staffs were hand-picked. Most interviewees considered profes-
sional experience to be very important in this situation. 
It‘s very, very important, because personal and professional ma-
turity is required to handle this in the right way.72 
This was expressed by an editor, who also emphasised that younger 
less experienced reporters can certainly be put to work successfully but 
that the assignments need to be adapted. 
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Some journalists, but not all, though that previous professional ex-
perience of meeting people in a crisis situation can be of importance to 
reporters and photographer covering an accident like the fire.  
It’s crucial, I think. I mean, professional experience tells you how 
to act when you meet these people [the afflicted]. Even if you get pretty 
far with common sense and politeness (laughs).73 
A photographer thought that professional experience is essential 
when it comes to refraining from taking certain pictures: ”Then experi-
ence matters. I can afford not taking these pictures…”.74 The photog-
rapher worked for the morning paper DN. He also brought up the issue 
of, to what extent, the nature of the paper affected views on freedom 
and responsibility and if managing editors had pressured their photog-
raphers in different degrees to move closer and portray intrusively: ”If 
I had been at an evening paper, it might have been different. I don’t 
know”.75 
The DN photographer’s suggestion was supported by the study. The 
evening papers’ demands for single-copy sales and quantity in report-
ing certainly put pressure on staff to produce a great deal of person-
centred material quickly.  
Another photographer remarked that the degree of professional ex-
perience greatly affects the degree of professional ethics.  
I don’t need to play it safe by taking many pictures. I know when: 
‘I nailed it, now I don’t need to be here anymore and be in the way.’ If 
I was uncertain I would have shot more.76 
The value of the journalistic experience is hard to appreciate.  So 
many other things play a role, making it difficult to predict which part 
of the competence that an individual has access to at the time of the 
accident. A reporter wondered about the value of having professional 
ethics and experience-based routines in the bones for managing the sit-
uation. It is an advantage but not a requirement for managing the job 
successfully. 
The gist of many statements on life and professional experiences 
was that both can be a strength and a liability in one and the same per-
son, at the same time, which may have contributed to making the reac-
tions seem difficult to interpret and some times incomprehensible. 
I’ve been in similar horrid situations and of course experience is 
good to have. But it didn’t help me now. I don’t think I was a better 
journalist for the experience.77 
A photographer thought that previous professional experiences are 
of marginal importance:  
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I don’t think it is of any great importance… It depends on your lug-
gage. You may be a super photographer and still don’t cope mentally 
with the pressure.78 
With ”baggage” the photographer meant life experience. A colleague 
agreed: ”At the accident site being a professional made no difference. 
There was such panic”.79 
All competence and experience can evaporate in the face of an on-
going disaster. In this situation, experience and formal qualifications 
are not as important as expected.  
I mean, you can have professional experience, have worked as a 
photographer for 25 years but never been close to such stressful situ-
ations. /.../ I think it’s an advantage if you have been in situations of 
stress earlier.80 
A photographer claimed that professional experience is very im-
portant, even if the gain is more obvious the later the reporting is made 
in the course of the tragedy.   
Some colleagues questioned their professional role very early.  
Then I felt that it could be important to have experienced similar situ-
ations before and processed the questions of ‘what am I doing here’, 
so to speak.81 
A reporter thought that his five years as local paper journalist had 
been useful:  
Then you have seen quite a few more car accidents than you care 
for. /.../ So there is always a creeping sense of discomfort at some-
thing really, really horrible when you arrive.  /.../ And this feeling is 
coupled with the deadline in 45 minutes and two persons to interview 
and two texts to write before the minutes are up. So the focus is on the 
job in spite of all.82 
Professional experience affects professional ethics in a favourable 
direction, a photographer thought, and said that less experience may 
mean that ethics are superseded by news euphoria: ”A new photogra-
pher is always alert. Then you might do more than you need”.83 
Having professional experience from one of the areas involved in 
rescue operations would perhaps strengthen the journalistic compe-
tence, as a photographer suggested: ”If you used to be a fireman and 
knew how to handle such a situation.”84 
The perceptions were thus ambivalent regarding deciding what 
types of experiences that were seen as most valuable in managing a dif-
ficult journalistic assignment such as reporting on the Gothenburg fire. 
The same applied to the interviewees’ long-term attitudes to the fire.   
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The importance of formal qualifications 
Certain formal qualifications are required for doing a good job at an 
accident site as most reporters and photographers agreed on. But how 
this expertise is acquired varies. Until quite recently, Sweden did not 
offer academic studies for journalists. So formal higher education qual-
ifications cannot be a requirement in Sweden. For journalists it is more, 
but not only, a question of learning the basic professional skills and 
press ethics. But the value of such knowledge in relation to practice is 
difficult to assess. An editor in the study did not think that there was 
any difference in the importance of education in accident reporting and 
other journalistic work.   
No more in this context than in any other.  Generally, I think that 
it’s important that journalists have a good education because journal-
ism is not really about writing, but…  about a method for adopting an 
approach.  The method and approach can be acquired… of course 
through a long time in the profession – I know many self-taught jour-
nalists who are fantastic. But generally speaking I think /.../ you can 
develop the skills on the basis of a good education.85 
Having learnt journalism properly as a method was regarded as im-
portant. When the journalism programme was highly praised, some 
did so because of certain components, while others attributed the 
praise to the whole degree programme.  
I can’t say that I think I would have managed better on the fire site 
or other accidents sites if I had some more credits in sociology.86 
Predictably, the answer was a combination of theory and practice: 
”Sometimes we lack education. But we wouldn’t want to be without 
practice either.”87 
Education is not sufficient in a situation like the fire, said a photog-
rapher. Despite the interviewees’ requests for more training in crisis 
psychology and crisis management, many thought that formal qualifi-
cations were not crucial at the traumatically unexpected event of the 
Gothenburg fire.  One photographer remarked that many older writing 
and photographing journalists have made a career after elementary 
school via a local paper and have become very good journalists. 
The School of Journalism was virtually an unknown concept for 
me when I started at a small local paper in Karlshamn (city in the 
south east part of Sweden). I don’t even think that Jolo or Bang [influ-
ential former journalists] ever went to a journalism college. But they 
were upper secondary school graduates, I suppose /.../ But many 
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great journalists have zero training in journalism. So it’s not only the 
photographers. But nowadays most photographers-to-be go to a pho-
tography school.88 
 
Professional development needs 
”A life-saving course up the sleeve”  
The educational competence that many of the journalists had felt that 
they lacked was surprisingly often in a very different area from journal-
ism. Many mentioned psychological reactions and medical first aid. ”I 
wish I had a life-saving course up my sleeve”.89 Several also expressed 
a need for psychology with a focus on crisis journalism: ”We probably 
had a two-week course in crisis journalism [higher education journal-
ism]”.90 
All photographers in the study lacked academic training in press 
photography. In a questionnaire aimed at some Swedish press photog-
raphers in the magazine The Viewfinder (Sökaren),91 requests were 
made for Swedish higher education studies in press photography with 
the same basic subject knowledge as for the writing journalists. There 
were also requests for further training in photo journalism, press ethics 
and law. Partly, these requests are met today through the national 
courses offered to journalists.   
Present press photographers have had Folk High School as a gate-
way, but one photographer still insisted, ”without any doubts”, on the 
need of higher education for Swedish photographers. 
Yes, I think it goes without saying that if you are entering the press 
photography profession these days, you need a journalist education 
too. They go hand in hand. Denmark has the combination, for in-
stance. Norway also, I think. Only Sweden lacks the combination in 
higher education.92 
Since the interviews took place, Sweden now has a university jour-
nalist programme for press photographers/photo journalists,93 as the 
result of the national evaluation of journalism in higher education 
(Högskoleverkets rapportserie 2000), for instance. The photographer 
above was supported by the paper’s chief photo editor, who said that 
reporter and photographer were basically the same profession: ”It’s all 
about writing journalists or photographing journalists. Only the 
work tool differs.”94 
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Bonding with survivors  
”It took me two months to find her”  
Brief encounters at an accident site can sometimes lead to life-long re-
lationships. Quite often journalists and survivors, or only one of them, 
try to get in touch after the disaster. When a journalist tries to make 
contact, this can be complicated: Is confidence shared with the journal-
ist in his/her capacity as a private person or a professional?  
A photographer recounted how a photo he took at the accident led 
him to a girl who survived the fire – she was the last one to be saved.  
It’s her, NN [names the girl], who I took a good close-up of when 
they carry her out of the building... And it took me two months to find 
her. I was told that she was alive and I went to see her. And we were 
introduced. 
INT: So, she got to see the photo then?  
Yeah. And she wanted to find the coloured man that carried her 
out. It took another month to find him. And then I was strangely 
proud. I found him in Malmö [the coloured man was one of the party-
goers. The photographer brought the girl and her ‘saviour’ to-
gether].95 
The photographer further described the meetings he arranged or 
’exposed’ the girl to, although with good intentions. The meetings with 
the man who saved her were, according to the photographer, ”calm, re-
laxed, happy and despondent, you could say.” But her seeing the photo 
of herself was very difficult:   
Yes, what can I say? Break-down. She had a break-down, quite 
simply. 
INT: Was it right or wrong to show her the picture? 
Maybe too early. But she insisted that she wanted to see it. I had 
said that I had a picture. I had said that it was bloody terrible and 
everything like that. But she insisted.  [The girl’s mother was present 
when the photo was shown and had consented]. It was shown at the 
fire station in Gothenburg with emergency care staff present. It was 
the staff that had carried her out and they had seen the photo on a 
previous occasion].96 
Another photographer described how a picture he had taken in the 
night came to assume great significance to the deceased girl’s family. 
Although he tried to take photos in which the persons could not be 
identified, this turned out to be impossible.   
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Later a family phoned, recognising their daughter in a picture [in 
the newspaper]. I thought they were going to kill me but they were 
eternally grateful that there were pictures… from the scene. I’ve even 
heard from friends who’ve met the family that they call me ‘best friend’ 
or something like that, and that they are very grateful.97 
The photographer also described how the girl’s family – or rather 
relatives – contacted him through the office to see more pictures she 
might be in.  
In the picture, their daughter is lying to the left of a boy they were 
trying to resuscitate. I had two frames where she is on the side. She 
wasn’t the main object, as it were.  Her arm covers her face. You could 
only see her feet then /.../ And they wanted to know when the photo 
was taken to establish the time of death. Because they didn’t know if 
she died on the 29th or the 30th. The photo was taken after midnight 
and it helped them a great deal to know when she died and so on.98 
Aftonbladet’s reporter said that he had been in contact with some 
of the next-of-kin after the fire. And in everyday situations she met 
other afflicted persons again and again in the street or in the corner 
shop. She also described an example from another accident in Gothen-
burg, namely a severe tram accident in 1992. A colleague of hers trav-
elled from Stockholm to Gothenburg to cover the accident. The col-
league made an interview that came to mean a great deal for the af-
flicted family. 
He had talked to a woman whose son died there, and it was such a 
terrible tragedy. He was given permission to write it because he had 
spoken with her. Then he kept in touch with her so much and so long 
that he was especially mentioned in the obituary. In my view, this is a 
good journalist who was willing to be involved so that people instead 
of being exploited were happy that he was there and wrote articles.99 
The Aftonbladet reporter thought that it was important to keep in 
touch with people after a situation like this: ”you can’t just abandon 
people, can you?” She also told the story to exemplify how a journalist’s 
proximity to the event and the accident site affects the reporting.  The 
personal involvement – and sensitivity – increases if the reporter or 
photographer is present in a place, she thought.  
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Self-evaluation and learning: conclusions 
The degree of professional focus on the accident scene varied from an 
experience of total clarity to inability to act. However, most of the re-
porters and photographers were satisfied with their journalistic work 
performance. ”Couldn’t have done it any better”, ”excellent technical 
quality” were some self-evaluative comments. A photographer was 
happy that that he had refrained from taking too many pictures. The 
sense of professional pride was shared by many, as well as the relief of 
having avoided ethical violations.  
A few self-critical negative comments were made, for example, by a 
reporter who thought that the text was less stylistically satisfactory, 
even though the content was acceptable.  
Concerning the evaluation of the newspaper’s reporting, all inter-
viewees displayed a high degree of loyalty to their own paper. One re-
porter was touched by the papers’ extra edition, and found it respectful 
and informative. Another person said that ”everything ran smoothly” 
and that ”our paper is the best when something big happens”. 
Several interviewees mentioned the importance of a well-oiled ma-
chinery and a good organisation. Many also emphasised the need of a 
generous attitude in conversations and internal critical discussions. 
Most interviewees made comparisons with their rival newspaper 
and rated their own paper relatively speaking a bit higher: ”We had 
fewer photos of people crying than our rivals,” as someone put it. Crit-
icism was also launched against colleagues for overstepping the mark, 
which was seen to reflect badly on the whole profession, whereas sev-
eral thought that the ultimate mark of a good job is the readers’ reac-
tions to the reporting.  
There were some cases of criticism of their own paper. Flawed re-
gional edition and too much focus on the children’s ”status as immi-
grants” were two objections. A general flaw of all the papers studied 
was the lack of reporters and photographers with immigrant back-
grounds or foreign roots. This type of multi-ethnic event requires news-
papers to have a wider cultural and ethnic competence.  
The journalists’ self-evaluation can be linked to their views on the 
journalistic mission. Disaster reporting often involves doing good – 
ethics of action.  Balanced and accurate reporting was the goal for 
many. The guiding principle seemed to be that the afflicted should suf-
fer no further harm from the reporting. A paradox in this context was 
the fact that photographers as well as reporters often received awards 
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for disaster reporting. There are mixed feelings in receiving an award 
for disaster pictures.  
When journalists reviewed their own professional efforts in connec-
tion with the fire, a prominent theme was the conflict between the pro-
fessional and private roles. Many were torn between the demands for 
journalistic performance and their human desire to help.  
It is noteworthy that some accounts reveal how strong bonds and 
relationships could be built between journalists and survivors.  Such 
bonding often occurs after traumatic events covered by the media. This 
is a very complicated and vulnerable relationship that must be handled 
with care, not least because the journalist is both a private and a pro-
fessional person, that is, having two roles that can be difficult for the 
afflicted person to distinguish between. The journalists must be very 
clear about in which role they are maintaining contact and if infor-
mation disclosed in conversations can be used for professional pur-
poses.  
What did the journalists learn from covering the Gothenburg fire? 
Among other things they learnt that knowledge and experience are es-
sential parameters for performing well on the job, but also that it is very 
difficult to prepare for and feeling prepared for a disaster assignment 
irrespective of the level of knowledge and experience. Every situation 
is unique and decisions must be made under great time pressure in an 
extremely exposed and vulnerable situation. Certain errors and mis-
takes will inevitably be made in such circumstances, regardless of 
knowledge and experiences. Preparation partly involves minimising 
the erroneous decisions, and this can sometimes be achieved through 
the learning processes subsequent to different assignments.  
Generally, most journalists agreed that they personally and collec-
tively had learnt a great deal from previous disasters. The coach acci-
dent in Måbödalen, Norway, in 1988 was mentioned, as well as the Es-
tonia ferry disaster in 1994. In the ten years between 1988 and 1998 the 
internal professional debate on press ethics increased, and several 
seminars were arranged on media coverage of accidents and disasters.  
  Individual learning of reporting on a disaster can have both con-
structive and destructive effects. Some felt that it was an advantage to 
have had similar experiences; others were overwhelmed by old memo-
ries, which might have contributed to a feeling of powerlessness.   
It is in principle impossible to predict how a particular individual 
will react to a certain traumatic event, such as the Gothenburg fire, 
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which makes it difficult to pick staff for the job, if it is at all practically 
possible to do so.   
Learning also includes experiences of the type of competencies that 
seemed to be of most importance for the ability to perform well. On the 
whole, the journalists rated life experience higher than both profes-
sional experience and formal education. Professional experience was 
also highly valued, but not necessarily of similar events, but rather 
when based on professional confidence and automatic ethical (re-)ac-
tion. The need of education to manage was rated the lowest. However, 
many comments on the need for academic programmes in photo jour-
nalism and short courses in disaster journalism and first aid were 
made, along with the view that young and inexperienced staff should 
not be sent on disaster reporting assignments.  
As mentioned, life experience was rated higher than education and 
professional experience. The importance of professional experience to 
the ability to manage a disaster assignment was, according to many, 
marginal. The journalists generally thought that life experience was 
more important. In terms of formal education, they would have liked 
to have had courses in disaster journalism, crisis psychology and med-
ical first aid.  Most of the interviewees doubted that long professional 
experience guaranteed the ability to manage a disaster situation but 
someone suggested that previous experience as a nurse or fireman 
might be useful. Those who emphasised the value of professional expe-
rience for the ability to manage a disaster assignment were thinking in 
terms of similar accidents rather than general professional experience. 
Journalistic professionality, however, was deemed to be of great im-
portance.  
Personally knowing the rescue and emergency personnel working 
on the scene was comforting, according to a photographer. Personal 
knowledge is commonly developed between reporters and photogra-
phers that often cover accidents and local rescue staff members.  
Several interviewees thought that professional experience – partic-
ularly assignments in connection with accidents and disasters – lead to 
professional maturity and experience of dealing with people in a crisis. 
It may also mean courage to refrain from photos and interviews that in 
all probability and experience will not be published.  
Someone suggested that professional experience from a human-
centred area other than journalism would be an asset in the context, 
and reporters and photographers alike did not think that long profes-
sional experience guaranteed ability to act and perform professionally 
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at an accident site. The lack of crisis experience might play a role here, 
or the opposite, i.e. that a lived trauma might be ”triggered” on the 
scene causing an inability to act professionally. 
Life experience was considered to be the most important form of 
competence for disaster reporting and many thought that a combina-
tion of difficult life experience and professional practice was a good 
foundation for disaster reporters and photographers.  
Having suffered loss and grief can improve the ability to see connec-
tions and consequences more clearly. A reporter suggested that report-
ing angles to a great extent were marked by lived experiences. On the 
other hand, such factors could increase individual vulnerability and im-
pede the work performance. Another view was that journalists’ life ex-
periences and their interpretations of professional ethics are intimately 
connected.  
Formal qualifications were seen as the least valued competence fac-
tor. It was suggested that journalism studies have importance because 
”journalism is not really about writing,” but is ”an approach”. Others 
thought that many self-taught journalists without formal qualifications 
demonstrate that professional excellence does not rely on formal edu-
cation. This also applies to photographers, who until recently have 
lacked higher education opportunities in their field, but now it is of-
fered as requested by several of the interviewed photographing jour-
nalists in this study.  
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 THE JOURNALIST AS EYEWITNESS 
 
 
 
 
 
In this study, journalists’ experiences of covering a disaster (for in-
stance, regarding reaction and performance) have been related to 
three factors: the private person – the journalist as an individual, the 
profession – the journalistic mission and role, and the situation – the 
traumatic event. In addition, a further dimension of the mission, 
namely reflection has also been discussed. In the following, a summary 
of the main conclusions in relation to the theoretical analysis model is 
presented.   
 
 
Situation 
The nature of the event is of the greatest importance for how reporters 
and photographers react to a traumatic assignment. The challenges in-
volve degree of controllability, stressors on the site, and conflicts with 
other actors. How did the journalists handle these challenges and how 
did they perceive the accident site as a workplace?  
 
Witnessing 
The fact that several reporters and photographers were present on the 
scene and witnessed the disaster meant that the situation had great ef-
fects on many of them, personally, professionally and in terms of po-
tentially traumatic reactions. Unbearable scenes were played out be-
fore their eyes.  Many aggravating factors were reported: the fire 
seemed impossible to extinguish, an unknown number of people were 
victims, the fire raged in a building with apparent evacuation obstacles, 
the victims were children and young adults, it happened in the middle 
of the night, the whole situation was confused and uncertain, and in 
retrospect, it turned out to involve a great number of fatal and injured 
victims. A large area was filled with crying and screaming youngsters, 
some jumping out of windows, or trying to save one another, or in some 
tragic cases returning into the smoke. The journalists, who had come 
to the site with another mission than saving lives, saw all of this. The 
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thesis title, ”The Eye of the Disaster,” grew out of the fact that the jour-
nalists were the professional eyewitnesses of the disaster, in the midst 
of disaster. In a traumatic field of chaos, life can come to a standstill, as 
in the eye of a storm, and when everything for a moment seems as un-
real and fictitious as in a film, powerless inactivity as well as hyperac-
tivity can affect the journalists.  
 
Unpreparedness 
The first journalists to arrive were totally unprepared. No one knew 
anything about the extent of the event. Many had simply responded to 
a fire alert. Perhaps one of the many fires without any harm to any per-
sons? Or maybe something bigger? Children or adults? Many or few? 
No one knew. The state of unpreparedness among the journalists also 
included the fact that the accident occurred in the night, which re-
stricted the chance to choose to go or choose to abstain.  In addition, 
few editors were on duty, which meant an absence of job instructions. 
In most cases it was the reporters and photographers who phoned to 
inform their bosses.  
 
Uncontrollability 
As the picture of the event became clearer, the journalists’ frustration 
that no one, let alone they, could control events also increased. The 
chance to rescue people seemed slim, and the consequences unforesee-
able. Witnessing such a course of events aroused strong feelings among 
the journalists. When feelings of uncontrollability are combined with 
individual vulnerability, hunger and lack of sleep, ill health etc., the sit-
uation can logically get increasingly harder to cope with.    
 
Stressors 
The  stressors that the journalists’ mentioned are on most counts iden-
tical  with  the stressors  that earlier have been identified in responders.1  
These included uncertainty on their way to the accident site and on ar-
riving, the strong sensual impressions, the sight of and contacts with the 
deceased and the injured, the development of the disaster, the continu-
ance and intensity of the fire, the experience of danger and the role con-
flicts between the personal and the professional – fellow human being 
and journalist identities. Other stressors that were highlighted in this 
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case were experiences of guilt and shame. These stressors can be de-
scribed as both functional and dysfunctional during the reporting. It 
was functional by making both reporters and photographers take a step 
back and exercise restraint in a way that surprised themselves, and dys-
functional because guilt and shame tended to increase their stress re-
actions and to aggravate their handling of the situation. In addition, the 
feelings of guilt and shame resulted in possibly exaggerated restraint 
and inactivity, which could be excused morally but not professionally. 
 
Interaction and confrontations  
For most of them, the journalistic task at the site was a very lonely busi-
ness. Few but respectful contacts were made with members of the res-
cue staff and a few verbal contacts with journalists from other media. 
But many experienced a kind of silent collegial support in the presence 
of colleagues, which was comforting in the situation. Relatively few 
contacts were made with the afflicted. If this happened, it was in the 
form of brief exchanges rather than interviews. Still, there were some 
confrontations between young people and journalists because the for-
mer failed to understand how someone could write and photograph 
while their friends were dying. The journalists found the confronta-
tions hard to handle at the time, although they noted in retrospect that 
the young people’s reactions were completely understandable and nor-
mal. Both reporters and photographers realised that their presence on 
the scene was provocative. Photographers, who could not easily hide 
their cameras, in particular were pained by the confrontations and re-
actions.   
 
 
Profession 
Reporters and photographers may in different degrees be psychologi-
cally affected by witnessing a continuous traumatic situation and re-
porting directly from an accident site or a disaster area. At the same 
time, they have to manage their journalistic task, their professional role 
and ethical rules. How did the journalists in Gothenburg experienced 
that their work situation and their professional task were affected by 
their own reactions? How did the journalists describe the conflicting 
roles of the private and professional person?  
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Duty to public interest 
The fact that a disaster theoretically is a textbook example of ”good 
news” obviously affects the journalists’ incentive to report. The criteria 
of both a disaster and an event with how news value involve a sudden 
and unexpected event of public interest, affecting many people with a 
high degree of identification and uncertain outcome. Ironically, this 
makes a disaster ideal news. Naturally, the journalists’ professional 
motivation was triggered and the adrenaline rose when the alert was 
given about a fire at Backaplan. There would be a public wish to read 
about the event the next morning. Media are obligated to report on the 
unbearable, and this sets the editorial machinery in motion and fills 
individuals with an impulse to report. A photographer phoned the of-
fice saying, ”send all the reporters you have.” A manifestation of both 
news valuation and the duty to inform was the GP’s historic decision to 
quickly issue an edition on a normally non-edition day (All Saint’s 
Day). 
 
Journalist role 
The professional role was, beyond doubt, tested on the journalists’ ar-
rival at Backaplan. ”I was a bad journalist then”, said a reporter, who 
thought that the reflex professionality vanished at the time.  Others ex-
perienced an increased professional focus and could see the ”poster 
headline in their minds” immediately on arrival. Some were surprised 
at their presence of mind, but this is one of many coping strategies in 
very stressful situations, and it was applied by the majority of the re-
porters and photographers. An editor also said that he had a vision of 
the edited paper early in his mind. While many spoke in terms of ”pro-
fessional filter”, ”reflex ethics” and ”editorial machinery”, there were 
also suggestions that the journalist role in extreme situations is not 
clear-cut. A basic explanation can be that journalists’ qualifications 
generally vary a great deal as do the attitudes to the professional codes 
in the press corps and media companies. Possible causes are unclear 
professional ideals and norms, along with different financial conditions 
for the morning and evening press, for instance, which can easily ‘rock 
the professional boat’ in a critical situation such as the Gothenburg fire. 
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Approaches 
Most of the journalists worked alone without colleagues from the same 
paper at the accident site during the first hours of the tragedy. There 
were, however, two reporters from the same paper who quickly decided 
on a distribution of roles, ”a straight news reporter and an observer”. 
Because of the time pressure, a form of reporting, reminiscent of radio 
journalism, was adopted by one evening paper especially. Reports were 
delivered by phone and mixed with interviews from the office and facts 
gathering from other media. The result was multipage articles with a 
byline of many names.  
Job instructions were seldom possible to give in connection with the 
call out since most reporters and photographers went to the site on 
their own initiative in the night. Instruction-giving was reversed to 
start with: from the field to the management. Somewhat later, when 
the editorial managements were formed to organise the reporting, 
there were, according to statements, orders issued to the concerned not 
to go too near the afflicted. A commended model was a newspaper’s 
decision to send a local editor from Stockholm to Gothenburg to lead 
the work. This was highly appreciated by the newspaper staff who felt 
comfortable in the local leadership. The interaction between editors 
and field workers was not conflict free. It showed how difficult it can be 
for an editor in Stockholm to understand what their colleagues at 
Backaplan, Gothenburg, were exposed to and their reactions. Most, 
however, perceived the editors to be sensitive as well as determined. 
 
Press ethics 
Concerning professional and press ethical codes, two codes were pre-
dominant in thoughts, considerations and discussions, namely: ”Al-
ways show the victims of crime and accidents as much consideration as 
possible” and ”be careful with photos.” The journalists at Backaplan felt 
that they were as considerate as possible. A news editor in chief, how-
ever, wondered whether too much consideration might be given in 
these situations, thus affecting the communication of information. If 
this happens, he thought, ”the history of Sweden will never be written.” 
Adequate consideration in terms of photos involves capturing the right 
moment in as few attempts as possible. A photographer remarked that 
he could not take pictures on a chance, thus risking disturbing and pro-
voking the young people. Instead he tested different camera settings 
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discretely to reduce the number of shots. One of the most difficult con-
siderations was judging the condition of the young people. Were they 
injured or dead? The risk of sending a photo to the paper with the cap-
tion that an injured girl was being carried out when she was in fact dead 
was apparent. And such mistakes were made. Severe stress, time pres-
sure and a certain degree of ignorance are possible explanations. Tak-
ing photos without revealing identities was also a very difficult task, 
bordering on impossible. But several photographers succeeded in do-
ing that. When they failed to get photos with faces turned away and so 
on the photos were pixalated or masked (in some cases only in the later 
issues).  
One photographer thought that a good news picture was a press eth-
ical borderline case. Another suggested that, considering the condi-
tions for work on the accident site, it is a miracle that it went so well.  
A clear change in the press ethical approach was noticeable in re-
gard to the coverage of manifestations of grief and commemorative 
events. Less time pressure, less stress and journalistic conditions less 
deviant from the normal as the work situation on the accident site was 
are possible reasons. At this point the ”ethics turned” and became less 
intrusive, more respectful and, in the terms of the Swedish visual art 
professor Gert Z Nordström, more lyrical.2 
 
Judgement and decision  
Reporters and photographers on the scene were faced with several dif-
ficult choices. The situation was not only difficult to assess but required 
professional decisions. Hiding or revealing the professional role? In-
terviewing or witnessing? Approaching or staying away? Helping or re-
porting? The role conflict between being a fellow human and a journal-
ist was difficult to handle and is further discussed in later sections. 
Among the editors, the conflict centred on how cautious the photo 
journalism should be, to what extent the multi-ethnic character of the 
event should be highlighted, diction be weighed and speculations 
made, etc. The important decisions also included what was not done, in 
the sense of refraining from mentioning or from photographing. One 
photographer felt like saying ”sorry” every time he took a photo.  
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The private person 
Reporters and photographers are people of flesh and blood, individuals 
with personality traits, vulnerability, life experience, stress susceptibil-
ity, resilience  and coping capacity. How do personal qualities affect the 
way journalists perform and react as private persons in a professional 
role when covering a disaster? How did the journalists react on the site 
in term of cognitive, emotional and behavioural reactions and coping 
strategies. 
 
Personality and vulnerability  
There is a collegial view of journalists as ”supermen” with an armour of 
steel against all kinds of strain, an unreasonable view built on myths 
and stereotypes. But if superman/woman refers to the ability to cope 
with stress, fend off crisis reactions and focus on the mission, then 
there were many ‘superpeople’ at Backaplan. On the other hand, few 
are supermen in the sense of going through the experience unscathed. 
This is where the greatest misconstruction occurs – that the protective 
mechanisms or professional filter on the job turns journalists into in-
vulnerable people. Several journalists gave examples of vulnerability 
factors of importance at Backaplan, for instance, the previous loss of a 
child or other family member and previous encounters with with sud-
den death or fire.  
 
Life experience and identification  
There is no guarantee that long journalistic experience is a safeguard 
against a situation such as Gothenburg fire. A reporter said that many 
years of experience as a nurse would have been a greater support in 
coping with the situation than long journalistic experience. Having en-
countered sudden death, severe injuries and human suffering before 
may have helped in the situation. Also other traumatic experiences in-
volving being in contact emotions and reaction patterns can have been 
useful for some, but for others the effect was the opposite: Backaplan 
opened old wounds and resurrected old memories. For a photographer 
the job meant reliving memories of the death of a son in a traffic acci-
dent. Relating to an accident in this way can be very painful. The 
daughter of a photographer had wanted to go to the fateful party but he 
had stopped his daughter’s attendance and he was relieved. But at the 
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same time the knowledge of her friends’ fate was extremely strainful 
mentally.  
 
Reaction 
Journalists who witness a disaster are indirectly affected by the event. 
This is how rescue personnel, saving, evacuating and taking care of vic-
tims, has been viewed for a long time. Journalists who have witnessed 
and covered a disaster should also fall into this category.  Journalists 
working during the night at Backaplan in principle displayed the whole 
spectrum of stress and crisis reactions that disaster psychology studies 
of responders have shown.3 In addition to the many reactions dis-
played, the journalists experienced strong feelings of guilt and shame. 
Compared to the responders, journalists are generally less prepared to 
encounter a disaster. They lack knowledge about what they lack – more 
than training opportunities. They lack clear job descriptions for disas-
ter assignments and besides, reporters and photographers, as men-
tioned,  have the more emotionally challenging and provocative task of 
”only” witnessing and portraying the event, not to save lives, put out 
fires or help people in need.  Such variables are important to under-
stand why journalists display the same crisis reactions as rescue per-
sonnel and other responders. 
 
Coping strategies 
If the journalists covering the Gothenburg fire were placed in Yerke’s 
and Dobson’s stress reaction curve,4 this would add insights into the 
descriptions they provided about their reactions at different points in 
time. On their way to the accident site, their adrenaline rose and the 
professional instinct tuned in to reporting. The performance potential 
is probably at its best when journalists are still ”protected” by their cop-
ing strategies, when they have their professional filter intact and are 
extremely focussed. Stress reactions can increase to a certain point and 
then ”tip over” when stress reactions become too intense, and maybe 
keep intensifying while performance is deteriorating. This can, for ex-
ample, be induced by a trigger that eliminates the professional filter 
and releases reactions. The reactions can lead to incapacity, or possibly 
hyperactivity that does not lead to good professional performance. This 
was perhaps the point at which a reporter was when she said ”I was a 
bad journalist then and should have gone home really”. Perhaps it was 
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the reporter who went shaky and ”started to pump blood” or someone 
else who ”broke down”. Who ”tips over” is most often hard to predict. 
It could involve anything from individual vulnerability to ”having a bad 
day”, because of lack of food or sleep. Also the sense of coherence is an 
important factor,5 but obviously difficult to access in a time of chaotic 
and unimaginable event as the Gothenburg fire.  
In Gothenburg there were examples of both problem focused and 
emotion focused coping strategies among the journalists. There are 
desriptions of a number of coping strategies in rescue workers and it is 
striking how many of these apply to journalists.6  
Mental preparation: Their thoughts on their way to the accident 
site. 
Derealisation: Was described by all journalist in principle.  
Suppression of emotions: The attitude that ”you mustn’t break 
down”. 
Distancing and dehumanisation: Choosing to think of headlines in-
stead of what was happening.  
Humour: Some attempts at humour were tried but were perceived 
to be less successful.   
Regulation of exposure: Many tried to hide themselves and their at-
tributes for reasons of both consideration and self-preservation. 
Activity to restrict reflexion: Only one photographer mentioned hy-
peractivity as a coping mechanism but many kept busy helping out and 
talking to the survivors.  
Sense of purpose: They tried to find meaning but found none… 
Self-reassuring comments: ”I have to fix this” 
Contact with others and social support:  Stated to be very im-
portant. 
For most of the photographers and reporters the coping strategies 
were functional, that is, they helped them to complete their assign-
ment.  
 
Reflection 
On completion of an assignment a phase of reflection, recovery and 
self-evaluation ensues. How did the reporters and photographers de-
scribe their need of defusing sessions and debriefing and how was this 
provided and handled? An important part of individual processing and 
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collegial learning is performance appraisal. How did the journalists as-
sess their own and their colleagues’ performance in covering the fire 
and how did they describe the internal and external learning generated 
by the process and feedback? Did they have any thoughts on how the 
media coverage would affect future reporting? 
 
Processing and recuperation 
The Gothenburg fire marked the starting-point for many media com-
panies to provide debriefing or other organised crisis management in 
the workplace, although to varied extent and success. Generally, the 
preparedness for providing help to employees was low. Several mis-
takes were made, according to the interviewees, and the freelancers 
were forgotten, but there were also good examples. The informal chats 
afterwards were said to give the greatest benefits. On their own initia-
tives, both reporters and photographers engaged in such interaction, 
for instance, with the family priest, or with members of the police and 
rescue services on duty at the site. A photographer said, ”the police 
were my crisis group.” Family and friends were also indispensable con-
versation partners. In some cases, other people’s approaches and in-
quisitive questions were experience as a strain. Their experiences of the 
importance of informal social support have been verified by recent re-
search on psychological first aid.7 
 
Self-evaluations 
Generally, the journalists thought that they had done their job surpris-
ingly well, considering the circumstances, thanks to functional reac-
tions to the event, a professional approach to the situation, and a cer-
tain instinctive ethical compass.  They were pleased with their own per-
formance (”I couldn’t have done any better”) as well as proud of their 
paper. Most of them seemed to have a realistic and rational view of how 
well the job could be done under the circumstances, but they also had 
objections to transgressions made by colleagues from rival media (”we 
would never have done that”). In the ensuing debate it was clear that 
they resented the fact that a whole profession had to ”pay” for individ-
ual colleagues’ press ethical mistakes.  
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Learning 
Even if many concluded that it is impossible to prepare for a disaster such 
as the Gothenburg fire,  most of the journalists agreed that there is every 
reason to learn from the disaster, for example, better employer prepar-
edness for crisis management after traumatic assignments. A photog-
rapher thought that too many inexperienced reporters had been in-
volved, the wisdom of which needed to be considered next time. An ed-
itor learnt to take psychological vulnerability into account when send-
ing journalists to cover a disaster and not only professional skills. Les-
sons learnt also indicated the need of further training in disaster jour-
nalism with training in stress and stress management as well as medi-
cal first aid provision.  
 
 
Issues generated by the study  
The result poses three more general issues related to the press coverage 
of major accidents and disasters. 
1. What role conflicts arise on the accident/disaster site?  
2. What different journalistic roles emerge? 
3. What qualifications are required for reporters and photogra-
phers?  
 
Role conflicts 
The conflict between the professional and the private person (journal-
ist vs fellow human being) was a pervading theme in the interviews as 
many felt torn between the roles.   
Roles are an expression of norms. A professional role is often gov-
erned by multiple norm requirements and different relationships. Ek-
man’s study of community policemen, for instance, shows how one 
norm must be given priority over others in a given situation.8 Role con-
flicts and dilemmas must be weighed against one another by the indi-
vidual policeman, who can choose to focus on one task or a norm at a 
time. 
The conflict between the professional and the private person was 
accentuated at Backaplan because the situation was unique and ex-
treme and therefore deviated from the norm. In his memoirs, the for-
mer journalist and editor in chief  Carl-Adam Nycop is torn between 
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”the journalistic ambitions of the ego and the professionalised journal-
ism’s ego-liberating logic.”9 The journalist and author Göran Rosen-
berg interprets Nycop’s battle between the profession and the ego as 
follows:  
In detail he describes all the mechanisms and intermediaries contributing to 
the displacement of the ego and the foregrounding of the anonymous edito-
rial collective. It is a chain of management that he often sees can change the 
approach, the tone, the meaning and significance of the original material. 
The higher up the chain, the less contact with the original event and the 
greater the scope for simplifications and pointedness.10 
An example of other types of conflicts and paradoxes on the site was, 
for example, the clash between theory and practice. Compared with the 
physician’s profession, the medical oath requires a practice based on 
science and proven experience, theory and practice in balanced har-
mony. This aim may seem simple, but harbours many difficult deci-
sions in the course of work.11 In contrast, most journalists have the op-
portunity to shape news and reports themselves in their professional 
practice. But theory and practice differ. Ekström and Nohrstedt have 
noted that journalists above all give weight to productivity, that is, the 
ability to accomplish punchy news.12 In Gothenburg, practice came be-
fore theory as the journalists adjusted to a situation that they had no 
previous experience of.  
The conflict between norm and deviation is another obstacle. Acci-
dent and disaster journalism is a clear example of a deviation from a 
norm. This means that a job must be done in accordance with journal-
istic principles but under abnormal circumstances. Many principles 
and rules are inapplicable and superseded by new ones adapted to the 
situation, often through informal communication between the journal-
ist and the office and many times because the reporters and photogra-
phers make their own decisions. The journalists reporting on the 
Gothenburg fire were forced to find new and unusual approaches on 
the site.  
The contradictory demands of a normal and an abnormal situation 
in journalism can be summed up in a conflict between ”may do” and  
”should not do”. In short, a journalist may interview a consenting per-
son but should not perhaps do it because of the person’s state. In the 
case of the Gothenburg fire, there were severely injured and people in 
distress who consented to being interviewed or photographed against 
their better judgement. Finally, the conflict between freedom and re-
sponsibility was a difficult role conflict. Journalists can neither give the 
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appearance of responsibility they do not have, nor argue their way out 
of a responsibility they have.13  The liberty to expose the life of an in-
jured person can have life changing consequences as well as affect the 
reciprocity between the parties. It is difficult but no less important to 
separate the professional and private roles. At Backaplan there were 
few or no opportunities to get ”informed consent” and decision rested 
on the respective journalist and photographer.   
 
Fellow human being or professional journalist 
A moral role conflict in journalism is the tension between the role as a 
fellow human being and that of the professional journalist. The Norwe-
gian media researchers Lamark and Morlandstø have described how 
the tension arises.14 They use the term ”decent human being [Norwe-
gian ’hederlig menneske’]” instead of the term ‘fellow human being’ 
that I use here. With  ‘decent’ [’hederlig] they refer to the estimation 
individuals’ make of themselves and their reputation. The decency is 
intimately linked to their own actions and whether or not what they do 
deviate from their own opinions on right and wrong. The second role 
that the authors describe is the ”good journalist [’god journalist’]”, 
which I have translated into ’professional journalist’. A professional 
journalist is an accomplished professional who competently perform 
the duties required.  Professionality is developed through journalistic 
practice. Ekström and Nohrstedt think that a good journalist has to un-
dergo two parallel learning processes, learning the professional ideals 
and the professional codes.15 
Lamark and Morlandstø also present an alternative approach to the 
connection between the human being and the professional person, 
based on the assumption that a decent person acquire the knowledge 
and journalistic ideals and the rules and routines that make up the pro-
fessional identity as a good journalist.  
This poses the interesting question if a thoroughly decent human 
being can become a professional journalist, or if decency is a funda-
mental requirement for good and professional journalism. But how 
much decency can the professional practice embrace? 16 
It is clear that professional practice – in the case of covering an ac-
cident – is affected by the situation in which the practice is taking place, 
that is, the event, time, place, how, the people involved and conse-
quences. The accident place as a workplace deviates greatly from the 
journalistic norm and a number of role conflicts and dilemmas have to 
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be solved. The reporters and photographers at Backaplan wanted both 
to write and save lives, take photos and give First Aid.  
 
 
Journalist roles 
Categorising the journalists' coping strategies at the accident site in 
Gothenburg, I discerned four journalist roles. They deviate in various 
ways from previous studies of journalist roles by, for example, Melin-
Higgins and Ekström och Nohrstedt,17 possibly because the roles were 
induced by the individual ways of reacting to the crisis situation the 
coping strategies that came to characterise the different persons. The 
roles are also affected by how the conflict between the roles of good 
fellow human being and good professional journalist is managed, in 
terms of the balance between the roles and the dominance of one or the 
other.   
 
The Eyewitness 
The Eyewitness role is characterised by both problem-solving and emo-
tional coping: affected by emotional reactions but solving the problem. 
The journalistic duty has to be professionally performed, but neither at 
the expense of the intrusion of the victim's privacy, nor of being ex-
posed to distressing scenes. The professional eyewitness keeps a proper 
distance to the epicentre of the disaster, but is very observant, taking 
down notes to report. The eyewitness photographer uses the telephoto 
lens rather than going too close, selects photos on site rather than ”vac-
uuming the field”, suffers from derealisation but seeks a purpose, and 
also manages to combine the private and professional roles, which 
leads to a good journalistic result through the professional eyewitness 
method. The photographer eyewitness may think ”sorry” when the 
photos are taken, but does not forget the duty to report.   
 
The Weasel 
The Weasel role, in contrast, involves repressing reactions and primar-
ily solving problems and regulating exposure to the trauma. This is 
achieved through their own mental regulation of exposure to the un-
bearable and through concealing their professional role to the survi-
vors. The weasel creeps around, camera behind back and notepad and 
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pen in pocket, hunting for cover photos, and would accept the Photo of 
the Year Award, but does not want to intrude unnecessarily and cer-
tainly not to provoke anyone by his/her presence. The weasel would 
gladly move aside to check the camera lens aperture, and takes no more 
pictures than necessary. The weasel reporter may appear as any fellow 
human being – hugging, chatting, comforting and lending his mobile. 
At the same time, the weasel works professionally, memorising quota-
tions and other notes to write down interviews that no one knew were 
made later.  
 
The Hack 
The Hack is the most problem-solving role, but also completely domi-
nated by the wish to be a good journalist, repressing the instinct to be 
a good fellow human being at this point in time. The hack keeps active 
– sometimes hyper active – to prevent reflecting on events. The princi-
pal hack coping strategy is distancing and dehumanisation. The hack 
may appear cold and cynical but only wants to do a good job. However, 
the hyperactivity can manifest itself in unnecessarily frequent and in-
discriminate photographing. The hack can also persuade him/herself 
that this is not really happening but is only an unusually horrible film 
or nightmare that will soon pass when the job is done. The hack is often 
praised by the editorial staff – sometimes rightly so – for the fantastic 
ability to capture the headline picture or for a particularly apt interview 
with a self-appointed hero or a talkative eyewitness. But the hack's ac-
tivity is sometimes deceptive, as the extreme problem-solving attitude 
may lead to missing out on important nuances such as the difference 
between injured and dead persons, or between a person in shock and a 
calm person.   
 
The Guardian Angel 
The Guardian Angel reacts to and manages situations mainly emotion-
ally, seeks contact with others, is in need of social support and soon 
forgets all about the professional role. The Angel reduces the im-
portance of the professional task and emphasises the value of being a 
fellow human being, and is torn between the wish to help and to go 
home, feeling the duty to write, but lacks the energy to do it. The Angel 
feels that no colleague understands, and that he/she is a bad journalist, 
while suggesting that it does not really matter there and then since an 
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article or a picture is a trivial thing in comparison with the present dis-
aster. The Guardian Angel benefits more from serving as a good human 
being, but is then tormented by professional anguish. The Guardian 
Angel may have problems gaining the employer's understanding.  
Among the interviewed reporters and photographers in the Gothen-
burg study, all four roles were represented. It is important to be aware 
of the fact that one and the same interviewee can assume different roles 
in different types of situations. It is also possible that the interviewee 
who initially starts as the Hack in the reporting, suddenly turns into (or 
experiences him/herself as) a Guardian Angel, which represents a 
gradual slippage from being a good journalist to being a good fellow 
human being, or vice versa. The starting-point is that the journalist, in 
normal circumstances, is both a good fellow human being and a good 
journalist, but under the influence of acute stress, there is a slippage 
between the two roles. In extreme cases, an individual can drop the 
journalist role completely to simply act as a fellow human being and 
assume the role of Guardian Angel, which very seldom happens. These 
roles do not suggest that journalists always react in one way or the 
other. Rather, it can illustrate that the role conflict is more than merely 
a tension between a good human being and a professional journalist. 
The journalist in the human being can furthermore react in some or all 
the four respects above during one and the same report assignment. 
It needs to be stressed that the journalistic mission is the reason 
why the role of the ”professional journalist” should take priority. It 
would be disastrous for media reporting if all journalists should react 
and act as fellow human beings during a traumatic assignment. The 
different characteristics, or roles, are also crudely categorised. All roles, 
however, have a place and can be assumed by one and the same person 
or different persons depending on the colleagues’ way of reacting and 
choosing approaches. Considered as different coping strategies for 
acute mental stress, all four roles can be explained. From a professional 
perspective, all but the Guardian Angel can be justified, but also the 
Guardian Angels should be respected for their attempts to handle the 
situation professionally even if they failed. All roles are probably in 
need of stress management on mission completed. The Hack and 
Guardian Angel may be more at risk. Both can be afflicted with guilt 
feelings: the Hack for having done too much and gone too close and 
perhaps even arguing with angry and shocked survivors, or not having 
helped at all, although the editors probably praised the material. The 
Guardian Angel has guilt for the opposite reasons; having broken down 
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as a journalist and done a bad professional job, or in worst case nothing 
at all. The Guardian Angel’s professional guilt feelings are alleviated, 
however, by having been a good fellow human being at the accident 
site.  
These are four stereotypes with fuzzy contours but still clear char-
acteristics. They form an image of how different journalists can react to 
the same event. Hopefully, the image can serve to increase understand-
ing of how journalists witnessing an ongoing trauma are affected by 
their coping strategies, approaches and performances on site and 
through published material.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Journalist roles at the disaster site. 
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Competence to report on a disaster  
Can theories of professional knowledge and skills explain journalists’ 
different ways of handling specific work situations? The journalists 
who worked at Backaplan during the first chaotic hours in Gothenburg 
1998 had to deal with a great deal more than interviewing and photo-
graphing. They were faced with unspeakable challenges, decision anx-
iety, mental pressure and their own crisis reactions. Skills and routine 
were required but also the absence of too much personal vulnerability. 
But is it possible to know in advance who has the competence necessary 
to handle a disaster and what competence is required to complete the 
task as successfully as possible?  
 
Sufficiently good ability  
Competence can be defined as sufficiently good ability to do some-
thing.18 A sufficiently good ability should be a reasonable goal for media 
reporting from an accident site, as maximum performance is not to be 
expected from anyone under such circumstances. Competence cannot 
be formally learnt or predicted. It is acquired in many ways. Ellström19 
has developed a model that can describe this dynamic view of the func-
tion of learning in competence building.   
Briefly, formal competence can be described as the competence ac-
quired through formal education which can be documented in grades, 
certificates, diplomas etc. Actual competence is an individual’s accu-
mulated competence, which could be used to solve a task. The compe-
tence required for a certain task is described as formally stipulated 
competence. In journalism, we can regard the press ethical rules as ex-
amples of stipulated competence as well as laws and agreements regu-
lating freedom of speech, of the press etc. To handle the situation suc-
cessfully the competence that the task/situation requires is needed. Fi-
nally, the competence actually used in a situation can be called the uti-
lised competence. It involves what the individual actually does. Indi-
vidual ability and the task come together in the act. The utilised com-
petence does not necessarily equal the actual competence. Sometimes 
the task does not require full competence and in other situations, actual 
competence does not suffice. If the individual interprets the situation 
in an erroneous way, for example as impossible to influence, the com-
petence that could have been used will remain unutilised.20 
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In the action situation, the individual’s interpretation process is of 
greatest importance. If the situation is not interpreted correctly, the 
person cannot utilise all the competence that would be of value in the 
situation.21 For example, stress reactions have a great impact on peo-
ple’s interpretation process.  
Although the journalistic task is not to influence course of events, 
the human being can experience great powerlessness in not being able 
to do anything to influence events or intervene in any way. The work 
situation and and the work environment are difficult to influence dur-
ing an ongoing disaster.   
One of Ellström’s conclusions is that an analysis of an individual’s 
professional know-how, that is, competence for a certain task, should 
include the practical situation in which the competence is applied as a 
parameter.22 
The competence to perform a certain task has two components, ac-
cording to Ellström. One is related to the stipulated demands pertain-
ing to a profession and the task concerned. The second is the compe-
tence required by the situation. The stipulated competence require-
ments are the sum of professional training content, the orders of the 
supervisors or editors, and criteria of what a good performance is in the 
context. It is not only about written rules but also the norms and rules 
framing the professional practice.23 This is a view that is applicable to 
the media reporting from an accident site.  
 
Competence perspective on the journalist profession 
The analytical model of this thesis can be placed in a learning context 
with the help of theories on professional know-how and competence. 
Such a perspective on covering traumatic events can hypothetically fa-
cilitate for journalists to prepare and understand their own reactions 
in extreme situations. It is also conceivable that editors may find sup-
port in this perspective in their efforts to choose suitable candidates for 
the job. The competence model for disaster journalism, in my view, 
could also serve to increase management’s insights into employee 
needs after covering a disaster. Competence involves handling a task 
sufficiently. It is a reasonable requirement that employees assigned the 
task of covering a traumatic disaster have sufficiently good ability to do 
so.  
A situation-adapted competence may mean that parts of journalistic 
competence that have no bearing on daily news reporting can be crucial 
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to the ability to be a reporting eye witness at an accident site. This in-
volves the abilities to identify the situation quickly, to focus despite 
chaotic circumstances, and to make decisions adapted to the situation.  
Perhaps a newly graduate journalist with nursing background in emer-
gency care is better equipped (in terms of ‘situational competence’) 
than an experienced journalist who has never encountered brutal death 
of the Gothenburg fire kind. On the other hand, personal experience of 
similar events may trigger memories and emotions that aggravate the 
situation also for experienced persons. The difference is subtle. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Competence model for disaster journalism. 
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The private person – actual competence 
Life and professional experiences are the sum of life lived. What the 
journalists in the study ranked highest in terms of previous experience 
and competencies was life experience. Professional experience was 
deemed important but less so in relation to the situation. Life experi-
ence determines individual personality and vulnerability in a high de-
gree.  The fact that the human psyche is developed through efforts and 
challenges can mean both strength and increased vulnerability. It can 
both reinforce and break you. Vulnerability can be affected by factors 
such as personality, previous life crises, stress resilience, unprocessed 
trauma, previous mental problems and present physical status such as 
hunger and lack of sleep. Different individuals have also different resil-
ience to meet and handle potential traumatic events.24 The effect of vul-
nerability on work performance is related to the current situation and 
not least training and experiences.25  The latter begs the question: do 
journalists practise enough for disasters or other assignments under 
the influence of acute stress?   
 
The private person – formal competence  
Life and professional experiences were the factors most valued by the 
journalist covering the Gothenburg fire. Formal education was rated 
lower. However, there were some knowledge areas in which the jour-
nalists would have liked to have formal training: medical first aid, dis-
aster journalism and stress and stress management.  
 
The profession – formally stipulated competence 
Different types of journalistic assignments require different types of 
stipulated competence. There are, for examples, different demands 
placed on a sport reporter and an economics reporter. The professional 
codes for press, radio and the TV apply to all journalist categories but 
the rules are only adjusted to situation specific journalism to a very lit-
tle extent. This should be done to a greater extent. There are both writ-
ten an unwritten rules for news coverage. Many journalist referred to 
”the editorial machinery” starting and how ingrained reflexes worked, 
which is good but is it enough? Job descriptions were understandably 
scant during   the first hours since reporters informed their bosses ra-
ther than the other way round. But a checklist or a trauma specific 
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framework would have served a function at the kind of eyewitness re-
porting that was operative in Gothenburg.  
 
Reaction – coping competence 
A factor not previously included in, for instance, Ellström’s studies of 
competence26 is what I would like to call coping competence, which can 
be considered as a combination of the actual individual competence 
(related to vulnerability and life experience) and the situational com-
petence, which determines how a person handles the extreme situa-
tion. A person with access to a great deal of actual competence under 
more normal circumstances, may, for different reasons, prove not to 
have good coping competence in an extreme traumatic situation. This 
is an unpredictable form of competence, which not even the individual 
can assess. Since different types of traumatic events in different situa-
tions trigger different memories and reactions in different situations, 
this is like a lottery. But you can still be more or less equipped. In-
creased knowledge of how, for instance, coping strategies work and 
what works for individuals might increase coping competence. Know-
ing normal reactions should be beneficial to normal reactions to abnor-
mal situations since the overwhelming effect is less powerful. Daniel 
Goleman’s27 concept ”emotional competence”  entails an ability to rec-
ognise one’s own and others’ competences. Such a competence is prob-
ably beneficial to performance in such a situation. 
 
Performance – the utilised competence  
A sufficiently good journalistic performance can, in traumatic situa-
tions, also refer to the competence to dare to refrain from doing some-
thing or doing something as correctly and as well as possible. A way of 
protecting individuals afflicted by a disaster – or undergoing one – is 
that the journalist takes a step back and assumes the role of the eyewit-
ness instead of the interviewer or photographer. In the acute phase of 
a disaster, this may be necessary to protect all parties. Asking the right 
questions or taking the most press ethically correct photos in the con-
text are impossible. If the event is filtered through the journalist’s own 
emotional filter, it can have two positive side effects: the journalist does 
not expose him/herself to guilt and shame for refraining from engaging 
in the chaos of rescue efforts, resuscitation attempts, grief and wrath 
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played out at the site. The reporter becomes an eyewitness and the pho-
tographer takes a step back. Both strategies were applied successfully 
(on some rare occasions) in connection with the Gothenburg fire. Per-
sonal eyewitness accounts and chronicles belonged to the most reada-
ble texts, and photos taken from a distance to the most successful ones. 
This practice does not mean compromising on the quality of journal-
ism. On the contrary, the result can be perceived as more informative 
and ethically correct. Since journalists’ presence on the scene seems 
provocative to others and themselves, this practice is also a chance to 
alleviate the acute and long-term stress reactions that also reporters 
and photographers are afflicted with. For how well does a journalist 
work in distress? 
 
Reflection – learning and feedback  
An important part of individual and collective competence is continu-
ous learning. Without evaluation and reflection, without self-criticism 
and professional debate, learning stagnates, and with it journalism. A 
part of the learning process can also be informal and formal conversa-
tions or evaluations, for instance, a prolonged Monday meeting where 
everyone has a chance to unburden themselves or individual therapy 
sessions with psychologists. In 1998, the year of the fire, confidence in 
defusing and debriefing was not high. Presently, more and more re-
searchers share the view that that the human being possesses a re-
sistance that can be mobilised through social support rather than rou-
tine debriefing.28 More, informal meetings for evaluation and learning, 
used routinely can, however, serve as professional development and 
collective learning. Feedback should also take place repeatedly even 
when experiences have sunk in and merged with other experiences.  
 
Professional norms for trauma journalism  
According to the result of this thesis, the press ethical rules should, in 
connection with journalists witnessing traumatic event, be supple-
mented with the following recommendations: 
1. Remember that interviewed persons in distress or or with more 
severe stress reactions can not only cause publicity damage because of 
the media exposure in a vulnerable situation, but also prove to be an 
unreliable witness, i.e. an unreliable source.  
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2. If possible, avoid interviews with individuals in distress or with 
more severe stress reactions  and rely on your own eye witness account.  
3. In choosing photos of identifiable persons, consider especially the 
choices made for issues and broadcasts in the area closest to the acci-
dent site, or a place directly affected (in particular an international dis-
aster involving Swedish citizens from one or a few geographical places).  
4. If possible, avoid photographing identifiable persons whose faces 
must be masked/pixaleted before publication. Try to select on site.   
5. Avoid providing captions to your photos or comments that can 
mislead or be obsolete in damaging way on publication. Avoid referring 
to persons as ”saved” or ”injured” if their medical condition is uncer-
tain or fatal before or immediately after the publication.   
6. Work together in pairs when reporting as eyewitnesses from an 
accident site. The social support of a colleague is indispensable in the 
psychological and professional coping of a potentially traumatic expe-
rience on site and long-term.   
7. Make clear to colleagues and others that the journalist’s job at an 
accident site differs from the duty of other professional groups in a cru-
cial way: journalists have no duty to help and save lives, but are only 
obligated to be professional eyewitnesses. Increased understanding of 
this may hopefully counteract the strong feelings of guilt and shame 
that afflict journalists reporting on an ongoing trauma.  
8. Be aware that seemingly absurd behaviour (such as aggression, 
humour and distancing) can be normal reactions to abnormal events. 
This applies to the afflicted (injured and survivors at the accident site) 
and indirectly afflicted (eyewitness journalists). Make sure that you 
have basic knowledge of common crisis reactions and coping strategies. 
The situation will then be less difficult to comprehend.  
9. Stress management for media personnel should (as for anyone 
else) be based on individual needs. The media company employer 
should draw up a crisis organisation for providing social and psycho-
logical support and any treatment warranted by potentially traumatic 
experiences. Social support from family and friends should not be un-
derestimated.  
10. Systematic organisational learning should be implemented after 
traumatic coverage, be it accidents, disasters, crime, terror attacks or 
war. Employees reporting on such events have invaluable experiences 
to convey to their own company and to colleagues.  
The purpose of the extended framework is to achieve a ”sufficiently 
good trauma journalism.”  
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Learning for better or worse 
Learning and competence are ongoing processes. Competence cannot 
be restricted to special challenges. ”Learning refers to relatively perma-
nent changes in individuals as a result of individual interplay with the 
surroundings”, writes Ellström.29 In the pedagogical debate, experi-
ence-based learning from everyday practice has been emphasised.30 
This is to be considered as an opposite to ”learning” in the sense of 
learning in formal educational situations. Competence is not available 
”in a jar” as a static and isolated phenomena, but is built.  
Learning is automatically regarded as positive and beneficial to the 
individual. But is all learning really beneficial? Ellström, for instance, 
calls individual repetitive experience of negative situations destructive 
learning. In the long run this is equivalent to acquired helplessness. 
The effect of this situation is passivation, reduced problem-solving 
ability and lowered self-esteem, which in turn leads to a kind of dis-
mantling of professional development.31 
In this light, the above reasoning regarding the risks of destructive 
learning and acquired learning seems obvious for all professional 
groups involved in uncontrollable events. Rescuers as well as media 
representatives are in great need of sensitive organisations with con-
structive learning and professional development. ”We have to keep it 
up all life”, said former arch bishop KG Hammar, once about our need 
for life-long learning.32 He referred to how a monastery in Denmark 
adopted the idea of ”life-long learning as just as unavoidable as the cal-
endar.” Is this happening in journalism?  
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POSTSCRIPT: ON SILENCE  
 
 
 
 
The type of media coverage treated here would sometimes benefit from 
seeking moments of silence as a balance to the pervading cascades of 
words and images – giving readers, listeners, viewers a chance to re-
flect and understand. In the TV medium, the absence of words could be 
accompanied by image and music (music or environment sounds).  Ra-
ther than forcing viewers to turn off the set when they can take no more, 
and rather than simply ”churning out” more and more misery, viewers 
could be offered a pause of rest with sound and collage designed to be 
filled with their thoughts.  Properly done, it would not be experienced 
as uninteresting or as losing momentum, but as a chance to ”breathe”. 
On the radio, breathing space can be music or environment sounds. 
Such ”soundscapes” – listening landscapes – should be offered more 
often as a break from the word-stream in the  . The silence of the press 
could be implemented through pages with comforting images and brief 
headlines, for example, a poem or, as in the case of the Gothenburg fire, 
when Aftonbladet published a prayer by the former Archbishop K.G. 
Hammar, placed next to a picture of young people embracing. It is com-
forting to rest one’s eyes on a page like that after all the dramatic pic-
tures of sudden, tragic death and unbearable suffering. What is the 
point of ”churning out” words when they cannot capture the indescrib-
able?  
This ‘wordy’ book on the media coverage of the Gothenburg fire, a 
book characterised by volubility as well as ”lack of words” and a multi-
tude of pictures of that which is ”undisplayable,” is concluded with a 
line written by Caroline Krook, bishop of the Stockholm Diocese, in 
Svenska Dagbladet 2003: 
 
For the strongest feelings  
there are no common words.  
Only poetry, at best.  
Or silence. 
 
(The daily paper Svenska Dagbladet, 2003-01-26, and quoted in The Swedish 
Church magazine Kyrkans Tidning no 5/03.) 
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APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLE OF INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: Gothenburg fire, 1998, for reporters 
 
Personal details 
Name: 
Newspaper:  
Number of years in the profession: 
Education: 
Age: 
Date of interview: 
 
Main task in connection with the event (several  checks possible):  
(  ) accident site; arrived at: 
( ) hospital 
( ) home 
( ) commemorative/public grief site 
( ) funeral 
( ) follow up, e.g. documentary, thematic supplement etc., some months   
     after the event 
( ) other 
 
Questions 
Alert phase: 
How were you informed about the Backaplan fire? What was your first thought/reflection 
on the event?  
How was the assignment defined (instructions / directives)? 
Were there different opinions on how the coverage should be handled?  
Did the assignment give rise to any thoughts for you?   
Did you ever have a wish to decline / to be able to say no?  
Was the task redefined while you were at the site?  
The course of events: some time specifications: 
After your time at the site; when were you back on duty? 
 
At the site: 
Can you describe the scene when you arrived?   
What were your immediate thoughts?  
Did you make any decision that was later to define your action on site?  
If yes, can you describe the decision, its meaning and consequences?  
Do you think you made the right decisions? 
How did you experience your own role as a professional person (journalist) at the site? 
In retrospect, can you assess and describe how you felt during the assignment? 
How did you reason before approaching/interviewing the afflicted? Could you assess their 
condition?  How did you relate to this?   
To what extent was it possible to take notes on site? Did you take notes? 
Did your presence at the site provoke any reactions?  
Did you refrain from doing anything that you normally would have done as part of a jour-
nalistic task? 
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Did you feel a need to spare yourself from the experiences at the site? 
In what way were you and the editorial office in contact during the coverage? 
How were decisions made on interviews, photos etc.?  
To what extent did you work in a team on site? With another journalist? With a photogra-
pher? If yes, what was the significance of the collaboration to the outcome (= result in the 
newspaper)?  
To what extent did you cooperate/interact with journalists from other media on site?   
Did the editors stop anything you produced from being published? If yes, what, and for 
what reason/s?   
How did the cooperation with other professional groups work on site (e.g. rescue ser-
vices, ambulance crew, police)? 
 
Back at the office: 
Was there occasion to consider any special ethical issues in connection with publishing?  
For example, editorial approach to 
a) publishing interviews with people in shock   
b) publishing photos of traumatised/afflicted survivors. 
 
When was it clear to you that many nationalities were involved? What aspects of ethnic-
ity were discussed?  
Do you think that your description (coverage task) was affected by the fact that many 
people with immigrant background were involved in the accident?  
If yes, how?  
Was there a discussion on whether the ethnicity aspects of the event should be empha-
sised or downplayed? 
If yes, why?  
Was choice of words discussed? 
In what degree (if any)  did you feel prepared to tackle this assignment?  
Was there, to your knowledge, any reporter or photographer who could not carry out 
his/her duties?  
Have you been offered/participated in crisis management/debriefing in connection with 
the assignment organised by 
a) the employer 
b) yourself 
c) anyone else? needs/forms/problems 
Were you on leave of absence during any period after the assignment?  
If yes, did you request it or did the office suggest that you needed leave?   
 
In the longer term: 
Were the assignments given to you afterwards different in character? 
 
Self-evaluation: 
How would you assess and describe your own contribution in connection with the assign-
ment? 
How important is knowledge, education and experience to this type of assignment?  
- how important is professional experience?  
- how important is life experience/age? 
- how important is formal training? 
How do you think that your editorial office/newspaper covered the event  
- at the site?  
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- in the hospitals?  
 In portraying people in grief? 
The ethnical aspects:  the fact that so many nationalities were involved?  
What did you (the paper) do best? 
Where did you (your paper) fail? 
Could you have approached it differently?  
Is there an alternative to eyewitness accounts, for example?  
Do you have other experiences of covering disasters apart from the Gothenburg fire?  
To what extent has there been a process of learning in the professional corps regarding 
media coverage of disasters?   
What did the media learn from the Estonia disaster?  
Have you/the editorial office  learnt anything  from disasters happening before the 
Gothenburg fire? If yes, how was the fire coverage influenced by previous disasters? 
What have you/the editorial office learnt from the Gothenburg fire?   
 Is there anything you will do differently next time?  
What do you think that the press corps / organisation has learnt from the Gothenburg 
fire? What effects can this have on future disaster coverage?   
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APPENDIX 2: CODE OF ETHICS FOR PRESS, RADIO AND 
TELEVISION IN SWEDEN 
 
 
 
The press, radio and television shall have the greatest possible degree of freedom, within 
the framework of the Freedom of the Press Act and the constitutional right of freedom of 
speech, in order to be able to serve as disseminators of news and as scrutinizers of public 
affairs. In this connection, however, it is important that the individual is protected from 
unwarranted suffering as a result of publicity. 
Ethics does not consist primarily of the application of a formal set of rules but in the 
maintenance of a responsible attitude in the exercise of journalistic duties. The code of 
ethics for press, radio and television is intended to provide support for this attitude. 
 
WHAT CAN THE PRESS OMBUDSMAN REVIEW? 
The Press Ombudsman, PO, can review printed newspapers and magazines as well as 
some online publications, i.e. online publications that are members of The Swedish Media 
Publishers’ Association (TU – Medier i Sverige) or The Magazine Publishers’ Association 
(Sveriges Tidskrifter), alternatively having filed for membership of the Ethical Press Sys-
tem. The Swedish Press and Broadcasting Authority handles complaints regarding radio 
and television. 
 
RULES ON PUBLICITY 
 
Provide accurate news 
1. The role played by the mass media in society and the trust of the public of these me-
dia call for accurate and objective news reporting. 
2. Be critical of news sources. Check facts as carefully as possible in the light of the cir-
cumstances even if they have been published earlier. Allow the reader/lis-
tener/viewer the possibility of distinguishing between statements of fact and com-
ments. 
3. News bills, headlines and introductory sections must be supported by the text. 
4. Check the authenticity of pictures. See to it that pictures and graphical illustrations 
are correct and are not used in a misleading way. 
 
Treat rebuttals generously 
5. Factual errors should be corrected when called for. Anyone wishing to rebut a state-
ment shall, if this is legitimate, be given the opportunity to do so. Corrections and re-
buttals shall be published promptly in appropriate form, in such a way that they will 
come to the attention of those who received the original information. It should be 
noted that a rebuttal does not always call for an editorial comment. 
6. Publish without delay critical rulings issued by the Swedish Press Council in cases 
concerning your own newspaper. 
 
Respect individual integrity 
7. Consider carefully any publicity which could violate the privacy and integrity of indi-
viduals. Refrain from such publicity unless the public interest obviously demands 
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public scrutiny. 
8. Exercise great caution in publishing information about suicide and attempted suicide, 
particularly with regard to the feelings of relatives and in view of what has been said 
above concerning the privacy and integrity of individuals. 
9. Always show the greatest possible consideration for victims of crime and accidents. 
Consider carefully whether to publish names and pictures out of respect for the vic-
tims and their relatives. 
10. Do not emphasize ethnic origin, sex, nationality, occupation, political affiliation, reli-
gious persuasion or sexual disposition in the case of the persons concerned if this is 
not important in the specific context or is demeaning. 
 
Exercise care in the use of pictures 
11. Whenever appropriate, these rules also apply to pictures. 
12. Montage, electronic retouch and captions should be handled in such a way as not to 
mislead or deceive the reader. Whenever a picture has been altered through mon-
tage or retouch this should be stated. This also applies to such material when it is 
filed in picture libraries. 
 
Listen to each side 
13. Offer persons, who are criticized in a factual report, the opportunity to reply in-
stantly to the criticism. Aim at presenting the views of all parties involved. Bear in 
mind that the sole objective of filing complaints of various kinds with various bodies 
may be to cause harm to an individual. 
14. Remember that, in the eyes of the law, a person suspected of an offence is always 
presumed innocent until proven guilty. The outcome of a legal case should be pub-
lished if it has been previously reported on. 
 
Be careful with naming 
15. Show careful consideration to the harmful consequences that might ensue for per-
sons if their names are published. Refrain from publishing names if it might cause 
harm unless it is obviously in the public interest. 
16. In case a person´s name is not published, also refrain from publishing a picture of 
that person or details on occupation, title, age, nationality, sex, etc, which could ena-
ble identification. 
17. Bear in mind that the entire responsibility for publishing names and pictures rests 
with the publisher. 
 
More on Press Ethics 
The code of ethics consists of a set of rules for members of the press regarding publicist 
decisions, it is not legislation. The rules serve as protection of the individual against pub-
licity damages, beyond what the legal system can offer. PO and PON adhere to the press 
ethic rules in their assessments. 
The legal framework concerning publications in newspapers and magazines are part of 
the Freedom of the Press Act (Tryckfrihetsförordningen, TF). TF gives each citizen the right 
to express her/himself in writing. The law also offers protection for the individual against 
defamation in newspapers. Online newspapers adhere to the corresponding rules in the 
Freedom of Expression Act (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen, YGL). If an individual considers 
her/himself to be subject of slander in a newspaper, there is the possibility of arbitrary 
prosecution. The Chancellor of Justice can also prosecute. 
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RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCTS 
 
Strong journalistic integrity is crucial for maintaining credibility. Those who scrutinize so-
ciety must also be able to withstand scrutiny. It is important that journalists show due re-
spect when working in the field and that journalists while on duty strive to report cor-
rectly, in order to retain the confidence of the general public. Trust in the media and its 
employees is built upon following the rules of professional conduct. 
 
The journalist’s integrity  
1. Do not take on journalistic commissions in your professional capacity from people 
outside an editorial management group. 
2. Do not accept commissions, invitations, gifts, free trips or other benefits – and do 
not enter into any agreements or other undertakings – that may cast suspicion upon 
your position as a free and independent journalist. 
3. Do not succumb to pressure from outside parties that aims to hinder or restrict legit-
imate publicity or to create publicity when it is not journalistically motivated. 
4. Do not use your position as a journalist, or your press pass, to apply pressure for 
your own or someone else’s gain or to obtain private benefits. 
5. Do not use unpublished news regarding financial circumstances or measures taken 
by the state, local government, organizations, companies or individuals for your own 
gain or that of others. 
6. Observe the regulations of the collective agreements for journalists, which state that 
employees may not be ordered to carry out degrading tasks or tasks that are con-
trary to their believes. 
 
Acquisition of material  
7. Show particular consideration to inexperienced interviewees. Inform the interviewee 
whether the conversation and other material is intended for publication. Be careful 
to reproduce statements and other material that non-public figures publish in social 
media. 
8. Accommodate reasonable requests from interviewees who want to know in advance 
how and where their statements will be used. 
9. Do not falsify interviews or images. 
10. Show due respect when on photographic assignments and when obtaining pictures, 
especially in connection with accidents and crimes. 
11. Hidden camera and other hidden recording equipment, when used for the purpose 
of publishing, should be used only in exceptional cases, after careful consideration 
and when a journalistic evaluation has stated that the information is not available in 
any other way. Concerned parties should be informed that the recording took place 
and why it was carried out, before publishing the information. 
12. Respect copyright rules regarding text, images and sound. 
13. State the source when an account is based largely on someone else’s information. 
  
(https://po.se/about-the-press-ombudsman-and-press-council/code-of-ethics-for-press-
radio-and-television-in-sweden/ , 2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
